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ABSTRACT
Given the economic importance of distressed firms, this thesis was motivated by an 
apparent lack of financial economic research examining distressed firms and their 
securities. The thesis principally focuses on the following two areas: (1) the costs of 
Chapter 11, and (2) the financial performance of low-grade bonds (i.e., "risky debt"). 
In addition, the laws and regulations affecting distressed firms are reviewed. 
Therefore, the main contributions of this thesis are empirical in nature.
Regarding the costs of Chapter 11, the evidence presented suggests that they are large. 
Specifically, the costs of "successful" Chapter 11 are found to be an increasing 
function of firm size up to a point (i.e., they are a declining function for the very 
largest firms). Therefore, these findings contrast with previous studies which have 
found economies of scale for the administrative costs of bankruptcy. This has 
important implications for capital structure theories which trade-off the costs of 
bankruptcy with the tax shield advantage of debt over equity. In addition, generally 
larger costs are found than were found in previous research.
Regarding the financial performance of low-grade bonds, the evidence presented 
suggests that risky debt valuation models which incorporate interest rate risk, in 
addition to default risk, best describe the return generation process for the three risky 
bond asset classes examined. The evidence for low-grade corporate bonds, low-grade 
municipal bonds, and convertible corporate bonds strongly supports this hypothesis.
In addition, the evidence examined would suggest that the interaction between the 
various embedded options in risky debt should be an important element in any risky 
debt valuation model.
Therefore, at a very broad level the thesis has the following two arguments: (1) 
bankruptcy is very costly; and (2) risky debt displays a return generation process 
which is very complex. The evidence presented strongly supports both theses.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is not a traditional monograph. Four of eight of the chapters which follow 
the introductory chapter are modified articles concerned with issues on bankruptcy 
and the risky bond return generation process (i.e., Chapters 4 and 6 through 8). The 
introduction is organized as follows: (1) background, (2) objectives of the thesis, and
(3) outline of the thesis.
Excluding the introductory and concluding chapters, Chapters 2 through 4 and 5 
through 8 can be viewed as two related groupings of chapters. Chapter 2 addresses 
legal issues and reviews relevant finance work in the area of low-grade debt and 
bankruptcy. Chapter 3 provides the more specific background to Chapter 4. Chapter 4 
is an examination of the losses realized by firms which have emerged from 
bankruptcy. Chapter 5 provides the background to Chapters 6 through 8. Chapters 6 
through 8 are studies analyzing the impact of embedded options on the financial 
performance of three risky bond asset classes.
The smallest firms have about even odds of disappearing, for favorable or 
unfavorable reasons, within a decade. The largest firms have a mortality rate of 
about 20 per cent.
Queen and Roll [1987, p.9]
Since the introduction of the corporate form in North America, about 50 businesses 
founded between 1767 and 1833 remain in business in the United States (U.S.).1 
Effectively, once a business has been bom it is either acquired or liquidated. Most 
businesses end their lives being liquidated. Regarding firm mortality, it is more a
1 See Zweig [1992] regarding the oldest U.S. firms. Currently there are over 8 million corporations in 
the U.S. Many of the oldest U.S. firms are not independent entities. For example, the oldest U.S. firm 
(i.e., the Dexter Corporation, founded in 1767) is now foreign owned.
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question of when, not whether, a firm will die. In the U.S., the number of large 
business deaths during the period 1970 through 1989 can be seen in the following 
figure, which shows the number of acquisitions and failures over the period.2
Figure 1
Acquisitions and Failures (1970 through 1989)
These values were gathered from the Statistical Abstract o f  the United States (1970-1991).
Acquisitions and Failures (1970-1989)
120
100 □  Acquisitions
■  Failures
©
©
©
©
Year
Sources: Statistical Abstract o f  the United States (1970-1991)
Acquisitions are used here as a basis of comparison against failures. Also, acquisitions 
and failures represent the two methods by which firms die. Until recently, financial 
economists have focused their attention on large business acquisitions over business 
failures. There has been substantially more finance literature on business acquisitions 
than business failures. This is unfortunate, given that there is often more to be learned 
in business, and economics, from business failure than business success.
In the field of finance there has developed a large body of literature concerning 
business acquisitions (i.e., often referred to as "mergers and acquisitions" or "M&A"). 
The emphasis has been on large, public acquisitions. This thesis will focus on the less 
glamorous side of business mortality. More specifically, this thesis will address issues 
regarding the costs associated with firms in bankruptcy, and the return generation 
process of bonds with significant default probabilities. Specifically, low-grade bonds 
will be the focus of much of the empirical research performed. The following table
2 Interestingly, the average liabilities o f  bankrupt firms has increased for the very largest firms, but 
decreased for large firms relative to small firms (see Hudson [1992] for a model measuring this recent 
trend in the size o f  firms filing for bankruptcy).
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has been provided to give some indication of the absolute level of businesses, new 
incorporations, acquisitions, and failures in the U.S. from 1970 through 1993.
Table 1
New Incorporations, Acquisitions, and Commercial Failures (1970 through
1993)3
New Incorporations Acquisitions Failures
# per # per # per
Concerns in 10,000 10,000 10,000
Year Business Number Concerns Number Concerns Number Concerns
1970 2,442,000 264,000 1,081 1,351 6 10,748 44
1971 2,466,000 288,000 1,168 1,011 4 10,326 42
1972 2,490,000 317,000 1,273 911 4 9,566 38
1973 2,567,000 329,000 1,282 874 3 9,345 36
1974 2,591,000 319,000 1,231 602 2 9,915 38
1975 2,679,000 326,000 1,217 439 2 11,432 43
1976 2,782,000 376,000 1,352 559 2 9,628 35
1977 2,793,000 436,000 1,561 590 2 7,919 28
1978 2,786,000 478,000 1,716 607 2 6,619 24
1979 2,708,000 525,000 1,939 519 2 7,564 28
1980 2,780,000 532,000 1,914 1,558 6 11,742 42
1981 2,745,000 581,000 2,117 2,395 9 16,794 61
1982 2,806,000 566,000 2,017 2,298 8 24,908 89
1983 2,851,000 602,000 2,112 2,395 8 31,334 110
1984 4,885,000 635,000 1,300 2,243 5 52,078 107
1985 4,990,000 663,000 1,329 1,719 3 57,078 114
1986 5,119,000 702,000 1,371 2,497 5 61,616 120
1987 6,004,000 685,000 1,141 2,479 4 61,111 102
1988 5,804,000 685,000 1,180 2,970 5 57,098 98
1989 7,694,000 677,000 880 3,752 5 50,389 65
1990 8,038,000 647,000 805 4,239 5 60,747 74
1991 8,218,000 629,000 765 3,446 4 88,140 107
1992 8,805,000 667,000 758 3,502 4 97,069 109
1993* 8,966,000 NA NA NA NA 85,982 90
Source: exclusive of acquisitions, Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, New York, N.Y., The Failure Record 
and Monthly Failure Report.
Acquisitions source: Statistical Abstract of the United States (includes only change of control 
transactions of at least $1 million). * preliminary estimates.
3 The following applies to new business incorporations and business failures: (1) before 1970 excludes 
Hawaii, (2) before 1975 excludes Alaska, (3) total concerns and failure data prior to 1984 exclude 
agriculture, forestry and fishing, finance, real estate, and services; therefore are not directly comparable 
with data for 1984 and later, (4) data through 1983 represent the number of names listed in the July 
issue of the Dun & Bradstreet Reference Book, (5) data for 1984-1993 represent the number of 
establishments listed in Dun & Bradstreet's Census of American Business. Also, note that the base has 
changed due to the expanded business failure coverage. The post 1983 base includes concerns 
discontinued following assignment, voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy, attachment, 
execution, foreclosure, etc.; voluntary withdrawals from business with reorganization or arrangement 
which may or may not lead to discontinuance; and businesses making voluntary compromise with 
creditors out of court.
Also, the number of concerns in business does not match up with the number of new incorporations, 
failures, and acquisitions. This discrepancy is in part due to the emphasis on collecting data for large 
business failures. Again, these numbers are only gross indications not exact representations.
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Even during merger waves (e.g., the 1980s), bankruptcies occur more frequently than 
acquisitions. In addition, as measured by total liabilities, there has been a general 
increase in the size and absolute level of bankruptcies. Specifically, after 1980 the 
absolute level of business failure has increased dramatically. In 1979 the total amount 
of current liabilities held by failing businesses was approximately $2.7 billion. By 
1989 that figure had increased to approximately $44.3 billion.4 The following table 
provides background on the failure rate and the mean size of failing firms.
4 White [1989, p. 146-147] estimated that in the U.S. during the period 1980 through 1985 losses from 
bankruptcy averaged $18 billion per year. White based this estimate on the spread between interest 
rates on "high risk" and "low risk" corporate bonds and multiplied this value by the average level of 
liabilities o f U.S. financial corporations. This value also suggests that bankruptcy has some economic 
importance.
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Table 2
Industrial and Commercial Failures - Number and Liabilities (1955 - 1993)5
Year
Total
Concerns in 
Business**
Failures Cases
Number
Number per 
10,000 
Concerns
Current 
Liabilities 
(millions $)
Average
Liabilities Filed Pending
1955 2,633 10,969 41.66 449 40,968 59 56
1956 2,629 12,686 48.25 563 44,356 62 59
1957 2,652 13,739 51.81 615 44,784 74 68
1958 2,675 14,964 55.94 728 48,667 92 80
1959 2,708 14,053 51.89 693 49,300 101 84
1960 2,708 15,445 57.03 939 60,772 110 95
1961 2,641 17,075 64.65 1,090 63,843 147 124
1962 2,589 15,782 60.96 1,214 76,898 148 134
1963 2,544 14,374 56.50 1,353 94,100 155 148
1964 2,524 13,501 53.49 1,329 98,454 172 157
1965 2,527 13,514 53.48 1,322 97,800 180 162
1966 2,520 13,061 51.83 1,386 106,091 192 169
1967 2,519 12,364 49.08 1,265 102,332 208 185
1968 2,481 9,636 38.84 941 97,654 198 184
1969 2,444 9,154 37.45 1,142 124,767 185 179
1970 2,442 10,748 44.01 1,888 176,000 194 191
1971 2,466 10,326 41.87 1,917 186,000 201 201
1972 2,490 9,566 38.42 2,000 209,000 183 197
1973 2,567 9,345 36.40 2,299 246,000 173 189
1974 2,591 9,915 38.27 3,053 308,000 190 201
1975 2,679 11,432 42.67 4,380 383,000 254 202
1976 2,782 9,628 34.61 3,011 313,000 247 271
1977 2,793 7,919 28.35 3,095 391,000 214 254
1978 2,786 6,619 23.76 2,656 401,000 203 240
1979 2,708 7,564 27.93 2,667 353,000 226 258
1980 2,780 11,742 42.24 4,635 361 421
1981 2,745 16,794 61.18 6,955 360 362
1982 2,806 24,908 88.77 15,611 368 461
1983 2,851 31,334 109.91 16,073 375 537
1984 4,885 52,078 106.61 29,269 344 578
1985 4,990 57,078 114.38 36,937 365 609
1986 5,119 61,616 120.37 44,724 478 729
1987 6,004 61,111 101.78 34,724 561 809
1988 5,804 57,098 98.38 39,126 595 814
1989 7,694 50,361 65.45 44,261 643 869
1990 8,038 60,747 75.57 56,130 725 962
1991 8,218 88,140 107.25 96,825 880 1,123
1992 8,805 97,069 110.24 94,317 972 1,237
1993* 8,966 85,982 95.90 48,423 919 1,191
Source: Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, New York, N.Y., The Failure Record and Monthly Failure 
Report.
* Preliminary estimate.
 ^The same caveats apply as those of the previous table. Also, liabilities exclude long-term publicly 
held obligations; and offsetting assets are not taken into account. Source: Dunn & Bradstreet 
Corporation, New York, N.Y., The Failure Record Through 1993 and Monthly Failure Report. 
Aggregate values were taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States.
6 Values in thousands of firms.
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In the U.S., since 1955, there has been a significant increase in the relative number of 
failures, particularly since 19807, shortly after the new bankruptcy code (the "Code") 
took effect. The failure rate seemed to peak in 1986 at 120.37 per 10,000 business 
concerns, even though 1986 was not a recessionary period. Recently, the failure rate 
has become higher in both absolute and relative terms. Failure rates appear to now be 
less dependent on the business cycle (e.g., see Hudson [1989 & 1992]). Although, 
some of the observed decrease in the dependence of failures on the business cycle is 
due to the availability of Chapter 12 of the Code beginning in 1986.8
Over the period 1989 through 1992 the total current liabilities of business failures was 
estimated to be $291.5 billion9, while the total value for M&As was estimated to be 
$789.2 billion over the same period (a ratio of failures to M&As of approximately 
37%). Although, the M&A activity included divestitures10 valued at $304.3 billion. If 
divestitures were added to failures in order to approximate the value of most large 
distressed situations over the period, the ratio of distressed situation value to net 
M&A activity was approximately 75%.
1 Background
This section consists of the following sub-sections: (1) low-grade corporate bonds, (2) 
bankruptcy and distress, (3) the approximate size of the asset classes under study, and
(4) the role of theory. Research in the field of financial distress has primarily focused 
on the following areas: (1) bankruptcy prediction, (2) bankruptcy costs, (3) agency 
theory applied to financial distress, and (4) security performance around the 
bankruptcy announcement date. From the finance literature on distress, it is clear that 
the financial academics in the field of financial distress have been heavily reliant on 
the legal definition of bankruptcy. A great deal of research in the field has been 
concerned with bankruptcy prediction. The consensus has been that financial
7 A comparison of the 1980-1989 mean of 42,415 versus the 1955-1979 mean of 11,735 resulted in a t 
value of 8.36, which is significant at well below the 1% level of significance.
8 This will be reviewed in Chapter 2.
9 The original source of these values was New Business Incorporations, monthly; The Failure Record 
Through 1991; and Monthly Failure Report, Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, New York, N.Y. Current 
liabilities excluded long-term publicly held obligations and offsetting assets were not taken into 
account.
^  In a sense, divestitures are tantamount to double counting in the case of M&A activity during the 
1980s. Many acquisitions in the 1980s resulted in the sale of unprofitable businesses. Therefore, 
counting the purchase of a complete company and the following sale of specific unit(s) essentially 
results in the double counting of acquisition activity as it relates to divestitures.
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statement information is useful in predicting bankruptcy. Regarding the absolute costs 
associated with bankruptcy and the significance of bankruptcy costs, there is no 
consensus. There has been limited application of agency theory to financial distress.
In addition, there has been limited and contradictory evidence concerning the 
performance of securities around the bankruptcy announcement date.
This thesis is concerned with providing empirical evidence in order to resolve some 
issues in the field of financial distress. Given that the pricing of low-grade bonds are 
directly affected by defaults and the probability of defaults, the effect of defaults on 
several low-grade bond asset classes will be examined. This thesis is particularly 
interested in the impact of default periods on the time series of low-grade bond asset 
class returns. Finally, it is important to note that all the evidence provided is based on 
U.S. sources.
1.1 Why Study Low-Grade Bonds?
Low-grade bonds, by definition, are affected by economic distress. Low-grade 
corporate bonds, more commonly referred to as high yield bonds, junk bonds, or 
speculative grade debt, are corporate debt rated BAA and below by Moody's rating 
service or BBB or lower by Standard & Poor's ("S&P") rating service.11 Ratings are 
based on the following considerations12:
(1) Likelihood of default - capacity and willingness of the obligor as to the timely 
payment of interest and repayment of principal in accordance with the terms of 
the obligation;
(2) Nature of and provisions of the obligation;
(3) Protection afforded by, and relative position of, the obligation in the event of 
bankruptcy, reorganization, or other arrangement under the laws of bankruptcy 
and other laws affecting creditors' rights.
[S&P High Yield Quarterly, p. 48]
Given the above definition, low-grade debt instruments are a useful security type to 
study the effects of distress. It is useful that discrete distress events such as default, 
reorganization, and bankruptcy are part of the definition of the low-grade bonds. Even
i i The National Association of Insurance Companies ("NAIC") has six categories of security ratings 
that directly correlate with those of the ratings agencies (see Dizard [1991, p. 43-44]).
12 For an overview of the credit rating industry see Cantor and Packer [1995].
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if the ratings reflect real information with a time lag13, the ratings given to securities 
classified as low-grade imply a high expected probability of default relative to more 
highly rated securities.14
The following figure highlights the inflows and outflows in the low-grade debt 
universe.
Figure 2
Inflows and Outflows in the Low-Grade Universe 
Inflows and Outflows in the Low-Grade Universe
Additions to the Low-Grade Universe
• Net New Issuance of Low-Grade Debt (New Issuance net of Refinancings)
• Downgradings of High-Grade Debt ("Fallen Angels")
Deletions from the Low-Grade Universe
• Upgradings of Low-Grade Debt ("Rising Stars")
• Calls
• Maturities
• Exchanges
• Partial Repurchases
• Defaults
Source: Modified from Cherry, M., and M. Fridson, "The Future of High Yield," The Journal of High 
Yield Bond Research: Merrill Lynch Extra Credit, September/October 1991
As can be seen from Figure 2, additions to the low-grade universe are composed of 
net new issues and downgrades of high-grade debt. From 1980 through 1990 Moody's 
reported that approximately $103 billion of corporate debt had been downgraded to 
noninvestment grade status. In 1970 there was approximately $7 billion of low-grade 
debt outstanding, by 1991 there was over $200 billion (Altman [1991a, p. 3]). Much 
attention has been focused on the new issue market for low-grade bonds (e.g., Blume
13 it should be noted that ratings differences generally reflect "differences in firm history rather than 
differences in the firm's prospects" (see Pogue and Soldofsky [1969, p. 224]). Therefore, although 
ratings tend to reflect a firm's fundamental financial information (e.g., see Pinches and Mingo [1973]), 
that historic information may not have much predictive power.
1  ^It has been pointed out that updates of bond ratings by the two ratings agencies are done very 
infrequently (see Lowenstein [1990]). Therefore, even if ratings were a relatively accurate 
representation of the probability of default, they would not necessarily be useful for much of the year 
for very distressed issues.
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and Keim [1987]), but what has always distinguished the low-grade market is its 
abundance of "fallen angels".15
1.2 Bankruptcy and Financial Distress
Although Beaver [1966,1968] defined failure broadly, most subsequent empirical 
work has restricted it to mean bankruptcy. Most of the theoretical literature uses 
the term bankruptcy. But this is somewhat misleading, for the theory really deals 
with the failure of a firm to meet its financial obligations, and such failure does 
not always lead to bankruptcy.
Scott [1981, p. 342]
Until recently, there has been relatively little empirical work in finance on business 
and security distress. One of the reasons may be that financial economists have been 
uncomfortable with the inherently legal issues involved with distress. Those financial 
economists which have ventured into the field have become dependent on the legal 
definition of distress, which has changed since the late 1970s.
Implicitly, often bankruptcy was assumed to represent the legal definition, which was 
assumed to be a subset of financial insolvency. This can be problematic, given that, 
for example, the largest "bankruptcy" in U.S. history (i.e., Texaco, 1987) was not 
what most financial economists would argue to be an economic failure.
We refer to distressed securities as a market and as an asset class. These labels, 
however, are premature due to the field's developing condition and the fact that 
there has been a lack of rigorous research.
Altman [1991b, p.l]
There is no universal definition of financial distress. Unfortunately, there are no 
definitions of distress in financial textbooks or financial journals. The word has often 
been used in the finance literature, but has never been defined. Good proxies for 
failure include the definitions of bankruptcy and insolvency; but distress, especially as 
it relates to securities, is harder to define with the use of proxies. As Zmijewski [1984, 
p. 637] wrote, "before data can be collected, the population of firms must be 
identified, and an operational definition of financial distress assumed." A sample set is 
usually drawn based on the assumption that legal bankruptcy is a good proxy for 
financial distress.
U  Fallen angels represented approximately 30% of the low-grade corporate bond market in early 1987 
(Altman [1987, p. 13]). In addition, see Fridson [1993] on the "Fallen Angel Hypothesis".
30
1.3 The Size of the Low-Grade Bond Asset Classes Studied
The following asset classes are of particular importance to this thesis: (1) low-grade 
corporate bonds (Chapter 6), (2) low-grade municipal bonds (Chapter 7), and (3) 
convertible corporate bonds (Chapter 8). In addition, high-grade corporate bonds and 
high-grade municipal bonds are used as reference asset classes. As of year-end 1993, 
the Federal Reserve Bulletin reported that corporate bonds were approximately $1,230 
trillion and tax-exempt obligations were approximately $1,217 trillion. Regarding 
low-grade corporate bonds, the market was estimated to be approximately $175 
billion as of year-end 1992, down from a high of about $200 billion in 1990 (see 
Altman [1993]). Regarding low-grade municipal bonds, there are no academic 
estimates available. Regarding convertible corporate bonds, the following table 
provides estimates of the overall size of the convertible security market (i.e., 
convertible bonds and preferred stocks).
Table 3
Total Par Value of Convertible Securities 
(1984 through 1993)
Year
Total Par 
Value (Billions $)
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992 
1993*
$23,033
28.434
32.793
33.601
40.596
43.897
52.141
61.732
58.253
52.877
Source: Value Line Convertibles, Value Line 
Publishing, Inc., 711 3rd Avenue, New York, N.Y.
* as of June 28, 1993.
Given that the values are par values, the above values overestimate the market value 
of convertible securities, but they provide some notion of the size of the market since 
1984.
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Open-end mutual fund returns are used to proxy for the asset class returns analyzed. 
Therefore, some notion of the size of open-end mutual funds for the asset classes 
being analyzed in Chapters 6 through 8 is required as background. The following table 
provides estimates for the total year-end market value of various mutual fund types 
which correspond to the asset classes of special interest to the thesis.
Table 4
Open-End Mutual Fund year-end Market Values for Low-Grade Corporate
Bonds, High-Grade Corporate Bonds, Low-Grade Municipal Bonds, High- 
Grade Municipal Bonds, and Convertible Corporate Bonds (1984 through 1994)
All values and definitions are derived from Lipper Analytical Services data. Low-grade corporate bond 
funds are defined as funds which tend to invest in lower grade debt issues. High-grade corporate bond 
funds are defined as funds which invests 65% or more of assets in corporate debt issues rated "A" or 
better or government issues. Convertible bond funds are defined as funds which invest primarily in 
convertible bonds and/or preferred stocks. Low-grade municipal bond funds are defined as funds 
which invest at least 50% of assets in lower rated municipal debt issues. High-grade municipal bond 
funds are defined as funds which invest at least 65% of assets in municipal debt issues in the top four 
credit ratings.
Year
Low-Grade 
Corporate 
Bond Funds
High-Grade 
Corporate 
Bond Funds
Convertible 
Bond Funds
Low-Grade 
Municipal 
Bond Funds
High-Grade 
Municipal 
Bond Funds
1984 $6,922 billion $3,497 billion $0,296 billion $3,188 billion $10,646 billion
1985 12.686. 4.820 0.875 5.610 17.493
1986 24.648 7.229 3.250 9.202 30.120
1987 24.836 7.555 3.353 8.436 28.945
1988 30.298 8.195 2.820 10.103 33.338
1989 25.555 10.016 2.518 13.112 38.387
1990 16.683 11.329 1.714 14.008 41.582
1991 23.499 15.375 1.834 16.358 50.515
1992 30.921 20.109 2.404 19.060 60.200
1993 44.413 24.500 3.599 23.427 74.182
1994 41.889 22.292 3.560 21.122 64.337
Source: Lipper Directors' Analytic Data, Lipper Analytical Services, Inc., 1994.
All five types of bond funds seem to have had dramatic increases over the past ten 
years. Of importance for this thesis is that the size of total open-end mutual fund 
assets under management for a particular asset class analyzed is large enough relative 
to the asset class to suggest that it is a representative sample of that asset class.
1.4 The Role of Theory in the Thesis
The four article chapters are motivated by the following two sets of theory: (1) capital 
structure theory, and (2) risky debt pricing theory. Capital structure theory as it relates 
to the bankruptcy costs is the basic motivation for the empirical research on the costs
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of bankruptcy. Therefore, it is indirectly used as a motivation for Chapter 4 and will 
be addressed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5 reviews the theory on the pricing of risky debt. Given that Chapter 6 
through 8 are empirical chapters analyzing the impact of embedded options on the 
financial performance of risky bond asset classes, a review of the theory of risky debt 
pricing will be provided. In particular, the expected direction and sensitivity of risky 
bond prices during periods when the various embedded options would be expected to 
be exercised and/or the probability of exercise increases will be analyzed. Embedded 
options (e.g., the put or default option) and their effects over time occupy much of the 
analytic work of this thesis.
2 Objectives
All the objectives of this thesis are directly or indirectly concerned with the field of 
financial distress. The next chapter will provide background on laws and regulations 
affecting financially distressed firms, but the focus of this thesis will be primarily on 
the finance literature in the field. Although the finance literature in the field has 
greatly increased in recent years, it remains limited.
The following are the objectives of the thesis:
1) review important laws and regulations affecting distressed firms (Chapter 2),
2) review the empirical literature on the costs of bankruptcy and provide the 
background to the empirical chapter on the losses incurred during successful 
bankruptcy (Chapter 3),
3) further address the question of the size and magnitude of the costs of distress as 
well as examine several factors which might affect the total costs of successful 
bankruptcies (Chapter 4),
4) review the relevant literature on risky debt pricing and empirical studies on risky 
debt returns (Chapter 5),
5) establish the theoretical expectations regarding the three related empirical chapters 
(Chapter 5),
6) generally extend the empirical literature on low-grade corporate bond financial 
performance (Chapter 6),
7) begin empirical literature on low-grade municipal bond financial performance 
(Chapter 7),
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8) generally extend the empirical literature on convertible bond financial performance 
(Chapter 8), and
9) provide evidence to support more complex contingent claims analysis ("CCA") 
models of risky bond pricing (Chapters 6 through 8).
The contributions of this thesis will be dependent upon the thesis' ability to resolve 
these nine objectives.
3 Outline of the Thesis
This introductory chapter is followed by eight chapters. Chapter 2 provides 
background on U.S. laws and regulations affecting the creditors of distressed and 
bankrupt businesses. Also, background information on the rate and magnitude of 
bankruptcy in the U.S. is provided. Chapter 3 provides background for the chapter 
analyzing the costs of bankruptcy. Chapter 4 examines the losses realized in 
successful bankruptcies.
Chapter 5 provides the empirical and theoretical background on risky bonds. Chapter 
6 examines the financial performance of low-grade corporate bonds. Chapter 7 
examines the financial performance of low-grade municipal bonds. Chapter 8 
examines the financial performance of convertible corporate bonds.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND ON LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to present an overview of legal factors which impact 
distressed firms and the securities they issue. Regarding laws and regulations, the 
emphasis will be on those laws and regulations which have an economic impact on 
distressed security valuation. Also, some background numbers regarding the 
frequency of "Chapter 7" and "11" bankruptcies will be presented. This chapter will 
provide background on some of the legal aspects of low-grade bonds and firm distress 
in general.
2 Laws and Regulations
The complexity of laws and regulations affecting distressed securities generally 
increases the costs associated with investing in those securities. Specific laws and 
court rulings have significant impacts on the valuation of securities in distress (e.g., 
Ma et al. [1989] and Kaen and Tehranian [1990]). The impact of changing laws and 
regulations is often through changing the behavior of the agents involved in 
negotiations during workouts and restructurings (e.g., the LTV Case). The laws 
regarding distress have not been a foundation of predictability (e.g., absolute priority 
rulings). Also, regarding existing laws, more recent economic theory applied to 
bankruptcy law implies that many types of renegotiation which occur for bankrupt 
firms are inefficient (e.g., Gertner and Scharfstein [1991], and Webb [1991]). 
Referring to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"), Webb concluded by 
stating:
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A major weakness of Chapter 11 in the US is that it provides incentives for the 
latter, encouraging distributional games, distorting ex ante decisions, rather than 
the realization of value. Significant costs may be incurred and the business 
severely damaged, rather than the burden of creditors removed.
Webb [1991, p. 156]
Thus, significant additional costs may be incurred with and without security-holder 
consent.1 These costs will be reflected in lower recoveries in bankruptcy (this will be 
addressed in more detail in Chapter 3). Not only does the bankruptcy code seem 
expensive for distressed security holders, but there is some evidence indicating that 
changes in bankruptcy laws during 1978 have increased the cost of bankruptcy (see 
Bradley and Rosenzweig [1992]). However, more recent changes in the Code may 
have lessened some of the costs associated with bankruptcy (see Jacob et al. [1994] on 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994). Given that all the data used in this study was 
previous to any recent changes in the Code, the review which follows will emphasise 
the 1978 Act.
2.1 Before and After the New Code
Auctions allocate resources to their highest-valued uses. Yet bankruptcy does not 
use auctions. Instead judges determine a value and parcel out interests on the 
assumption that this valuation is correct.
Easterbrook [1990, p. 411]
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 established the current bankruptcy code. The 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 modified some critical sections of the Code. Most of 
the data in this study was derived after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and before 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. The new bankruptcy laws may have increased 
the complexity and costs of distress for security holders (e.g., see Bradley and 
Rosenzweig [1992]).2 In addition, Scott and Smith [1986] found that small businesses 
incurred higher borrowing costs after the new Code was enacted. Chapter 11 of the 
Code has given managers more power and latitude than the previous bankruptcy code. 
Bradley and Rosenzweig [1992] found that both stockholders and bondholders of
1 In some cases where some explicit or implicit form of government guarantee is in place for the firm's 
debt, management may purposely cause the firm to incur losses and go bankrupt in order to extract 
value (see Akerlof and Romer [1993] on what they call "bankruptcy for profit").
2 Some literature has concerned itself with the overall impact o f the bankruptcy code on all firms. For 
example, Hudson [1992] examined average liabilities of bankrupt firms during the period 1952-1989 
in an effort to quantify the impact of the new Code on all U.S. firms.
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bankrupt firms have lost significantly more after the Code when compared to 
claimholders before its inception.3
The Bradley and Rosenzweig [1992] results contradict a theory of deadweight costs 
held by White [1983]. White [1983] felt that the deadweight costs associated with the 
Code were less than those of the old Bankruptcy Act. White's [1983] estimates were 
based on a model of ex ante bankruptcy costs of liquidating versus reorganizing firms. 
The data used was for firms filing for court protection in the Southern District of New 
York.4 None of the Code cases the results were based on had their cases formally 
closed (White [1983, p. 483]). Also, the payoff rates were undiscounted, which biased 
the results to find lower bankruptcy costs for later years. There was no statistically 
significant result, only a rough estimate of deadweight costs. Although, Bhandari and 
Weiss [1993] found that the Bradley and Rosenzweig [1992] post-1978 filings result 
was flawed, in that they felt that the post-1978 increase in bankruptcy filings was due 
to lower profitability and increased leverage, rather than the change in law. In 
addition, LoPucki [1992, p. 85-91] found that the extra post-1978 bond losses found 
by Bradley and Rosenzweig [1992] may have been due to the fact that more bonds in 
their pre-1978 sample were more senior relative to their post-1978 sample.5
Whether or not the Code is more expensive for distressed security holders is not of 
primary importance for this thesis. But, to the extent changes in the Code create 
uncertainty in the markets for distressed securities, changes in the Code are relevant. 
Of more importance are the individual laws directly affecting the valuation and 
distribution of value among distressed security holders. If the bankruptcy laws were 
invariant with respect to time and case, bankruptcy laws would be of little importance 
for valuing risky securities. Unfortunately, the Code has changed and laws have not 
been applied uniformly (e.g., regarding the Doctrine of Absolute Priority).6
3 Also, the introduction of the Code may have increased the event of bankruptcy. Concerning the 
increase in bankruptcies during the 1980s, Hudson [1989, p. 69] noted the following: "It is interesting 
to note that this most recent upturn coincides with the introduction of the new Bankruptcy Code, and it 
may be that the new code has in some way tended to increase the number of bankruptcies."
4 The Southern District of New York is significantly different than all other bankruptcy court districts 
in the U.S. It is not a good district to take a representative sample (see Chapters 3 & 4).
 ^Although, it is possible that for very large companies in the late 1980s and beyond, prepackaged 
Chapter 11s may result in lower deadweight costs than previous bankruptcy law would have allowed 
(e.g., see Betker [1995b]). In addition, the LoPucki [1992] criticism applies to all empirical bankruptcy 
studies, not just the Bradley and Rosenzweig [1992] study.
6 There have been several proposals to significantly change Chapter 11 of the Code (e.g., see Roe 
[1983], Bebchuk [1988], and Aghion et al. [1992]).
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2.2 The Latest Code Changes
The latest set of modifications to the Code was the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 
(the "New Act"). The New Act was passed on October 6, 1994 and signed into law on 
October 22, 1994. Given that the most recent data series used in this thesis ends on 
September 30,1994, it is assumed to not have had an impact on the results of this 
thesis. It is reviewed here in order to update this chapter's review of the Code.
The primary focus of the New Act has been to increase the rights and remedies of 
creditors (see Jacob et al. [1994]). In particular, the New Act encourages the election 
of a trustee in Chapter 11 cases. Therefore, the New Act has, at least in one respect, 
brought the U.S. Code closer to British insolvency law. The New Act was designed to 
shift the power away from the debtor toward creditors. At this time, it is not clear that 
the New Act will have the intended effect.
The following is a partial list of significant amendments made to the Code by the New 
Act: (1) The New Act is intended to expedite automatic stay relief hearings. The 
automatic stay (i.e., Section 362(e) of the Code) was amended in the New Act to 
complete final hearings on motions for stay relief within 30 days with few or no 
exceptions.
(2) The New Act is intended to expedite the debtor-in-possession's period of 
exclusivity (i.e., the period under which the debtor has the exclusive right to propose a 
plan of reorganization). The amendment does not change the period of exclusivity 
(i.e., 180 days). Rather, it gives any party that is aggrieved by extending the period of 
exclusivity the right to appeal. How this is supposed to expedite the period of 
exclusivity is not clear.
(3) The New Act is intended to encourage the appointment of trustees in Chapter 11 
cases (section 1104(a)) as has been the case with Chapter 7 cases. The amendment 
allows creditors to elect their own trustee in Chapter 11 cases, although creditors must 
show that the continuation of current management is not in the interests of the 
bankrupt entity.
2.3 Background on Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 Cases
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Empirical studies on distress have used the event of bankruptcy as their implicit or 
explicit definition of distress. Given the reliance on the event of bankruptcy, it is 
crucial to understand what is legally meant by bankruptcy and the various legal forms 
of bankruptcy. The different classifications of bankruptcy were a direct result of 
judicial intent regarding the discrimination between going concerns and liquidations.
Bankruptcy law can and should help a firm stay in business when it is worth more 
to its owners alive than dead. That is a far cry, however, from saying that it is an 
independent goal of bankruptcy law to keep firms in operation.
Jackson [1986, p. 2]
"The bankruptcy laws are designed to either rehabilitate a financially distressed debtor 
or to assemble and liquidate his assets for distribution to creditors."7 In the U.S., the 
courts require that only "financially distressed" companies file for bankruptcy. A 
company should not file for business strategy reasons. Bankruptcy court protection is 
viewed as a means to save viable businesses from liquidation, or businesses that will 
be liquidated from a "fire sale". Congress has drafted bankruptcy legislation based on 
the presumption that managers will act in the interest of society to maximize its 
welfare (see the Code). Also, Congress has assumed that bankruptcy court protection 
provides creditors with a method of sorting out their relative claims on a debtor’s 
assets.8
Currently, court supervised protection under the Code can be obtained under the 
following four chapters of the Code: Chapter 7, Chapter 11, Chapter 12, and Chapter 
13.9 Chapter 7 of the code, the liquidation chapter of the code, allows an individual to 
keep certain exempt property. That property which is not exempt (for businesses all 
property is usually non exempt in Chapter 7) is then sold off by a court appointed
7 In Flynn, E., "Bankruptcy Statistical Information," The Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, September 9, 1991, p. 1.
8 See Jackson [1986, p. 2-192],
9 The following is a short summary of bankruptcy definitions as provided by the Administrative Office 
of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director: Bankruptcy is a legal recognition that a company or 
individual is insolvent and must restructure or liquidate; Petitions 'filed' means the commencement of a 
proceeding in which the administration has not been completed; Business bankruptcies include those 
filed under Chapters 7, 9, 11, or 12; Bankruptcies include those filed under Chapters 7, 11, or 13; 
Chapter 7 is a liquidation of non-exempt assets of businesses or individuals; Chapter 9 is an adjustment 
of debts o f a municipality; Chapter 11 is an individual or business reorganization; Chapter 12 is an 
adjustment of debts o f a family farmer with regular annual income, effective November 26, 1986; 
Chapter 13 is an adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income; and Section 304 deals with 
bankruptcy cases ancillary to foreign proceedings.
trustee. Money from the sale is then to be paid to the creditors.10 Chapter 11 of the 
Code allows a business to restructure its operations as a going concern rather than be 
liquidated. Chapter 12 of the Code allows family farmers to restructure their financial 
obligations and continue farming operations as a going concern.11 Chapter 13 of the 
Code allows individuals with regular income to pay their creditors, in full or in part, 
over a three year period.12 This thesis will focus on Chapter 11 of the Code (i.e., 
Chapters 3 and 4), more specifically as it relates to firms which have successfully 
reorganized under court supervision.
The majority of business bankruptcies are filed under Chapter 7 of the Code, not 
Chapter 11. This preponderance of Chapter 7 firms is due to the fact that the largest 
share of businesses filing for bankruptcy are relatively new, small, single product or 
service firms which generally do not have the financial resources and/or market to 
continue as going concerns (see Queen and Roll [1987]). The ratio has been about 
four Chapter 7 cases to every one Chapter 11 case (see Tables 1 and 2). Also, most of 
the cases filed under Chapter 11 are eventually converted to Chapter 7. Thus, the 
effective ratio is higher than one to four (see Table 2).
Regarding the status and confirmation rates of Chapter 11 cases in the 1980s, the 
following can be stated: (1) over 1/4 of the cases filed before 1987 were still pending 
as of January 31, 1989; (2) approximately 1/2 of the cases filed prior to 1987 have 
been closed in Chapter 11 without court confirmation13 or have been closed as "no 
asset Chapter 7" cases; (3) approximately 1/15th of the cases closed so far were closed 
after confirmation; (4) approximately 17% of the cases prior to 1987 have been or will 
be confirmed14; (5) the rate of confirmation rose from 13.3% of cases filed in 1982 to 
22.4% of cases filed in 1986; (6) Flynn [1989, p. i] estimated that the rate of 
confirmation for cases filed after 1986 will be 25% to 30%; (7) the pre-1987 
confirmation rate was under 10% in some districts and over 40% in the Southern
10 In actuality, in some cases little or nothing has gone to creditors. Often in these cases the trustee, the 
courts, and the various attorneys associated with the case are paid and there is nothing left for the 
creditors.
11 Basically, it is a form of Chapter 11 for family farmers. It is a form of "special interest" legislation 
which attempts to make it easier for family farmers facing Chapter 7 of the Code to remain in 
operation.
12 Again, this is a form of Chapter 11, but for individuals with regular incomes. Also, the bankruptcy 
judge in the case can extend the payment plan up to five years, but three years has been the norm. 
Interestingly, based on 1991 filing levels, there is an approximately one in ten chance that an 
individual in the U.S. will file for Chapter 13 at some point in their lifetime.
13 This is most likely to occur in cases, such as in real estate cases, where there may be no need for 
filing a plan of reorganization for the business. This might be expected in any case where the business 
has a single asset.
1  ^That is, as of the writing of the report in 1990.
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District of New York15; (8) the accounting firm which reviewed the cases estimated 
that 20% to 30% of the cases reviewed contained liquidity plans rather than 
reorganization plans16; and (9) Flynn [1989, p. i] estimated that 10% to 12% of cases 
result in a successful reorganization of the debtor’s business. Also, the probability of 
maintaining a business in distress through the use of Chapter 11 of the Code has been 
very low, even during a period of economic expansion.17
Chapter 11 has not been as important as other chapters of the Code in terms of the 
absolute number of cases, but it has been the most important regarding share of 
estimated asset values. Chapter 11 of the Code has accounted for approximately four 
percent of all bankruptcy filings since 1979. Although, the total amounts of assets, 
debts, and creditor payments in Chapter 11 cases was greater than all other cases filed 
under all other chapters of the Code combined. It has been estimated by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts that as of 1991 the combined assets of all 
businesses filing under Chapter 11 of the Code was in excess of $200 billion. This 
paper will focus on approximately $12.6 billion of the Chapter 11s that resulted in the 
confirmation of plans of reorganization (Chapter 4). In terms of asset value, Chapter 
11 was and is the most important chapter of the Code.
The status of Chapter 11 cases is very difficult to accurately determine. The following 
are the nine status categories of Chapter 11 cases: (1) pending in Chapter 11, (2) 
pending in Chapter 7, (3) pending in Chapter 12 or 13, (4) closed in Chapter 11 after 
confirmation, (5) closed in Chapter 11 without confirmation, (6) closed in Chapter 7 
with creditor payments, (7) closed in Chapter 7 without creditor payments, (8) closed 
in Chapter 12 or 13 with payments, and (9) closed in Chapter 12 or 13 without 
payments. Below are some aggregate values regarding the status of Chapter 11 cases 
as of January 31,1989.
Many bankruptcy statistics are gathered from the Southern District of New York. This is due in 
large part to the large number of large companies which file there, and the relative availability of data 
which results. Given this fact, there is a bias between this bankruptcy court district and all others in the 
United States.
16 Given that 17% of Chapter 11 cases get confirmed, the adjusted number, taking into account this 
finding, would be between ten to twelve percent result in reorganization o f the filing entity.
17 Obviously, this is in contrast to its stated objectives.
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Table 1
Status of Chapter 11 Cases Filed 1979 through 1986*18
These values are from the Administrative Office of the United States Bankruptcy Courts: Division of 
Bankruptcy.
Status of Chapter 11 Filing Number Percentage
Pending in Chapter 11 33,768 26.9%
Pending in Chapter 7 12,563 10.0%
Pending in Chapter 12 or 13 396 0.3%
Total still Pending 46,727 37.2%
Total Closed as of January 31, 1989
Closed in Chapter 11 after Confirmation 5,334 4.3%
Closed in Chapter 11 without Confirmation 43,177 34.4%
Closed in Chapter 7 with Creditor Payments 8,692 6.9%
Closed in Chapter 7 without Creditor Payments 19,948 15.9%
Closed in Chapter 12 or 13 with Payments 701 0.6%
Closed in Chapter 12 or 13 without Payments 1,059 0.8%
Total Closed 78,911 62.8%
Total Chapter 11 Cases Filed 125,638 100.0%
* There is a small discrepancy between cases filed and case status listings filed between 1985 and
1986.
Source: Modified from Flynn, E., "Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11," Administrative Office of the 
United States Bankruptcy Courts: Division of Bankruptcy, October 1989
The above table illustrates the relatively low confirmation rate of cases prior to 1987. 
62.8% of the cases were closed, but of those only a small percentage were closed in 
Chapter 11 after confirmation. More than eight times as many cases closed in Chapter 
11 were closed without confirmation than after confirmation. Over 60% of the cases 
are either still pending or have been closed outside of Chapter 11. Of the slightly less 
than 40% of the cases that have been closed under Chapter 11, 34.4% (i.e., 89%) have 
been closed without confirmation. Apparently most Chapter 11 cases either (1) don't 
end as a Chapter 11 cases, or (2) don't close.19 A successful Chapter 11 case has been 
rare.
The slightly good news for creditors was that even though few cases are confirmed, or 
projected to be confirmed, some of the Chapter 7 cases have resulted in payments to 
creditors. Although, in the case where creditors received some value, the numbers 
shown in the above table do not provide estimated recovery rates per say, only an 
indication of whether, from the bankruptcy court viewpoint, anything was recovered. 
This thesis assumes recovery rates in confirmed Chapter 11 cases were higher than 
closed Chapter 7 cases. Also, these numbers do not indicate the extent to which
Taken and modified from Flynn [1989, p. 6].
19 Certainly not encouraging numbers, especially if you are concerned with Chapter 11 of the Code 
being a method to prolong business entities which are encountering temporary problems.
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secured creditors were able to file motions for relief from the automatic stay,20 which 
was quite common.21
Table 2
Status of Chapter 11 Cases Filed 1979 through 1986 by Calendar Year 
(percentages as of January 31 ,1989)*22
These values are from the Administrative Office of the United States Bankruptcy Courts: Division of 
Bankruptcy.
Status o f Chapter 11 Filing 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Pending in Chapter 11 15.2 17.2 18.6 20.1 25.4 32.2 42.8
Pending in Chapter 7 7.6 8.9 9.1 9.3 10.6 11.4 10.7
Pending in Chapter 12 or 13 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6
Total still Pending 23.0 26.3 27.9 29.7 36.2 44.0 54.0
Total Closed as o f January 31,1989
Closed in Chapter 11 after Confirmation 8.5 6.3 5.5 4.7 3.6 4.1 1.4
Closed in Chapter 11 without Confirmation 26.7 31.2 34.7 38.4 36.5 34.8 32.4
Closed in Chapter 7 with Creditor Payments 19.0 14.7 10.6 7.9 5.5 2.5 1.2
Closed in Chapter 7 without Creditor Payments 19.4 19.8 19.3 17.7 17.1 13.4 10.4
Closed in Chapter 12 or 13 with Payments 2.5 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2
Closed in Chapter 12 or 13 without Payments 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5
Total Closed 77.0 73.7 72.1 70.3 63.8 56.0 46.0
Total Chapter 11 Cases Filed 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* Status is as of the calendar year the Chapter 11 case was filed.
Source: Modified from Flynn, E., "Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11," Administrative Office of the 
United States Bankruptcy Courts: Division of Bankruptcy, October 1989
The numbers in the previous table do not form an image of an quick process. Chapter 
11 is a very slow process that has occasionally ended with a confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization as a going concern. Over the seven years studied, a large percentage of 
cases remain open after years of bankruptcy court protection.23 Nevertheless, the 
overall numbers do give some insight into the absolute effectiveness of Chapter 11 of 
the Code.24
2® In addition, primarily in the cases o f businesses without limited liability (e.g., partnerships and sole 
proprietorships), secured creditors can file a motion to compel the abandonment of estate property.
21 For example, during 1988, approximately 195,000 of these motions were filed. There are no 
statistics on the disposition of these motions.
22 Taken and modified from Flynn [1989, p. 8].
2  ^Keeping in mind that the minimum amount of time passed of the seven years shown was three years 
(i.e., cases filed in 1986 but not resolved as of 1989).
2  ^Based on a normal distribution of the 1,516 cases examined, as of June 1990, 0%, 0%, 0.3%, 0.4%, 
0.9%, 2.5%, 6.9%, and 16.8% of Chapter 11 cases filed in 1979,1980, 1981, 1982, 1983,1984, 1985, 
and 1986, respectively, could be expected to still be pending with hope of successfully exiting Chapter 
11.
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The substantial number of firms emerging from Chapter 11 that are not viable or 
need further restructuring provides little evidence that the process effectively 
rehabilitates distressed firms and is consistent with the view that there are 
economically important biases toward continutation of unprofitable firms. 
Hotchkiss' [1995, p. 3]
Finally, there is additional evidence to suggest that even the larger companies which 
tend to successfully emerge from court protection do not fare well. Hotchkiss [1995] 
finds that of a sample of 197 public companies that emerged from Chapter l l 25: (1) 
over 40% continued to experience operating losses in the three years following their 
emergence, and (2) 32% reenter bankruptcy or privately restructure their debt. The 
general conclusion is that the management responsible for bankruptcy, if left in place, 
tends to exacerbate negative performance.26 In addition, the evidence generally 
supports the view that Chapter 11 is biased toward reorganization over liquidation.
2.4 The Doctrine of Absolute Priority
Nevertheless, the absolute priority rule and its rhetoric stand in distinct contrast to 
the distrust of market mechanisms and ex ante bargains that pervades both the 
practice of bankruptcy and discussions of bankruptcy policy.
Baird and Jackson [1988, p. 738]
The application of the doctrine of absolute priority directly affects the valuation of the 
securities of distressed firms.27 The doctrine of absolute priority calls for the 
administrative expenses of the bankruptcy to be paid first (e.g., court fees and legal 
bills), priority claims second (e.g., unpaid taxes, wages, and social security payments),
25 The 197 firms were derived from an initial sample of 806 public firms filing for Chapter 11 
between October 1979 and September 1988. Therefore, only 24% emerged from bankruptcy and 
continued to file financial statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). See 
Hotchkiss [1995, p. 6-7] for sample details.
26 Khanna and Poulsen [1995] find that managers of bankrupt firms are not responsible for bankruptcy 
(i.e., Chapter 11). They find that, three years previous to filing for Chapter 11, bankrupt firm managers' 
actions do not differ significantly from non-bankrupt firm managers' actions. Although, their results do 
not explain the fact that firms which go bankrupt, by definition, tend to economically underperform 
their competitors.
22 Although, there has been a study examining the ability of firms to shift relative priorities through 
time by forming captive finance subsidiaries (see Kim et al. [1977]). Kim et al. [1977, p. 808] found 
the following: "the empirical evidence indicates that stockholders have on average earned excess 
returns and old bondholders have suffered windfall losses when firms have formed captive finance 
subsidiaries." Kim et al. found that "creditors' income claims may be abridged not only through 
formation of captive finance companies, but also through other financial manipulations that do not 
violate 'normal' indenture agreements." In short, violation of priority can occur well before distress 
ensues.
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unsecured creditors third (e.g., low-grade debt and trade debt), and equity last, if 
anything remains. Secured creditors have a right to claim their security (e.g., a 
particular asset such as a machine), and are therefore outside the ordering. In theory, 
those with higher priority should be fully satisfied before lower priority creditors are 
satisfied. In the U.S. this rarely happens, except in smaller bankruptcies.28 The figure 
below provides a clear list of the priority of claimants in Chapter 11. Indirectly, this 
thesis will be particularly concerned with the recovery in or out of bankruptcy of 
unsecured claimants.
Figure 1
Hierarchy of Claims in Chapter 11 (Most Senior to Most Junior)
Hierarchy of Claims in Chapter 11
1) Secured claims
2) Superpriority claims (e.g., debtor-in-possession financing)
3) Priority claims
3a) Administrative expenses (including legal and professional fees 
incurred in the case)
3b) Wages, salaries, or commissions
3c) Employee benefit claims
3d) Claims against facilities that store grain or fish produce
3e) Consumer deposits
3f) Alimony and child support
3g) Tax claims
3h) Unsecured claims based on commitment to a federal depository 
institutions regulatory agency
4) General unsecured claims
5) Preferred stock
6) Common stock
Source: Gilson, S., "Investing in Distressed Situations," Financial Analysts Journal, November- 
December 1995, p. 10
In the U.S. the doctrine of absolute priority has not been strictly followed by the 
courts. Legal scholars often point to the decision rendered in the case of Northern 
Pacific Railway versus Boyd29 as a justification for this result. In that case a group of 
subordinated creditors was "frozen out" while a group of former shareholders were 
granted some ownership rights (see Baird and Jackson [1988, p. 744-747]). It is the 
observation that managers often combine with bank debt to the economic detriment of 
intermediate creditors and the firm which seems to indicate suboptimal behavior for
28 See White [1991] for a good treatment of the differences between the U.S. and European 
bankruptcy codes, and their theoretical effects on incentives by large and small companies to file.
29 228 U.S. 482(1913).
society,30 and poor recoveries for bondholders. Historic low-grade debt recovery rates 
and step-downs would indicate this ruling still influences negotiated and 
nonnegotiated settlements in distress.
As the literature in the area is reviewed, it will be clear that deviations from absolute 
prioity are the rule in large bankruptcies. Therefore, it is clear that risky securities are 
impacted by court rulings which tend to encourage or discourage deviations from 
absolute priority. This thesis is not primarily concerned with the social impact of 
deviations from the legal doctrine of absolute priority (e.g., Scott [1977]).31 This 
thesis is indirectly concerned with the impact and predictability of deviations from 
absolute priority over time and across seniority of instrument (i.e., specifically, 
impacts which might affect the pricing of risky debt in particular).
The first published work to study low-grade debt and deviations from absolute 
priority was by Hickman in 1958.32 Even though deviations from absolute priority 
were not the focus of the study, Hickman [1958] reported default losses by lien 
position (i.e., secured versus unsecured debt). Whereas Hickman detailed recoveries 
after default for senior and unsecured debt, the majority of the finance literature which 
followed his work reported and analyzed deviations from absolute priority for equity 
versus bonds in the reorganization plans of Chapter 11 firms.
Warner [1977b, p. 331] found that "there are substantial deviations from the doctrine 
of'absolute priority"', but that the bond markets generally seem to price bankrupt debt 
appropriately with respect to its risks. Although, Warner [1977b, p. 364] found that 
"while the market appears to have been characetrized by an absence of gross 
inefficiencies in the 1935-1939 and 1943-1955 periods, ex ante profit opportunities 
may well have been available to investors who bought the sample bonds in the early 
1940's." Warner's sample was based on 73 bonds of 20 railroad companies which filed 
under Section 77 (a special railroad section of the bankruptcy code, this Amendment 
was enacted in 1933) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The sample included railroads
30 Absolute priority among the senior securities of related companies may not even hold. That is, the 
senior debt of a parent holding company may not be as relatively valuable as the subordinated 
securities of an operating subsidiary (see Monaghan and Ross [1989, p. 2-4])
31 In addition, Eberhart and Senbet [1993] argue that absolute priority violations are useful in reducing 
agency conflicts between stockholders and bondholders caused by financial distress. Using CCA, they 
show that absolute prioity violations can be useful in controling risk-shifting caused by financially 
distressed firms (i.e., specifically stockholder-oriented management taking on risky projects that they 
wouldn't take on if they couldn't shift the risk to bondholders). Although this may be true within the 
context o f simplified CCA approach, it still begs the point that it may be more efficient from a social 
welfare perspective to enforce creditor claims and absolute priority in the first place.
32 This study emphasized bond returns to rating (see Hickman [1958]).
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which had initiated and terminated bankruptcy proceedings between 1930 and 1955, 
and had bonds traded on the NYSE after 1925 and at some point prior to filing for 
bankruptcy. The focus of the study was determining whether distressed bonds were 
efficiently priced. That is, whether deviations from absolute priority were impounded 
into security prices before and after the bankruptcy filing. Market efficiency would 
imply that the probability of bankruptcy and possible deviations from absolute priority 
should be impounded into pricing. It was found that by buying the sample railroad 
bonds in the month following the bankruptcy petition, abnormal returns were 
generated over a period of a year (Warner [1977b, p. 355-361]). These abnormal 
returns were explained as being the result of changes in regulations over the period 
1940 through 1942. Warner made reference to two specific court cases which he felt 
may have significantly impacted bankrupt bond pricing during the study period (i.e., 
the DuBois case, and especially the Milwaukee case), because they resulted in 
"unanticipated" transfers of wealth between claimants (bondholders and shareholders). 
Interestingly, the deviations from absolute priority occured prior to the Code (i.e., 
1978), which is generally believed to favor creditors more than stockholders.
Franks and Torous [1989] also found large deviations from absolute priority. Unlike 
previous studies, their study focused on analyzing deviations from the perspective of 
stockholders receiving consideration from bondholders (see e.g., Bebchuk and Chang 
[1992] on the dynamics as to how stockholders and managers are able to extract value 
from bondholders during Chapter 11). Their study is based on a sample of 30 firms 
which emerged from Chapter 11 (or its pre-1978 equivalent Chapter X) during 1970 
through 1984. Note, that like all finance work in the area, the sample is baised toward 
large public companies. Two general arguments are put forward to explain these 
deviations in favor of stockholders. First, it is suggested that certain debtor rights, for 
example the period of exclusivity, confer upon stockholder-oriented management the 
implicit threat to impose costs which creditors must pay to avoid (i.e., an equity 
option(s) argument). Therefore, deviations represent creditors purchasing the option(s) 
before expiration in order to avoid certain costs being imposed. Alternatively, based 
on Baird and Jackson [1988], it is suggested that these extractions of value from 
bondholders are the result of stockholder-oriented management's ability to preserve 
firm value. Thus, the deviations represent a recontacting between creditors and 
stockholders which recognizes stockholder-oriented managements' ability to preserve 
value. Given the evidence of the preformance of entrenched management in large 
publicly traded bankrupt firms, it is unlikely the Baird and Jackson [1988] rationale is 
a realistic one (see e.g., Hotchkiss [1995]). By their definition of deviation, 21 of 27 
firms experienced deviations from absolute priority. Also, Franks and Tourous [1989,
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p. 754] may not have picked up other deviations because seniority is sometimes 
unclear. In short, one problem with all of the absolute priority studies which attempt 
to specify deviations from priority is the difficulty of defining seniority itself, which 
may result in biased and/or inaccurate results. It is clear that, at least for large 
publicly-traded firms, large deviations do exist.
Weiss [1990] examined 37 large publicly traded firms which filed under Chapter 11 
of the Code between November 1979 and December 1986. Following Franks and 
Torous' [1989] analysis of stockholder/bondholder deviations, he found that absolute 
priority was violated in 29 of 37 cases. In addition, Weiss extended the analysis to 
break out secured and unsecured creditors. As expected, the violations of absolute 
priority tended to occur between unsecured creditors and stockholders. Secured 
creditors claims were upheld in 34 of 37 cases. Weiss [1990, p. 296] stated that: 
"lawyers indicate that two factors, firm size and location of bankruptcy, are important 
in predicting whether priority of claims will be violated."33 Larger bankruptcies are 
considered to be more complex and thus present smaller lower priority creditors with 
more opportunities to extract concessions from other creditors. Lawyers claim that 
different bankruptcy courts and judges treat different classes of debtors differentially. 
Therefore, even though federal bankruptcy law was intended to be applied 
uniformally, different judges are expected to sytematically skew deviations from 
absolute priority in their own way (e.g., the Southern District of New York).
Eberhart et al. [1990] analyzed whether equity markets forecast deviations in absolute 
priority, and attempted to explicitely model the stockholder delay option mentioned in 
Franks and Torous [1989]. Their study was based on a sample of 30 large publicly 
held companies which filed under and emerged from Chapter 11 of the Code over the 
period 1979 through 1986. Unlike Franks and Torous [1989] who used a measure of 
deviation focusing on the creditor deficit, Eberhart et al. [1990] used a measure of 
deviation which measured deviations from the proportion of firm value distributed to 
common stockholder in excess of that specified by absolute priority. Like the previous 
stockholder based studies on absolute priority deviation, they found numerous and 
significant deviations from absolute priority for stockholders. In addition, they found 
support for the hypothesis that equity markets generally forecast deviations from 
absolute priority. Based on their own methodology, Eberhart et al. [1990, p. 1468] 
found only "modest support for the notion that shareholders are paid more for 
forfeiting their delay option early." Although, they pointed out that errors in
33 Also, see Weiss [1991].
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measurement of their delay variable may have caused the statistical significance of 
their findings for the delay option to be understated.
Eberhart and Sweeney [1992] examined the efficiency of the corporate bond markets 
with respect to Chapter 11 filings for 74 large publicly traded firms (187 bonds) which 
filed for Chapter 11 protection after October 1,1979 and emerged from court 
protection between 1980 and 1990. In addition, they examined the degree to which the 
corporate bond markets, as of the bankruptcy filing month, anticipated departures 
from absolute priority. Although large deviations from the initial estimates are found 
and there appears to be some positive bias, they do not appear to be significantly 
positively or negatively biased. Also, based on average cumulative abnormal return 
(ACARs) and price unbiasedness tests, they concluded that the market for bankrupt 
corporate bonds is informationally efficient. Although, they provide some results 
which contradict the conclusion of informational efficiency. In addition, their 
estimates of market model alphas seem to drive their results (see Eberhart and 
Sweeney [1992, p. 970-975]). Overall, it is difficult to comment on the impact of the 
study on research in the area.
Fabozzi et al. [1993] examined the deviation from absolute prioity for the following 
three broadly defined groups of creditors: (1) secured creditors, (2) unsecured 
creditors, and (3) equityholders. The sample consisted of 26 firms which emerged 
from Chapter 11 between September 1988 and March 1990. Based on Weiss' [1990] 
group classification methodology, they found that absolute priority was violated in 22 
of 26 cases. Absolute priority between secured and unsecured creditors was violated 
in 10 of 22 cases, and between unsecured creditors and equityholders in 20 of 22 
cases. In addition, Fabozzi et al. [1993, p. 7-8] point out that net operating losses 
(NOLs) can have a significant impact on reorganization plan payouts. As long as there 
is no ownership change a firm's pre-petition NOLs will not be limited post-petition 
(this will be covered in more detail later in the chapter). Therefore, it is possible that 
violations of absolute priority are also affected by the tax laws addressing NOL 
carryovers.
Franks and Torous [1994] compared deviations from absolute priority for firms which 
had confirmed restructuring plans under Chapter 11 of the Code and firms which 
completed distressed out-of-court restructurings. The sample was composed of 45 
distressed exchanges and 37 Chapter 11 reorganizations over the period 1983 through 
1988. Again, the sample was composed of large publicly traded companies. Not only 
are recoveries for creditors higher in out-of-court restructurings than in-court
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restructurings (i.e., formal Chapter 11s), but equity/bondholder deviations from 
absolute priority are greater for out-of-court restructurings than in-court 
restructurings. Franks and Torous [1994, p. 362] find that, on average, equity holders 
receive 2.3% of the reorganized firm for in-court restructurings versus 9.5% for out- 
of-court restructurings. The determinants of the cross-sectional variation of equity 
deviations from absolute priority were hypothesized to include: (1) the value of 
shareholder-oriented management's option to delay repayment of creditor claims, (2) 
management turnover (which is higher in Chapter 11 s than out-of-court 
restructurings), and (3) the complexity of bargaining. Equity deviations were found to 
be primarily positively determined by firm size (as measured by liabilities) and 
negatively determined by whether it was an in-court rather than an out-of-court 
restructuring. Therefore, the larger the firm the greater the expected positive deviation 
from absolute priority in favor of stockholders, and there seems to be an added benefit 
to stockholders by avoiding formal bankruptcy. Oddly, stockholders seem to be able 
to gamer more benefit by avoiding that which gives them formal bargaining power 
(i.e., Bankruptcy Court protection). In addition, given that equity deviations tended to 
increase with firm size, this suggests that larger firms have relatively more to lose by 
not recontracting with shareholder-oriented management in a timely fashion. Thus, the 
relative costs of distress must be higher for larger firms.
Betker [1995a] examines the cross-sectional determinants of absolute priority 
violations in favor of equity for 75 firms which emerged from Chapter 11 during 1982 
through 1990. Betker [1995a, p. 162] notes that it is usually assumed that managers 
act in the interests of stockholders during the Chapter 11 process (e.g., Bulow and 
Shoven [1978], Brown [1989], and Giammarino [1989]). In actuality, there may be 
agency problems between stockholders and managers. The Betker [1995a] study 
extends the research on the determinants of absolute priority violations performed by 
Eberhart et al. [1990] and Franks and Torous [1994] (both of which had significant 
results for firm size). Absolute priority violations are modeled as a function of the 
following: (1) relative allowed claims (i.e., claims divided by the estimated value of 
all securities on emergence), (2) percentage of claims held by priority, secured, and 
bank creditors, (3) total assets prior to emerging from bankruptcy (i.e., firm size), (4) 
number of creditor classes, (5) creditor concentration (a Herfindahl index of creditor 
claims), (6) Southern District of New York dummy, (7) percentage of firm shares held 
by the pre-reorganization plan CEO, (8) original CEO replaced dummy, (9) original 
CEO shares, (10) replacement CEO shares, (11) CEO pay dummy (if CEO pay 
increased during plan confirmation period), (12) equity committee dummy, (13) 
creditors firing CEO dummy, and (14) lost exclusivity dummy. The regression results
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suggest that absolute priority violations in favor of equity are at least in part 
determined by: (1) relative allowed claims (- relationship, p-Value < 1%), (2) 
percentage of claims held by priority creditors (- relationship, p- Value < 1%), (7) 
percentage of shares held by CEO (+ relationship, p-Value = 1%) or (9) original CEO 
shares (+ relationship, p-Value = 1%), (11) CEO pay dummy (- relationship, p-Value 
< 1%), and (14) lost exclusivity dummy (- relationship, p-Value < 6%). Of more 
interest might be those variables which were not statistically significant. For example, 
in Betker's broader model, equity violations were not determined by firm size, creditor 
concentration, or creditor claims complexity. In addition, the positive relationship 
between CEO shares and absolute priority violations in favor of equity gives strong 
support to the argument that managers do exercise considerable power in the 
renegotiation of claims in bankruptcy. Overall, the results support the critics of the 
Chapter 11 process as one which appears too lenient on incumbent management (see 
Betker [1995a, p. 182]).
2.5 Default Recovery Rates by Capital Priority
Given the importance of low-grade debt to this thesis, this section will present some 
values on default34 recoveries for various levels of seniority. The following two tables 
provide some background on the loss rate of various defaulted low-grade bonds, 
according to seniority in the capital structure, and year of default. Note that 
historically, assuming issuance at par, the price decline of defaulting issues from 
January of the year default occurred to the default date has been approximately 40% 
over an average number of 5.73 months before default, compared with an 
approximately 61% decline from the original issue date to the date of default (Altman 
[1987, p. 22]).
34 Default here is generally defined to include any stoppage o f coupon payment(s), which is not cured 
within 30 days (e.g., see Gomez et al. [1991]).
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Table 3
Original Issue Low-Grade Debt Default Losses (Salomon Brothers' Numbers)
These values are from Salomon Brothers.
Debt Seniority in Capital Structure
Senior Senior Senior Junior
Year Secured Unsecured Subordinated Subordinated Subordinated Overall
1979 NA NA NA $38.00 NA $38.00
1980 NA NA NA 43.00 NA 43.00
1981 NA NA NA 40.00 NA 40.00
1982 NA $41.50 $40.00 36.00 NA 38.14
1983 NA NA NA 36.75 NA 36.75
1984 $43.00 NA 35.00 36.42 NA 36.83
1985 83.00 77.00 31.41 33.25 NA 36.53
1986 62.00 41.33 29.67 39.32 NA 37.91
1987 57.00 49.57 41.71 38.11 NA 43.73
1988 87.00 81.42 30.83 36.91 $55.00 43.03
1989 70.88 35.51 32.84 25.76 35.38 36.30
1990 42.79 34.30 32.30 20.55 16.63 30.63
1991 41.20 31.85 38.43 30.26 8.25 33.42
77-91 $54.76 $40.18 $34.08 $31.26 $22.97 $35.54
Source: Salomon Brothers, Original-Issue High-Yield Default Study - First Half of 1991, High Yield 
Research Department, August 2, 1991
Table 4
Average Recovery Prices for Low-Grade Defaulted Debt (Altman's Numbers)
These values are from Merrill Lynch Corporation.
Debt Seniority in Capital Structure
Year Secured Senior
Senior
Subordinated
Subordinated 
Cash Pay
Subordinated 
Non-Cash Pay
1985 $74.25 $34.81 $36.18 $41.45 NA
1986 48.32 37.09 37.74 31.58 NA
1987 12.00 70.52 53.50 40.54 NA
1988 67.96 41.99 30.70 35.27 NA
1989 82.69 53.70 19.60 23.95 NA
1990 35.04 32.02 24.04 17.93 $18.99
1991 54.50 58.15 34.62 20.28 21.06
1985-1991 $60.51 $52.28 $30.70 $27.96 $19.51
Observations (41) (164) (107) (158) (16)
Source: Merrill Lynch, "Defaults and Returns on High Yield Bonds," High Yield Securities Research, 
March 6, 1992. These values were based on a study done by Altman.
Over the last 13 years, the actual recovery percentages obtained by holders of 
defaulted low-grade debt were approximately 36 cents on the dollar. Note, at times 
seniority did not guarantee larger payments for legally more secure debtholders. 
Neither table has a security class which had larger recovery values than a lower class 
in every year. Over the 1980s, capital priority did not strictly determine the recoveries 
for the various classes of low-grade debt. In addition, average step-downs over the 13
52
year period of the first table seem to run counter to the doctrine of absolute priority.35 
The fact that legal seniority did not guarantee recovery seniority is an area for future 
research.
2.6 The Doctrine of Fraudulent Conveyance
Unsecured creditors are increasingly likely to use fraudulent conveyance statutes 
to attempt to reduce or eliminate bank's senior secured position in failed LBOs. 
Smith [1991, p. 1]
The doctrine of fraudulent conveyance is another legal doctrine affecting the valuation 
of distressed securities. Although, it has not received as much attention in the finance 
literature as the doctrine of absolute priority (actually, to date no empirical finance 
studies have focused on this doctrine).
Essentially, fraudulent conveyance is a transfer of value from one creditor(s) with 
intent to defraud that creditor(s).36 The situation of fraudulent conveyance exists 
whenever a transfer of value from a creditor(s) occurs and the value received in 
consideration was not of an equal value, which then renders the debtor insolvent (see 
Weil et al. [1991a] for an example where the ruling required rendering of insolvency 
even though the transfer of value was fraudulent). This is typically the case in 
leveraged buyouts ("LBOs") where fraudulent conveyance issues can occur due to the 
technique of using the assets of the company being acquired to repay all or part of the 
old stockholders' interests.37 The future earnings of the acquired company are 
typically used to pay off debtholders (see Ammidon and Doyle [1989]). Obviously, if 
future operating earnings become insufficient to pay off creditors (i.e., an event of 
default), fraudulent conveyance is a strong possibility. Ultimately, in the case of a 
failed LBO, the question of fraud is often one of the accuracy of the business 
projections made by the acquiring firm (see Michel and Shaked [1990, p. 45-49] for
35 The step-downs from senior secured to senior unsecured, senior unsecured to senior subordinated, 
senior subordinated to subordinated, and subordinated to junior subordinated were approximately 73%, 
85%, 92%, and 73% respectively.
36 See Landy et al. [1992] for a general description of fraudulent transfers and various remedies and/or 
courses of action available to low-grade bondholders.
37 For additional background on LBOs as they relate to low-grade debt financing in the 1980s: (1) see 
Ammidon and Doyle [1989] for background on the degree of financial risk in the early stages of a low- 
grade debt financed LBO; (2) see Hanley et al. [1988] for deal structure; (3) see Ross [1988] regarding 
negative pledge clauses which in theory increase the value of low-grade debt; (4) see Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens [1990] regarding the profitability of what they incorrectly call "reverse LBOs", and (5) 
Kaplan and Stein [1990] for a thorough study of the change in equity betas during and after an LBO.
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an example of a case). A large number of low-grade securities are those of former 
failed LBOs.
Although sections 544 and 548 of the Code deal with alleged fraudulent conveyances, 
they have not been implemented to the extent that the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act have.38 In much the same way 
prepackaged Chapter 11s have recently changed the Chapter 11 process for creditors, 
fraudulent conveyance39 has had some influence on the Northern Pacific v. Boyd 
ruling regarding absolute priority. "According to the floor statements concerning 
1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, it always violates the absolute priority rule to 'skip 
over' a dissenting class (Baird and Jackson [1989, p. 776-777])." Fraudulent 
conveyance is an effective method of not only enforcing absolute priority (i.e., 
enforcing 1129(b)), but also achieving a new level of priority for a victorious 
bondholder. In cases where fraudulent conveyance is found, claims are then 
"equitably subordinated" to those of the injured party's.40 Since the Code's inception, 
there has been an attempt by some low-grade bondholders to enforce the fraudulent 
conveyance laws which have existed on the books for some time and appear to 
contradict the Northern Pacific v. Boyd ruling (see Smith [1991]). The most 
successful cases for subordinated bondholders have been applying fraudulent 
conveyance to LBO situations. By definition, almost any failed LBO can be 
considered a fraudulent conveyance (see Michel and Shaked [1990] regarding this 
particular point and an extreme example of a successful fraudulent conveyance case 
for unsecured creditors).
Fraudulent conveyance risk hinges in large part upon the differential between GAAP 
and legal definitions of insolvency. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act defines 
insolvency as:
3** It is hard not to comment on the notion of two "uniform" acts. Apparently, the more recent act is the 
more applicable of the two.
39 Historically, the following three sets of laws have been attributed with the responsibility for 
establishing the legal doctrine of fraudulent conveyance: (1) Statute of 13 Elizabeth [1571], Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act [1918], and (3) Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act [1985].
40 That is, the doctrine of equitable subordination is applied. Section 510(c) of the Code authorizes the 
use of the doctrine of equitable subordination, but leaves its specific application to the discretion of the 
bankruptcy judge (see Weil et al. [1991b, p. 3-6]). It was intended to be applied to claims of the same 
type.
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A business is insolvent when the present fair saleable value of its assets in a 
reasonably prompt sale is less than the amount that will be required to pay its 
probable liability on its existing debts as they become absolute and matured. For 
the purpose of this definition all debts are considered whether mature or 
unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent.
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act [1918]
Essentially, the legal definition of insolvency includes off-balance-sheet items and 
real intangibles.41 In cases where there are relatively high levels of off-balance-sheet 
items and high levels of real goodwill, the spectre of fraudulent conveyance appears. 
The typical LBO of the 1980s fits that description (again, see Ammidon and Doyle 
[1989]). If the risk of fraudulent conveyance has an impact on security valuation it 
should appear in market valuations, particularly for distressed low-grade debt which 
include a large number of failed LBOs. As Smith accurately stated:
Whenever there is a Chapter 11 or a Chapter 7 filing, the creditors-the creditors 
committee in particular-look back in time at transfers and transactions that 
occurred prior to the filing, and see if there is a potential claim of fraudulent 
conveyance that they can bring against some deep pocket. And then when the 
course of the Chapter 11 proceeding is being worked out, in a plan, for instance, 
usually those claims are then resolved and releases are exchanged.
Smith [1991, p. 2]
Previous studies have failed to point out the wide array of laws contributing to the 
uncertainty facing distressed security holders in the U.S. In addition to absolute 
priority and fraudulent conveyance, there are other parts of the Code which can affect 
valuation.
2.7 Debtor-in-Possession ("DIP") Financing
The Code (sections 364(b) and 364(c)) allows for the subordination of prepetition 
claims to postpetition debt, commonly referred to as DIP financing.42 In cases where 
DIP financing is applied to cases where negative net present value projects are being
41 Michel and Shaked [1990, p. 45] also make this point. They seem to indicate that in order for an 
LBO's secured creditors to protect themselves from equitable subordination they should "make a good 
faith effort to determine the fair saleable value of the firm's assets and its total liabilities as of the date 
of the LBO." In reality, this is easier said than done. Much of the law in this area is so contestable 
because it is hardly ever clear what the "fair" value of the assets are.
42 This is known as "priming", or coming ahead in priority of the prepetition debt.
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taken on, it suboptimally reduces the value of prepetition claims.43 Although DIP debt 
is issued when Chapter 11 occurs, it is not clear whether it should be considered 
distressed debt. DIP debt enjoys the next highest priority, just behind the government, 
and normally has a very short maturity (see Altman [1991b]).44 Its importance to the 
low-grade debt of very distressed companies lies in the presumption that it is required 
to work a company out of bankruptcy.45
DIP financing is often intended to be used in situations where a bankrupt firm's senior 
and subordinated debt are at the holding company level, while trade debt is at the 
operating company level (see Rohman and Policano [1990, p. 98]). Subordinated debt 
covenants typically prohibit any other debt at the operating subsidiary level. These 
covenants are effectively nullified once a company enters Chapter 11. Through 
bankruptcy court approval, Chapter 11 effectively takes security away from 
subordinated lenders and frees it up to be pledged to senior secured lenders. DIP 
financing is an extension of the theory that large firms with assets pledged to 
subordinated lenders should be allowed to continue to operate. It may also be a partial 
explanation behind some of the findings in Chapter 4. Often, firms which have elected 
to enter the court protection afforded by Chapter 11 of the Code have already lined up 
DIP financing before filing.46 DIP financing would seem to be another tool given to 
management which may tend to reduce the value of prepetition debt, particularly 
unsecured subordinated debt. As Rohman and Policano [1990, p. 99] point out: "the 
mere fact of having a new lender ready to provide financing on the eve of a Chapter 
11 filing puts management in a stronger position relative to existing lenders."
"A typical DIP loan is an oversecured, revolving credit facility with a maturity of up 
to two years (Altman [1991b, p. 28])." Can a loan be "oversecured" and still be of real 
economic value to a company in Chapter 11? More specifically, does the ability of a 
firm to receive DIP financing indicate a higher than average probability for emergence
43 This is due in large part to the bankruptcy judge's assumption that managers are better informed 
than creditors to decide on DIP financing. In practice, this often happens (e.g., Microband, which filed 
under Chapter 11 of the Code was allowed DIP financing which later received almost all the liquidated 
value of the company).
44 This short maturity may not just be due to the premise that it is only required to overcome a 
temporary liquidity crisis. Section 546(a) of the Code places a two year statute of limitations on a 
trustee's ability to recover property previously transferred by the debtor (Weil et al. [1991b, p. 10]).
The tendency for the DIP loan to have a maturity of two years may be in large part to avoid questions 
of prepetition or postpetition fraud.
43 DIP financing has never been academically studied, even though "during the first nine months of 
1990, over $43 billion of DIP financing for bankrupt firms" was arranged (Altman [1991b, p. 29]). It is 
a large financial market with little public information. Also, due to tax reasons, many of the firms 
operating in the U.S. are overseas banks.
46 This is known as "filing on a pillow."
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from Chapter 11? That is, does DIP financing help creditors, or does it signal 
management's willingness to prolong bankruptcy? These issues have not been 
researched. The issue of the economic value of DIP financing is an area for future 
research, but one that is beyond the scope of this thesis.47 Besides specific laws 
affecting valuation, certain cases have had significant impacts on valuation. The most 
significant may be the LTV Case.
2.8 The LTV Case
The July 17,1986 filing of bankruptcy by the LTV Steel Company was a watershed 
for efforts to restructure companies in the wake of many failed low-grade debt LBOs 
of the 1980s, and like the Penn Central bankruptcy it generated a large amount of 
research. At the time it was one of the largest restructurings, and as of 1986 the largest 
bankruptcy in U.S. history.48 It discouraged the use of restructurings, and contributed 
to the later switch to prepackaged Chapter 11s (see Ma et al. [1989] and Tashjian et al. 
[1996, p. 154-155]). Essentially, the LTV bankruptcy court ruling required marking to 
market any claims exchanged in a restructuring, at the time of the restructuring, but 
maintained the status of nonexchanged securities. Thus, as was the case with the LTV 
Company, if an exchange is made but the company subsequently files for bankruptcy, 
all exchanged debt will be marked to market at discounted market prices as of the 
restructuring while all nonexchanged debt will remain at par value when the plan of 
reorganization is made and proposed payments to creditors are decided upon in that 
plan. The problem only occurs if subsequent to an exchange the debtor files for 
bankruptcy.
The LTV ruling effectively applied original issue discount ("OID") to the securities of 
restructured companies. Normally, OID is the difference between the amount 
exchanged for a debt instrument and its face amount. Applying OID to bankrupt 
company debt was the result of applying Paragraph (2) of Section 502(b) of the Code.
4? Prior beliefs on the matter tend toward the belief that DIP financing is a net real detriment to large 
bankruptcies, and a net real positive for smaller firms filing under Chapter 11. Managers of larger 
firms may tend to use the extra time gained to their advantage and to the detriment o f creditors.
48 The LTV bankruptcy filing has another less heralded claim to fame. It is responsible for section 
1114 of the Code, which gives retirees retroactive priority in bankruptcy. After entering bankruptcy, 
the LTV corporation announced the termination of all medical and life insurance benefits of all of its 
retirees. "Section 1114 gives retirees special priority status - they're allowed to stand ahead of 
unsecured creditors (Lyons [1991, p. 104])." This is just another example of the volatile nature of 
claims under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. One day a claim is subordinate, the next it has superpriority 
and all other claims are worthless.
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This part of the Code disallows claims for the accrual of interest, since a bankruptcy 
petition accelerates principal and suspends the accrual of interest (see Chapman and 
Cutler [1990, p. 26] for details and case rulings on the matter). To illustrate, consider 
the following example: an exchange is made for a bond with a par amount of $500 
for a bond with a par amount of $1,000 which subsequently trades at $250. If a 
bankruptcy ensues, based on the LTV ruling, that claim would be valued at $250 plus 
accrued interest. Nontendering bondholders could claim $1,000 per bond plus accrued 
interest. The LTV ruling discouraged the use of out-of-court restructurings, and 
thereby exacerbated the holdout problem.49
Ma et al. [1989] studied the "resiliency" of the low-grade debt market by examining 
implied default rates before and after the LTV bankruptcy. They found a significant 
increase in implied default premiums which lasted approximately six months after the 
bankruptcy filing date. The Ma et al. [1989] study supported the contention that 
whether transitory or permanent, the effects on the valuation of low-grade debt of 
large bankruptcy filings are real. Also, large bankruptcy court case decisions probably 
have a large impact on perceived probabilities of negotiated settlements, which in turn 
have an impact on security valuation in distress. This later possibility has not been 
researched, and is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is important to note that not only 
do specific laws impact valuation, but cases do as well. Also, in addition to court 
cases, certain S.E.C. rules affect low-grade security valuation.
2.9 Rules Regarding the Trading of Private Placements (S.E.C. Rules 
144A, Amended Rule 144, and Regulation S)
The U.S. private placement market is one of the largest financial markets in the world. 
The relevant low-grade portion of that market is estimated to be larger than the 
relevant low-grade portion of the public corporate debt market (Altman [1991b, p. 4- 
12]). Given that private placement securities are not traded on public exchanges, rules 
restricting trading are very important to liquidity available in that market.50 To the
49 in theory it is possible to avoid the OID problem by either of the following two types of legal 
methods: (1) amend the existing indenture in an attempt to claim there has been no exchange, and (2) 
get a court order stating that there is no OID.
'0  See Silber [1991a & 1991b] regarding the overwhelming influence of Rule 144 on the pricing of 
restricted equities. His "results indicate that marketing a large block of illiquid securities requires 
significant price concessions to investors, even firms with substantial creditworthiness [p. 11]." He 
indicates that he is not quite sure why any firm would offer securities restricted by Rule 144 in the first 
place, given the cost.
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extent that the low-grade debt market includes low-grade private placements, rules 
144,144A, and Regulation S are very important to the low-grade market.51
To provide some background as to the size of the market, Tice [1989, p. 4] reported 
that in 1980, 968 issues were placed with an average transaction size of $16 million 
(i.e., about $15 billion), in 1988, 3,516 issues were placed with an average size of $57 
million (i.e., about $200 billion). Most of these issues were not and are not rated by 
the ratings agencies. Many of the issues in this market are considered low-grade.
The Securities Act of 1933 established the basic foundation for the private placement 
market, but it did not provide for the trading of privately placed securities to 
individuals which were considered "unsophisticated". Institutions, particularly 
insurance companies, dominate the private placement market.52 Rule 144 of the 1933 
Act created an exemption for the trading of publicly registered private placements 
between institutions, after a holding period of at least two years. In 1988 a proposal to 
update Rule 144 was made by the S.E.C.
In 1988, the S.E.C. published for comment Rule 144A, which would exempt 
registration requirements for institutional investors. This would eliminate the holding 
period requirement and the inability to resell privately placed securities for 
institutions. It would generally increase the liquidity in the market.53 Since the 
original publishing of Rule 144A, the S.E.C. has subdivided institutional buyers into 
tiers based on investment portfolio size.
Also in 1988, the S.E.C. published for comment an amendment to Rule 144 and 
Regulation S. Currently, each time a private placement is sold, the holding period is 
reset. Therefore, after purchasing a security that was held over two years, the 
institution purchasing the security must wait another two years before they are 
permitted to sell the security. The proposed amended Rule 144 would eliminate the 
practice of beginning new periods each time a private placement is sold. The holding 
period would be counted once from time of original issuance. Regulation S would 
exempt the resale of U.S. private placements outside the U.S. Thus, Regulation S 
would make it relatively easy for foreign investors to purchase U.S. private 
placements as long as they were issued outside the U.S. These proposals would
For details on these rules see Tice [1989].
52 Zwick [1980, p. 24-25] stated that life insurance companies hold "about two thirds" of private 
placements and essentially dominate the market.
53 Zwick [1980, p.23] found that over the period 1961 through 1977 the average spread between 
privately placed bonds and comparable publicly issued bonds was approximately 50 basis points.
59
substantially increase the liquidity of the private placement market for low-grade and 
high-grade debt.
2.10 Prepackaged Chapter 11s, Reorganizations, and Restructurings
Section 1126 of the Code allows for both out-of-court restructurings and prepackaged 
Chapter 11s (see Salerno and Hansen [1991]).54 Under Chapter 11a plan of 
reorganization is approved by the bankruptcy court (a "Chapter 11 Plan"), while under 
Section 1126 the plan may be approved by a vote of creditors. The difference between 
plan approval by creditors under a restructuring scenario versus a prepackaged 
Chapter 11 is that the indentures governing the securities govern the voting rules 
outside of court approval, whereas the prepackaged Chapter 11 takes advantage of 
using the bankruptcy court's "cram down" powers to force dissenting and nonvoting 
holders to accept the plan if more than 2/3 in amount and more than 1/2 in number of 
each class agree on the plan, regardless of the indenture provisions specifying voting 
majorities required to amend the covenants.55
Essentially, a prepackaged Chapter 11 is a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition with a 
creditor accepted plan of reorganization attached (see Chapman and Cutler [1990, p. 
25] for practical details of the procedure). It's primary economic reasons for existence 
seem to be to avoid free rider problems and reduce the direct and indirect costs of 
bankruptcy. Particularly in large bankruptcies with complex capital structures and 
large numbers of holders, it is clear to small holders that their individual agreement to 
a plan of restructuring will have little impact on the outcome of a restructuring 
exchange offer for their bonds.56 Collectively, these small holders may make or break 
a restructuring exchange offer, but individually this may not be the case. Given that it 
is most economic in larger bankruptcies, which have higher probabilities of survival 
in the first place, there should be a tendency for there to be a higher survival rate 
among corporations using prepackaged Chapter 11s rather than restructurings.57
54 Also, even more specifically, they are often referred to as "1126b filings”.
55 They also have certain real tax advantages if structured properly (see section on accounting and tax 
rules of restructurings and workouts, covered later in this chapter).
56 For example, assume the following: (1) there are three holders of the only issue of debt, (2) the 
company is economically insolvent, and (3) two holders control 49.9% of the issue each. Given that the 
two holders together can in or out of court complete a restructuring, the 0.2% holder has little incentive 
to accept an offer which diminishes the value of his or her securities.
57 Essentially, the increasing use of "prepacks" may have resulted in higher confirmation rates and 
quicker times to plan of reorganization confirmation.
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The largest practical benefit to a prepackaged Chapter 11 is that the free rider problem 
can be avoided (see Tashjian et al. [1996, p. 153-154]).58 The downside is that 
although it does not result in the common form of bankruptcy, technically it is still a 
Chapter l l . 59 There may still be a stigma associated with Chapter 11 petitions even if 
they are prepackaged plans of bankruptcy. That is, the abnormal price decline found 
on Chapter 11 announcement dates may apply equally on prepack announcement 
dates. In "prepack" cases where the plan includes an immediate exit from Chapter 11 
protection, prepackaged Chapter 11 is economically equivalent to a restructuring. The 
differences are: it is easier to get creditor approval (i.e., a lower percentage of 
approval is required), and the free rider problem is almost completely avoided.60
Betker [1995b] examined 49 prepacks which were filed between 1986 and 1993. The 
reasons given for favoring prepacks over out-of-court restructurings were: (1) 
elimination of the hold-out or free-rider problem, and (2) preservation of NOL 
carryovers (i.e., ala Fabozzi et al. [1993]). Possible avoidance of cancellation of 
indebtedness income (COD) was also given as an advantage of prepacks over out-of- 
court restructurings, but Betker [1995b, p. 11-12] concluded that no firm in the sample 
would have benefited from one form of reorgaization over the other (i.e., specifically 
as it relates to current tax benefits). In 27 cases, the COD income was less than the 
firm's insolvency. In the other 17 cases with values estimated, the firm had sufficient 
NOLs to offset the taxable gain. Therefore, regardless of Betker's conclusion, there 
were 17 cases with a potential future benefit caused by the treatment of COD income 
in a prepack versus an out-of-court restructuring. Although, regarding NOL 
carryovers, prepacks may no longer have a clear economic advantage over out-of- 
court restructurings after January 1, 1995 when the Stock-for-Debt Exception is 
repealed (see Betker [1995b, p. 18]). Betker [1995b, p. 4] stated that "on most 
dimensions prepacks provide benefit between what previous authors have reported for 
workouts and traditional bankruptcies." In particular, it was suggested that prepacks 
had about the same direct costs as formal Chapter 11s, but their indirect costs were 
lower, and that they were similar in total costs to out-of-court restructurings.
58 See McConnell [1991] for a rare general discussion of the benefits o f prepackaged Chapter 11s. 
Although, much of the article is based on conjecture and other parts are clearly wrong.
5^ Gilson et al. [1990, p. 325] state that "in practice prepackaged filings are extremely rare." Their 
sample covers 1978 through 1987. As of 1987 there has been a tremendous increase in the use of 
prepackaged plans o f reorganization over restructurings for the types o f firms Gilson et al. studied 
(e.g., Southland).
60 Although, it is possible for a class of creditors (which requires that at least two creditors from the 
same class agree) to object to the plan of reorganization if they declare and can prove they are being 
treated unfairly as a class under the proposed plan of reorganization (e.g., this happened in the largest 
prepack case in U.S. history, Southland).
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Tashjian et al. [1996] examined 49 prepacks which were filed between 1986 and 
1993. The following were some of the findings: (1) compared to Warner's [1977b] and 
Weiss' [1990] values on formal Chapter 11s, prepacks result in lower direct costs of 
bankruptcy; (2) compared to Weiss' [1990], Gilson et al.'s [1990], and Franks and 
Torous' [1994] values on formal Chapter 11s, prepacks result in less time spent in 
reorganization and formal bankruptcy; (3) compared to Franks and Torous' [1994] 
values on formal Chapter 11s, prepacks result in higher recovery rates by creditors;
(4) compared to Weiss' [1990] values on formal Chapter 11s, prepacks result in fewer 
incidences of absolute priority violations; and (5) compared to Gilson's [1990] and 
Weiss' [1990] values on formal Chapter 11s, prepacks have similar transfer of control 
to creditors. Therefore, the study would tend to view prepacks as a relatively 
inexpensive substitute for formal Chapter 11. Although, as pointed out by the authors, 
the evidence presented is not capable of determining whether prepacks can be 
substituted for formal Chapter 1 Is or out-of-court restructurings. The traditional view 
has been one of assuming that the three basic legal tools for restructuring a firm are 
looked upon by creditors and debtors as a continuum, with the "proper" tool used 
being that which provides the greatest benefit at the least cost. Although, if this were 
strictly true, one would not expect to see a surge in the use of one particular method of 
reorganization as has been witnessed with prepacks relative to formal Chapter 1 Is. In 
addition, Tashjian et al. [1996] examined the distinction between "pre-voted" and 
"post-voted" prepacks. They found that pre-voted prepacks spent significantly less 
time in bankruptcy and insignificantly more time in pre-bankruptcy negotiations.
The Penn Central bankruptcy is considered to be a seminal successful Chapter 11 
bankruptcy (see Fridson [1991a]). It is in large part responsible for spawning what 
could loosely be referred to as the financial distress field of financial economics. 
Gordon [1971] was one of the first to attempt to explain the meaning and implications 
of the term "financial distress". Murray [1971] was one of the first financial 
economists to suggest that the Penn Central case was evidence of the weak form of 
efficient markets not holding in distress. Weston [1971] was one of the first financial 
economists to emphasize the importance of understanding the regulatory and legal 
aspects of the Penn Central case of distress. The size and publicity associated with the 
Penn Central case highlighted the lack of very basic levels of informational efficiency 
in the case of distress, and the importance of laws and regulations in cases of distress. 
Aside from the work resulting from the Penn Central bankruptcy in 1970, much of the 
empirical work in the field is relatively recent.
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Two more recent studies which have provided some empirical background to firms 
restructuring out-of-court and in-court were by Gilson et al. [1990] and Asquith et al.
[1991].61 As Baldwin and Mason [1983, p. 505] stated: "The resolution of claims in 
these situations often differs from what is predicted by legal rules or standard 
theoretical models." The Gilson et al. [1990] study reviewed some of the legal 
advantages and disadvantages of out-of-court restructuring over Chapter 11 
reorganization.62 Based on their sample of 169 publicly traded companies which 
restructured their debt between 1978 to 1987 (89 filed for Chapter 11 and 80 
restructured their debt outside of formal bankruptcy), they found that formal Chapter 
11 is more likely to result the more classes of debt are outstanding; while formal 
Chapter 11 is more likely to be avoided the more of the firm's assets are intangible 
and/or the more debt is owed to banks. Asquith et al. [1991] examined 102 distressed 
low-grade debt issuers (generally, distress is defined to occur when estimated 
internally generated cash flow is less than reported interest expense after issuing low- 
grade debt) and found the following: (1) restructuring bank debt alone is not a 
sufficient condition for avoiding bankruptcy (i.e., the firm is required to restructure its 
public debt to have a chance of avoiding formal bankruptcy); (2) banks almost never 
forgive principal63 or provide new financing; (3) asset sales are an important means of 
avoiding formal bankruptcy, but they are at least in part dependent on industry 
factors64; (4) "complex" capital structures tend to be associated with formal 
bankruptcy; and (5) financial performance has little or no impact on a firm's ability to 
avoid formal bankruptcy, sell assets, or decrease capital expenditures (all of which 
seem to be important in avoiding Chapter 11). At a minimum, these results tend to 
confirm the view that distress in general creates complex agency problems.
In addition, it should be noted that a central argument of the Gilson et al. [1990] study 
was that there was not a strong holdout problem for out-of-court restructurings versus 
formal Chapter 11s. They did not provide a very convincing argument. The following
61 In addition, a study by DeAngelo and DeAngelo [1990] focused on dividend policy and financial 
distress.
62 They define (Gilson et al. [1990, p. 326]) a successful restructuring to be a restructuring in which 
there is no bankruptcy filing within one year of the declared restructuring date. Often the negotiations 
continue for years beyond the declared restructuring date (e.g., Leaseway Transportation), then end in 
the filing for protection under Chapter 11 of the Code. It is not clear that one can distinguish between 
restructurings and reorganizations in the first place, particularly for the predominantly large firms 
being studied by academics such as Gilson et al. Furthermore, it is not clear that Chapter 11 
reorganizations clearly and necessarily result in worse economic outcomes than restructurings.
63 Only in one case did banks forgive principal. This company was one which the former president of 
the U.S. was formerly associated with (i.e., Zapata Oil).
64 Asquith et al. make reference to Shleifer and Vishny concerning this point. Shleifer, A., and R. 
Vishny, "Asset Sales and Debt Capacity," manuscript, University of Chicago, 1991.
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is a table which will aid in illustrating the magnitude of the holdout problem for low- 
grade debt restructurings.
Table 5
Percentage Exchanged and Returns One Year after the Exchange Date65
These values are from the First Boston Corporation.
"Old" Security "New" Security
Security Type Return
Distressed66
Nondistressed
Average
12.20%
20.03
14.97%
Exchanged
67.86%
74.33
70.15%
Not
Exchanged
32.14%
25.67
29.85%
Return
-10.64%
8.37
■3.91%
Source: First Boston Corporation, High Yield Handbook, High Yield Research Group: CS First 
Boston, January 1990
It may or may not be profitable to restructure out-of-court, but it is certainly profitable 
to holdout. From this table, the more interesting question is not why negotiations 
breakdown, but rather, why they succeed? Unfortunately, regarding valuing distressed 
low-grade debt, there is not much insight to be had from the Gilson et al. [1990] 
article, other than the reiteration of practitioner contentions that low levels of 
intangible assets and high levels of bank debt tend to discourage out-of-court 
restructurings.
Given the foregoing discussion, it should be clear that financial economists have 
recently categorized distressed restructurings into the following three general types:
(1) formal Chapter 11s, (2) out-of-court restructurings, and (3) prepackaged Chapter 
11s. Prepacks, like out-of-court restructurings, are a form of negotiated settlement 
dependent on a certain level of creditor approval. Unlike most restructurings, they 
usually require a relatively low level of acceptance. For the purposes of this thesis, it 
is important to note that the variety of types of "bankruptcy" increase the illiquidity of 
distressed security markets by increasing the uncertainty of bankruptcy itself.
65 This study covers the period 1985 through 1990. 130 issues for 49 different issuers were studied.
66 First Boston defines distress "as any transaction where the value of the consideration received by 
holders was less than the par amount of the securities for which there was a tender or exchange offer 
(First Boston [1992])."
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3 Bond Covenants
Since strong traditional covenants protect bondholders from wealth losses in 
LBOs, the declining use of such covenants in the 1980s and the introduction of 
new covenants seem anomalous.
Asquith and Wizman [1990, p. 196]
Regarding leverage buyouts, strong bonds covenants protect prebuyout bondholders 
from wealth losses (also, see Laber [1992] and Kahan and Tuckman [1993]). 
Additionally, the use of protective covenants had declined during the 1980s (see 
Asquith and Wizman [1990]). Even though the intent of many bond covenants was to 
protect bondholders in the event of corporate financial distress, it is unknown if strong 
covenants actually protected distressed bondholders from wealth losses in times of 
distress.67 Although possibly a useful study, it is not the purpose of this thesis to 
investigate the hypothetical effect of protective bond covenants on distressed 
corporations (e.g., see Black and Cox [1976]68 for a contingent claims approach to 
valuation regarding four general bond covenants). This thesis assumes that protective 
covenants limit wealth losses for bondholders of financially distressed corporations. 
Therefore, while not a principal focus of this thesis, bond covenants are assumed to be 
significant factors in the pricing of distressed and nondistressed bonds.69
The objective of this section is to present an overview of the covenants and indenture 
provisions which are common for low-grade bonds (also, see Smith and Warner 
[1979] for an agency theory overview of some covenants). Given that most of the data 
used in this thesis are derived from low-grade bonds of varying levels of distress, 
knowledge of low-grade bond covenants and indenture provisions should be useful 
detailed information. The remainder of this section will review ten of the more
67 There has been limited theoretical work in related areas. For example, see Berlin and Mester [1990] 
regarding an agency theory rationalization of the observation that private debt tended to have more 
restrictive covenant protection than public debt. Also, see Ho and Singer [1982] for a theoretical option 
pricing treatment of four common indenture provisions (e.g., maturity date).
6% The four covenants analyzed by Black and Cox [1976] were: (1) "safety covenants"; (2) 
"subordination arrangements"; (3) "restrictions on the financing of interest"; and (4) "restrictions on the 
financing of dividends".
69 Indirectly, studies have shown that bondholders may be hurt by the weakening of covenants. For 
example, Kahan and Tuckman [1993] have shown that relative to bondholders, shareholders receive 
positive abnormal returns around dates of bondholder accepted covenant changes. Although not a 
conclusion of that study, this would suggest that bondholders gave up significantly more value by 
agreeing to weakened covenants, thus implying a significant level of coercion on the part of 
management and/or shareholders.
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important low-grade bond covenants, then additional related covenants and indenture 
provisions will be listed.70
3.1 Common Low-Grade Bond Covenants
As stated above, the first part of this section presents an overview of ten common low- 
grade bond covenants. Although, the emphasis is on low-grade bonds, the covenants 
reviewed equally apply to high-grade bonds (i.e., all corporate, and municipal, debt 
obligations).
3.1.1 Restrictions on Mergers
A restrictions on mergers covenant is intended to restrict the ability of a firm to merge 
to the detriment of bondholders. Asquith and Wizman [1990] have confirmed the 
economic importance of these covenants. Asquith and Wizman found [1990, p. 201] 
"abnormal returns are 2.6% for strong covenant protection, -0.7% for weak protection, 
and -5.2% for no protection." Coverage tests and net worth tests are commonly part of 
a restrictions on merger covenant.71 This type of covenant was the most common and 
oldest of the change of control provisions.
3.1.2 Limitation on Dividends and Restricted Payments
Limitations on dividends and restricted payments are intended to stop creditors with 
lower priority from making payments which effectively increase their priority at the 
expense of higher priority creditors. Net worth tests are commonly part of this type of 
covenant. Also, the size of a payment can be strictly defined as a maximum 
percentage of defined net income figure. Exceptions are often specified for certain 
payments.
70 This list was taken from Yamarone and Chen [1989].
71 The purpose of these tests is to avoid LBO type mergers, where the target company is often levered 
to the detriment of pre-merger bondholders. For example, net worth tests typically specify that the post 
merger net worth must be greater than pre-merger net worth, or the merger is disallowed.
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My evidence indicates that the stockholders do not pay out all the allowed 
amount of debt and investment financed dividends. All the firms in my sample 
maintain reservoirs of substantial magnitude.
Kalay [1982, p. 227-228]
Corporate dividend policy has been the focus of much financial research. Although, 
with the exception of the Kalay [1982] study, dividend limitations as set forth by bond 
indentures have received limited attention. Kalay's evidence on this particular type of 
bond covenant suggests that limitations on dividends are not exercised to their legal 
limit. It is not clear that distressed firms act in a similar way. The examination of 
stockholder-bondholder conflict and limitations on dividends and restricted payments 
is a promising area for future research. Actually, the Kalay type of analysis applied to 
distressed, and nondistressed, corporations would provide for substantial future 
research opportunities.
3.1.3 Limitation on Additional Indebtedness
Limitations on additional indebtedness are intended to avoid excessive debt. It is an 
anti-layering provision with standard exemptions made for senior debt (i.e., bank 
debt). In order to take on additional indebtedness, a coverage test (e.g., a "fixed charge 
ratio") is often used to measure the level of additional indebtedness which can be 
issued. Foreign subsidiary debt is often not covered by the standard covenant of this 
type.72
3.1.4 Limitation on Liens (Negative Pledge)
Limitations on additional liens are intended to avoid the pledging of unpledged 
property. As with limitations on additional indebtedness, bank debt is exempted. An 
example of this covenant was provided by the 4% prior lien bonds due in 1997 and 
3% general lien bonds due in 2047 issued by the Northern Pacific Railroad (see Laber
[1992] regarding a case study of these bonds).
72 Smith and Warner [1979] analyzed some "standardized provisions" within the context of Agency 
Theory. Smith and Warner analyzed a document produced by the American Bar Foundation called 
"Commentaries on Indentures", which included a standard debt contract.
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3.1.5 Use of Asset Sale Proceeds
Covenants restricting the use of the proceeds from asset sales are limited to significant 
asset sales. The level of significance is strictly specified within the indenture. Also, 
what is defined as an "asset sale" is strictly specified within the indenture. Proceeds 
from significant "asset sales" can be specified to be devoted to the following types of 
activities: (1) repayment of the most senior debt, (2) investment in new acquisitions, 
or (3) capital investments.
3.1.6 Maintenance of Net Worth
This covenant is used as an early warning sign. "Tangible" or "adjusted" net worth is 
specified within the indenture as of a specified time period (e.g., every two quarters). 
GAAP net worth is "adjusted" in order to approximate economic value. Highly 
levered firms often require the relaxation of this covenant in times of financial 
distress.
3.1.7 Change of Control Provisions
Change of control provisions give bondholders a put option on their bonds. The put 
option is exercised when a "change of control" occurs. A change of control is strictly 
defined within the indenture (e.g., over 50% of the assets of the business are sold). 
This type of provision is directly related to the restriction on mergers covenant.
3.1.8 Transactions with Affiliates
The purpose of this provision is to specify the extent to which funds can be 
upstreamed and/or downstreamed from parent to subsidiary. This is of particular 
concern for LBOs where the corporate structure is often dominated by a parent 
holding company which has no tangible assets. A working definition of affiliate is 
specified within the indenture. Also, a "fairness" test is applied to the transaction in 
order to evaluate whether it was detrimental to the company which issued the bond. 
Director approval and/or independent valuation of affiliate transactions can be 
specified within the indenture.
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3.1.9 Limitations on Senior Subordinated Indebtedness (Anti-layering)
Like covenants limiting additional indebtedness, limitations on senior subordinated 
indebtedness were designed to limit the layering of debt. In short, low-grade 
bondholders can be subordinated below their current level of priority by allowing debt 
to be placed in the capital structure between themselves and the senior debt. Anti­
layering provisions are designed to stop the layering of both senior and subordinated 
debt.
3.1.10 Subsidiary Restrictions
Like provisions limiting transactions with affiliates, provisions limiting subsidiaries 
are intended to limit fraudulent transfers between units within a company. This type of 
provision by its nature must be well defined. Also, the definition of a wholly owned 
subsidiary can be problematic for large corporations with complex holdings.
3.2 Other Covenants and Indenture Provisions
The following table lists other bond covenants and indenture provisions not addressed 
by the preceding discussion.
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Figure 2
Other Covenants and Indenture Provisions
Other Covenants and Indenture Provisions
(1) Basic Covenants
(1) Payment of Principal and Interest
(2) Maintenance of Office
(3) Maintenance of Existence
(4) Waiver of Usury Laws
(2) Information Rights
(1) Quarterly and Annual Reports
(2) Compliance Certificates
(3) Additional Covenants
(1) Limitation on Acquisitions
(2) Restriction on Board of Director Composition
(1) Independent Directors
(2) Board Seats for Bond Holders
(3) Sinking Funds73
(4) Default Provisions/Cure Periods
(1) Payment Defaults
(2) Major Covenant Defaults
(3) Minor Covenant Defaults
(5) Acceleration
(6) Subordination
(1) Importance
(2) Blockage Periods
(3) Bankruptcy
(7) Registration Rights
(1) Purpose
(2) Shelf Registration and Duration
(3) Liquidated Damages/Penalty Interest
(4) Filing and Effectiveness Deadline
Source: Yamarone, C., and E. Chen, "Covenants: presentation on bond covenants," August 25, 1989
At the most basic level, the indentures must specify the amount and timing of interest 
and principal. The provision and timing of financial statements are commonly
73 See Dyl and Joehnk [1979] and Kidwell et al. [1989] for examples of research on the effect of 
sinking funds on the cost of corporate debt. Generally, the studies in the area suggest that sinking funds 
reduce the cost o f debt by decreasing default risk and increasing liquidity.
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specified within indentures. Although more common for equity, provisions regarding 
the composition of the board of directors can be added to low-grade bond indentures. 
For some companies issuing low-grade bonds, default provisions can restrict most 
major payment and investment decisions. In short, low-grade bond covenants can be 
extensive and restrictive.
4 Tax and Accounting Considerations of Debt Restructurings
In addition to strict economic considerations (e.g., industry capacity and relevant 
market demand), the value of distressed and nondistressed companies, and their 
securities, are affected by tax74 and accounting75 laws and regulations. For example, 
Kim and Schatzberg [1987, p. 313-314] state that voluntary liquidations can in large 
part be attributed to "tax considerations". Given that a large part of this thesis is 
concerned with low-grade debt, the following section is intended to present 
background on the principal tax and accounting laws affecting distressed U.S. 
corporate debt.76
4.1 U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences of Restructuring Debt
There are three principal tax considerations impacted by federal tax laws regarding 
distressed corporations. Specifically, those tax considerations are the following: (1) 
OID, (2) NOL carryovers, and (3) COD. Depending on a distressed company's 
circumstances, all three tax considerations can affect the valuation of that company's 
securities, particularly subordinated debt.
74 The tax discussion is in part based on Boshkov's [1991, p.214-227] detailed discussion o f the tax 
consequences of debt restructurings after the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990. Therefore, for a 
more detailed discussion see Boshkov [1991].
75 The accounting discussion is primarily based on Kieso and Weygandt's [1991, p. 718-726] 
accounting textbook treatment of "troubled debt restructurings". Therefore, for a more detailed 
discussion see Kieso and Weygandt [1991].
76 Although, the discussion that follows equally applies to the equities of distressed corporations. The 
federal government has attempted to but been unable to distinguish debt from equity regarding COD 
issues (see Boshkov [1991, p. 215]).
4.1.1 Original Issue Discount
71
If new securities are exchanged for old securities and there exists a reduction in value 
as a result of the exchange, OID tax laws apply. In most cases, the amount of OID is 
the net difference between the original issue price ("OIP") of the security plus any 
accrued interest and the offering price of the new security or package of securities. 
Also, in cases where issues are not publicly traded, any original or secondary issue 
will be priced by the first buyer.77 Whereas when an issue is publicly issued and 
traded, its value will be set at its market value as of issue and exchange in order to 
calculate OID. Generally OID is considered to be income to the firm making the 
exchange and a loss to the investor, and treated as such for tax purposes.78
4.1.2 Net Operating Loss Limitations
The economic usefulness of NOL carryovers can be limited in cases where there is an 
ownership change as defined by Section 382 of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 
1990. Although, there is a special rule applied to corporations which are under 
bankruptcy court protection. A loss of NOL carryovers can be avoided if the 
corporation is owned by at least 50% of the existing creditors and shareholders of a 
bankrupt company immediately before a change in ownership.79 In that case the 
existing NOL carryovers can be used by an acquiring entity without annual 
limitations.
There are some notable exceptions to the exception to limitations on NOL carryovers. 
With the exception of trade creditors, creditors which did not hold their debt for at 
least 18 months prior to the bankruptcy filing date are not considered to be existing 
creditors and/or shareholders. A substantial amount of debt and/or shares held by 
these ineligible creditors may make it impossible to carryforward any NOLs, thus 
making an acquisition uneconomic. Also, disallowance of all interest deductions for 
the three years prior to the ownership change can substantially reduce NOLs for 
highly levered corporations attempting to reduce their current leverage by means of a 
restructuring.
77 Specifically, pricing is determined by Section 1274 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
78 Although, for U.S. insurance companies OID is measured by certain reductions in par value, not 
market value.
79 The 50% cutoff is by both voting rights and value o f securities. Also, see Fabozzi et al. [1993, p. 7- 
8] on the issue o f NOL carryovers and IRS limitations and rules.
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4.1.3 Cancellation of Indebtedness Income
OIDs cause COD for corporations participating in restructurings or workouts. NOLs 
can be used to offset the COD from OIDs caused by the acquisition of a distressed 
corporation. Distressed companies interested in restructuring their obligations and/or 
being acquired have an economic interest to avoid as much COD income as possible 
and to carryforward as high a level of NOL as possible (e.g., Southland Corporation 
and Allied & Federated Stores).
4.1.4 Examples
The following are three basic types of distressed exchanges possible: (1) debt for debt,
(2) stock for debt, and (3) debt and stock for debt. Generally, the significant economic 
differences within each of the three types of exchanges are determined by whether the 
exchange is legally viewed as an out-of-court restructuring or an exchange 
consummated under bankruptcy court protection. The remainder of this sub-section 
will be used to review examples of the three types of distressed exchanges.
As an example of exchange type #1, assume the following for a bond exchange: (1) 
the old bond had an OIP of $1,000, (2) the old bond carried a market rate of interest,
(3) the new bond will have a face value of $500, (4) the new bond will carry a 
substantially reduced rate of interest set at the current applicable federal rate80 
("AFR"), (5) the new bond will have an issue price of $250, (6) the old bond was not 
publicly traded, (7) the new bond will be publicly traded, and (8) it is an out-of-court 
restructuring. The company issuing the new bond will have $750 of COD. The 
creditor will have to report an OID of $250 over the term of the new bond and the 
company issuing the new bond can report a deduction of this amount over the term of 
the new bond. If the new bond were not publicly traded, then its issue price would be 
its face value of $500 and COD would be $500. Assuming the first seven assumptions 
and that the exchange is pursuant to a plan of reorganization, there would be no COD 
or OID. However, there would be $500 of "bond issue premium" to be recognized by 
the issuing company over the term of the new bond.
That is, this is the statutory specific minimum federal rate as determined under Section 1274.
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As an example of exchange type #2, assume the following for a stock for bond 
exchange: (1) the old bond had an OIP of $1,000, (2) the old bond carried a market 
rate of interest, (3) the new stock will have a "fair" market value of $500, (4) the old 
bond was not publicly traded, (5) the new stock will be publicly traded, and (6) it is an 
out-of-court restructuring. If the newly issued stock has a fair market value equal to 
that of the newly issued bond in example #1, then there is no difference in the tax 
treatment of the stock for debt in this example versus the debt for debt exchange 
above. Although, if the company is under bankruptcy court protection, no COD may 
result. Generally, in bankruptcy, a company can shelter its exchange generated COD 
to the point at which it is insolvent. Therefore, if the COD were $750 and the 
company was at least $750 insolvent, then no COD need be reported. This could in 
part explain the popularity of stock for debt exchanges for bankrupt companies. The 
primary exception to this exception is the case of disqualified stock (e.g., most 
preferred stock doesn't count as stock). Attributes of disqualified stock include one or 
more of the following: (1) a de minimus or token amount of stock offered in exchange 
for debt, (2) stock with a fixed redemption date, and (3) stock which can be redeemed 
one or more times by the holder.
An exchange of stock and bonds for bonds can be illustrated by combining examples 
#1 and #2. All the exceptions and exceptions to the exceptions of examples #1 and #2 
apply. Again, the critical issues depend on whether the bonds and/or stock are 
publicly or privately placed and whether the stock exchanged represents a change in 
control. Generally it can be stated that the tax laws discourage the use of preferred 
stock and high coupon bonds in such exchanges. In addition, the tax laws generally 
encourage privately placed securities in out-of-court restructurings and publicly traded 
securities in bankruptcy court supervised restructurings. These laws and their effects 
on restructuring corporations are an obvious area for future research.
4.2 Accounting for Debt Restructurings (FASB Statement No. 15)
As mentioned before, in the U.S. financial obligations are often "restructured" in order 
to permit the debtor to continue as a going concern. Restructurings occur when 
creditors for economic and/or legal reasons grant certain concessions to the debtor. 
The most common concessions granted are to reduce the interest and/or the principal 
of the obligations being restructured (e.g., see Asquith et al. [1991]). These effects are 
especially commonplace in the low-grade debt market (see Gomez et al. [1991]). 
Given that a large part of this thesis is concerned with low-grade debt, the following
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section is intended to present background on the principal accounting law affecting 
distressed U.S. corporate debt.
FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 15 is the principal 
accounting law affecting distressed U.S. corporate debt. Statement No. 15 was 
intended to achieve a level of symmetry between the debtor’s gain and the creditor's 
loss for a distressed restructuring. As Kieso and Weygandt [1991, p. 719] state, 
"although the objective of FASB Statement No. 15 was to achieve symmetry between 
the entries recorded by the debtor and creditor, symmetry is not always attained." 
Asymmetry is the result of the fact that Statement No. 15 must be separately applied 
by each party to the restructuring. After accounting for creditor or debtor specific 
circumstances, it is possible that only one party will record a "troubled debt 
restructuring" (i.e., typically COD for the debtor).
The critical distinction for the creditor is whether the "fair market value" of the 
security or package of securities is less than the "carrying amount" of the original 
security. For example, assume all the assumptions of exchange type #1 hold, and the 
creditor had written down the bond to a net book value of $350. In this case since the 
market value is $250, an additional loss of $100 will need to be recognized by the 
creditor for that bond and an entry will need to be made for the extraordinary loss on 
restructuring of debt. If the market value was determined to be $350 or more, no loss 
would be recognized by the creditor. If there was a modification of the terms of the 
current security (e.g., the maturity date was extended) then no settlement exists and no 
gain or loss need be recognized (in this case a loss). The act of exchanging securities 
necessitates the recognition of a loss or gain. Particularly in the case of out-of-court 
restructurings, this aspect of Statement No. 15 should tend to encourage holdouts.
4.3 Low-Grade Company Financial Statements
The original Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 exempts firms that have publicly 
issued securities which have fewer than 300 holders from releasing financial statement 
information. That rule was later modified to state that a firm which has publicly issued 
a security with fewer than 300 security holders must file financial statements with the 
S.E.C. at least through the first year after issuance (see Norris [1990]). These rules 
have significantly increased the monitoring costs for holders of some very large 
companies' low-grade debt (e.g., Ampex Group, Stop & Shop, and Revlon: see 
Jereske [1991, p. 68]).
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Apparently, some companies have refused to release financial statement information 
in efforts to decrease liquidity, and consequently the bid prices, of their low-grade 
debt in order to purchase them back at a discount (see Jereske [1990] and Merrill 
Lynch [1991]). Many original issue low-grade debt issues are still held by fewer than 
100 institutional holders. In 1990 approximately $5 billion par value of debt changed 
their policy to one of non-disclosure in order to take advantage of this fact.
Does the lack of financial statement information have an impact on price? If it does, 
has the low-grade debt market become less informationally efficient as a result of the 
1990 trend in nondisclosure by firms which had issued original issue low-grade debt 
in great numbers during the late 1980s? Even if there were an effect, given that most 
of the original issue low-grade companies still issue financial statements to investors, 
it would be very difficult to detect. In this thesis, it will be important to take note of 
this caveat concerning the availability of financial statements from many low-grade 
debt issuers, particularly distressed ones.
If disclosed, low-grade company financial statements may be useful, but the financial 
statements of low-grade companies which have reorganized under Chapter 11 of the 
Code have not been viewed, at least by the accounting profession, as useful. This state 
of affairs prompted the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to issue 
Statement of Position 90-7, entitled "Financial Reporting by Entities in 
Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code (see Weil et al. [1991a, p. 14-16] for 
details)." Their purpose was to require consistent prepetition and postpetition 
standards. The following is a list of Chapter 11 reporting requirements: (1) estimate 
reorganization value, using discount "rates reflecting the business and financial risks 
involved"; (2) for the balance sheet, list prepetition liabilities subject to compromise, 
not subject to compromise, and postpetition liabilities; (3) distinguish in the statement 
of operations between reorganization items, such as professional fees, and 
nonreorganization items; (4) encourages use of "direct cash methods" applied to the 
statement of cash flows; and (5) generally encourages care with statement preparation 
for affiliated corporate entities which have also filed for Chapter 11. These all seem 
useful, but they have yet to be universally applied. The result is that the financial 
statements of companies filing under Chapter 11 of the Code require a great deal of 
discounting and interpretation of the information provided, if provided. This caveat 
applies to all finance studies which rely on distressed firm financial statements to 
derive their results.
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CHAPTER 3
BACKGROUND ON THE BANKRUPTCY COST ISSUE
1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to review the issue of bankruptcy costs. The emphasis 
of the review will be on the empirical finance literature in the field. In addition, given 
its importance to the motivation behind research on the bankruptcy cost issue, a brief 
review of bankruptcy costs and optimal capital structure will be made. This chapter is 
required as background and motivation to Chapter 4, which is an empirical study on 
the total losses incurred during bankruptcy.
2 Optimal Capital Structure and Bankruptcy Costs
The capital structure puzzle is tougher than the dividend one.
Myers [1984, p. 575]
There are essentially the following three sets of capital structure theories: (1) 
signalling theory, (2) agency theory, and (3) theories which trade-off the tax 
advantage of debt with the costs of bankruptcy. Signalling theory applied to capital 
structure suggests that capital structures convey signals from management to 
shareholders regarding management's expected future prospects for the firm (see Ross 
[1977]). In addition, signalling theories are generally considered to imply a "pecking 
order" framework for capital structure, where internal is preferred to external 
financing and debt to equity (see Myers [1984]). Agency theory applied to capital 
structure suggests that agency costs cause optimal capital structures (see Jensen and 
Meckling [1976], Myers [1977], and Bamea et al. [1981]). There are agency costs 
associated with both debt and equity, such that ownership structure and the firm's
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financial prospects are not independent. Debtholders must trade-off possible wealth 
expropriation by stockholders (both internal and external) against the ex ante yield 
they demand, and external stockholders must trade-off the costs of monitoring 
manager/co-owners with the percentage of equity raised externally.1 Finally, the most 
popular approach suggests that there are costs to leverage which at some point 
overwhelm the tax advantage of debt (see e.g., Scott [1976]). This final approach is 
the principal approach which has motivated research in the field of bankruptcy cost 
estimation and Chapter 4.
In the final approach, the effect of bankruptcy costs is critical to the argument for an 
optimal capital structure. Although, the existence of bankruptcy costs themselves are 
not a sufficient argument for them to have a significant impact on the determination of 
the optimal capital structure for the firm. According to this approach, in order for 
there to exist a possibility that there is an optimal capital structure which contains debt 
and equity, bankruptcy costs must usually be "nontrivial". The standard non­
signalling theory and non-agency theory argument trades the tax advantage of debt 
against the nontrivial cost of bankruptcy. Therefore, the central issue of concern for 
empirical research in the field is the absolute level of bankruptcy costs and not merely 
their existence.
2.1 Tax Shield/Bankruptcy Cost Trade-off Models
Since the theory of capital was first established by Modigliani and Miller [1958 & 
1963], one of the central questions regarding the cost of capital has focused on the 
realized costs of bankruptcy. Assuming no costs of bankruptcy, no personal taxes, and 
various other simplifying assumptions, Modigliani and Miller [1958] established that 
the market value of the firm is independent of its capital structure. Although, if the tax 
rate is above zero, the tax deductibility of debt payments would result in the firm 
taking on 100% debt (i.e., at the risk-free rate). In addition, given perfect and 
complete capital markets without bankruptcy costs, the percentage of debt or equity 
does not effect the value of the cash flow of the firm. Therefore, whether debt is risky 
or risk-free does not effect the value of the cash flow of the firm or the value of the 
firm. Ignoring the maturity structure of debt, observed capital structures suggest that 
there may be some optimal trade-off between debt and equity financing which is not
1 It should be noted that agency theory does not preclude the importance of various costs of 
bankruptcy for the contracts negotiated between clients, employees, and creditors (see Titman [1984]).
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captured by the Modigliani and Miller [1958 & 1963] result (e.g., Scott [1972] and 
Castanias [1983]).
Assuming costly bankruptcy, Baxter [1967] was one of the first to suggest that as 
leverage increases for the firm, there is a point at which the increase in the volatility of 
earnings will result in an increased risk of bankruptcy which will cause the net value 
of the firm to decrease at some point. Therefore, there would be an optimal capital 
structure for the firm at least in part determined by the expected probability and cost 
of bankruptcy.
Early studies addressing the issue of the trade-off between the tax shield on debt and 
the costs of bankruptcy tended to argue for the irrelevance of the costs of bankruptcy. 
After Baxter [1967], early theory on capital structure implied that bankruptcy costs 
had to be of greater value than the tax shield of debt that resulted from the Modigliani 
and Miller [1963] model (see e.g., Kraus and Litzenberger [1973], Scott [1976], and 
Kim [1978]). Furthermore, citing early research on the administrative costs of 
bankruptcy, Miller [1977] argued that bankruptcy costs are small and irrelevant. In 
addition, Haugen and Senbet [1978, p. 392] stated: "bankruptcy costs, which affect 
the capital structure decisions, must be trivial or non-existent if one merely assumes 
that capital market prices are competitively determined by rational investors." Haugen 
and Senbet [1978] argued that assuming standard no arbitrage/efficient capital market 
conditions, the costs of bankruptcy will equal the lower of the costs of transferring 
ownership among the classes of claimholders (e.g., equity- to debtholders) or the cost 
of issuing new equity.2 Therefore, one must assume imperfect markets and/or 
imperfectly rational agents in order to develop models where the costs of bankruptcy 
can significantly impact capital structure.
Capital structure models assuming asymmetric or incomplete information and/or large 
indirect costs of bankruptcy have shown that the bankruptcy costs can affect the 
capital structure decision (e.g., see Titman [1984] and Webb [1987]). Titman [1984] 
questioned some of assumptions made by Haugen and Senbet [1978] as not realistic. 
For example, Haugen and Senbet [1978] implied that recoveries on assets are the 
same whether the firm is in bankruptcy or not. In addition, Haugen and Senbet [1978] 
argued that liquidation is a capital budgeting decision independent of the state the firm 
finds itself in (i.e., solvency or bankruptcy). If the agency costs of bankruptcy are
2 Whited [1992] presents empirical results which suggest that "financially unhealthy" firms are 
constrained by access to capital markets, particularly debt markets.
79
large, one could conclude that the Haugen and Senbet [1978] arguments begin to 
break down.
Clearly, the arguments made by strong opponents of the relevance of the costs of 
bankruptcy are not without apparent problems (i.e., Miller [1977] and Haugen and 
Senbet [1978]). Especially problematic are the issues relating to agency costs caused 
by asymmetric information, especially during financial distress. Therefore, the next 
issue to address is the different possible costs incurred by firms in bankruptcy.
2.2 The Costs Incurred by Bankrupt Firms
There are many more potential costs of bankruptcy than administrative expenses. This 
subsection is intended to present a relatively comprehensive list of the costs firms may 
incur before, during, and after bankruptcy. Many of these costs are indirectly or 
directly related to agency costs incurred due to distress (e.g., see Giammarino [1989] 
on distress related costs of asymmetric information and judicial discretion). This list 
of costs is based on a study by Scherr [1988], who reviewed the literature in the field. 
As noted by Scherr [1988] many of these costs may occur more than once during a 
bankruptcy.
1) Administrative Costs. These types of costs include the following: bankruptcy court 
filing fees, other bankruptcy court costs, attorney fees, trustee fees, and other 
professionals' fees (e.g., appraisers and auctioneers). These expenses are typically fees 
paid to third parties to work the bankrupt firm through Chapter 11 and/or Chapter 7 of 
the Code (see e.g., Ang et al. [1982]).
2) Liquidation Losses. The sale of assets by a firm experiencing financial distress 
tends to bring lower values than if the assets were sold under non distress conditions. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the option of filing under Chapter 11 of the Code is an 
attempt to at least partially avoid such losses (i.e., the focus of U.S. bankruptcy laws 
is to salvage going concerns through Chapter 11 of the Code).
3) Lost Sales. This type of cost is particularly relevant for producers of consumer 
durables (also capital goods producers) and/or providers of services which require 
long term commitments of time. Although, Baldwin and Mason [1983, p. 512] point 
out that it is difficult to identify the extent to which sales reductions, and operating 
inefficiencies, are the result of financial distress or the result of the poor management
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which may have brought on the financial distress in the first place. Regardless of the 
direction of causality, it is assumed that bankruptcy, particularly the threat or 
realization of Chapter 7, will result in lost value to consumers, which will reduce 
prices and sales (see e.g., Altman [1984]).3 Rational consumers trade-off the 
probability of bankruptcy and the price of the goods and/or services they are 
considering purchasing. In addition, in the case of implied or explicit warranties, 
consumers will trade-off the probability of the warranty being voided and the 
estimated value of that warranty (see e.g., Scherr [1988, p. 154]). The higher the 
relative value of the implied and/or explicit warranty(ies), the greater the potential in 
lost sales and/or reduced sales prices for the distressed firm.
4) Missed Profitable Opportunities. When a firm experiences financial distress its 
manager(s) may be forced to conserve cash and/or be unable to raise cash in the 
financial markets. As a result, the firm may miss profitable investments (see Castinias
[1983]). In addition, during a distress period the firm's manager(s) may be unable to 
devote sufficient time to seek out and evaluate profitable investments (this is related 
to #7). The lost opportunity value of these investments not taken are a cost of 
bankruptcy.
5) Lost Tax Shields. If a firm goes Chapter 7, all tax credits stop. Therefore, a 
liquidation of the firm will reduce the value of future amortization and depreciation 
deductions, operating loss carry forwards, investment tax credits, etc. to zero (see e.g., 
Ang et al. [1982]). Assuming tax outflows or potential tax outflows, these tax shields 
would have value in reducing tax payments. Specifically, as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
NOL carryovers can mean the difference between maintaining going concern status 
versus liquidation.
6) Intangible Asset Losses. If a firm goes Chapter 7, the value of firm specific 
intangibles will be lost. The following is a partial list of the potential intangible asset 
losses incurred by liquidating the firm: (1) lost value due to the dismissal of personnel 
with firm specific training and/or skills (see e.g., Ang and Chua [1981])4, (2) lost
3 Directly related to this cost is a cost associated with the agency cost of debt. As leverage increases, 
the ability of the firm to effectively compete will diminish during distress. That is, distress related 
reduced sales can also be a result of the pure agency cost of increased leverage. Opler and Titman 
[1994] find highly levered firms lose "substantial market share" and equity losses during industry 
downturns.
4 It could be argued that in the case of management turnover caused by financial distress, that any 
manager time spent unemployed in search of employment is an indirect cost o f distress. Indeed, Gilson 
[1989] finds that managers of large publicly held firms fired for defaulting or filing bankruptcy take at 
least three years to find comparable employment.
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goodwill (e.g., advertising investments lose value), and (3) lost research and 
development costs (e.g., valuable R&D projects which stop due to financial distress or 
liquidation). As pointed out by Cornell and Shapiro [1987, p. 7-8], implicit or 
intangible claims (e.g., firm specific employee skills) "cannot be unbundled and sold 
apart from the firm's other business dealings". Therefore, the risk associated with such 
assets is difficult to diversify away and, by definition, the firm is not able to sell them 
even at distressed prices. This in turn implies that intangible assets are particularly 
vulnerable to bankruptcy and especially liquidation.
7) Management Time Losses. This is an opportunity cost argument (see e.g., Warner 
[1977a]). As a firm becomes more distressed, the management spends an increasing 
amount of its efforts and time attempting to correct the causes of distress. This can 
include increased time spent analyzing the causes of the problem(s), negotiating with 
suppliers, calming and comforting customers, etc. The argument is that this time spent 
on attempting to control and correct the problem(s) could be spent creating value for 
the firm rather than attempting to control losses. In addition, management time lost 
can increase the firm's vulnerability to its competitors (see Weiss [1990, p. 289]).
8) Disruption of Supplier Relationship(s). As a firm becomes more insolvent, its 
suppliers will tend to make the terms of purchase more demanding (see e.g., Altman 
[1984]). For example, a firm that was given a discount for timely payment may 
suddenly be charged a premium. In addition, cash in advance may be required for a 
firm which is perceived by a supplier to be insolvent. The extra costs associated with 
dealing with suppliers who view the firm as insolvent or potentially insolvent in the 
near future are a cost of bankruptcy.
9) Renegotiation and/or Issuance Costs. When faced with insolvency, a firm can 
renegoitate payments to creditors or issue new securities to raise more capital. Both 
methods have costs associated with them. In addition, the issuance of new shares 
would provide a negative signal to the equity markets which would in turn reduce the 
price of the issued shares (see Myers and Majluf [1984]). Given the costs of distressed 
issuance, few firms in financial distress issue new securities.
10) Increased Labor Costs. Assuming the level of work doesn't affect a worker's 
possibility of dismissal, that worker may decrease effort as the perception of an 
exogenously determined dismissal increases. According to Cornell and Shapiro 
[1987], this would be a rational response for a corporate stakeholder, such as an 
employee, to take. Also, if distress causes the dismissal of some workers and the
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relocation of others (see Scherr [1988, p. 155]), the relocated workers will be less 
productive while they learn the new job and the dismissed workers represent an 
intangible loss ala #6. Distress and internal restructuring(s) can lead to increased labor 
costs.
It should be noted that it has been pointed out that there are possible benefits to 
bankruptcy and/or reorganization (see Wruck [1990, p. 435-436]), especially in regard 
to improvements in capital structure. In addition, based on a case study on Federated 
Department Stores, Kaplan [1994, p. 134] claimed that the "financial and anecdotal 
evidence in Federated's case illustrate the basic argument in Wruck (1990) that 
Chapter 11 (and, more generally, financial distress) provides benefits to as well as 
imposes costs on distressed firms."5 However, there is no strong evidence that there 
are benefits to bankruptcy beyond those accruing to the debtor and management.
Of the empirical research focusing on the direct costs of bankruptcy, most studies 
have measured the administrative costs of bankruptcy.6 Even though the list of 
possible indirect costs of bankruptcy is rather lengthy compared to the list of direct 
costs, there has been very little research on the indirect costs of bankruptcy. However, 
two studies measuring the total costs of bankruptcy have concluded that the total costs 
of bankruptcy are nontrivial (see Altman [1984] and James [1991]).7 The following 
section reviews the empirical results of studies measuring the costs of bankruptcy.
3 Review o f Empirical Studies on Bankruptcy Costs
Modigliani and Miller [1958] showed that, given some strong assumptions, the market 
value of the firm is independent of its capital structure. One assumption made was that 
bankruptcy is costless. Bankruptcy cost research has been directed at proving not just 
that bankruptcy costs exist, rather research has attempted to prove or disprove the 
contention that the costs of bankruptcy are non trivial. Beginning with Warner
5 Yagil [1989] suggests that the expected value of bankruptcy costs is lower after a merger due to a 
coinsurance effect and a diversification effect.
6 Although, a study by Lang and Stulz [1992] examined the effect of bankruptcy announcements on 
the equity value of the bankrupt firm's competitors. They found a small negative effect for firms in 
highly levered industries and a small positive effect for firms in concentrated, low leverage industries. 
That type of study should have picked up some of one type of indirect cost o f bankruptcy (i.e., costs 
and/or benefits to the industry as a result of bankruptcy).
7 A case study of the Texaco-Pennzoil case found an approximately 60% loss rate (i.e., 30% of the 
joint value of the two companies before the dispute) for the transfer of wealth between the two firms 
under study (see Cutler and Summers [1988]). This adds some anecdotal support to the argument that 
the total costs of distress are nontrivial.
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[1977a], empirical studies of bankruptcy cost have attempted to determine the 
magnitude of bankruptcy costs in order to provide evidence for the debate on the 
relevance of bankruptcy costs in the theory of capital structure.8 At this time, there is 
still no consensus on the magnitude of bankruptcy costs or its theoretical 
ramifications.
Most empirical studies indicate that if only explicit costs for non financial companies 
are counted, costs are small, and probably trivial.9 If all relevant costs are included, 
then costs are likely non trivial by any definition. Finance academics have assumed 
that "bankrupt firms are inherently less profitable subsequent to the bankruptcy filing 
(Gilson et al. [1990, p. 345])," but there has been no empirical confirmation or 
measure of this assumption.
In addition to the size of the costs of bankruptcy, there is the question of the impact of 
possible scale effects. If bankruptcy costs are nontrivial for most firms in most 
industries, but there are significant scale effects, the costs of bankruptcy for larger 
firms may be trivial. There is evidence to suggest that there is a scale effect to the 
administrative costs of bankruptcy (see e.g., Ang et al. [1982]).
The remainder of this literature review section is divided into two sub-sections. The 
first section reviews bankruptcy and distress cost literature. The second section 
reviews the results from the first section which apply to the scale effects of the costs 
of bankruptcy.
3.1 Bankruptcy and Distress Cost Literature
Beginning with Stanley and Girth [1971], there has been a line of research focusing 
on the actual costs of bankruptcy. The following table summarizes the results of some 
of the empirical bankruptcy cost studies performed.
8 Also, there has been some work on attempting to measure the costs of bankruptcy for the U.S. (see 
White [1989]). The White [1989] article assumed that the costs of bankruptcy can be measured by die 
spread between debt instruments of varying qualities.
9 See discussion by E. Altman and W. Taylor on several articles related to bankruptcy and financial 
distress (Altman and Taylor [1983, 517-523]).
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Table 1
Empirical Studies on the Costs of Bankruptcy and Distress
See relevant text and footnotes for background details.
Study
Time
Period Industry
Mean/Median 
Firm Size
Sample
Size Costs %
Costs as a 
% of Equity
Stanley & Girth [1971] 1964 Diverse 0.168 1,675 24.9% NA
Dipchand & George [1977] 1965-75 Diverse 0.046 48 40.6% 72.6%
Warner [1977a] 1933-55 Railroads 50.000 11 NA 5.3%
Ang et al. [1982] 1963-78 Diverse 0.109 86 7.5% NA
White [1983] Unknown Unknown 1.600 90 1.3% NA
White [1983] Unknown Unknown 2.600 96 1.6% NA
Altman [1984] 1970-78 Nonfinancial 92.789 18 6.2% NA
Altman [1984] 1970-78 Nonfinancial 92.789 18 16.7% NA
Weiss [1990] 1979-86 Nonfinancial 239.182 31 3.7% 20.6%
Guffey & Moore [1991] 1970-85 Trucking 9.800 16 9.1% NA
James [1991] 1985-88 Banking 32.575 412 30.5% 3,135.0%
Although the Stanley and Wirth [1971] study was primarily concerned with individual 
and sole proprietorship bankruptcy and not corporate bankruptcy, there was a large 
part of the sample which consisted of bankrupt firms. Of the sample of 1,675 cases, 
1,277 were personal cases of bankruptcy (i.e., 398 were corporate and sole 
proprietorship cases). Therefore, if sole proprietorships differ significantly from the 
corporate form regarding their costs of bankruptcy, the results for Chapter 11 cases 
may not be representative of the costs of corporate bankruptcy. Eight bankruptcy court 
districts were examined, including Southern New York. The sample was limited to 
cases which were closed in 1964. Median firm size as measured by median assets was 
$0,168 million. The administrative costs of bankruptcy for Chapter 11 cases were 
estimated to be approximately 24.9% of court reported assets.
The Dipchand and George [1977] study measured the administrative costs of 
bankruptcy for 48 Nova Scotian businesses over the period 1965 through 1975. 
Dipchand and George [1977, p. 29] found a "strong linear relationship between 
liquidation proceeds and administrative costs." The higher liquidation proceeds, the 
higher were the administrative costs of bankruptcy. As measured by total reported 
assets, and excluding one large outlier, the average firm size was $0,046 million. 
Relative administrative costs were measured as total administrative costs relative to 
total liquidation proceeds, and were estimated to be 40.6% for the full sample. The 
remainder of the liquidation proceeds went to creditors (i.e., 59.4%). Measured as a 
percentage of unsecured liabilities, the administrative costs of bankruptcy were 
approximately 72.6%.
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The Warner [1977a] study measured the administrative costs of bankruptcy for 11 
railroads over the period 1933 through 1955 (i.e., filing under Section 77 of the 
Bankruptcy Act). As measured by the market value of all publicly traded securities as 
of the month of filing for bankruptcy protection, the average market value of the firm 
was approximately $50 million. One limitation of using publicly traded securities is 
that not all securities are publicly traded. Seven years before filing for bankruptcy 
protection, the average market value of publicly traded securities for the sample firms 
was approximately $251 million. Relative administrative costs were measured as total 
administrative costs relative to the market value of publicly traded securities. As of 
the month of filing for bankruptcy protection, the estimated cost of bankruptcy was 
approximately 5.3%, and 1.0% seven years before filing.
The Ang et al. [1982] study measured the administrative costs of bankruptcy for 86 
Western District of Oklahoma corporations over the period 1963 through 1978. The 
sample included "several machine tool manufacturers, construction firms, retail and 
wholesale furniture outlets, restaurants, hair styling salons, plumbing supply 
distributors, and at least one each of the following: an ice distributor, a janitor supply 
distributor, a mobile home retailer, an oil distributor, and so on (Ang et al. [1982, 
p.221])." As measured by the total debts listed at the bankruptcy filing, the median 
size of the firm was $0,109 million and the mean size of the firm was $0,205 million. 
The median and mean values for total payments from liquidation were estimated at 
$0,058 million and $0,109 million, respectively. Relative administrative costs were 
measured as administrative fees relative to the total liquidating value of the firm. The 
mean and median relative administration costs of bankruptcy were estimated to be 
7.5% and 1.7%, respectively.
The White [1983] study estimated the "ex-post or transactions" bankruptcy costs for 
reorganizing and liquidating firms from the Southern District of New York before and 
after the new Code (i.e., White [1983] uses 1980 as the cut-off). White [1983, p. 484] 
reports ex post bankruptcy cost results only for firms filing for bankruptcy before 
1980. The number of firms liquidated (i.e., Chapter 7) and reorganized (i.e., Chapter
11) are 90 and 96, respectively. As measured by total liabilities, the mean size of 
liquidating and reorganizing firms was $1.6 and $2.6 million, respectively. Estimated 
"ex-post" bankruptcy costs were, by definition, very low (see White [1983, p. 483- 
484]). Relative ex post bankruptcy costs were measured as ex post bankruptcy costs 
relative to total liabilities. The ratio of total ex post bankruptcy costs to total liabilities 
for liquidating and reorganizing firms was 1.3% and 1.6%, respectively.
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The Altman [1984] study was the first study to estimate indirect bankruptcy costs for 
a sample of 12 retailers (one of which did not have any bankruptcy cost values) and 6 
industrial firms filing for bankruptcy over the period 1970 through 1978. In addition, 
Altman [1984] estimated the administrative or direct costs of bankruptcy for a sample 
of 11 retailers and 7 industrial firms filing for bankruptcy over the period 1970 
through 1978. The value of the firm was estimated by adding the market value of 
equity to the market value of debt plus the book value of other debt plus the 
capitalized value of financial leases. As of the bankruptcy filing month, the mean 
value of the firm for the sample of 11 retailers was $140.5 million and $10.7 million 
for the sample of 7 industrial firms. Indirect costs of distress were measured by 
estimating lost sales for each firm three years prior to filing for bankruptcy. Based on 
sales 13 to 4 years previous to filing for bankruptcy (i.e., 10 years), regressions were 
run to estimate lost sales for the three year period. Based on these estimates and 
historic profit margins, unexpected losses were estimated. Relative total costs of 
bankruptcy were measured as the total costs of bankruptcy (i.e., direct costs and 
estimated indirect costs) relative to the estimated value of the firm. As of the 
bankruptcy filing month, the relative total costs of bankruptcy and the administrative 
costs of bankruptcy were estimated to be approximately 16.7% and 6.2%, 
respectively. As of the bankruptcy filing month, the relative total costs of bankruptcy 
for the retail and industrial sample were estimated to be approximately 12.2% and 
23.7%, respectively (the comparable figures for administrative costs were 4.0% and 
9.8%).
The Weiss [1990] study estimated the administrative costs of bankruptcy for 31 firms 
filing for bankruptcy over the period 1979 through 1986. Mean firm size, as measured 
by the book value of assets at the fiscal year-end prior to the bankruptcy filing, was 
estimated to be $239.2 million. As measured by the ratio of the administrative costs of 
bankruptcy to the book value of assets, the relative total cost of bankruptcy was 
approximately 3.7% for the full sample. As measured by the ratio of the 
administrative costs of bankruptcy to the market value of equity at fiscal year-end 
prior to the bankruptcy filing, the relative total cost of bankruptcy was approximately 
20.6% for the full sample.
The Guffey and Moore [1991] study measured the administrative costs of bankruptcy 
for 16 trucking firms over the period 1970 through 1985. As measured by book value 
of assets as of the year prior to the bankruptcy petition year, the average firm size was 
approximately $9.8 million. Relative administrative costs were measured as total 
administrative costs relative to total book assets prior to bankruptcy, and were
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estimated to be 9.2% for the full sample. In addition to estimating the costs of 
bankruptcy for trucking firms, Guffey and Moore [1991, p. 230-233] found that 
trucking, retail, industrial, and trucking firms have significantly different costs of 
bankruptcy (i.e., as measured by the ratio of bankruptcy costs to total assets). This 
suggests that there are industry specific effects on the administrative costs of 
bankruptcy.
The James [1991] study measured the losses realized for 412 banks which where 
placed under Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") receivership over the 
period 1985 through 1988. This study was unique in that it focused on financial firms 
(i.e., banks only) and, like the Altman [1984] study, it went beyond estimating only 
the administrative costs of distress (i.e., in this case bank failure and liquidation by the 
FDIC). Loss was measured as the difference between the book value of bank assets at 
the time of its closure and the value of its assets in an FDIC receivership or the value 
of the assets to an acquirer. In Chapter 4 a similar measure will be used to measure 
losses. As measured by the book value of assets at the time of bank failure, the 
average firm size was approximately $32.6 million. Relative losses were measured as 
the ratio of loss to the book value of assets at the time of bank failure, and were 
estimated to be 30.5% for the full sample. The ratio of liquidation costs to the book 
value of equity capital was 3,135%.
The Altman [1984] and James [1991] studies were the only two studies reviewed 
which included costs other than the administrative costs of bankruptcy.10 These two 
studies suggest that the total costs of distress are nontrivial. Although, there are 
several limitations of the Altman [1984] and James [1991] results. The James [1991] 
results were not strictly bankruptcy costs, and the sample consisted solely of finance 
firms (i.e., banks). In addition, all bank failures were administered by the FDIC not a 
district bankruptcy court. The Altman [1984] indirect cost results relied on forecasts. 
Given some of the limitations of the Altman [1984] and James [1991] studies, the 
question remains whether the total costs of bankruptcy are trivial outside of FDIC 
insolvent banks. Chapter 4 will contribute to the short list of studies estimating and 
analyzing the total costs of distress.
Also, Hoshi et al. [1990] presented indirect evidence from Japan regarding significant indirect costs 
of distress. They found that firms in Japan with capital structures making distress renegotiation difficult 
among creditors suffered substantially higher indirect costs of distress than firms with more 
"harmonious" capital structures (i.e., capital structures which tend to avoid free-rider problems and 
information asymmetries).
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3.2 Scale Effects of Bankruptcy
Four of the reviewed studies support the notion of a bankruptcy scale effect. Warner 
[1977a, p. 74] states that the: "evidence suggests that there are substantial fixed costs 
associated with the railroad bankruptcy process, and hence economies of scale with 
respect to bankruptcy costs." Ang et al. [1982] found strong evidence of a scale effect 
for the administrative costs of bankruptcy. Guffey and Moore [1991, p. 233] find a 
scale effect for the administrative costs of bankruptcy for trucking firms. James [1991, 
p. 1225] stated that there "are however, significant economies of scale with respect to 
direct costs of liquidation." All support the notion of economies of scale for the costs 
of distress, but only for the administrative costs of distress.
Regarding economies of scale for the administrative or direct costs of bankruptcy, 
Warner [1977a] was the first to find some scale effect for railroad company 
bankruptcies. Ang et al. [1982] found a scale effect for the administrative costs of 
bankruptcy in the Western District of Oklahoma. The question remains, outside of the 
Western District of Oklahoma and railroad bankruptcies, are there significant scale 
effects? Chapter 4 will contribute to this short list of studies examining whether there 
is a scale effect for firms filing under the Code.
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CHAPTER 4
THE LOSSES REALIZED IN SUCCESSFUL CHAPTER 11
1 Introduction
On the other hand, a comprehensive and detailed study of data from all regions of 
the country and for firms of all sizes is prohibitively expensive for one set of 
researchers.
Ang et al. [1982, p. 225]
Although not all capital structure theories rely on the costs of bankruptcy, the 
importance of the costs of bankruptcy as a determinant of firm finance policy has a 
long history. Beginning with Robichek and Myers [1966] and Baxter [1967], financial 
economists have argued that, regarding debt financing, bankruptcy costs may 
represent a significant offset to the tax-deductibility of interest payments. Since those 
seminal theoretical studies, others have explicitly modelled the process whereby firms 
increase debt financing to the point at which the marginal present value of the future 
tax shield equals the marginal present value of the future bankruptcy costs (e.g., see 
Kraus and Litzenburger [1973], Scott [1976], and Kim [1978]). Based in large part on 
the theoretical models which rely on the bankruptcy cost/tax shield trade-off, 
empirical work in the area of bankruptcy costs has been conducted.
Based upon Chapter 3, there are several issues worth further examination within the 
empirical literature on the bankruptcy cost issue. Included are the following three 
objectives of this chapter: (1) an estimate of the total losses of successful Chapter 11;
(2) a test for scale effects of the total losses of successful Chapter 11; and (3) an 
analysis of some of the determinants of the total losses in successful Chapter 11. This 
chapter is intended as an extension to the following studies: Ang et al. [1983], Altman
[1984], and James [1991]. In this chapter, evidence will be presented on the losses
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incurred during Chapter 11. These values will be assumed to represent a proxy for 
total costs of Chapter 11.
Regarding the issue of the total costs of bankruptcy/distress, the literature is sparse. 
To this author's knowledge only Altman [1984] and James [1991] have tackled the 
subject. In addition, although a path breaking study, the Altman [1984] study values 
were heavily reliant on forecast sales figures to estimate the indirect costs of 
bankruptcy1. Also, the sample size used by Altman [1984] was relatively small (i.e., 
18 firms), which would significantly decrease the generalizability of the results. The 
James [1991] study avoided the sample size problem (i.e., 412 firms), but the sample 
was composed of only banking firms. In addition, the bank failures examined by 
James [1991] were not Chapter 11s. Therefore, the James [1991] sample has some 
generalizability problems of its own. Namely, the James [1991] results can only 
tentatively be extended to non finance Chapter 11 firms. Clearly, extensions to the 
two previous total costs of bankruptcy studies could broaden the field.
Regarding the scale effect of the total costs of bankruptcy, there is no literature in the 
area.2 Clearly, by the same logic applied which makes the scale effect of the 
administrative costs of bankruptcy important applies to the total costs of bankruptcy. 
If larger firms encounter relatively lower total costs of bankruptcy, then any potential 
bankruptcy cost/tax shield trade-off will be less important in determining firm 
financing the larger the firm. In addition, the principal study examining the scale 
effect of the administrative costs of bankruptcy by Ang et al. [1982] lacks 
generalizability. Specifically, the sample consisted of 86 firms from the Western 
District of Oklahoma. As Ang et al. [1982, p. 22] pointed out: "without comparison 
with data from other regions of the country, we have no way of determining if these 
results can be generalized." The size of the sample in this chapter allows a more 
detailed analysis of firm size and total bankruptcy costs.
Regarding some of the determinants of the total losses in Chapter 11, there is no 
literature in the area. Although, a recent article by Alderson and Betker [1995] does 
use a similar measure of total losses as is used in this chapter.3 But that study focuses
1 Although, a study by Lang and Stulz [1992] examined the effect of bankruptcy announcements on 
the equity value of the bankrupt firm's competitors. They found a small negative effect for firms in 
highly levered industries and a small positive effect for firms in concentrated, low leverage industries. 
That type of study should have picked up some of one type of indirect cost of bankruptcy (i.e., costs 
and/or benefits to the industry as a result of bankruptcy).
2 Of course, this ignores the James [1991] study on bank failures.
3 They are essentially identical, except Alderson and Betker [1995] call their measure liquidation costs.
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on the determinants of post-Chapter 11 capital structures for a sample of 88 firms 
which "successfully” emerged from Chapter 11. This chapter is interested in 
examining the losses incurred by firms during Chapter 11 and some determinants of 
those losses.
This chapter examines a subset of firms within the set of "bankrupt" firms. Those 
firms which have entered and exited from Chapter 11 are studied. These firms are 
generally considered to be the "successful" firms within the legally defined set of 
distressed firms. These firms have entered and exited court protection, thus avoiding 
liquidation. This chapter will examine the successful failure of $12,646 billion in asset 
value of firms successfully entering and exiting Chapter 11 of the Code.
In this chapter the total losses realized during successful Chapter 1 Is are examined. 
Losses are measured as the difference between the estimated value of assets reported 
by the company filing for Chapter 11 protection net of the value of proposed 
payments confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court. This chapter produces the following 
findings: (1) the losses of successful Chapter 11 are large, representing about 24% of 
asset value; (2) at certain asset levels, some contradictory evidence regarding the 
"scale effect" of the costs of bankruptcy; and (3) some of the determinants of the total 
losses associated with successful bankruptcy include firm size, time spent under court 
protection, and the relative level of debt.
Assuming that bankrupt going concerns encounter lower costs of distress by 
maintaining their going concern status rather than by liquidating, the measure of the 
cost of distress reported here will be lower than that for bankrupt liquidated firms. 
Therefore, this subsample of bankrupt firms would be expected to have lower costs of 
distress than that of any other set of bankrupt firms.4 Based on studies reviewed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, it is expected that as one moves from out-of-court restructurings to 
Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, the costs of distress increase. Thus, the losses caused by 
bankruptcy for a sample of "successful" bankrupt firms should be a lower bound 
estimate for all bankrupt firms (i.e., going concerns versus liquidations).
4 Baldwin and Mason [1983, p. 505] note that "the restriction of samples to legally bankrupt firms thus 
introduces a potential selection bias. The bias is especially troubling in cases where an attempt is made 
to infer the magnitude of the costs of financial distress, since many of such costs may be incurred in the 
process of avoiding formal bankruptcy." Thus, it is possible that firms successfully avoiding 
bankruptcy may incur higher costs than those actually filing for court protection.
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The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. The second section presents 
the measure for estimating the total losses of successful bankruptcies and presents 
values regarding the relationship between the losses of bankruptcy and firm size (and 
describes the data set). The third section presents the results and analysis of the "scale 
effect" of successful bankruptcy. The forth section presents a general model of the 
total cost of distress, and presents the results and analysis of several models used to 
test the specified relationships. The conclusions are summarized in the last section.
2 Losses Realized during Chapter 11 Protection
The substantial number of firms emerging from Chapter 11 that are not viable or 
need further restructuring provides little evidence that the process effectively 
rehabilitates distressed firms and is consistent with the view that there are 
economically important biases toward continuation of unprofitable firms. 
Hotchkiss [1995, p. 3]
This chapter uses as its measure of loss a measure which is similar to the measure 
used by James [1991], but the measure does not change from bankruptcy to 
bankruptcy. James [1991, p. 1226] measured the loss on assets as the difference 
between the book value of the failed bank's assets and the approximate value of the 
assets at the time of failure resolution. The measure James [1991] used varied for each 
type of resolution made by the FDIC.5
In addition, the measure used here has some of the characteristics of the Alderson and 
Betker [1995] measure of "liquidation costs" in successful Chapter 11s. Alderson and 
Betker [1995, p. 46] "define the cost of liquidation as the excess of going-concem 
value over liquidation value". Both values are contingent on firm values given to the 
Bankruptcy Court (see Alderson and Betker [1995, p. 51]). By definition, firm 
managers must show that their estimated liquidation value of the firm is less than their 
estimated going-concem value (i.e., unless they would prefer to file under Chapter 7 
of the Code). Therefore, there is an expectation that the values must be biased toward 
showing the firm to be of greater value as a going-concem rather than liquidated (i.e., 
it is in the interests of those reporting the going-concem and liquidation values to the 
courts to do so). Indeed, Hotchkiss [1995, p. 11-14] has shown that successful Chapter 
11 firms make substantial systematic overestimations of post-bankruptcy
5 In most cases (i.e., 287 of 412) loss was estimated as the difference between the book value of the 
failed bank's assets and the later sale value o f the bank.
93
performance.6 Therefore, it is clear that in order to improve its chances of emerging 
from Chapter 11, a firm must bias the net differential between estimated going- 
concem value and estimated liquidation value upward. In this chapter, although both 
are also court reported values, the two values used to calculate losses do not suffer 
from the same inherent biases.
Total listed assets net of total proposed payments ("PP") is the measure used to 
calculate the loss associated with successful Chapter 11. This chapter assumes the 
following: (1) listed assets are an unbiased estimate of the realizable value of the firm 
when it files for court protection, and (2) PP are an unbiased estimate of expected 
payments to owners. Over the whole sample, the estimated total losses incurred during 
successful court supervised Chapter 11 cases relative to total assets is approximately 
23.8%. Total costs relative to total debts is approximately 23.5%. The loss values do 
not account for firms which fail to make their PP and/or ended up back in bankruptcy.
As of the bankruptcy filing the value of the firm's assets is an estimate of the value of 
the firm (i.e., given that the automatic stay is in effect) and as of the reorganization 
plan confirmation PP are a negotiated estimate of the value of the firm (i.e., the 
residual value of the firm as a going concern)7. Given that, prior to the bankruptcy 
filing, the value of the firm is equal to its residual or equity value, and as of 
bankruptcy filing equity value is zero (ignoring its option value due to the lack of 
enforcement of absolute priority), the value of the firm as of the bankruptcy filing is 
equal to the sum of its asset values. Given that as of the bankruptcy filing date, 
creditors are intended to own the firm while claims are stayed, the value of the firm as 
a going concern after emergence from court protection is approximated by the total 
value of PP agreed upon by the debtor and its creditors.8
As is standard methodology in the cost of bankruptcy literature, the measure of loss 
used in this chapter is based upon values derived from bankruptcy court documents. 
The bankruptcy judge, creditors, and debtors are responsible for determining asset and
6 For example, for operating income during the year the plan is confirmed, one year after confirmation, 
and two years after confirmation, actual performance lags management projections by -58%, -81%, 
and -72% respectively (see Hotchkiss [1995, Table IV on p. 13]). In addition, Hotchkiss [1995, p. 11, 
14] points out that management "concerned with the firm's survival, may need to convince creditors 
and the court that the firm value is high enough to warrant reorganization rather than liquidation."
7 Kaplan [1994, p. 123] notes that "the post-bankruptcy value includes all direct and indirect costs of 
bankruptcy and financial distress."
 ^To the extent that equity holders have the ability to extract value during the Chapter 11 process, this 
would only lend support to the notion of the above measure of loss being a lower bound estimate.
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PP values. PP are normally based on a management restructuring proposal, voted 
upon by the company's creditors. Creditors and management have an incentive to 
agree to a level of proposed payments which are high enough to satisfy the creditors, 
but not so high as to put the company back under court protection. Listed assets are 
management's responsibility while total claims or total debts are creditors' 
responsibility, but there is bankruptcy court oversight of each to ensure that total 
assets and total debts are not under or overstated (see Franks and Torous [1989] for a 
review of creditor and debtor rights under Chapter 11). If assets are overestimated, 
creditors and/or the bankruptcy court judge will demand more in the restructuring 
proposal. If assets are underestimated, the bankruptcy court judge and/or creditors will 
be justified in replacing management for putting forth an unrealistic restructuring 
proposal.9
The following figure illustrates the timing associated with successful Chapter 11 and 
critical values reported to the bankruptcy court.
Figure 1
Time Line for Successful Chapter 11s
Time Line for Successful Chapter 11s
t-i t t+1
Distress Distress
Begins Filing Confirmstlon Ends
me I--------------------------------------------------1------------------------------------------1-----------------------------------------------1
| Pre-Ch. 11 Distress | Ch. 11 Distress | Post Ch. 11 Distress |
Proposed Payment Period
Mean time from filing to confirmatlon=2 years (Ch. 11 Distress period) 
Listed debts and asse ts  are measured as of the filing date.
Proposed payments are measured as  of the confirmation date.
Explicitly, costs are measured by the following: Lossl+l = Assets, -  PPt+l. Estimates of 
assets and debts are submitted to the bankruptcy court at the time of filing. The level 
of PP includes projected losses after plan confirmation and any equity value (i.e., 
reissued stock). The courts are provided with PP which represent future values, not 
present values. Therefore, PP would be expected to overestimate the value of creditor 
claims, thus underestimating losses.10
9 In addition to assets and PPs, is the category of listed debts. Listed debts are creditors' responsibility. 
Creditors have no economic reason to underestimate what is owed them. If they overestimate debts, 
management and/or the bankruptcy court judge can strike down claims which aren't based on real legal 
claims against the debtor.
1® The accountants who calculated the values used in this study did not base their estimates of the total 
proposed payments under the plan of reorganization on present values. The values they used were
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To the extent realistic plans of reorganization are confirmed by the bankruptcy courts, 
by using PP to estimate firm value as of plan confirmation date, the measure of losses 
presented in this chapter picks up undiscounted losses beyond the plan confirmation 
date. That is, all explicit costs and many implicit costs were reflected in the asset 
values and court approved PP.11 For example, in the U.S. the firm filing for court 
protection pays all legal and administrative fees; therefore, these values should be 
accounted for when drafting a plan of reorganization. Thus, the loss values reported 
include all direct costs and many indirect costs of bankruptcy.
2.1 Data - The SARD Sample
As nearly one-half of all Chapter 11 cases filed since inception of the Bankruptcy 
Code are still pending , limitations imposed by the current statistical reporting 
system have prevented a full understanding of the results of the Chapter 11 
process. In the first ten years of the Bankruptcy Code (October 1,1979 through 
September 30,1989) there were about 176,500 Chapter 11 cases initiated nation­
wide. To date little summary information has been available on the outcomes and 
status of these Chapter 11 cases.12 
Flynn [1989]
All the values used in this chapter came from the Statistical Analysis and Reports 
Division ("SARD") of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The 
SARD maintains court administrative data on Chapter 11 cases.13 The clerks of the 
court are required to submit the following three types of reports depending on the 
status of a particular case: (1) a case opening report, (2) a case change report (i.e., if 
the case is converted to another chapter of the Code), and (3) a case closing report.
absolute values (i.e., a proposed payment the day after the plan of reorganization was confirmed was 
treated the same as a proposed payment twenty years after confirmation). Ed Flynn of the Bankruptcy 
Division o f the Administrative Office of the United States Courts believes "the proposed payments 
would have been 10 to 20 percent lower if the study had discounted future payments to determine their 
true present value." Therefore, it would seem that proposed payments under confirmed plans of 
reorganization were biased upwards.
11 This is the nature of the bankruptcy process. For example, post petition court costs for the debtor 
and its creditors are "carved out" from the assets listed as of the petition date. Also, any D.I.P. 
financing is also taken into account.
12 Flynn, E., "Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11", The Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, October 1989.
13 The focus of these statistics is principally on the timing o f court procedures within the bankruptcy 
process itself (e.g., whether the case was terminated or is still pending).
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SARD Chapter 11 values are the result of a study made on their behalf by Ernst & 
Young.
Before the study performed by Ernst & Young, Inc. to examine confirmed Chapter 11 
cases14 was conducted, questions such as the percentage of Chapter 11 cases 
eventually confirmed and how long confirmation takes were not known. In 1989 a 
study was performed on 2,395 confirmed cases in 15 bankruptcy court districts in 
order to answer these and other questions. The cases examined were those filing for 
court protection over the period October 1,1979 through December 31,1986 and 
exiting court protection March 5,1980 through July 29,1989. The following is a list 
of case data gathered by the accounting firm performing the study: (1) filing date, (2) 
confirmation date, (3) total listed assets15, (4) total listed liabilities16, (5) number of 
related cases, and (6) total proposed payments under the plan of reorganization. 
Fifteen bankruptcy court districts were chosen out of a total of ninety.17 The 2,395 
cases represent 1,516 actual firms filing under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 
(the "Code”).
This same data set is used in this chapter. Of the 1,516 firms, two firms are excluded 
from the analysis due to one having no listed assets and the other no listed debts. The 
principal intent of the SARD study was to provide background on the frequency and 
geographic distribution of bankruptcy, whereas, the principal intent of this chapter is 
to use the SARD data to measure and examine the losses associated with successful 
bankruptcy.
14 These "confirmed Chapter 11 cases" did not include cases filed under another chapter o f the Code 
then converted to Chapter 11, only cases originally filed under Chapter 11 of the Code.
15 Taken from the A schedule of the business filing under Chapter 11 of the Code. The accountants did 
not include assets which were listed as "unknown", "unliquidated", or "undetermined".
16 Taken from the B schedule of the business filing under Chapter 11 of the Code. The accountants did 
not include liabilities which were listed as "unknown", "unliquidated", or "undetermined".
17 Also included in the U.S. totals are the territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, the 
Northern Marianas Islands, and the District of Columbia. Ten of the fifteen districts were selected at 
random, while the other five were selected based on the prior belief on the part of the Statistical 
Analysis and Reports Division of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts that they had 
"potentially unique characteristics of their caseload." The five non-random selections were the 
following: (1) the Central District of California, (2) the Southern District of New York, (3) die District 
of New Jersey, (4) the Southern District of Texas, and (5) the Northern District of Illinois. As of 
September 30,1988, combined, the five non-random selections accounted for approximately 22.6% of 
all cases pending nationally.
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2.2 Sample Description
The size of the sample analyzed in this chapter allowed a ranking by size to better 
analyze the relationship between firm size and the cost of successful bankruptcy. 
Except for the James' [1991] study of 412 failed banks, this was not previously 
possible. Larger firms seem to incur more losses than smaller firms filing under and 
exiting Chapter 11 of the Code.18 This result holds even though larger firms appear to 
be more financially solvent upon entering bankruptcy than smaller firms.19 The 
following tables provide some background to this observation.
Table 1
Values of Relative Loss, DAR, PPDR, PPAR, TTC, and RC by Deciles Ranked
by Size
Except for related cases, all values are median values.
Loss % DAR PPDR PPAR TTC RC
1.58
Obs
Full Sample 33.54% 1.24 0.58 0.66 642 1514
Decile 1 - largest 51.21 0.95 0.53 0.49 613 4.72 152
Decile 2 55.46 0.92 0.58 0.45 657 1.61 152
Decile 3 52.40 0.96 0.55 0.48 624 1.32 152
Decile 4 44.57 1.06 0.58 0.55 728 1.24 152
Decile 5 38.17 1.15 0.59 0.62 637 1.21 152
Decile 6 33.45 1.28 0.57 0.67 681 1.18 152
Decile 7 19.84 1.50 0.57 0.80 682 1.13 152
Decile 8 14.32 1.44 0.59 0.86 637 1.20 152
Decile 9 5.31 1.78 0.63 0.95 592 1.09 151
Decile 10 - smallest -142.08 4.79 0.65 2.42 610 1.10 147
Loss is equal to total listed assets as of the date the firm filed for court protection less the total value of 
proposed payments in the court approved plan of reorganization divided by total listed assets as o f the 
date the firm filed for court protection. DAR is the ratio of total debts to total assets. PPDR is the ratio 
of total proposed payments to total debts. PPAR is the ratio of total proposed payments to total assets. 
TTC is the total time, in days, from filing for court protection to plan confirmation. RC is the related 
number of cases.
This sample of firms would seem to confirm findings by Hudson [1992] that in the U.S. the relative 
size and number of the very largest bankruptcies has increased, but the relative size and number of the 
generally large bankruptcies has decreased. That is, it seems that there are quit a few very large 
bankruptcies, but there seems to be a large size gap between these very large bankruptcies and the next 
biggest bankruptcies.
19 One old hand of the bankruptcy process explained this apparent conundrum as follows: "If you owe 
the bank $100,000 and are unable to pay next week, you have a real problem. If you owe the bank 
$100,000,000 and can't pay, the bank has a real problem." For whatever reasons, creditors and the 
courts encourage the continuance of insolvent large companies.
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Table 2
Values of Relative Loss, DAR, PPDR, PPAR, TTC, and RC by Deciles Ranked
by Size (Weighted by Assets)
All values are weighted mean values, weighted by total assets.
Loss % DAR PPDR PPAR TTC RC
Full Sample 23.78% 1.01 1.22 0.76 879 6.26
Decile 1 - largest 22.27 0.89 1.30 0.78 897 6.98
Decile 2 45.39 1.63 0.62 0.55 753 1.59
Decile 3 41.92 1.84 0.62 0.58 738 1.33
Decile 4 25.77 1.74 0.65 0.74 825 1.24
Decile 5 23.99 1.81 0.60 0.76 745 1.21
Decile 6 22.53 2.04 0.68 0.77 766 1.18
Decile 720 -15.21 3.69 1.86 1.15 764 1.13
Decile 8 -18.67 2.80 0.65 1.19 739 1.21
Decile 9 -67.46 3.28 1.40 1.67 715 1.09
Decile 10 -smallest -257.53 9.19 0.72 3.58 663 1.09
Loss is equal to total listed assets as of the date the firm filed for court protection less the total value of 
proposed payments in the court approved plan of reorganization divided by total listed assets as of the 
date the firm filed for court protection. DAR is the ratio of total debts to total assets. PPDR is the ratio 
of total proposed payments to total debts. PPAR is the ratio of total proposed payments to total assets. 
TTC is the total time, in days, from filing for court protection to plan confirmation. RC is the related 
number of cases.
As opposed to past evidence on the direct costs of distress, the median and mean loss 
values for larger firms indicate that larger firms incur relatively more bankruptcy 
losses than smaller firms. For example, the largest decile of firms (i.e., decile 1) has a 
median loss value of 51.21%, while the smallest decile of firms has a median loss 
value of negative 142.08%. However, the very largest firms do not incur the highest 
costs during court protection. The negative value for the smaller firms indicates a gain 
for creditors from court supervised protection under Chapter 11 of the Code. When 
weighted by total assets the relationship between cost and firm size is also clear (i.e., 
Table 2). The smallest firms have a mean loss value of negative 257.53%, but the 
largest firms realize a median loss value of 22.27%. Regarding costs, the most 
consistent result is the most striking. That is, the few successful small firm 
bankruptcies21 appear to do better than their larger counterparts even though they tend 
to be more highly levered (i.e., DARs were highest for the smallest firms).
The ratio of PP to debts and PP to assets are heavily influenced by several very high 
relative values for PP (compare PPDR and PPAR from Tables 1 and 2). This may be 
due to data collection errors and/or businesses with very high levels of equity which
20 This decile was heavily skewed due to one observation. Assets were listed at 293,000, debts at 557, 
and proposed payments at 118,430. There was no way of knowing whether this was a typographical 
error on the part of the data entry person, or whether total debts were really that small.
21 That is, relatively fewer small firms are able to both enter and exit Chapter 11 in the first place.
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successfully pay back equity holders. For example, the highest relative pay back is 
from an observation in decile 7 where PP are $118,430 and debts are $557 (i.e., a ratio 
of PP to debts of 212.62). Although, median values for PPDR and PPAR show a 
relative increase in PP as the size of firm decreases. PPDR and PPAR values weakly 
support a diseconomies of scale in the losses incurred during successful Chapter 11s.
Total time to plan of reorganization plan confirmation is relatively equal across firm 
size decile, while the largest firms have a significantly higher number of related cases 
compared to all other deciles. The median number of related cases for the largest 
decile of firms is 4.72 versus 1.61 for the next highest decile. In short, there seems to 
be a strong relationship between firm size and the number of related cases.
The following table more clearly shows where there are significant differences by 
asset size decile.
Table 3
Means Tests for Relative Loss, DAR, PPDR, PPAR, TTC, and RC by Asset Size 
Deciles (remaining nine decile mean versus the decile mean)
Loss is equal to total listed assets as o f the date the firm filed for court protection less the total value of 
proposed payments in the court approved plan of reorganization divided by total listed assets as of the 
date the firm filed for court protection. DAR is the ratio of total debts to total assets. PPDR is the ratio 
of total proposed payments to total debts. PPAR is the ratio of total proposed payments to total assets. 
TTC is the total time, in days, from filing for court protection to plan confirmation. RC is the related 
number of cases.
Loss % DAR PPDR PPAR TTC RC
Decile 1 - largest -4.07**** 4 12* * * * 1.33 4 07**** -0.50 -3.31**
Decile 2 -3 94**** 3.17** 1.58 3 94**** 0.08 -0.15
Decile 3 -3 84**** 2.50* 1.60 3.84**** 0.10 1.89
Decile 4 -3.32*** 3.11** 1.38 3.32*** -1.67 2.87**
Decile 5 -3.25** 3.09** 1.72 3.25** 0.32 2.94**
Decile 6 -3.16** 2.65** 1.15 3.16** -0.67 3.27**
Decile 7 -1.84 0.12 -0.90 1.84 -0.47 3 90* * * *
Decile 8 -1.78 1.61 1.46 1.78 0.33 3.16**
Decile 9 0.06 0.70 1.19 -0.06 0.81 4.33****
Decile 10 -smallest 2.93** -2.69** 0.65 -2.93** 2.43* 4 23****
The t-test used here is an approximate t statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the means of two 
groups are equal. Under the assumption of unequal variances, the approximate t is computed as:
t  = (*i “  * 2 ) /  a/(ct? /  n\ ) +  ( a 2 /  n2 ) •
**** denotes significance at the 0 .01% level of significance, *** denotes significance at the 0 .1% level 
of significance, ** denotes significance at the 1% level of significance, and * denotes significance at 
the 5% level o f significance.
Regarding loss %, deciles 1 through 6 have significantly higher (i.e., greater positive 
values) means while decile 10 has a significantly lower (i.e., negative value) loss %
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value than the mean for all other deciles. Regarding DAR, deciles 1 through 6 have 
significantly lower means while decile 10 has a significantly higher mean DAR value 
than the mean for all other deciles. Regarding PPDR, there is no significant difference 
between the mean for each decile and the mean for all other deciles. Regarding PPAR, 
deciles 1 through 6 have significantly lower means while decile 10 has a significantly 
higher mean PPAR value than the mean for all other deciles (i.e., as expected, a 
similar result as for DAR and the opposite of loss %). Regarding TTC, only decile 10 
shows a significant difference between its mean and that of all other deciles (i.e., a 
shorter time to plan confirmation). Regarding RC, deciles 4 through 10 have a 
significantly lower mean number of related cases than the mean for all other deciles, 
whereas decile 1 has the opposite relationship.
Some further comment is warranted for the TTC result for the smallest firms. It has 
been pointed out that "the most efficient reorganization procedure is that which 
creates or preserves the greatest value net of all costs. Unfortunately, efficiency cannot 
be observed directly. However, a number of indirect measures of efficiency, such as 
length of time required to reorganize" can be observed directly (see Tashjian et al. 
[1996, p. 136]). Therefore, from this perspective smaller firms more efficiently 
negotiate the Chapter 11 process than larger firms. This TTC evidence for small firms 
contradicts the administrative costs of bankruptcy evidence presented by Warner 
[1977a] and Ang et al. [1982], which would suggest, from an efficiency perspective, 
the administrative costs of bankruptcy favor larger firms.
3 The Scale Effect of the Losses of Bankruptcy
For small firms, the direct costs of the bankruptcy proceedings can easily
consume the entire corpus (an apt term), but they are essentially fixed costs and
hence represent only a small portion of the recoveries in the larger cases.
Miller [1991, p. 10]
With respect to the administrative costs of bankruptcy, Warner [1977a] and Ang et al. 
[1982] have found evidence supporting an economies of scale argument. Regarding a 
scale effect for the direct costs of bankruptcy, the most direct and comprehensive 
analysis was made by Ang et al. [1982]. Ang et al. [1982, p. 225] concluded that the 
significance of their results was dependent upon "the role of the administrative costs 
of bankruptcy as an ingredient of total bankruptcy costs." In addition to the 
administrative costs of bankruptcy limitation, Ang et al. [1982] were reluctant to 
generalize their results because of the generally small size of the 55 firms in their
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sample, and because all 55 firms filed for bankruptcy in the Western District of 
Oklahoma. This chapter does not suffer from the above limitations noted by Ang et al. 
[1982], but it is limited by the fact that the sample is exclusively composed of 
successful Chapter 11 firms in fifteen bankruptcy court districts.
Based on the Ang et al. [1982] methodology, this section will analyze whether the 
scale effect result applies to the losses of successful bankruptcy. In this section, the 
following null hypothesis will be tested:
H0: there is no scale effect on the losses from successful Chapter 11.
Ang et al. [1982, p. 223] used two functional forms to test for a scale effect for the 
administrative costs of bankruptcy. Based on Ang et al. [1982], the two functional 
forms were as follows:
(1) Loss = a 0 + pj x Assets + p2 x Assets2 and
(2) ln(Zo^) = a 0 + p, x In (Assets).
Equation 1 is the quadratic function and equation 2 the logarithmic function. 
According to the scale effect hypothesis, the signs of the coefficients of equation 1 are 
as follows: a 0 = 0, pj > 0, and P2 < 0, and the signs of the coefficients of equation 2 
are as follows: a 0 = 0 and 1 > pt > 0 (see Ang et al. [1982]). The results are provided 
in the following table.
Table 4
Regression Results: Chapter 11 Loss as a Function of Total Assets
T-statistics are below the estimated coefficient values.
Equation A
a o
A
Pi
A
P2
F-Value Adj. R2 Obs.
(1) OLS -1,290,097
-0.81
0.S925
13.30****
-9.8337E-10
-17.52****
189 97**** 0.1999 1,514
(1) WLS
wtd. by debts
-0.2803
-4.23****
0.6013
125.19****
3.0138E-10
0.50
7,869.67**** 0.9123 1,514
(2) OLS (log model) 
positive losses
-2.2569
-10.80****
1.0959
74.04****
5,481.30**** 0.8390 1,053
**** denotes significance at the 0 .01% level of significance.
Due to heteroskedasticity in the OLS quadratic regression, estimates of a weighted 
least squares ("WLS") model are reported. To correct for heteroskedasticity in the 
quadratic model, each variable was weighted by total court reported debts.22
22 Total debts were chosen for the following reasons: (1) the error variances of the quadratic OLS 
model varied directly with the independent variable; (2) total debts varied directly with the 
independent variable; and (3) by using total debts to weight each variable, the error term became
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Therefore, the results of the OLS quadratic model are only reported in order to 
compare the SARD sample results directly with Ang et al. [1982].
Given that 461 of the 1,514 loss values are negative, the logarithmic regression results 
are limited to the 1,053 positive values. Therefore, the logarithmic regression results 
are based on larger firms than the full sample results. The mean size of the positive 
loss firms is $10,205 million in asset value versus $4,123 million in asset value for the 
negative loss firms, and the mean loss for the positive loss firms is $5,456 million 
versus -$5,938 million for the negative loss firms.
In both quadratic regressions, the estimated intercept term is negative, but it is 
statistically significant for the WLS regression. The estimated intercept of the 
logarithmic regression is also significantly negative. The estimated intercept terms of 
the WLS and logarithmic regressions (i.e., the regressions not showing problems with 
heteroskedasticity) strongly contradict the scale effect theory.
Overall, the results of the WLS quadratic regression suggest that the scale effect 
hypothesis does not describe the data generation process for successful Chapter 11 
losses well. First, the estimated intercept is negative and statistically significant at 
below the 0.01% level of significance. Second, the estimated coefficient for the asset 
value is positive, but it is over twenty times larger than that estimated by Ang et al. 
[1982, p. 224]. Third, although not statistically significant, the estimated coefficient 
for asset value squared is positive. Thus, there is a point at which the costs incurred by 
large firms is greater than unity (i.e., diseconomies of scale due to loss being a convex 
function of asset value).
Overall, the results of the logarithmic regression strongly suggest the scale effect 
hypothesis does not hold. First, the estimated intercept is negative and statistically 
significant at below the 0.01% level of significance. Second, the estimated coefficient 
for the natural log of asset value is greater than unity and statistically significant at 
below the 0.01% level of significance.
As a final caveat, there is a strong difference in the scale effect for successful bankrupt 
firms experiencing negative losses and those experiencing positive losses during
homoscedastic (i.e., according to the Goldfeld Quandt test used to test for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity).
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Chapter 11. Two sets of unreported regressions were run using the WLS quadratic 
model on two samples composed of positive and negative cost firms, respectively.
The size of the estimated coefficient for asset value for the negative loss sample and 
positive loss samples suggests a structural difference between the two samples (i.e., - 
1.1640 and 0.6007, respectively). The negative estimated coefficient for asset value 
for the negative loss sample suggests that larger successful bankrupt firms experience 
relatively fewer savings than smaller successful bankrupt firms. In the case of positive 
losses, larger successful bankrupt firms experience relatively slightly fewer losses 
than smaller successful bankrupt firms. Given that the negative loss sample is 
principally composed of smaller firms, this would suggest that small successful 
bankruptcies do not conform well to the scale effect hypothesis.
Also, although less than unity, the estimated coefficient for asset value in the full 
sample OLS quadratic regression is over 31 times greater than that in a comparable 
regression made by Ang et al. [1982, p. 224]. Thus, if the full sample OLS quadratic 
regression results are reliable, the total losses of successful bankruptcy have only a 
slight scale effect and are approximately thirty times greater than the direct costs of 
bankruptcy. Given that the full sample OLS quadratic regression has major problems 
with heteroskedasticity, the results of the OLS quadratic regression should be viewed 
with caution.
4 The Determinants of Losses incurred during Successful 
Bankruptcy
Empirical work has attempted to estimate the direct and indirect costs associated with 
bankruptcy.23 24 The direct costs of bankruptcy include all administrative expenses 
(e.g., all the court costs and filing fees, lawyers' fees, accounting costs, etc. associated
23 See Altman [1984] and Kalaba et al. [1984] on attempts to estimate the indirect costs of bankruptcy. 
Thus far, only Altman [1984] has used real data to do so. Although, Baxter [1967] seems to have been 
the first to discuss and present evidence on the indirect costs of bankruptcy.
24 See Hudson [1989] on a separate issue, that of the birth and death of firms. He finds that the 
unemployed are the primary entrepreneurs of the U.S. economy, and the majority o f these new 
ventures fail. The cost involved with shifting from the protection of a failed firm to the failure in a 
start-up firm can be considered an indirect cost of bankruptcy. Those few unemployed entrepreneurs 
that succeed, are indirect benefits of corporate failure. To this author's knowledge no academic has 
mentioned this possible indirect benefit of corporate failure, the focus of this chapter and other studies 
has typically been on the magnitude of the costs of failure. Although, Wruck [1990, p. 433-436] 
provided a partial review of the following practitioner mentioned benefits o f Chapter 11: (1) changes in 
top management, (2) changes in strategy and/or structure, (3) the automatic stay, and (4) D.I.P. 
financing.
10 4
with bankruptcy). The direct costs are the explicit costs of reorganization or 
liquidation.
Implicit or indirect costs of bankruptcy are much harder to define and measure. 
Indirect costs are typically defined as all costs which result in a real loss in firm value 
and are caused by the threat of a negative event, such as bankruptcy (e.g., managers' 
lost time due to reorganization negotiations, lost suppliers and customers due to the 
threat of bankruptcy, the cost of retraining laid off workers, etc.).25 An increasingly 
popular belief among theoretical financial economists is that the implicit costs of 
bankruptcy, or those of less dramatic events, are great (e.g., Cornell and Shapiro 
[1987]). In addition, it has been noted that even if the implicit costs can be measured 
by lost cash flow, that measured lost value will tend to underestimate actual losses.
In summary, stakeholder theory implies that shocks, such as product recalls, 
production delays, litigation and the like, will have a larger negative impact on 
the value of the firm than is indicated by the actual cash outlays involved. In such 
cases, the prices of implicit claims fall and stakeholders may even require that 
tacit 'understandings' be replaced by explicit contracts.
Cornell and Shapiro [1987, p. 13]
The results of this chapter would support this view of bankruptcy; but it should be 
noted that successful distressed large firms are generally more negatively impacted 
than successful distressed small firms.
Given that there are significant losses during bankruptcy, the question remains as to 
what factors determine the losses during bankruptcy. In addition to firm size, this 
section is intended to explicitly test for some of the determinants of the losses during 
successful bankruptcy. The remainder of this section is organized as follows: (1) a 
reconciliation of past direct cost of bankruptcy results with the results of this chapter;
(2) establishing possible factors causing the losses of bankruptcy; and (3) modelling, 
results, and analysis.
25 Essentially, these are the opportunity costs of being and seeming bankrupt. Baldwin and Mason 
[1983, p. 511] provide the following list, which was taken from Litner, J., "Some New Perspectives on 
tests on CAPM and Other Capital Asset Pricing Models and Issues of Market Efficiency," in Blume, 
Crockett and Taubman (ed.) Economic Activity and Finance (Ballinger 1982): "(1) increases in agency 
and monitoring costs with increasing debt, (2) the loss of'financial flexibility', (3) the loss of sales due 
to weakened assurance of delivery, (4) increasing inability to undertake otherwise profitable future 
investment opportunities, and (5) increasing probabilities of costly violations of restrictive indenture 
provisions and of incurring dead-weight bankruptcy costs." Also, see Chapter 3.
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4.1 Reconciling Past Research with Current Findings
This section is intended to reconcile past empirical bankruptcy costs research, which 
imply that there are economies of scale with respect to the administrative or direct 
costs of bankruptcy, with the findings of this chapter, which indicate that the absolute 
losses incurred during a successful bankruptcy have an inverted scale effect (i.e., 
small firms, not large firms, incur fewer relative losses). Regarding the economies of 
scale of the direct costs of bankruptcy, the results of this chapter do not necessarily 
contradict past empirical work. This can be explained by the fact that even though 
there may be economies of scale for the direct costs of bankruptcy, the indirect costs 
of bankruptcy are relatively higher for larger firms and these indirect costs swamp the 
scale effect of the direct costs. That is, direct costs, such as court fees, are small 
relative to the amount of assets that are lost through such indirect costs as decreased 
worker productivity and lost customers due to filing for bankruptcy, even in the case 
of successful Chapter 11 firms.
Given the industry and geographic focus of most past studies on the administrative 
costs of bankruptcy, it is possible that past studies have been so industry and 
geographically specific that they have failed to pick up more general bankruptcy cost 
patterns. Also, it may be that under the current Code small firm management interests 
are more in line with maximizing creditor value than the management of larger firms. 
At the extreme, sole proprietors may be much more successful at stopping the erosion 
of asset value than managers of larger firms.26
The bankruptcy cost question can be addressed by the following identity: SBC = DC 
+ IC, where SBC = successful bankruptcy costs, DC = Direct Costs, and IC = Indirect 
Costs. From the Chapter 3 review of bankruptcy costs, DC = Administrative Costs 
and IC = f(Size, Court Specific Factors, Length of Period of Distress, Creditors, 
Customers, Suppliers, Managers, Employees, Product, Capital Structure), and IC > 
DC (see Altman [1984]). DC are the sum of all administrative costs, while the 
relationship between some IC may be less than clear. It is important to note that there 
are no a priori reasons to believe that the relationship between indirect costs and the
26 Although, Ang and Chua [1981, p. 73] found a size effect for job losses among top level managers 
which suggests smaller firm management has less to fear than larger firm top level managers in 
bankruptcy. "The lower job loss among top executives in smaller companies could not be explained by 
a difference in the rate of successful reorganization." Apparently, smaller firm management performed 
better without the same level of fear of job loss as managers from larger firms.
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various factors affecting it are linear in nature. Also, it is likely that the factors 
affecting indirect costs have effects on each other.27 For example, the size of a firm 
seems to be of importance in determining the cost of bankruptcy, but it also can be 
related to the length of court protection. Managers' time lost due to financial distress 
may increase the number of lost customers, increase the number of lost suppliers, and 
reduce employee morale. Many factors may be partly subsumed within size itself. For 
example, a small firm may not incur as relatively high a level of IC due to capital 
structure, given that smaller firms generally do not have as complex capital structures 
as larger firms.28
This chapter has found that the total relative losses incurred during successful Chapter 
11 generally increase as firm size increases. Alternatively, for example, Altman 
[1984] finds that the direct costs of bankruptcy decrease as firm size increases. At a 
minimum, the fact that the results of this chapter show the opposite firm 
value/bankruptcy loss relationship than those examining the firm value/administrative 
costs of bankruptcy relationship suggests that the total costs of bankruptcy include 
substantial amounts of indirect costs.
This chapter finds that for successful Chapter 11 bankruptcies the total losses during 
supervised Chapter 11 increase as the size of the firm increases. These losses peak for 
the largest firms, but there is a large range over which they increase as firm size 
increases (i.e., deciles 10 through 2). Direct costs show a different pattern. Generally, 
it has been found that direct costs decrease as the size of the firm increases (e.g., 
Warner [1977a and Ang et al. [1982]). The evidence presented would support the 
notion that the indirect costs of bankruptcy increase substantially as the size of the 
firm increases. At least empirically, it would appear that indirect costs increase with 
firm size in such a way as to swamp the scale effects of the direct costs of bankruptcy. 
For all but the very smallest firms and finance firms, the direct costs of bankruptcy 
may be relatively trivial after all. For a distressed situation investor it would seem 
more profitable, but possibly much more difficult, to identify small firms successfully 
exiting Chapter 11 than large ones. Therefore, much of the inverse scale effect for 
smaller firms may be in large part due to a selection bias among successful small firm 
Chapter 1 Is. If there are economies of scale in Chapter 11, it is one of volume not 
size.
27 it is important to note that DC can also be in part a function of variables such as size, court district, 
and time in distress.
28 That is, agency problems, ala Jensen and Meckling [1976], do not cause many indirect costs for 
smaller firms.
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4.2 Explaining the Losses Incurred during Successful Bankruptcy
As discussed in the previous section, the relationship between the losses incurred 
during successful bankruptcy can be expressed as a function of the direct and indirect 
costs of the bankruptcy. Given that DCs are linearly additive, but the relationship 
between IC factors, DCs, and ICs themselves is unknown, this section is intended to 
provide evidence on the factors affecting the DCs and ICs of successful bankruptcy 
(i.e., the total losses incurred during successful bankruptcy). Unfortunately, the data 
allowed only limited direct tests of all the factors listed in the previous section. Of 
these, proxies for size, court and case specific factors, and length of distress exist.
Researchers have theorized about the possibility of the indirect costs of bankruptcy 
(e.g., Baldwin and Mason [1983] and Cornell and Shapiro [1987]), but only Altman 
[1984] has directly addressed the issue. In the previous section this chapter has 
suggested that, among others, the indirect cost of bankruptcy may be in part a function 
of firm size, court specific factors, and time in distress. This section is intended to 
analyze these possibilities with respect to the losses incurred during successful 
bankruptcy. For example, is there a correlation between loss and court district or does 
firm size seem to be the primary determinant of the losses incurred during successful 
bankruptcy? This chapter is not intended to analyze all possible factors determining 
the losses incurred during Chapter 11. Therefore, other factors remain an area for 
possible future research.
4.2.1 Firm Size
This chapter and past empirical research has established the importance of firm size in 
determining the costs of distress. In addition, in the case of successful Chapter 11, size 
appears to have been a very important determinant of reorganization plan 
confirmation, even though with increased size there is a tendency for increased case 
complexity. As Flynn [1989] wrote "I believe that the most predictive single piece of 
information reported would be the amount of assets listed by the debtor on its 
schedules." A case with over $1 million in assets listed was almost five times more 
likely to be confirmed than a case with less than $100,000 in assets listed (i.e., a small 
firm non selection bias).
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The following table provides evidence regarding the following two hypotheses: (1) 
there is no relationship between time in bankruptcy and bankruptcy losses; and (2) 
there is no relationship between loss and firm size. Among other observable measures, 
Tashjian et al. [1996, p. 136] discuss the expected relationship between time in 
bankruptcy and the efficiency of the bankruptcy process (i.e., the difference between 
the value of the firm preserved and the costs of bankruptcy during bankruptcy). The 
shorter the time in bankruptcy the lower the expected costs of bankruptcy and the 
higher the value of the firm which is preserved. Regarding total costs and firm size, 
Warner [1977a], Ang. et al. [1982], and Miller [1991] have suggested that the total 
costs of bankruptcy are relatively higher for smaller firms.
Table 5
Correlation Coefficients and the Significance Probability for Ho: p = 0 by Asset
Decile
These are Pearson correlation coefficients. The null hypothesis is Rho = 0.
Loss and TTC Loss and Total Assets
Decile Estimated p Significance Prob. Estimated p Significance Prob. Obs.
-0.02962 24.95% -0.19629 0.01%**** 1,514
1 -0.09694 23.48 -0.23350 0.38%** 152
2 0.18755 2.07* 0.29095 0.03*** 152
3 0.20507 1.13* 0.12212 13.39 152
4 0.14112 8.29 0.00285 97.22 152
5 0.08109 32.06 0.02629 74.78 152
6 0.07236 37.57 0.24935 0.19** 152
7 -0.11105 17.32 -0.07587 35.29 152
8 0.09902 22.49 0.06542 42.33 152
9 0.10262 20.99 0.13165 10.71 151
10 -0.10677 19.80 0.07709 35.34 147
**** denotes significance at the 0 .01% level of significance, *** denotes significant at the 0 .1% level 
of significant, ** denotes significance at the 1% level of significance, and * denotes significance at the 
5% level of significance.
Except for deciles 2 and 3, there isn't a strong relationship between loss and TTC. As 
suggested by the last section, there is a strong relationship between loss and firm size, 
but it is negative. Although, this relationship is stronger for the larger firms than the 
smaller firms.
The largest firms seem to be driving the sign of the correlation coefficient between 
loss and total assets. The correlation coefficient for loss and total assets for the largest 
decile is negative, and statistically significant. Among the very largest firms filing 
under Chapter 11, the losses incurred during bankruptcy decline as firm size increases.
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4.2.2 Court District
The lawyers I spoke with both in Florida and Illinois insisted that judges and
lawyers in their jurisdictions are significantly more willing to freeze out equity
holders than judges and lawyers in New York.
Weiss [1991, p.77]
By law, large firms have an option as to the court district in which they choose to file 
for court protection. Most large corporations in the U.S. are incorporated in the state 
of Delaware, yet they rarely file for protection there. By law, a business can file for 
bankruptcy anywhere it has business interests. Many large firms have some interests 
in the city of New York. This tends to be one of the districts of choice in which to file 
for Chapter 11 status, and why it was selected by the SARD as one of its non random 
district selections.
The Southern District of New York (i.e., district 10) was qualitatively different than 
other court districts. The average number of cases per record was 3.77 in the Southern 
District of New York and 1.58 in the other 14 districts. A case filed in district 10 was 
more than twice as likely to be comprised of at least two cases.29 Approximately 
21.0% of the records in district 10 had at least three cases, while the other 14 districts 
had approximately 6.3% of their records with at least three cases. District 10 had more 
than twice as many cases filed there than any other district over the study period, and 
it had the longest median time to filing confirmation of any district in the study. Cases 
filed there were at least twice as likely to be confirmed than in the other 14 districts. 
Nationally, it accounted for more than twenty percent of PP confirmed.30 In the study, 
it accounted for over half the PP confirmed. District 10 appeared to be unique among 
the 15 districts the Administrative Office of the United States Courts collected data 
on. Why was district 10 such a focal point for large, solvent Chapter 11 filings? Was 
this due to the type of firm filing there, the judges and trustees presiding over cases 
there, or both? These questions may provide useful focus for future research.
Even though this chapter is primarily concerned with the effect of filing in certain 
court districts, it is interesting to note that, it may be that larger distressed firms with
29 Also, they were more than three times as likely to contain at least three cases. As an aside, half of 
the cases containing nine or more cases were in the Southern District of New York, including one 
record containing 129 cases.
30 The Southern District of New York tends to have larger and more solvent firms filing for 
bankruptcy there. Although the Southern District of Texas also appears to have a similar bias. District 
10 is a popular place for large, solvent firms to file for Chapter 11.
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shareholders in control have an economic incentive to file in the Southern District of 
New York. Weiss [1991] found that both larger firms and firms filing for bankruptcy 
in New York were "more likely" to violate the absolute priority rule ("APR") than 
smaller firms and firms filing for bankruptcy outside of New York. Weiss [1991] 
indicated that the New York bias was likely to be the result of court and lawyer 
attitudes towards violation of the APR, and shareholders' interest in attaining a share 
of the reorganized company in excess of their legally prescribed amount. This may in 
part explain why there was a tendency for larger more solvent firms to file for 
bankruptcy in New York than the other districts examined in this chapter.
Systematic industry differences across districts may have also significantly influenced 
the estimated loss values across districts. Given that this is a large sample of 
successful bankruptcies, it is assumed that systematic industry differences between 
districts did not exist. The data did not allow this premise to be tested. For the sample, 
the industry of each firm was unknown.
The following table provides values by district.
Table 6
Values of Relative Loss, DAR, PPDR, PPAR, TTC, and RC by District
Except for related cases, all values are median values.
District Loss % DAR PPDR PPAR TTC RC
1 42.50% 1.03 0.56 0.57 558 1.42
2 24.14 1.51 0.56 0.76 722 1.30
3 12.04 1.56 0.62 0.88 575 1.22
4 34.85 1.35 0.54 0.65 724 1.32
5 15.25 1.16 0.75 0.85 527 1.09
6 38.32 1.07 0.67 0.62 505 1.21
7 32.52 1.43 0.57 0.67 497 1.12
8 66.38 1.32 0.40 0.34 935 2.09
9 19.79 1.57 0.55 0.80 708 1.53
10 21.08 1.46 0.48 0.79 596 3.77
11 28.38 1.01 0.75 0.72 906 1.24
12 37.90 1.08 0.62 0.62 459 1.85
13 49.46 1.11 0.45 0.51 743 1.33
14 33.67 1.18 0.56 0.66 683 1.27
15 36.69 1.08 0.62 0.63 686 1.18
Loss is equal to total listed assets as of the date the firm filed for court protection less the total value o f  
proposed payments in the court approved plan of reorganization divided by total listed assets as of the 
date the firm filed for court protection. DAR is the ratio of total debts to total assets. PPDR is the ratio 
of total proposed payments to total debts. PPAR is the ratio of total proposed payments to total assets. 
TTC is the total time, in days, from filing for court protection to plan confirmation. RC is the related 
number of cases.
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Of the fifteen districts only the Southern District of New York was known (i.e., 
district 10), all other fourteen court districts were anonymous. The majority of the 
largest firms in the largest decile (i.e., those in decile 1) are from the Southern District 
of New York.
Bankruptcy court districts differ substantially in terms of losses incurred during 
bankruptcy. Districts 3 and 5 have relatively low loss values, while district 8 has a 
relatively high level of loss values. Except for the number of related cases, the other 
variables did not differ substantially from district to district.
Table 7
Means Tests for Relative Loss, DAR, PPDR, PPAR, TTC, and RC by District 
(remaining fourteen district mean versus the district mean)
Loss is equal to total listed assets as of the date the firm filed for court protection less the total value of 
proposed payments in the court approved plan of reorganization divided by total listed assets as of the 
date the firm filed for court protection. DAR is the ratio of total debts to total assets. PPDR is the ratio 
of total proposed payments to total debts. PPAR is the ratio of total proposed payments to total assets. 
TTC is the total time, in days, from filing for court protection to plan confirmation. RC is the related 
number of cases.
Loss % DAR PPDR PPAR TTC RC
District 1 -2.99** 1.49 1.41 2.99** 2.77** 0.68
District 2 1.09 0.59 -1.32 -1.09 -0.99 2.08*
District 3 0.44 -0.83 1.26 -0.91 0.24 2.43*
District 4 0.64 -0.76 1.99* -0.64 -1.93 1.85
District 5 -2.07* 1.71 0.49 2.07* 0.98 3.86****
District 6 -0.77 2.53* 0.86 0.77 1.93 2 .66**
District 7 -0.97 0.84 0.97 -0.95 5.77**** 3.64***
District 8 -2.56* 0.01 1.85 2.56* -2.00 -0.87
District 9 0.35 -0.40 1.80 -0.35 -1.37 0.34
District 10 (SDNY) -1.14 1.88 0.84 1.14 1.81 -2 .22*
District 11 -2.26* 3.50*** 0.62 2.26* -5 34**** 1.53
District 12 -2.32* 0.75 1.63 2.32* 7 72**** -0.85
District 13 -3.14** 2.24* 2.46* 3.14** -0.95 1.70
District 14 0.85 0.48 1.60 -0.85 -1.05 2.47*
District 15 -2.32* 1.79 1.18 2.32* -1.70 3.29***
The t-test used here is an approximate t statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the means of two 
groups are equal. Under the assumption of unequal variances, the approximate t is computed as:
t = (xi - x 2) / yl(<j2/nt) + (<y2/n2).
**** denotes significance at the 0 .01% level of significance, *** denotes significance at the 0 .1% level 
of significance, ** denotes significance at the 1% level o f significance, and * denotes significance at 
the 5% level of significance.
Regarding loss %, districts 1,5, 8,11,12,13, and 15 have significantly higher means 
than the mean for all other districts. Regarding DAR, districts 6,11, and 13 have 
significantly lower means than the mean for all other districts. Regarding PPDR, 
districts 4 and 13 have significantly lower means than the mean for all other districts.
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Regarding PPAR, districts 1, 5, 8,11,12,13, and 15 have significantly lower means 
than the mean for all other districts (i.e., as expected, a similar result as for DAR and 
the opposite of loss %). Regarding TTC, districts 1, 7, and 12 have significantly lower 
means than the mean for all other districts, while only district 11 has a significantly 
higher mean than the mean for all the other districts. Regarding RC, districts 2, 3, 5, 6, 
7,14, and 15 have a significantly lower mean number of related cases than the mean 
for all other districts, whereas district 10 has the opposite relationship.
Given that bankruptcy is a legal framework, it should not be surprising that 
institutional factors may play a role in determining the costs and/or timing of 
bankruptcy. If it is the case that the cost and timing of a successful bankruptcy is in 
part determined by district, then the optimal initiation of bankruptcy proceedings is 
not just a function of when the case is filed31, but also where it is filed. This 
institutional point concerning choice of venue was first made in the law literature (see 
LoPucki and Whitford [1991]).32
The following table provides evidence regarding the following two hypotheses: (1) 
there is no relationship between time in distress and loss; and (2) there is no 
relationship between loss and firm size.
31 See Van Home [1976] regarding a dynamic programming solution to the optimal timing of 
bankruptcy from the debt holders' perspective.
32 Although, Johnson and Abbott [1991] have noted that some of the abnormal benefit derived from 
merging with financially distressed firms may be determined by the size of the net operating loss 
("NOL") tax shield available to the acquiring firm. Unfortunately, their sample would, by the standards 
of this study, be considered only slightly distressed. Also, they find diversification and asset 
revaluation to be the primary determinants of abnormal gains from "distressed" acquisitions, not the 
size of NOLs available to the acquirer.
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Table 8
Correlation Coefficients and the Significance Probability for Ho: p = 0 by
District
These are Pearson correlation coefficients. The null hypothesis is Rho = 0.
Loss and TTC Loss and Total Assets
District Estimated p Significance Prob. Estimated p Significance Prob. Obs.
1 -0.03949 74.19% 0.97125 0.01%**** 72
2 -0.05994 57.69 0.96725 0.01**** 89
3 0.08471 39.96 0.91844 0.01**** 101
4 -0.04195 62.26 0.82292 0.01**** 140
5 -0.14666 51.49 0.03560 87.50 22
6 0.10241 37.87 0.99897 0.01**** 76
7 0.18531 8.76 0.90146 0.01**** 86
8 0.10202 57.85 0.99963 0.01**** 32
9 -0.07440 39.84 0.93275 0.01**** 131
10 -0.16986 4.25* -0.80054 0.01**** 143
11 0.35962 0.03*** 0.56919 0.01**** 97
12 0.10346 26.49 0.99410 0.01**** 118
13 0.20908 4.67** 0.93363 0.01**** 91
14 0.00105 98.85 0.98897 0.01**** 192
15 0.20397 2.31* 0.87557 0.01**** 124
**** denotes significance at the 0 .01% level of significance, *** denotes significant at the 0 .1% level 
of significant, ** denotes significance at the 1% level of significance, and * denotes significance at the 
5% level of significance.
Districts 10, 11,13 and 15 had statistically significant coefficients at the 5%, 0.1%, 
1%, and 5% levels of significance, respectively, for loss and TTC. Over the full 
sample, and in most districts loss and TTC show no statistically significant 
relationship.
The loss and total asset results are more striking. All but district 5 had statistically 
significant coefficients at the 0.01% level of significance for loss and total assets.
Only in district 10 is the same negative correlation between loss and total assets found 
as was found in size decile 1. Therefore, the large district 10 firms are responsible for 
most of the economies of scale in large Chapter 11 firms. District 10 is an unusual 
district. The large district 10 firms are unlike the other large firms in the SARD 
sample. Large district 10 firms actually display a scale effect most other large firms 
do not display.33
33 As a final note, given the peculiarity o f the relationship between firm size and costs in district 10, 
data samples drawn from district 10 should be viewed with caution (e.g., White [1983] draws a sample 
from the Southern District of New York). That is, generalizations about all court districts based on 
district 10 should be avoided.
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4.2.3 Case Complexity
Ceteris paribus, the more complex a bankruptcy is, the more costly it is. Therefore, 
this chapter hypothesizes that case complexity positively impacts the losses incurred 
during successful Chapter 11. Regarding the SARD sample, related cases (i.e., RCs) 
are used to proxy for case complexity. Related cases are typically cases where a 
subsidiary files for protection under Chapter 11 of the Code in conjunction with a 
parent company filing for court protection. Both parent and subsidiary(ies) file 
separate plans of reorganization. This variable is intended to be a measure of the 
complexity of the bankruptcy case itself. More related cases would be expected to 
prolong the period to confirmation and the cost of bankruptcy itself. Therefore, RC 
should be positively related to the time to plan confirmation and the losses incurred 
during Chapter 11.
4.2.4 Time in Distress (Time to Case Confirmation)
Another indicator of bankruptcy costs is the length of time that the bankruptcy
procedure takes.
White [1989, p. 147]
Ceteris paribus, the faster a going concern is able to enter and exit Chapter 11, the 
lower its costs of bankruptcy. Regarding the SARD sample, time to confirmation (i.e., 
TTC) is used to proxy for distress time. TTC is the measure of time (in days) from the 
filing of bankruptcy until the date the plan of reorganization is confirmed by the 
bankruptcy court. The time to confirmation is a measure of the speed, or lack thereof, 
of the Chapter 11 process. The longer a firm is under court supervised protection, the 
worse the expected condition of the firm, ceteris paribus.34 Therefore, the longer the 
bankruptcy takes, the larger the expected losses incurred during bankruptcy.
34 As suggested by the Ernst & Young, Inc. study, at the very least, the more likely the case turns into 
a Chapter 7.
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4.2.5 Agency Theory
And, given our costly and cumbersome court-supervised bankruptcy process, it 
seems clear that far more of this operating value can be preserved by privately 
resolving conflicts among the firm's claimants rather than filing under Chapter 
11.
Jensen [1991, p. 24]
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that highly levered firms, 
through increased levels of monitoring, incur fewer agency costs than less levered 
firms. It has also been theorized that relatively high levels of debt give creditors the 
ability to "discipline" managers in times of distress, which has the affect of decreasing 
the costs of distress (e.g., see Harris and Raviv [1990]). Is there a leverage effect in 
the case of successful Chapter 11s? That is, are relatively high levels of debts 
associated with lower levels of losses incurred during bankruptcy?
For the successful bankruptcies studied, the smaller the business, as measured by 
assets listed, the lower was the likelihood of filing before debts were greater than 
assets. 90.7% of the businesses with under $100,000 in listed assets filed after debts 
exceeded assets, whereas 21.1% of the businesses with over $100 million in listed 
assets filed after debts exceed assets. Generally, in terms of solvency, larger 
businesses filed for Chapter 11 protection earlier than smaller businesses. One reason 
for this may have been to extend the tenure of managers. Although, data on the 
longevity of managers in these cases was not available. Another reason for quick 
filing on the part of managers of large companies may have been to preempt creditors 
from gaining control of the business.35 Given the losses incurred during Chapter 11, 
especially for larger businesses outside of district 10, early filing was not an 
economically beneficial move from the perspective of the company and its creditors 
(i.e., the data supports a positive relationship, particularly for larger firms, between 
loss and length of bankruptcy).
Relative solvency is proxied by the amount owed to creditors relative to the amount of 
assets of the firm. Given that under the court supervision the automatic stay is in
There are as many arguments as there are stars in the night sky; but it is likely that those people 
controlling the Chapter 11 filings of large businesses were attempting to seek protection for other 
reasons than those of the managers of smaller businesses. Given that smaller businesses tend to have a 
greater share of ownership in the hands of management than larger businesses, it is unlikely that small 
business owners are not acting in the interests of shareholders by waiting longer to file for Chapter 11 
protection.
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effect, the liquidity of the firm should not be as important in measuring the solvency 
of the firm as is its long term ability to pay back its creditors.
4.3 Modelling & Analysis of the Losses Incurred during Successful 
Chapter 11
Based on the preceding discussion, the following is the general model used:
LosSj = /  {S iz e , TTC t, RCj , So/v,., District ) 
where:
Size , = size of bankrupt firm as measured by total assets as of bankruptcy filing (size 
variable),
7TC, = total time from bankruptcy filing to plan of reorganization confirmation (court 
specific),
R C ^  total number of related cases (firm and case specific variable),
Solv(= relative firm solvency (capital structure variable), and 
District;.= district firm filed bankruptcy petition (court specific variable).
The models tested were as follows:
(3) Losst = a 0 + Pj x Assetsi + P2 x Assets] + P3 x TTCi + p4 x RCi + P6 x DVD 10,. + e(
(4) ln(Zo5^) = a 0+p, x \n(Assetq)+p3 x ln(7TCj)+p4 x ln(/?Cj)+P5 x ln(ZX4i^ )+P6 x DVD\0, +et 
where: Assets, TTC, RC, and DAR were defined earlier; DVD 10 = dummy variable 
for bankruptcy court district 10 equal to 1 if district 10, 0 otherwise; and e is the error 
term. Equation 3 is the WLS regression equation and equation 4 the logarithmic 
regression equation. The natural logarithm of all nondummy variables was taken in 
the logarithmic equation.
From the previous section, some of the expected relationships can be summarized by 
the following hypotheses:
H0l: for equations 3 and 4, a  = 0.
H02: for equation, 3 pj > 0, and for equation 4,1 > P1 > 0.
Hm: for equation 3, P2 <0.
Hm : for equations 3 and 4, P3>0.
Hm: for equations 3 and 4, P4>0.
H06: for equation 4, p5<0.
HQ7: for equations 3 and 4, p6 * 0.
The following table provides the regression results.
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Table 9
Determinants of Loss - WLS and OLS Logarithmic Regression Results
WLS Model Logarithmic Model
Variable Estimated Coefficient Variable Estimated Coefficient
Intercept -0.2569 Intercept -2.9027
t-statistic -3.73*** -8.24****
Assets 0.7266 ln(Assets) 1.0788
t-statistic 28.91**** 66.41****
Assets Squared -2.5654E-I0
t-statistic -0.42
Time to Confirmation 56.9556 ln(Time to Confirmation) 0.1396
t-statistic 2.60** 3.25**
Related Cases -79,414 ln(Related Cases) -0.0398
t-statistic -0.70
ln(Debt to Assets Ratio) -0.1708
t-statistic -5.73****
District 10 Dummy -0.1348 -0.1086
t-statistic -0.61 -1.18
Observations 1,514 1,053
F-Value 3,231.999**** 1,156.832****
Adjusted R-squared 0.914 0.846
**** denotes significance at the 0.01% level of significance, *** denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
of significance, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level of significance.
The first three estimated coefficients of the WLS regression support the results of the 
WLS scale effect regression, and the first two estimated coefficients of the logarithmic 
regression support the results of the logarithmic scale effect regression. In both 
regressions, the estimated intercept term is negative, and statistically significant. 
Again, the estimated intercept terms of the WLS and logarithmic regressions strongly 
contradict the scale effect theory. Thus, H0l is rejected. Regarding H02, the WLS 
regression results generally support some scale effect and the logarithmic regression 
results reject a scale effect. Also, as with the WLS scale effect regression, the 
estimated coefficient for assets squared is not statistically different from zero. Thus, 
H03 is rejected. None of the results of the first sets of regressions differ in the full 
model results.
Regarding the estimated coefficient for TTC, the results of regression models 3 and 4 
support H04. Logically, longer bankruptcies cost more. For successful Chapter 11 
cases, the time spent under court supervision has a significant positive impact on the 
losses incurred during bankruptcy.
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Regarding the estimated coefficient for RC, the results of the WLS model contradict 
Hos, and the results of the logarithmic regression are indeterminate. For the WLS 
regression, the negative coefficient for RC indicated that, contrary to expectations, the 
more complex the bankruptcy (as measured by the number of related cases) the lower 
the losses incurred during bankruptcy. Given that the sample used in the logarithmic 
regression is composed of generally larger firms than the full sample, the small firms 
are driving the WLS regression results. The WLS regression results contradict 
expectations regarding case complexity and losses incurred during successful 
bankruptcies.
Regarding the estimated coefficient for DAR, the result of the logarithmic regression 
supports H06. In the case of successful bankruptcy, as suggested by agency theory, the 
higher levels of monitoring associated with relatively higher levels of debt seem to 
decrease the agency costs associated with distress. Therefore, the higher DAR is for a 
successful Chapter 11, the lower its losses during the legally defined bankruptcy 
period.
Regarding the estimated coefficient for the district 10 dummy variable, neither 
regression supports H01. Even though there is a significant level of correlation 
between losses in district 10 and assets, there is no significant district 10 effect, after 
controlling for the various determinants of loss. There is an obvious bias in the size 
and solvency of district 10 firms, but there doesn't appear to be a significant benefit to 
filing for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York.
5 Summary and Conclusions
The total losses incurred during successful bankruptcy are nontrivial. From a large 
sample set of successful Chapter 11 cases, size, time in distress, and long run solvency 
are important factors in determining the losses incurred during bankruptcy. Regarding 
a "scale effect" for the losses incurred during successful bankruptcy, the results of this 
chapter contradict the scale effect theory of direct bankruptcy costs. Actually, for all 
but the very largest firms, the relative size of losses of successful Chapter 11 increase 
as firm size increases.
There is one bankruptcy court policy implication of this chapter. However, this 
implication may not apply for the very largest firms and smallest firms filing for 
Chapter 11, which do not encounter the same level of relative losses as other sizes of
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firms. Because there is a positive relationship between the costs incurred under court 
protection and time under court protection, it may be economically advantageous to 
encourage large firms to file prepackaged Chapter 11 versus Chapter 11 in order to 
decrease their time under court protection (see McConnell [1991], Salerno and 
Hanson [1991], and Tashjian et al. [1996]).
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CHAPTER 5
BACKGROUND TO THE LOW-GRADE BOND EMPIRICAL 
EXAMINATIONS IN THIS THESIS
1 Introduction
Empirical and theoretical research aimed at understanding the returns process of
low-grade bonds is sparse.
Shane [1994, p. 79]
The following are the primary questions addressed by this thesis in the following three 
empirical chapters: (1) do low-grade corporate bonds as an asset class show evidence 
of possessing a higher proportion of calls and/or weaker call protection than high- 
grade corporate bonds; and (2) do low-grade corporate bonds as an asset class 
demonstrate a return generation process which would suggest that changes in risk-free 
interest rates and/or the economy account for a significant amount of the relative 
return variation in the low-grade market overall? Regarding question #1, the analysis 
is extended to low-grade municipal versus high-grade municipal bonds and 
convertible corporate bonds versus straight low-grade corporate bonds. Regarding 
question #2, the analysis is extended to low-grade municipal versus high-grade 
municipal bonds and convertible corporate bonds versus straight low-grade corporate 
bonds. In general, the results presented in Chapters 6 through 8 support the basic 
hypotheses presented in this chapter.
Generally, Chapters 6 through 8 of this thesis test the hypothesis that the returns of 
low-grade bonds as an asset class are significantly affected (i.e., relative to its high- 
grade or straight low-grade bond asset class) during periods when significant changes 
in interest rates and/or the economy occur. The periods used to examine the processes 
being examined are directly related to the principal options embedded in the risky
12 1
bond security types studied (i.e., straight low-grade bonds, straight high-grade bonds, 
and convertible bonds). This methodology is intended to analyze several unresolved 
questions regarding low-grade and high-grade corporate bonds, and generally extend 
research on the returns generation processes of relatively under researched asset 
classes (i.e., low-grade municipal bonds and convertible corporate bonds). In addition, 
the essential arguments which can explain the returns behavior of low-grade bonds 
relative to high-grade bonds can be found in CCA pricing models for risky debt which 
assume an underlying stochastic process for both the firm value and the risk-free rate 
of interest (e.g., Longstaff and Schwartz [1995]).
Beginning with Hickman [1958], there has been a relatively long, although "sparse", 
history of financial research on the subject of whether low-grade corporate bonds 
outperform high-grade corporate bonds. The primary research questions motivating 
these studies have been the hypotheses that low-grade corporate bonds have or may 
have returned significantly more than high-grade corporate bonds (e.g., Frame and 
Mills [1961], Joehnk and Nielsen [1975], and Weinstein [1987]); and whether the 
default experience of low-grade corporate bonds suggests that low-grade bonds have 
been systematically underpriced (e.g., Altman [1989] and Asquith et al. [1989]). For 
example, Cornell and Green [1991] motivate their study by stating:
One of the arguments used by Drexel Burnham Lambert to promote the sale of 
low-grade or 'junk' bonds is that the risk adjusted returns are greater than those 
for more highly rated bonds. Though Drexel's hypothesis is of keen interest to 
both academics and practitioners, definite tests have proved difficult to conduct 
because junk bonds are traded over-the-counter by a limited number of market 
makers so that reliable transaction data are rarely available.
Cornell and Green [1991, p. 29]
This "Drexel hypothesis" is merely a restatement of one of Hickman's [1958] results. 
Beginning with Fraine and Mills [1961], several studies have countered Hickman's 
[1958] original claim (e.g., Fridson [1994]), while others have supported it (e.g., 
Fitzpatrick and Severiens [1978]). Generally, these differences between studies are 
due primarily to methodology and secondly to sample period.
In addition to the fact that there have been few studies concerned with analyzing the 
return generating process for low-grade bonds and the above standard motivations 
given, this thesis has at least two other motivations which have been generated by the 
Blume et al. [1991] and Cornell and Green [1991] studies. First, there is the following 
issue:
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The standard deviation of low-grade bond returns is frequently less than the 
standard deviation of high-grade bond returns. Blume, Keim and Patel attribute 
this to the fact that low-grade bonds typically have a shorter duration. The 
effective duration of low-grade bonds is lower than that for high-grade bonds and 
Treasury bonds because the coupons are higher and because low-grade bonds are 
often called earlier. Early calls occur more often for low-grade bonds because 
they generally have weaker call protection than their high-grade counterparts and 
because the credit quality of low-grade bonds is more likely to rise.
Cornell and Green [1991, p. 39]
Although, it is generally true that low-grade corporate bonds have a lower duration 
than high-grade corporate bonds, this thesis will show that calls alone cannot be the 
principal explanation for their shorter duration, and subsequent lower standard 
deviation, for low-grade corporate bonds relative to high-grade corporate bonds. In 
fact, it will be shown that defaults have had a greater impact on the duration of low- 
grade bonds than calls. Defaults and the probability of default have a greater impact 
on low-grade bonds than high-grade bonds. Therefore, it is the relative lack of defaults 
for high-grade bonds which make them more volatile relative to low-grade bonds. In 
addition, as a by-product of the method developed in this chapter, the above assertion 
that low-grade bonds are called more often and/or earlier will be tested.
Second, there is the following seemingly anomalous finding:
The finding that low-grade bonds are more sensitive to interest rates during 
recessions is more difficult to understand. One possibility is that as the 
probability of default rises, bond prices react more strongly to economic 
conditions. However, this explanation implies that low-grade bond prices should 
become more sensitive to both interest rates and the market, but only the former 
is observed.
Cornell and Green [1991, p. 44]
Cornell and Green [1991] find that low-grade corporate bonds become significantly 
more sensitive to Treasury bond market movements during recessionary periods, but 
this result does not reconcile with CCA models of risky bond pricing which do not 
account for changes in the risk-free rate of interest. A more simplified CCA risky debt 
valuation model would suggest that low-grade corporate debt should become 
increasing more sensitive to the equity market as credit quality declines during 
recessionary periods. This issue will be further examined by the methodology 
employed and will be examined for low-grade municipal bonds.
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The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2 summarizes 
previous low-grade corporate bond return research and unresolved low-grade versus 
high-grade corporate bond issues of interest to this thesis, and reviews some CCA 
risky debt pricing models of interest to this thesis. Section 3 presents the relevant 
implications of CCA for this thesis and the importance of embedded options in 
explaining the return generation process for risky bonds. Section 4 presents the 
research method and statistical model used in Chapters 6 through 8. Section 5 reviews 
and summarizes the risky bond asset classes analyzed in this thesis.
2 A Summary of Previous Research and Unresolved Low-Grade 
vs. High-Grade Corporate Bond Issues
More important, from the portfolio manager's perspective, is one point that all of 
the studies have agreed on: High yield bonds have produced higher returns than 
investment grade bonds over the long run, net of all credit related losses.
Altman et al. [1990, p. 4]
This section is divided into the following three sections: (1) a low-grade corporate 
bond return literature review, (2) a review of the low-grade bond return literature as it 
relates to this thesis, and (3) a review of several CCA risky debt pricing models which 
can explain seemingly abnormal low-grade corporate bond empirical results. There is 
no comparable set of convertible corporate bond return or low-grade municipal bond 
return literature. Therefore, the empirical literature review which follows is based on 
past low-grade corporate bond research only.
2.1 Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns Literature Review
Whether low-grade corporate bonds as an asset class have outperformed high-grade 
corporate bonds became a more popular area of research among academics with the 
large increase in the size of the low-grade corporate bond market in the early to mid 
1980s (e.g., Bierman [1990]).1 The more recent academic consensus has been that,
1 A surge in practical research has also accompanied the surge in new issues (e.g., Cherry and Fridson 
[1991], Fridson [1991b], and Goodman [1990]). Although, the Cherry and Fridson [1991] article was 
more concerned with the issue o f positive abnormal returns for securities o f the Penn Central 
Transportation Corporation rather than low-grade bonds as an asset class.
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after accounting for risk with a particular factor model, low-grade corporate bonds' 
performance as an asset class was not abnormal.
Most of low-grade corporate bond return literature is not directly linked to the 
question of the abnormality of low-grade corporate bond returns. The exceptions to 
this are the following studies: (1) Blume and Keim [1987], (2) Weinstein [1987], (3) 
Cornell and Green [1991], and (4) Blume et al. [1991]. The one result which is 
consistent among those directly and indirectly linked to the abnormality of low-grade 
bond returns is that the various results seem to be inconsistent. The following table is 
intended to highlight the academic work in the field.
Table 1
Studies Examining the Abnormality of Low-Grade Bond Returns
These represent academic studies and one speech in the area.
Study Sample Period
Method of Risk 
Measurement
Compare 
HG vs. LG Abnormal
Hickman [1958] Financial Manuals 1900-1943 Realized Yield Yes +
Fraine & Mills [1961] NBER Sample 1900-1943 Realized Yield Yes -/0
Joehnk & Nielsen [1975] RR & Industrial 61:01-71:12 Realized Yield Yes -
Fitz. & Severiens [1978] S&P 65:12-76:06 Realized Yield Yes +
Blume & Keim [1987] Constructed Index 77:01-86:12 One Factor Model Yes 0
Weinstein [1987] Unknown 62:06-74:07 One Factor Model Yes 0
Fons [1987] 702 bonds 80:12-84:06 One Factor Model Yes +
Altman [1989] S&P 71:01-87:12 None Yes +
Asquith et al. [1989] S&P & Moody's 77:01-88:12 None Yes 0
Kaplan & Stein [1990]2 8 to 12 LBOs 1985-1988 One Factor Models No -
Cornell & Green [1991] Mutual Funds 60:01-89:12 Two Factor Model Yes 0
Blume et al. [1991] Constructed Index 77:01-89:12 One Factor Model Yes 0
Cornell [1993] Mutual Funds 78:01-89:12 Two Factor Model Yes 0/+
"Compare HG vs. LG" refers to whether the study compared the performance of high-grade bonds to 
that of low-grade bonds. What is defined as "abnormal" is contingent upon the methodology used to 
control for risk.
2 The Kaplan and Stein [1990] study examined the betas of 12 leveraged recapitalizations before and 
after recapitalization. The period studied covered a four year period (1985-1988). Kaplan and Stein 
[1990, p. 244] concluded that "debtholders in our sample do not receive adequate compensation for the 
risk they bear." This result was based on the assumption that interest on the debt accrued at a fixed rate 
with certainty over the estimation period (i.e., interest payments were ignored in the beta calculations). 
Given its risky nature, this may not have been a reasonable assumption to be made for low-grade 
bonds. In addition, especially in the first two years following a recapitalization, the success of a low- 
grade bond issue is heavily dependent on a paydown of debt (see Altman and Smith [1990]). The great 
changes in leverage during the first few years of a typical LBO of the late 1980s makes the pricing and 
estimation o f Betas problematic. Regarding the Kaplan and Stein study, the following issues were 
problematic: (1) the small size of the sample, (2) the period under study, (3) the shortness of the period 
under study, (4) assumptions made, and (5) the very specific type of transaction under study.
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The classic Hickman [1958] study was the first and most complete study of corporate 
bonds ever made. The study was based on a complete set of financial manuals 
provided by the four rating agencies existing at the time (i.e., Moody's, Fitch,
Standard Statistics, and Poor's). The study was divided into the following parts: (1) 
aggregate investor experience, (2) agency ratings, (3) municipal bonds, (4) the 
market's implied ability to rate bonds, and (6) a comparison of the various ratings 
systems. Regarding this thesis, Hickman's conclusions regarding investor experience 
are the more relevant results of his study. Of Hickman's [1958] fourteen primary 
conclusions, the following were the most relevant: (1) over all corporate bonds the net 
loss rate was zero, (2) capital gains and losses varied significantly from period to 
period, (3) low-grade bonds outperformed high-grade bonds over long periods, (4) 
high-grade bonds were more liquid than low-grade bonds, and (5) a "wide disparity of 
performance was the rule for minor groupings and for bonds held over short 
investment periods." Therefore, Hickman indicated that comparisons between high- 
grade and low-grade bonds should be made over long periods; and liquidity may be a 
partial explanation as to why low-grade bonds have outperformed high-grade bonds 
over long periods.
The Fraine and Mills [1961] study was a follow-up to the Hickman [1958] study. The 
period under study was the same period Hickman [1958] had studied (i.e., 1900 
through 1943). They noted that during the later part of the sample period "most of the 
bonds extinguished during this period were extinguished by call", and suggested that 
the abnormal realized yields found by Hickman [1958] were in large part due to the 
end of period effect that low 1943 interest rates had on corporate bonds. After 
"modifying" yields for undefaulting bonds by substituting the contractual yield for the 
yield realized over the period, Fraine and Mills [1961] found that low-grade bonds 
had "realized" lower yields than high-grade bonds. Thus, Fraine and Mills' [1961] 
results contradicted the Hickman [1958] comparative corporate bond conclusion. 
Although, this result was caused by the exclusion of issues affected by out-of-court 
restructurings (see Fridson [1994, p. 50-52]).
The Joehnk and Nielsen [1975] study was a stand alone study on the investment 
performance of "speculative grade corporate bonds" from railroads and industrial 
sectors. No defaulted or upgraded bonds were included in the sample of low-grade 
bonds. The quarterly realized yields of low-grade corporate bonds were compared to 
those of investment grade (i.e., high-grade) corporate bonds over the periods: (1) 
January 1961 through December 1964, and (2) January 1968 through December 1971. 
After controlling for risk as measured by the standard deviation of return, Joehnk and
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Nielsen [1975, p. 39] concluded: "on average, speculative grade bonds provided 
totally unsatisfactory investment outlets" and there is "little or no justification for 
investing in speculatives, on the average."
The Fitzpatrick and Severiens [1978] study was a follow-up to the Hickman [1958] 
and Fraine and Mills [1961] study. Fitzpatrick and Severiens [1978, p. 54] noted that 
both the Hickman [1958] and Fraine and Mills [1961] studies were essentially one 
period studies and they choose to study the period December 1965 through June 1976 
because "the ten-year span embraces both economic recessions and expansions." 
Convertible bonds and the bonds of "issuers affected by government control" were 
excluded from the sample (e.g., railroads, airlines, and utilities). After subtracting the 
annual default rate3 from the yield to maturity, Fitzpatrick and Severiens [1978, p. 57] 
found that "a low quality bond will have a higher realized yield to maturity than a 
higher rated bond." Thus, Fitzpatrick and Severiens [1978] contradicted the Fraine 
and Mills [1961] results and supported the Hickman [1958] results.
The Blume and Keim [1987] study covered the period January 1977 through 
December 1986. The return series was essentially a spliced series. The values prior to 
1982 came predominantly from the S&P Bond Guide and those after 1981 were 
derived from average returns used to compile the Salomon Brothers and Drexel 
Burnham Lambert lower-grade indexes. The following was the risk model used:
LGR, = a 0 + p x  SPSOOR, + et, where LGR = low-grade bond return, a 0 = the 
"alpha coefficient" (i.e., the measure of abnormal return, after accounting for market 
risk), p ^  = "beta" (i.e., the measure of asset return covariability with the "market" 
return), SP500R = S&P 500 equity index return (i.e., return on the "market"), and e = 
the error term. The estimated alpha was insignificantly positive.
The Weinstein [1987] study was a follow-up to the Blume and Keim [1987] study.
The principal difference in this study was the earlier time period studied (i.e., 62:06 
through 74:07 versus 77:01 through 86:12 for Blume and Keim [1987]). Using the 
Blume and Keim [1987] market model, Weinstein found significant positive abnormal 
returns for low-grade bond returns. In addition, Weinstein found significantly positive 
abnormal returns when regressing the return difference between low-grade and high- 
grade bonds, suggesting low-grade bonds returned significantly more than high-grade
3 This was the actual default rate for the year and did not account for the actual recovery rate. 
Therefore, this would imply that defaulted bonds had zero value upon defaulting. Furthermore, by not 
adjusting for actual default recovery rates which exceed zero, the study underestimates realized yields.
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bonds over the period under study. Although, using more restricted definitions of 
high-grade and low-grade (see Weinstein [1987, p. 76-77]) resulted in a positive but 
insignificant estimated alpha. Finally, Weinstein [1987, p. 78] adjusted the returns of 
high-grade and low-grade bonds for "yield curve effects" by the following model:
BRj = P0 +pj x Couponi + P2 x Terrr^  + p3 x Durt, where BRt = return on bond i, 
Coupon = the coupon rate on bond i, Terrr^  = the term to maturity on bond i, and 
Du^ = the duration on bond i.4 The residuals derived from these regressions were 
used to proxy for "term structure corrected" returns. Although still positive, these 
residuals for low-grade and high-grade bonds no longer showed a statistically 
significant estimated alpha. Weinstein [1987, p. 80] concluded by stating that low- 
grade bonds "appear to be fairly priced."
The Fons [1987] study focused on the default premium associated with low-grade 
bonds. Fons [1987, p. 84-86] developed a risk-neutral model for estimating yield 
based on the previous work of Bierman and Hass [1975], Yawitz [1977], and Yawitz 
et al. [1985]. Given that the model was driven by default risk adjusted payment 
streams, Fons [1987] tested for the ability of the model's derived default rate to mimic 
the actual default rate. The following was the model used to evaluate the market's 
ability to accurately price default prone low-grade bonds: IDRt = a 0 + p, x ADRt + et , 
where IDR = implied default rate (i.e., model based), and ADR = actual default rate. 
Therefore, Fons [1987] attempted to establish a relationship between the default 
premium and actual default rates. The expectation was that the estimated alpha would 
be equal to zero. Over the period 80:12 through 84:06 the estimated alpha was 
significantly positive at well below the 1% level of significance. Fons [1987, p. 93] 
suggested two possible conclusions: (1) "the market for low-rated debt is inefficient in 
that arbitrage opportunities exist", and/or (2) "the risk-neutral model used here (and 
elsewhere) is deficient." In addition, Fons [1987, p. 93-96] unsuccessfully attempted 
to use "macroeconomic surprises" to account for the abnormal performance.
The Altman [1989] study was primarily concerned with default rates. Although, 
Altman [1989, p. 920] made the following strong point: "the results show that 
investors have been more than satisfactorily compensated for investing in high-risk 
securities. Indeed, if expected default losses are fully discounted in the prices (and 
yields) of securities, our return spreads should be insignificantly different than zero.
4 There is likely to be a high degree of multicollinearity between the duration and coupon and term to 
maturity (i.e., given that duration is at least in part a function of the coupon rate and term to maturity). 
This might have introduced biases in the estimated parameters, which may have affected the final 
conclusion made by Weinstein [1987].
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The fact that the spreads are so positive has a number of possible explanations, none 
of them easily corroborated." Among other explanations, Altman [1989, p. 920-921] 
mentioned market inefficiency, liquidity risk, and market segmentation as possible 
explanations. Later, in an article primarily reconciling the Altman [1989] and Asquith 
et al. [1989] default rate results5, Altman [1990] was less bullish on the return pattern 
of low-grade bonds. Actually, Altman [1990, p. 92] stated: "there is scant evidence 
today of'abnormal' returns.6 Those differences in returns that cannot be explained as a 
'default risk premium' can be reasonably accounted for as reflecting a number of other 
factors, such as differences in liquidity."
The Asquith et al. [1989] study was also primarily concerned with default rates. 
Although, Asquith et al. [1989, p. 940-943] reviewed the low-grade bond return 
results of the Blume and Keim [1987] study and several others. Within their review of 
low-grade bond return results, Asquith et al. [1989, p. 940] indicated that they felt the 
Blume and Keim [1987] results were the best to that date, but "their results are 
mixed." Asquith et al. [1989, p. 943] concluded by stating "what is needed is accurate 
transaction-based return data over a full range of economic and capital market 
conditions and a complete (or random) sample of high yield bonds." In large part due 
to problems associated with matrix pricing, Asquith et al. [1989] did not find the 
Blume and Keim low-grade bond return series to be an adequate measure of low- 
grade returns.
The Kaplan and Stein [1990] study focused on the impact of LBOs on the riskiness of 
debt. Kaplan and Stein [1990] derived an implicit estimate of the post LBO debt beta 
based on systematic equity risk pre- and post-recapitalization. Based on daily returns, 
Kaplan and Stein [1990, p. 218 & 229] found that market model estimates of beta rose 
from an average of 1.01 prior to the acquisition to an average of 1.38 after the 
acquisition. Kaplan and Stein [1990, p. 218] expected a much larger increase. Kaplan 
and Stein [1990] found the following average post-recapitalization betas: (1) 0.65, 
assuming the asset beta is unchanged; (2) 0.40, assuming the entire market adjusted 
premium in the LBO represents a reduction in fixed costs; and (3) 0.89, assuming 
low-grade debt has twice the beta of bank debt. Based on their estimates, Kaplan and 
Stein [1990, p. 244] "suggest that debtholders in our sample do not receive adequate 
compensation for the risk they bear." In addition, Kaplan and Stein [1990, p. 235 &
 ^Also, see Bierman [1990] for another reconciliation of the Altman [1989] and Asquith et al. [1989] 
default rate results.
6 Later, Altman [1992, p. 85] updated his results on the "risks and returns o f low-grade bonds to 
include 1990". Altman [1992] somewhat contradicted his previous update.
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234, respectively] found that (1) "nonsynchronous trading does not have a large effect 
on our implicit beta estimates" (i.e., which does not support the use of an adjustment 
for nontrading by Cornell and Green [1991], especially given that their data was 
monthly not daily), and (2) their beta "estimates exceed the 0.25 found by Blume, 
Keim, and Patel" (i.e., thus not supporting the significantly lower estimates of beta 
found by Blume et al. [1991]).
The Cornell and Green [1991] study was principally concerned with determining 
whether low-grade bonds showed abnormally positive returns. Unlike all other studies 
on low-grade bond returns, the low-grade bond return series used was constructed 
from low-grade bond mutual funds and were net of management fees and all 
transactions costs. Of all the studies in the field, the Cornell and Green time series was 
the longest and best return series used. To their surprise, Cornell and Green [1991, p. 
43-45] found that low-grade bonds were more sensitive to changes in interest rates 
during recessions than high-grade bonds. The model used to test for return 
abnormality was of the form:
BRI = (Xq + P| x 7!5iJ+| + p2 x TB1^  +P3 x TBRt_^ + p^  x SPSOORf^  + P5 x SP500Rj +p6 x SPSQORj^  + ct where 
TBR = Treasury bond return. The lead and lag terms were included in order to "take 
account of the potential impact of nontrading" (Cornell and Green [1991, p. 41]). 
Although positive, neither high-grade bonds or low-grade bonds showed estimated 
alphas significantly greater than zero. Therefore, Cornell and Green [1991, p. 47] 
concluded that "low-grade bonds are fairly priced relative to high-grade bonds."
The Blume et al. [1991] study was directly concerned with determining whether low- 
grade bonds showed abnormally positive returns. The low-grade bond return series 
used was the same series used in the Blume and Keim [1987] study, except the sample 
was extended through 1989. The following is a list of some findings: (1) Blume et al. 
[1991, p. 65] stated that "age does not appear to be a significant factor in explaining 
realized returns", which partially contradicted Altman [1989] and Asquith et al.
[1989]; (2) Blume et al. [1991, p. 67] stated "low-grade bonds exhibit some of the 
characteristics of high-grade bonds and some of the characteristics of stocks"; (3) 
Blume et al. [1991, p. 65] found a January effect; (4) Blume et al. [1991, p. 65] found 
an October 1987 effect; and (5) Blume et al. [1991, p. 71] found that low-grade bonds 
were not over- or under-priced. The model used to test for return abnormality was of
the form: BRt = a 0 + PM, x [(0.75 x x /7Gi^)+(0.05 x LGRt)] + et ,
where HGR = high-grade bond return. Over the full period for both low-grade and 
high-grade bonds the estimated alpha was negative, but not significantly negative.
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The Cornell [1993] study was a follow-up to the Cornell and Green [1991] study. The 
same sample and model were used to test for the presence of abnormal returns each 
year during the period 1978 through 1989. Cornell [1993] found that low-grade bond 
returns during 1982 and 1983 showed significant positive abnormal performance. 
Cornell [1993] attributed this to the possibility of significant increases in liquidity for 
low-grade bonds during those years.
2.2 Review of the Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns Literature as it 
Relates to the Thesis
Since 1986, there has been literature directly and indirectly addressing the question of 
the abnormality of low-grade corporate bond returns. The consensus has 
predominantly been that low-grade corporate bonds are fairly priced. Although, the 
consensus has seemed to generally shift with the direction of the low-grade bond 
market itself. For example, after the dramatic decline in the low-grade corporate 
market in late summer 1989 the Journal of Finance published the two most thorough 
low-grade corporate bond return studies in the same issue (i.e., the Cornell and Green 
[1991] and the Blume et al. [1991] studies, respectively), both of which suggested 
low-grade bonds were fairly priced and both of which ended their respective sample 
periods during the year low-grade bonds had their worst performance ever (i.e., 1989). 
Previous to the decline, and ignoring studies concerned primarily with default rates, 
most studies either supported the view that low-grade corporate bonds possessed 
positive abnormal returns (i.e., Hickman [1958] and Fitzpatrick and Severiens [1978]) 
or the view low-grade corporate bonds were fairly priced (i.e., Fraine and Mills 
[1961], Blume and Keim [1987], and Weinstein [1987]). One of the two studies to 
suggest that low-grade corporate bonds (i.e., in LBOs) were overpriced was based on 
data derived from the period when low-grade corporate bonds were sustaining a 
period of substantial price decline (i.e., August 1989 through 1990). Beginning in 
1991 low-grade corporate bonds have sustained a period of substantial price 
appreciation, and the most recent study by Cornell [1993] has indicated that there are 
periods (i.e., 1982 and 1983) when low-grade corporate bonds seem underpriced.
Although a by-product of the method employed, this thesis is not primarily interested 
in studying whether low-grade bonds have returned significantly more than high- 
grade bonds. This issue is in part a motivating factor for researching the topic, but it is 
not the focus of the tests and method developed. This should become clearer in the 
next section.
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Matrix prices and the "selection bias problem" have plagued low-grade corporate 
bond return research. Unlike the Blume and Keim [1987], Weinstein [1987], and 
Blume et al. [1991] studies, the Cornell and Green [1991] study was not dependent on 
matrix prices (see Cornell and Green [1991, p. 30-32]). Also, the Cornell and Green 
[1991] study avoided the "selection bias problem" associated with bonds dropped due 
to default. Based on various problems associated with matrix pricing, of all the recent 
studies the Cornell and Green [1991] study possessed the best time series of low- 
grade corporate bond returns to date. Although, Cornell and Green [1991, p. 32 & 40- 
41] felt that nontrading was also a problem for returns based on low-grade corporate 
mutual funds. This thesis uses open-end mutual values to derive indices with which to 
test its various asset class hypotheses.
In addition to sample time period and matrix pricing, Alderson and Zivney [1994] 
point out that reported low-grade bond returns may be dramatically impacted by the 
method with which returns are computed. The focus of their criticism focuses on 
assumptions regarding reinvestment of assumed coupon income, and how calls and 
exchanges are dealt with. This criticism is not relevant for studies using mutual fund 
data.
Finally, there are two other issues which surfaced in the Blume et al. [1991] and 
Cornell and Green [1991] studies which will be addressed. First, there is the issue of 
the impact of interest rate calls7 on the relative sensitivity of the two corporate bond 
asset classes. Second, there is the issue of the seemingly abnormal behavior of low- 
grade corporate bond returns to periods of recession. These two side issues of the 
return generating process for low-grade bonds will be tested and used in part to 
motivate the research and methodology which follows.
7 There is a considerable literature providing background on the theory and motivation behind interest 
rate calls (e.g., see Boyce and Kalotay [1979], Brick and Wallingford [1985], Vu [1986], and Fischer 
et al. [1989]), and some early studies on the value and effect of interest rate call risk (e.g., see Pye 
[1967], and Jen and Wert [1967]).
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2.3 Review of CCA Literature Implications which are of Significance to 
the Thesis
We have developed a corporate bond valuation model which incorporates some 
important real world features. We have modelled stochastic interest rates and the 
importance of cash flow shortages in precipitating bankruptcy. The payoffs in the 
real world are very complex.
Kim et al. [1993, p. 130]
Three chapters of this dissertation (Chapters 6 through 8) analyze the financial 
performance of several risky bond asset classes, and since CCA is used in part to 
frame the empirical tests which follow, a brief review of the contingent claims 
literature on risky bond valuation is therefore appropriate. The review is not intended 
to be complete, but it is intended to cover some essential studies on risky bond 
valuation.
The first academic study of options was attributed to Louis Bachelier in 1900. The 
field didn't become active again until the 1960s. Then in 1961 Sprenkle constructed a 
warrant pricing model. After Sprenkle [1961], there were a series of warrant pricing 
model studies (e.g., Ayres [1963] and Samuelson [1965]).8 Also, Boness [1964] 
derived a more general option pricing model, and Poensgen [1965 & 1966] and 
Baumol et al. [1966] derived convertible bond pricing models.9 Although, it wasn't 
until 1973 that the field began to blossom. The general equilibrium model developed 
by Black and Scholes [1973] and the extensions made by Merton [1973] laid the 
foundation for all subsequent work in the field.
The foundation for the theory of option pricing was established by Black and Scholes 
[1973] and Merton [1973]. They derived closed form solutions for the value of 
European put and call options when the underlying stock pays no dividend or the 
option is protected against dividends. Of particular note was the Black and Scholes 
[1973] insight that corporate liabilities can be viewed as combinations of put and call 
options. Based on this insight, the subsequent generalization by Merton [1974] of 
option pricing is now known as CCA.
8 Chen [1970] extended the Samuelson [1965] model, which was the first to address American warrant 
pricing (i.e., the possibility that the warrant could be optimally exercised before maturity), by 
examining finite time warrants.
9 Also, see Brigham [1966], Weil et al. [1968], and Walter and Que [1973] for early analyses and 
modelling of convertible bond valuation.
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The Black and Scholes [1973] study was the first explicit general equilibrium solution 
to the option pricing problem for European puts and calls. The following assumptions 
were made in deriving their model: (1) no transactions or information costs, (2) no 
taxes, (3) trading in the underlying stock is continuous and the prices follow 
continuous and stationary stochastic processes, (4) the underlying stock pays no 
dividends, (5) no restrictions on short sales, (6) the option can only be exercised at the 
terminal date of the contract, (7) the risk-free interest rate is nonstochastic or constant, 
and (8) Ito dynamics: the value of the underlying stock or firm satisfies a stochastic 
differential equation.
The value of the option is a function of the following five variables10:
(1) the current underlying stock price - S,
(2) the instantaneous variance of the underlying stock price (which can be 
approximated by past variance) - a 2,
(3) the exercise price of the option - X,
(4) the time to maturity of the option - T, and
(5) and the risk-free interest rate - r.
Therefore, the functional form for the value of a call option is the following:
O = f(S,a2,X,T,r). The partial derivatives of the call option value, C, with respect to
i ~ . . r  i x- ii • dC  _ dC dC dC  A ,the five pricing factors are the following: —  > 0 , — j  > 0, —  < 0, —  > 0 , and
dS  0 a  dX  dT
DC—  > 0. All five partial derivatives have intuitive interpretations. The value of the call
dr
option is an increasing function of the stock price, an increasing function of the 
variance of the stock price, a decreasing function of the strike price, an increasing 
function of the time to maturity, and an increasing function of the risk-free interest 
rate. The partial derivatives of the put option value, P, with respect to the five pricing
dP dP dP dP dPfactors are the following: —  < 0, — 7 > 0, —  > 0, —  >< 0, and —  < 0. The value
dS d a 2 dX  dT dr
of the put option is an decreasing function of the stock price, an increasing function of
the variance of the stock price, an increasing function of the strike price, an 
indeterminate function of the time to maturity, and a decreasing function of the risk­
free interest rate.
10 Sprenkle [1961] derived a warrant pricing model which theorized that warrant prices were a 
function of all the Black and Scholes [1973] factors but the risk-free rate of interest (i.e., 
Warrant=f(ratio of the mean expected stock price to the present price, recent standard deviation of the 
stock price, ratio of the exercise price to mean expected price, time to maturity of the warrant, and the 
risk preferences of the investor).
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The original Black and Scholes model has been found to be quit robust with respect to 
the relaxation of the assumptions it was based upon. Merton [1973] in particular 
showed the robustness of the model with respect to the relaxation of basic 
assumptions under which it was derived (e.g., a stochastic interest rate). Among other 
extensions, later research has extended this option valuation model to take account of 
noncontinuous trading (Rubinstein [1976]) and jumps in security values (e.g., see Cox 
and Ross [1976]).
As noted, Black and Scholes [1973] suggested that their analysis could provide the 
basis for analyzing the value of other contingent claims whose values may be a non­
linear function of another asset or liability. It is this insight which is attributed with 
the development of the CCA of risky debt valuation. In particular, the Merton [1974] 
study on the effects of risk on the value of corporate debt laid the foundation for CCA 
of risky debt. For example, Black and Cox [1976] extended Merton's [1974] study by 
explicitly modelling some indenture provisions.
Merton [1974] was the first to rigorously apply CCA to the analysis of corporate debt, 
and Merton's [1974] risky bond valuation analysis was a direct extension of his 1973 
study.
The value of a particular issue of corporate debt depends essentially on three 
items: (1) the required rate of return on riskless (in terms of default) debt (e.g., 
government bonds or very high grade corporate bonds); (2) the various provisions 
and restrictions contained in the indenture (e.g., maturity date, coupon rate, call 
terms, seniority in the event of default, sinking fund, etc.); (3) the probability that 
the firm will be unable to satisfy some or all of the indenture requirements (i.e., 
the probability of default).
Merton [1974, p. 449]
Merton [1974] was the first to systematically emphasize the probability of default in 
the pricing of corporate bonds. The following is a list of the assumptions made to 
derive the risky debt valuation model: (1) no transactions or information costs, (2) no 
taxes, (3) trading in the underlying asset is continuous and the values follow 
continuous and stationary stochastic processes, (4) homogeneous investors with 
homogeneous beliefs which do not impact values, (5) no restrictions on short sales,
(6) borrowing and lending at the same rate of interest is possible, (7) the term 
structure is flat and known with certainty (i.e., the risk-free interest rate is 
nonstochastic or constant), (8) the value of the firm is invariant with respect to its
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capital structure (i.e., the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies), (9) Ito dynamics: the 
value of the underlying stock or firm satisfies a stochastic differential equation, (10) 
no bankruptcy costs is implied, (11) investor risk neutrality is implied, and (12) return 
serial independence is implied (this is based on the form of the valuation equation 
used). As is the standard for CCA, the value of the firm, V, through time is described 
by a Gauss-Weiner stochastic process with stochastic differential equation 
(assumption 9): dV  = (aV  -  C)dt + &Vdz, where a  is instantaneous rate of return on 
the firm per unit of time, C is the total payments by the firm per unit of time to all 
claimholders (i.e., dividends to shareholders and coupons to bondholders) if positive 
and total payments received by the firm per unit of time from new financing if 
negative, a  is the instantaneous standard deviation of the return on the firm per unit of 
time, and dz is a standard Gauss-Weiner process. The same form of equation was 
applied to the dynamics of security valuation: dY  = (a  yY - C y)dt + a yYdzy, where Y 
is the market value of the security at any point in time whose functional form is the 
following: Y=F(V,t). This type of valuation derivation requires that the returns on the 
securities valued be serially independent. Many other assumptions made were for 
expositional convenience (e.g., assumption 7 was used to focus on the impact of 
default risk rather than interest rate risk and assumption 8 is proved) and others could 
be weakened without necessarily changing the results (assumptions 1, 2,4, 5, 6). This 
confirms the robustness of the results.
Given the importance of Merton's [1974] study and derivation of a model to value 
risky debt to CCA, a short review of the derivation is appropriate. Merton [1973] 
established the standard method by which contingent claims model derivations are 
made. By applying Ito's Lemma to the stochastic differential equation, and following 
the Merton [1973] derivation of the Black and Scholes [1973] model by forming a no 
arbitrage net zero investment portfolio consisting of the firm, the security, and riskless 
debt, Merton derived the following parabolic differential equation for F:
0 = ^ g 2V2Fvv + (rV -  C)FV - rF+ FT + Cy, where r is instantaneous return on the
riskless asset. Merton [1974, p. 452-455] applied this to a simple case of risky debt 
pricing for a firm with one class of zero coupon debt and one class of residual claims 
(i.e., equity). The firm cannot issue new claims on the firm, pay dividends or 
repurchase shares, and if the debt is not paid on maturity the debtholders become the 
residual claimholders. Given C=0, if F is the value of the debt issue, the above
equation becomes 0 = — a 2V2Fvv + rVFv - r F - F z. By definition,
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V = F(V,x) + f  (V,x), where f  is the value of the residual claims. Given two boundary 
conditions (i.e., F and f  can only be non-negative and debt must be less than or equal 
to the value of the firm) and applying the Black and Scholes [1973, p. 643] equation, 
the following valuation equation for debt follows:
F [F ,t] = Be~n[&h2(d,<j2x)] + — ®[hl(d,<j2x)], where d  = — — ,
hl(d,G2x) = - [ — c 2x - \ o g ( d ) ] /  a^Jx, and ^ ( d ^ x )  = - [— a 2T + log(d)]/aV x. The 
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risk premium on risky debt is a function of (1) the variance of the firm's operations 
and (2) the debt to firm value ratio (i.e., d). Therefore, based on the Merton [1974] 
derivation, the functional form for the value of a risky zero coupon debt is the 
following: D = F(V,a2,B,x,r), which is identical to the Black Scholes [1973] 
functional form (i.e., except that firm value is substituted for stock price and bond 
payments are substituted for exercise price). The partial derivatives of the debt value,
dD dD dDD, with respect to the five pricing factors are the following: —  > 0, — j  < 0, —  > 0,
dV d<5 dB
dD dl^—  < 0, and —  < 0. Essentially, all but the first of the five partial derivatives are the 
dx dr
inverse of those associated with the Black and Scholes [1973] result and have intuitive 
interpretations. The value of the zero coupon risky debt is an increasing function of 
the firm value, a decreasing function of the variance of the firm's operations, an 
increasing function of the bond payments, a decreasing function of the time to 
maturity, and a decreasing function of the risk-free rate of interest. Given that, by 
definition, anything which increases the value of residual claims tends to decrease the 
value of debt, it follows that the partials have the aforementioned relationships.
Based on the zero coupon (i.e., "pure discount") bond derivation, Merton [1974, p. 
467-469] extended the analysis to the pricing of risky coupon bonds. Merton [1974, p. 
467] pointed out that the critical problem to modelling risky coupon bonds: "if a firm 
defaults on a coupon payment all subsequent payments (and payments of principal) 
are also defaulted on." Therefore, it is not possible to value each subsequent coupon as 
a zero coupon bond and sum all the values (Selby [1983] addresses this problem). In 
short, one default before maturity is not an independent event. Merton [1974] solved 
the problem by modifying the indenture condition to require continuous coupon
payments at a coupon rate per unit of time (i.e., C=C =C ).  Therefore, the risky 
coupon bond value will satisfy the following partial differential equation:
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0 = ^ c tV 2Fvv + (ir V - C ) F v - r F - F x+ C .  Essentially, the original zero coupon bond 
solution applies.
For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to focus on Merton's [1974] risky debt 
model assumption regarding the risk-free interest rate being nonstochastic or constant 
has important implications (i.e., no interest rate risk). If the risk-free interest rate 
cannot vary over time, then, by definition, it will have no impact on the valuation of 
the firm or out-of-the-money interest rate calls. That is, since firm value cannot be a 
function of a constant risk-free interest rate there can be no interaction between 
changes in the risk-free interest rate and changes in the underlying firm value (i.e., 
since the risk-free interest rate doesn't change). Since the risk-free interest rate is 
constant, out-of-the-money interest rate call options have zero value, and in-the- 
money interest rate call options have constant value. Therefore, there can be no 
interaction between changes in in-the-money call options and other option values 
(specifically, the put value). Clearly, a risky debt model which does not incorporate a 
stochastic risk-free interest rate into the model will not be affected by changes in the 
risk-free interest rate on firm value or embedded option values which would be 
expected to be a function of interest rate risk (e.g., interest rate calls).
Black and Cox [1976] extended the Merton [1974] analysis by analyzing the effects of 
the following three general types of bond covenants: (1) default, (2) subordination, 
and (3) restricted payments provisions. Black and Cox [1976] make the same general 
assumptions and use the same valuation equation as Merton [1974]. Black and Cox 
[1976, p. 357] show that in the case of default provisions, it is in the bondholders' 
interests to be able to contractually declare bankruptcy as fast as possible (e.g., debt 
acceleration). Of course, this result is contingent upon being able to perfectly predict 
bankruptcy, and again assumes the cost of bankruptcy is zero. Assuming two classes 
of bonds, Black and Cox [1976, p. 358-361] find that the junior bonds have the 
risk/return (i.e., variance of return and expected return) characteristics of both debt 
and equity. The closer the firm is to bankruptcy, the more junior bonds take on the 
risk/return characteristics of equity; the farther the firm is from bankruptcy, the more 
the junior bonds take on the risk/return characteristics of senior bonds. Of course, this 
assumes that strict capital priority is maintained. Regarding the restricted payment 
covenant, Black and Cox [1976, p. 362-366] find that financing restrictions are most
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valuable for bondholders when the firm value is low.11 In sum, Black and Cox [1976] 
find that all three types of covenants increase the value of the bonds which contain 
them in the indenture. Again, it is important to note that the Black and Cox [1976] 
model assumes that the risk-free interest rate is constant.
Geske [1977] extended CCA by applying a compound option valuation technique to 
value risky subordinated debt. The Geske [1977] study differs from the Black and Cox 
[1976] study, in that Black and Cox [1976] value continuous coupon paying bonds for 
a square root process while Geske [1977] values finite maturity coupon paying bonds 
for a lognormal diffusion process. Essentially, the Geske [1977] study extends the 
Black and Cox [1976] study. Again, it is important to note that the Geske [1977] 
model assumes that the risk-free interest rate is constant.
Ingersoll [1977a & 1977b] extended CCA to convertible bonds.12 In addition to the 
usual CCA assumptions, regarding the equity call feature the following assumptions 
were made: (1) constant conversion terms, (2) no call notice (i.e., when the bond is 
called, the owners must immediately surrender their bonds for redemption or convert 
to equity), and (3) the convertible issue is the only bond issue and the only other issue 
is the common stock issue. Ingersoll [1977a] established the optimal call policy of the 
firm: call a convertible bond at that point when its conversion value is equal to its call 
price. Although, Ingersoll [1977b, p. 466] finds that of 179 issues called between 
1968 to 1975, the median company waited until the conversion value of its debentures 
was 43.9% in excess of the call price. Based on the relaxation of several assumptions, 
Ingersoll [1977b] still could not theoretically reconcile the actual call policies of firms 
with his valuation model (see Asquith [1995] for contradictory evidence). Again, it is 
important to note that the Ingersoll [1977a & 1977b] model assumes that the risk-free 
interest rate is constant. Actually, for convertible bond valuation models, the 
assumption of a constant risk-free interest rate makes the derivation much more 
tractable by excluding the possibility of interest rate calls which could force equity 
conversion (e.g., Ingersoll [1977b, p. 292]).
11 Note, given that the analysis of a restricted payments covenant required Black and Cox [1976] to 
assume a series of payments rather than a zero coupon bond, there was no closed form equation.
Ingersoll was not the first to derive a pricing model for convertible bonds. Poensgen [1965] is 
attributed with the first pricing model for convertible bonds. Ingersoll [1977a, p. 289-290] criticised 
earlier models for either not allowing for conversion before maturity (i.e., American call option versus 
European) and/or basing discounted values on an unspecified discount rate. Although, Ingersoll [1977a 
& 1977b] assumes no dividends for most of his results and doesn't explicitly allow for stochastic 
interest rates.
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Contemporaneously with Ingersoll [1977a], Brennan and Schwartz [1977] derived a 
contingent claims pricing model for convertible bonds. The primary difference 
between the two models is that Brennan and Schwartz [1977] derived a general 
algorithm whereas Ingersoll [1977a] derived closed form solutions to several 
convertible bond problems. Brennan and Schwartz's [1977, p. 1700] model allowed 
for the following: (1) coupon payments on the bond, (2) dividend payments on the 
stock, (3) the bond can be converted at any point in time, (4) if called by the firm, the 
bondholder can either convert the bond or redeem it at the call price, and (5) default 
may occur prior to or at maturity. One significant result is that for high firm values an 
increase in the variance rate increases the value of the convertible bond by increasing 
the value of the conversion option. Although concerned with convertible bonds, as 
Brennan and Schwartz [1977, p. 1714] state: "it should be apparent that the analysis 
captures many of the most important aspects of risky coupon-paying straight bonds, 
and thus represents a significant generalization of Merton's [1973] path breaking 
analysis of risky bonds, which was restricted only to discount bonds." Again, it is 
important to note that the Brennan and Schwartz [1977] model assumes that the risk- 
free interest rate is constant.
Brennan and Schwartz [1980] extended their 1977 study, and that of Ingersoll 
[1977b], by allowing explicitly for the uncertainty of interest rates. Allowing for 
stochastic interest rates substantially increased the complexity of the model.13 
Although, Brennan and Schwartz [1980, p. 926] state that the added accuracy of the 
stochastic interest rate model does not seem to outweigh the benefits of using the 
simpler nonstochastic interest rate version. This is a seminal article in that it is the 
first published CCA risky debt model which incorporated a stochastic risk-free rate of 
interest. Given the two types of risk (i.e., firm value and interest rate risk) explicitly 
incorporated into the model, the correlation between changes in the risk-free rate of 
interest and firm values (pr K) enters into the convertible risky debt valuation formula 
(see the appendix in Brennan and Schwartz [1980]). Although the example used by 
the authors does not explicitly show the impact of pr v (i.e., given their example, it is 
implicitly assumed to be 0) on the valuation of convertible bonds assuming a 
stochastic risk-free rate of interest versus assuming a constant risk-free rate of interest, 
it is possible that their conclusion regarding the differential between the simpler and
13 On the surface, the most complex asset class analyzed in this thesis is convertible bonds. The other 
bond types analyzed are subsumed within that bond type. Therefore, relative to the other literature, 
particular emphasis should be placed on the literature reviewed which analyzes the valuation of 
convertible bonds.
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more complex CCA models might be modified if the potential impact of pr V were 
taken account of.
Jones et al. [1984] modelled and tested the applicability of their contingent claims 
model for valuing high-grade and low-grade corporate bonds. Jones et al. [1984] 
make the same general assumptions and use the same valuation equation as previous 
studies using the Merton [1974] methodology. Unlike previous contingent claims 
models, Jones et al. [1993, p. 613] introduce the presence of sinking fund provisions 
on valuation. Also, unlike Merton [1974], multiple traunches of bonds, callability, and 
coupons are assumed. Even though the general result is that the derived contingent 
claims model does not have superior explanatory power over the naive riskless model 
tested for high-grade corporate bonds, it is an incremental improvement for low-grade 
corporate bond pricing. No explanation other than the possibility of tax effects or a 
year effect is posited to explain the high-grade/low-grade corporate bond differential 
in model valuation success (see Jones et al. [1984, p. 622-624]). In sum, the Jones et 
al. [1984] results suggest that contingent claims valuation may be more effective for 
valuing lower grade corporate bonds than high-grade corporate bonds. Again, it is 
important to note that the Jones et al. [1984] model assumes that the risk-free interest 
rate is constant.
Ramaswamy and Sundaresan [1986] applied CCA modelling to the valuation of 
floating-rate instruments, including corporate floating-rate instruments with default 
risk. Their evidence tends to support the hypothesis that floating-rate instruments tend 
to be undervalued. Their model assumes a stochastic risk-free rate of interest. 
Regarding the valuation of corporate floating-rate instruments with default risk, they 
assume that pr V = 0. Therefore, although they assume the risk-free rate of interest is 
not constant, their floating-rate CCA risky debt valuation model does not find any 
important interaction effect between changes in the risk-free rate of interest and 
changes in firm values.
Motivated by the apparent contradiction in observed corporate bond yield spreads and 
those estimated based on Merton's [1974] risky debt valuation model14, Kim et al.
14 See Sarig and Warga [1989] for an empirical investigation of the "risk structure of interest rates" 
developed by Merton [1974] and further refined by Lee [1981] and Pitts and Selby [1983]. Based on a 
sample of zero coupon bonds, it turns out that a graph of the actual values closely mirror the graph 
derived by Pitts and Selby [1983].
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[1993] extended the model developed by Brennan and Schwartz [1980]15 and 
estimated yield spreads which are consistent with observed levels. Kim et al. [1993] 
make some of the same general assumptions and use the same valuation equation as 
previous studies using the Merton [1974] methodology. But unlike most previous 
risky debt contingent claims models, Kim et al. [1993] assume that the firm can 
default on its coupon obligations, as opposed to maturity default only, and specify a 
stochastic process for the evolution of the short rate of interest. Therefore, as with 
Brennan and Schwartz [1980], firm value risk and interest rate risk are incorporated 
into the risky bond valuation model. Given no closed-form solution to the valuation 
equation, numerical solutions were estimated. The critical result with direct 
application to this thesis is that Kim et al. [1993, p. 125-126] find that "interactions 
between default risk and the call provision play an important role in determining the 
total spread defined in this way." In most realistic scenarios estimated, the majority of 
the yield spread (callable corporate bonds against comparable non-callable Treasury 
bonds) is determined by default risk, but a large portion is determined by the 
interaction between the stochastic firm value and the stochastic risk-free interest rate. 
It was found that the interaction effect of default risk with interest rate call risk 
decreases as interest rates increase and increases as interest rates decrease. In addition, 
the interaction effect of default risk with interest rate call risk decreases as the 
maturity decreases and increases as the maturity increases. Specifically, after 
assuming pr v = -0.2 and close to insolvent firm values, there were very large risky 
debt yield differences between the Kim et al. [1993] risky debt model which assumes 
a stochastic risk-free interest rate and the Merton [1974] risky debt model which does 
not. Clearly, pr v can have an affect of risky debt valuation.
Shimko et al. [1993] explicitly examine the pricing of risky debt when the risk-free 
interest rate is stochastically generated. They extend the Merton [1973] model for the 
pricing of options with stochastic interest rates to risky debt and combine this with the 
term structure model of Vasicek [1977].16 The study refines and extends the analysis 
presented in Kim et al. [1993] by specifically analyzing the impact of a stochastic 
risk-free interest rate on credit spreads. The general implication is that low-grade 
bonds can seem to become more bond-like and less stock-like when changes in the 
risk-free interest rate are negatively correlated with changes in the value of the firm
15 Their model was also based in part on the Black and Cox [1976] model, and their study was at least 
in part motivated by the Jones et al. [1984] study.
16 The Vasicek [1977] model assumes that the short-term risk-free rate of interest is mean-reverting to 
the long-run mean and the instantaneous volatility is constant. See Chan et al. [1992] for a thorough 
review and analysis of the various short-term interest rate models.
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(i.e., the Cornell and Green [1992] seemingly anomalous result may not be after all). 
Partial derivatives show credit spread to be: (1) positively impacted by the level of 
leverage; (2) the sign for interest rate volatility is dependent on whether prV is 
negative or positive (i.e., if prV is positive it is positively impacted by interest rate 
volatility); (3) the sign for asset volatility is dependent on maturity and leverage (i.e., 
generally it is positively impacted unless leverage is very high); and (4) positively 
impacted by pr V (i.e., the credit spread may not increase with maturity if pr V is 
strongly negative). Shimko et al. [1993, p. 64] conclude by stating that in theory "the 
correlation between interest rate movements and the returns on the underlying asset is 
clearly an important variable in determining the credit spread on risky debt."
Like Shimko et al. [1993], Longstaff and Schwartz [1995] explicitly examine the 
pricing of risky debt when the risk-free interest rate is stochastically generated. They 
extend the Black and Cox [1976] risky debt model to include both default and interest 
rate risk. Also like Shimko et al. [1993], the short-term riskless interest rate model 
employed is that of Vasicek [1977]. The risky debt model is applied to the valuation 
of fixed-rate and floating-rate debt and closed-form valuation expressions are derived. 
As the correlation between changes in the value of the firm and changes in the level of 
the risk-free rate of interest increases, credit spreads increase. By using actual 
corporate bond yield averages, Longstaff and Schwartz [1995, p. 791] "find that credit 
spreads are strongly negatively related to the level of interest rates. Furthermore, 
changes in interest rates account for the majority of the variation in credit spreads for 
most bonds in the sample." Clearly, the correlation of changes in firm value with 
changes in the risk-free rate of interest can have significant affects on the valuation of 
risky debt.
3 The Importance of Embedded Options in Explaining the 
Return Generation Process for Risky Bonds
The primary purpose of Chapters 6 through 8 is to examine the importance of 
embedded options in explaining the relative sensitivity of low-grade bond returns to 
movements in the government debt and the private equity markets during periods 
when options embedded in low-grade bonds (i.e., both straight and convertible) would 
be expected to be exercised and/or increase in value. This is done to test whether the 
relationships as implied by more recent risky debt pricing models hold.
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3.1 CCA Implications and the Thesis
As mentioned earlier, the foundation for the theory of option pricing was established 
by Black and Scholes [1973] and Merton [1973]. They derived closed form solutions 
for the value of European put and call options when the underlying stock pays no 
dividend or the option is protected against dividends. Of particular note was the Black 
and Scholes [1973] insight that corporate liabilities can be viewed as combinations of 
put and call options.
Assuming one debt issue with the same terms and maturity (i.e., the debt issue is the 
only liability of the firm), CCA views equity as a call option on the value of the firm 
(V = value of the firm) while debt can be viewed as a portfolio comprised of the risk­
free asset (B = bondholders' payment) and a put on the value of the firm. Due to 
limited liability, at the maturity of the debt issue, equity receives Max[V-B,0], while 
the bondholders receive Min[V,B]. The further the value of the firm is from its 
exercise price (i.e., the more valuable the equity of the firm is relative to the debt 
payment), the greater the probability the bondholders will receive B. Conversely, the 
closer (or more negative) the value of the firm is to the exercise price B, the greater 
the probability that the bondholders will receive V. Therefore, as the probability of 
default or bankruptcy increases, the higher the expected covariability of the firm's 
debt with its equity.17
Initially, equity is equal to the market value of the firm less the present value of any 
senior claims on the firm. In this case, at maturity the value of equity is equal to 
Max[V-B,0] (i.e., given that the exercise price is B, the end-of-period call value). 
Conversely, the bondholders receive Min[V,B] (i.e., B-Max[V-B,0] = Min[V,B]). 
Clearly, the value of the two securities are contingent on the value of the underlying 
firm.
This textbook case (see Copeland and Weston [1988, p. 249]) of the simple levered 
firm, which has one equity issue and one zero coupon bond issue with payment B due 
at maturity, can be used to put into perspective the anomalous finding by Cornell and 
Green [1992]. The table below is intended to illustrate the dynamics of the put option
As an alternative but equivalent view of this case, instead of the stockholders possessing a call 
option on the value of the firm, the bondholders have written a put option on the value of the firm. 
Effectively, the bondholders are long a risk-free bond and short an equity put option (i.e., where the 
stock price is V and the exercise price is B).
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embedded in risky bonds ("RB"). The bondholders' will only take control of the firm 
in bankruptcy. Given that the payment to bondholders is fixed, as the value of the firm 
approaches zero, the risky bonds would be expected to behave more and more like the 
residual claim on the firm (i.e., equity). As the value of the firm increases, the risky 
bonds would be expected to behave more and more like risk-free bonds. Therefore, 
risky bonds would be expected to covary with the equity of the firm more and more as 
distress nears. Conversely, risky bonds would be expected to covary with risk-free 
bonds more and more as the value of the firm increases.
Table 2
Stakeholders* Payoffs at Maturity for a Firm where Shareholders can Put the
Firm to Bondholders
States of the World
State 1 
If V<B
State 2 
If V>B
Shareholders:
Equity 0 (V-B)
Bondholders:
Risk-free Bond B B
Put Option -(B-V) 0
Bondholders' Position V B
Evaluation of Bond Position
4-Solvency T Solvency
As V-»0 => As V—»co =>
B->V B-»B
=>RB->V =>RB->B
Equity Risk-free Bnd
Furthermore, based on the above analysis, the closer a firm approaches insolvency 
(i.e., V-B=0), the closer its debt will be to being valued as its equity. Therefore, the 
distribution of returns for a firm's debt will converge toward the distribution of returns 
for its equity as it approaches bankruptcy. Conversely, the further a firm's value 
moves away from B, the distribution of returns for a firm's debt will converge toward 
the distribution of returns for the risk-free asset.
Given this analysis, which excludes interest rate call options, the Cornell and Green 
[1991] result that low-grade corporate bond returns are relatively more sensitive to 
government bond returns is anomalous. This simplified terminal value CCA suggests 
that the lower credit quality bonds should be less sensitive to government bond risk 
and more sensitive to equity market risk during periods when bankruptcy risk is 
increasing. Therefore, the CCA null hypothesis of specific interest to the thesis is the
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following: H0: during periods when the general credit quality is declining, low-grade 
bonds should become relatively more sensitive to Treasury bond market movements 
and less sensitive to stock market movements. In essence this is the Cornell and Green 
[1991] hypothesis.
Although the above example illustrates the basic theory behind the credit risk of risky 
bonds (i.e., the embedded put option), it is missing at least one other important option 
embedded in most risky bonds. Most firms issue bonds with the right to call the bonds 
at some price over the par value of the bonds at some time in the future. Effectively, 
bondholders write interest rate call options on the bonds they purchase. Based on the 
previous analysis, and in order to simplify the following analysis, the following 
assumptions are made: (1) bondholders write a European interest rate call option 
which matures the same day as B, (2) B is no longer constant (it is solely a negative 
function of the risk-free rate of interest), and (3) C is the exercise price of the interest 
rate call (C is greater than the original par value of B). Therefore, at maturity the value 
of the interest rate call option to the shareholders is equal to Max[B-C,0]. Conversely, 
at maturity bondholders will receive Min[B,C] (i.e., B-Max[B-C,0] = Min[B,C]).
The table below is intended to illustrate the dynamics of the interest rate call option 
embedded in risky bonds. As interest rates increase and the value of the bond payment 
approaches zero, the bonds would be expected to behave more and more like risk-free 
bonds. As interest rates decline and the value of the bond payment increases, the 
bonds would be expected to be called at the constant C. Therefore, the bonds would 
be expected to covary with the risk-free bond as interest rates rise. Conversely, the 
bonds would be expected to covary less with the risk-free bond as interest rates 
decline and their value approaches their call value.
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Table 3
Stakeholders' Payoffs at Maturity for a Firm where Shareholders cannot Put the 
Firm to Bondholders, but Shareholders can Call the Bonds from Bondholders
States of the World
State 1 
IfB<C
State 2 
If B>C
Shareholders:
Equity (V-B) (V-B)
Interest Rate Call 0 (B-C)
Shareholders' Position V-B V-C
. Bondholders:
Risk-free Bond B B
Int. Rate Call Option 0 (C-B)
Bondholders' Position B C
Evaluation of Bond Position
T Rates -I Rates
As i—>oo => As i->0 =>
B->0 B—>oo
=>Debt—>B =>Debt->C
Risk-free Bnd Called Bnd
Clearly, a bond with embedded interest rate call option would be expected to be less 
like the risk-free bond than a bond without an interest rate call options. Therefore, the 
comment about low-grade bonds' having relatively significantly more callable bonds 
and/or weaker call protection than high-grade bonds can be tested by testing the 
following hypothesis: H0: if low-grade bonds have weaker call protection than high- 
grade bonds, then during periods when interest rates are declining, low-grade bonds 
should become relatively less sensitive to Treasury bond market movements.
Of course, most risky bonds have both an embedded put and an embedded interest 
rate call. Based on the combination of the two previous examples, the following table 
presents the four possible payoffs available to stakeholders if the firm issues risky 
debt with an embedded interest rate call option.
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Table 4
Stakeholders' Payoffs at Maturity for a Levered Firm
States of the World
State 1 
If V<B<C
State 2 
If V<B>C
State 3 
If V>B<C
State 4 
If V>B>C
Shareholders:
Equity (i.e., put option) 0 0 (V-B) (V-B)
Int. Rate Call 0 (B-C) 0 (B-C)
Shareholders' Position 0 B-C V-B V-C
Bondholders:
Risk-free Bond B B B B
Put Option -(B-V) -(B-V) 0 0
Int. Rate Call Option 0 (C-B) 0 (C-B)
Bondholders' Position V V+C-B B C
Evaluation of Risky Bond ("RB") Position
4 Solvency & 4 Solvency & T Solvency & T Solvency &
t  Rates 4 Rates t  Rates 4 Rates
As V-B->0 => As V-B->0 => As V-B—>oo As V-B->oo
RB—>V and as RB—>V and as and as and as
i-»oo =>B->0 i—>0 =>B—>oo i—>oo =>B-*0 i->0 =>B->oo
=>RB-»V =>RB-> =>RB—>B =>RB—>C
V/C-B?
Equity Ambiguous Risk-free Bnd Called Bnd
In State 1, the shareholders exercise their put option, but do not exercise their interest 
rate call option. As V declines relative to B, the debt of the firm will behave more like 
equity. Clearly, the embedded put option causes risky bonds to behave more like 
equity as the credit quality of the firm declines.
In State 2, the shareholders exercise both options. In State 2, the bondholders end up 
with essentially the worst of all possible states of the world. That is, in State 2 the 
bondholders must take control of the firm and pay the former shareholders the 
difference between the C and B. Although, as B increases in value and V declines 
relative to B, it is not clear as to the general behavior of the bonds. The firm is 
declining in value relative to the bonds which were issued, but given that the firm may 
be increasing in value as well (although not as fast), the stock and bonds of the firm 
will tend to move in the same direction as risk-free interest rates decline. Although no 
expression for V has been provided, this effect would be accentuated if V were a 
negative function of the level of risk-free interest rates. Therefore, State 2 illustrates 
the following point: because one could hypothesize that if there were some significant 
degree of a natural hedge inherent in risky bonds it would tend to be most dramatic 
during periods when the embedded put and interest rate call would simultaneously 
move deeper into-the-money and/or be exercised. That is, it is possible that the return
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generation process of risky bonds, especially less credit worthy bonds, is significantly 
affected by its embedded options especially during periods when both option values 
would be expected to increase in value. From the risky bondholders1 perspective, 
default and interest rate calls combined may provide a useful hedge. This point will be 
elaborated upon in the next several sections.
In State 3, the shareholders do not exercise either option. As V increases relative to B, 
the debt of the firm will behave more like a risk-free bond. In this state of the world, 
both options move further and further out-of-the-money and the risky bonds covary 
more and more with the risk-free bond.
In State 4, the shareholders exercise their interest rate call option, but do not exercise 
their put option. As B increases and V increases relative to B, the debt of the firm will 
tend toward the constant C. As risk-free rates rise, the embedded interest rate call 
option causes risky bonds to truncate their value at their call price, and causes 
bondholder losses as risk-free rates cause bond values to rise above their exercise 
price.
In the case of convertible bonds, not only is the owner short an embedded put and 
interest rate call, but the owner is also long an equity call option. Therefore, because 
there are three embedded options, there are eight possible states of the world (i.e., 23 
versus 22). In addition to the assumptions used in the previous example of a straight 
risky bond, where the holder is short an interest rate call and put option, some 
additional complications are required. As before, assume all embedded options are 
European options with the same maturity dates. If the equity call option is exercised 
("conversion"), assume that the bondholders receive gV, where g is the dilution factor 
(i.e., g = n/(n+N), where n + N = the number of shares after exercise). Therefore, the 
equity call option will be exercised if gV>B. Assume that the equity call option 
embedded in the convertible bond will only be exercised when the value of the firm is 
greater than or equal to some critical value (V* = B/g).
The following table presents the four possible payoffs available to stakeholders if the 
firm issues convertible debt and the equity call option never ends up being in-the- 
money (i.e., the same possible states of the world as the case of a risky bond without 
the equity call option).
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Table 5
Stakeholders' Payoffs at Maturity for a Levered Firm with Convertible Debt 
(when the equity call option is out-of-the-money - V*>V)
States of the World
State 1 State 1 State 3 State 4
IfV*>V<B<C If V*>V<B>C If V*>V>B<C If V*>V>B>C
Shareholders:
Equity (i.e., put option) 0 0 (V-B) (V-B)
Int. Rate Call 0 (B-C) 0 (B-C)
Equity Call 0 0 0 0
Shareholders' Position 0 B-C V-B V-C
Bondholders:
Risk-free Bond B B B B
Put Option -(B-V) -(B-V) 0 0
Int. Rate Call Option 0 (C-B) 0 (C-B)
Equity Call Option 0 0 0 0
Bondholders' Position V V+C-B B C
Evaluation of Risky Bond ("RB") Position
4 Solvency & 4 Solvency & T Solvency & T Solvency Sc
t  Rates & I  Rates & T Rates & 4 Rates &
I  Firm Value i  Firm Value 1 Firm Value •I Firm Value
As V-B->0 => As V-B->0 => As V-B->oo As V-B->oo
RB->V and as RB->V and as and as and as
i—>oo =>B->0 i->0 =>B->oo i—>oo zz>B->0 i—>0 =>B->oo
and as and as and as and as
V->0=>E->0 V—>0=>E—>0 V—>0=>E->0 V—>0=>E^0
=>RB->V =>RB-> =>RB->B =>RB->C
V/C-B?
Equity Ambiguous Risk-free Bnd Called Bnd
In the above four states of the world the value of the firm is less than the critical 
conversion value V*. In these four states of the world the results are equivalent to the 
previous table results for the straight risky bond.
The following table presents the four possible payoffs available to stakeholders if the 
firm issues convertible debt and the equity call option ends up being in-the-money.
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Table 6
Stakeholders' Payoffs at Maturity for a Levered Firm with Convertible Debt (the 
additional four payoffs possible for a levered firm with convertible debt - V*<V)
States of the World
State 5
If V*<V<B<C
State 6
If V*<V<B>C
State 7
IfV*^V>B<C
State 8
If V*<IV>B>C
Shareholders:
Equity (i.e., put option) 0 0 (V-B) (V-B)
Int. Rate Call 0 (B-C) 0 (B-C)
Equity Call -gv -gv -gv -gv
Shareholders' Position -gV B-C-gV V-B-gV V-C-gV
Bondholders:
Risk-free Bond B B B B
Put Option -(B-V) -(B-V) 0 0
Int. Rate Call Option 0 (C-B) 0 (C-B)
Equity Call Option g v gv g v g v
Bondholders' Position V+gV V+C-B+gV B+gV C+gV
Evaluation of Risky Bond ("RB") Position
i  Solvency & ■I Solvency & T Solvency & T Solvency &
t  Rates & 1 Rates & T Rates & 1 Rates &
t  Firm Value T Firm Value t  Firm Value T Firm Value
As V-B->0 => As V-B->0 => As V-B->oo As V-B—>oo
RB->V and as RB—>V and as and as and as
i—>oo =>B->0 i—>0 =>B—>oo i—>oo =>B->0 i—>0 =>B—>oo
and as and as and as and as
V—>oo=>E—>oo V—>oo=>E—>oo V—>oo=>E—>oo V—>oo=>E—>oo
=>RB->V =>RB-> =>RB->B/V? =>RB—>C/V?
V/C-B?
Equity Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous
In the above four states of the world the value of the firm is greater than or equal to 
the critical conversion value V*. In these four states of the world the results are 
equivalent to the straight risky bond results with gV added.
In State 5, the shareholders exercise their put and bondholders their equity call option, 
but shareholders do not exercise their interest rate call option. As V declines relative 
to B, the debt of the firm will behave more like equity. Clearly, the embedded put 
option causes risky bonds to behave more like equity as the credit quality of the firm 
declines. As V increases to the point where the equity call is in-the-money, the debt of 
the firm will behave more like equity (i.e., levered equity - V+gV). Although, it is 
unlikely that the firm would decrease in value relative to B such that shareholders 
would exercise their put option but increase overall so that the bondholders would 
find it advantageous to exercise their equity call option.
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In State 6, the shareholders exercise both options and the bondholders exercise their 
equity call option (i.e., all three options are exercised). As in the straight risky bond 
State 2, the bondholders must take control of the firm and pay the former shareholders 
the difference between the C and B. Although, as B increases in value and V declines 
relative to B but increases relative to V*, it is not clear as to the general behavior of 
the bonds. The firm is declining in value relative to the bonds which were issued, but 
given that the firm may be increasing in value as well (although not as fast), the equity 
and bonds of the firm will tend to move in the same direction as risk-free interest rates 
decline. As with State 5, it is unlikely that the firm would decrease in value relative to 
B such that shareholders would exercise their put option but increase overall so that 
the bondholders would find it advantageous to exercise their equity call option. 
Nevertheless, in State 6 the bonds should behave as some combination of levered 
equity and the short value of an interest rate call option (i.e., C-B).
In State 7, the shareholders do not exercise either option, but the bondholders exercise 
their equity call option. As V increases relative to B, the debt of the firm will behave 
more like a risk-free bond, but as V increases relative to V* the debt of the firm will 
behave more like equity. In this state of the world, both shareholder options move 
further and further out-of-the-money while the bondholder option moves further into- 
the-money. In State 7 the bonds should behave as some combination of equity (i.e., 
gV) and the risk-free bond.
In State 8, the shareholders exercise their interest rate call option and the bondholders 
exercise their interest rate call option, but the shareholders do not exercise their put 
option. As B increases and V increases relative to B and V*, the debt of the firm will 
tend toward the constant C and gV. As risk-free interest rates rise, the embedded 
interest rate call option causes risky bonds to truncate their value at their call price, 
and causes bondholder losses as risk-free interest rates cause bond values to rise above 
their exercise price. Although, as the value of the firm increases and the equity call 
moves further and further into-the-money, the bonds will behave more like equity. In 
State 8 the bonds should behave as some combination of equity (i.e., gV) and the 
constant C. Therefore, because C is a constant, the bonds will tend to covary with the 
firm's equity movements. In practice, in State 8 bondholders would have to choose 
between C and gV.
Finally, given that risky bonds are some combination of debt and equity, CCA would 
imply that an appropriate simple asset pricing model for risky debt should control for 
equity risk and risk-free asset risk. This is done in this thesis by using a simple two-
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factor model which controls for equity market and government bond or Treasury 
market risk. This type of model is a compact means of controlling for relevant risks 
and testing the relationships at issue in Chapters 6 through 8.
3.2 Expected Return and Variance of Risky Bonds
As noted by Ambarish and Subrahmanyam [1989, p. 3], the put option in risky 
corporate bonds "has important implications for the measurement of the expected 
return and standard deviation of return on corporate bonds, the duration and the 
convexity of such bonds, and the interpretation of comparative time-series sample 
statistics of realized returns on corporate bonds and Treasury bonds." Ceteris paribus, 
generally the greater the number of embedded options whose price changes are 
negatively correlated with the underlying bond's price changes, the further out-of-the- 
money the embedded options which positively covary with their underlying bond 
price movements are, and/or the further in-the-money the embedded options which 
negatively covary with their underlying bond price movements are, the lower the 
expected volatility of the portfolio or asset class. This section will review the portfolio 
aspects of embedded options in risky bonds which significantly effect their return 
generation process. In order to simplify the analysis which follows, the first part of the 
section will focus on the effect of puts and interest rate calls on risky bond valuation.
Assume there are two types of bonds, those with credit risk and those without.18 The 
expected return of the bond without credit risk is defined as:
E[R hg ] = whgRf E[Rr/ ] -  whgcE[Rc], where E[RHG] = the expected return on the 
high-grade bond, E\Rr/ ] = the expected return on the equivalent risk-free bond,
E[RC\ = the expected return on the embedded interest rate call option; whg^ = B/(B- 
C) = the high-grade bond portfolio weight of the equivalent risk-free bond, where B = 
the value of the equivalent risk-free bond and C = the value of the embedded interest 
rate call option, and whgc = C/(B-C) = the high-grade bond portfolio weight of the 
embedded interest rate call option. Furthermore, whg^  > 1, whgc > 0, and whg^ - 
whgc = 1. The expected return of the bond with credit risk is defined as:
E[RLG] = w lgRf E[RRf] - { w \g c E[Rc ] + w \gP £ [ i^ ]) , where E[R LG] =the expected 
return on the low-grade bond, E[RP] = the expected return on the embedded put
18 In reality there exits a continuum, but to illustrate a point the analysis will be simplified by making 
this clear distinction between the two.
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option; w \gRf = B/(B-C-P) = the low-grade bond portfolio weight of the equivalent 
risk-free bond, where P = the value of the embedded put option, wlgc = C/(B-C-P) = 
the low-grade bond portfolio weight of the embedded interest rate call option, and 
w \gP = P/(B-C-P) = the low-grade bond portfolio weight of the embedded put option. 
Furthermore, w \gRf > 1, wlgc > 0, w \gp > 0, and wlg^ - wlgc - wlg^ = 1.
Given that the sum of the weights for each bond type equals one, the following 
expressions can be substituted into the two expected return equations: 
whgRf = 1 + whgc and wlg^ = 1 + wlgc+ wig,,. For the high-grade bond the expected 
return equation can be simplified to equal:
E [R hg ] = E\Rjy ] + whgc (E[Rjy ] -  E[RC ]); and for the low-grade bond the expected 
return equation can be simplified to equal:
E [R lg] = E[Rr/ ] + w \gc {E[Rv  ] - £[tfc ]) + w \gP(E iR #  ] -  E[RP]). Again, by 
definition, the embedded option weights are positive. In addition, the expected return 
spread between the risk-free interest rate and each embedded option is generally 
positive (see Cox and Rubinstein [1985]).19 Therefore, even if expected returns for the 
risk-free asset or the various embedded options are invariant with respect to time, 
higher values for any embedded option will increase that option's weight and hence its 
impact on the expected return (i.e., ceteris paribus). For example, the lower the 
quality of the bond, the greater the expected return weight given to the embedded put 
option.
From the above equations it is clear that the expected return spread between a risky 
bond and a risk-free bond is equal to the expected return spread between the risk-free 
bond and the embedded options of the risky bond. By definition, the lower the quality 
of bond, the greater the impact the embedded put option would be expected to have on 
the expected return spread between the risky bond and a comparable risk-free bond. 
Although, unlike Blume et al. [1992] and Cornell and Green [1992], there is no prior 
expectation that the embedded interest rate call options of lower quality bonds would
19 The expected return of the embedded interest rate call option is a function of the term structure of 
risk-free rates, the value of the interest rate call option, and the hedge ratio of the embedded call option 
and the risk-free rate (see Hull [1989, p. 186-194] regarding "delta" hedging). The expected return of 
the embedded put option is a function of the value of and expected return on the firm, the value o f the 
embedded put option, and the hedge ratio of the embedded put option and the risk-free rate. The 
expected return of the options are never greater than the risk-free rate (see Cox and Rubinstein [1985,
p. 210-211]).
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have any greater impact on the expected return spread between a risky bond and a 
comparable risk-free bond than a higher quality bond.
The expected return of a bond with credit risk and an equity conversion option is 
defined as: = wcnRfE[RRf'\-(w cncE[Rc ] + wcnPE[RP] -  wcnECE[REC]),
where E[RCN] = the expected return on the convertible low-grade bond, E[Rec] = the 
expected return on the embedded equity call option; wen^ = B/(B-C-P+EC) = the 
convertible low-grade bond portfolio weight of the equivalent risk-free bond, where 
EC = the value of the embedded equity call option, wcnc = C/(B-C-P+EC) = the 
convertible low-grade bond portfolio weight of the embedded interest rate call option, 
wcnP = P/(B-C-P+EC) = the convertible low-grade bond portfolio weight of the 
embedded put option, and wcnEC = EC/(B-C-P+EC) = the convertible low-grade bond 
portfolio weight of the embedded equity call option. Furthermore, wcn^ > 1, wcnc >
0, wcnp > 0, wcnEC > 0, and wcnRf - wcnc - wcnp + wcnEC = 1. Again, given that the 
sum of the weights for each bond type equals one, the following expression can be 
substituted into the expected return equation for convertible low-grade bonds: 
wenjy - 1 + wcnc + wcnp -  wcnEC. Therefore, for the convertible low-grade bond the 
expected return equation can be simplified to equal:
E[Rcn ] = ElRy ] + wcnc (EiRy ] -  ]) + wcnp (E[Rr/ ]-  E[RP ]) -  wcnEC (E[Rjy ] -  E[Rec ]).
From the above equation and the preceding discussion on risky bonds, the expected 
return spread between a convertible risky bond and straight risky bond would be 
generally attributable to the expected return spread between the risk-free bond and the 
embedded equity call option. By definition, the more solvent the firm, the greater the 
impact the embedded equity call option would be expected to have on the expected 
return spread between the convertible low-grade bond and a comparable straight low- 
grade bond.
Based on textbook portfolio theory (see e.g., Elton and Gruber [1991]), the following 
are the relationships for the variance of return on a high-grade bond and a low-grade
bond: a 2HG = w h g^ a 2^  +w hg2cG2c +2whgRfwhgcGBC and
= wlg%■ o 2w + wlSc °c + wlgp ° 2p +2(wlgx  wlgc a BC + wlg^ w lgP a BP + w\gc w\%P a CP) 
where g2hg = the variance of return on the high-grade bond, g2lg = the variance of 
return on the low-grade bond, = the variance of return on the equivalent risk-free 
bond, o 2c = the variance of return on the embedded interest rate call option, g 2p = the
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variance of return on the embedded put option, <j bc = the covariance between the 
return on the equivalent risk-free bond and the embedded interest rate call option, 
o BP = the covariance between the return on the equivalent risk-free bond and the 
embedded put option, and o cp  = the covariance between the return on the embedded 
interest rate call option and the embedded put option.
The following is the relationship for the variance of return on a convertible low-grade 
bond:
<j2lg = + wcri2cG2c + wcn2PG2P + wcn2ECG2EC +
2  (wcnBfwcnca BC + wcn^wcnpc  BP + wcn^wcn^a BEC + wcncwcnpa c P +  wcncwcnECa CEC +  wcnp wcnECG PEC)
where g 2ec = the variance of return on the embedded equity call option, o B EC = the 
covariance between the return on the equivalent risk-free bond and the embedded 
equity call option, o C EC = the covariance between the return on the embedded interest 
rate call option and the embedded equity call option, and o PEC = the covariance 
between the return on the embedded put option and the embedded equity call option.
Given that interest rate calls and the value of an equivalent risk-free bond are a 
function of the risk-free rate of interest (i.e., the interest rate call effectively truncates 
the positive side of the returns distribution of a high-grade bond), a digression on the 
possible affect that put returns might have on the return generation process for low- 
grade bonds is in order. Clearly, it is possible that the return generation process for 
low-grade bonds may be significantly impacted by the covariance between the 
embedded put returns and the equivalent risk-free bond returns as well as the returns 
on the embedded interest rate call option. Furthermore, even without an embedded 
interest rate call option, if the put option embedded in the low-grade bond sufficiently 
negatively covarys with the risk-free asset, the variance associated with a low-grade 
bond may be less than that of an equivalent risk-free bond (i.e., one with the same 
maturity and coupon).
Based on CCA pricing models which incorporate a time varying risk-free rate of 
interest, if changes in the value of the firm and changes in the risk-free rate of interest 
positively covary, an increase in the risk-free rate of interest will cause a decline in the 
value of the embedded put option and the equivalent risk-free bond (ceteris paribus). 
Hence, the possibility that changes in the risk-free rate of interest cause positive 
covariation between returns on the embedded put option and the equivalent risk-free 
bond. But if risk-free rates of interest and firm values are correlated, a change in the
risk-free rate of interest can cause the value of the embedded put to change. If risk­
free rates of interest and firm values are positively correlated, an increase in the risk- 
free rate of interest will be associated with an increase in the value of the firm and 
hence a decrease in the value of the put option. Conversely, if risk-free rates of 
interest and firm values are negatively correlated, a decrease in the risk-free rate of 
interest will be associated with an increase in firm value and hence a decrease in the 
value of the put option. Therefore, it is possible that risk-free rates of interest and firm 
values are negatively correlated enough to cause the return generation process for low- 
grade bonds to display return patterns which would cause low-grade bond returns to 
covary more with risk-free bond returns during periods when simple CCA would 
suggest that they covary more with equity returns. For example, the Cornell and 
Green [1991] observation that low-grade bond returns should have covaried more with 
equity returns during recessions than they did, may at least in part be working through 
the effect that risk-free interest rates and/or the economy has on the principal options 
embedded in low-grade bonds. This is a central hypothesis tested in Chapters 6 
through 8.
3.3 Comparative Statics for High-Grade and Low-Grade Bonds
From the above discussion, it should be clear that CCA risky debt valuation models 
which do not incorporate interest rate risk (i.e., in addition to default risk) would not 
expect risky debt values to be significantly affected by changes in the level of the risk­
free rate of interest. Furthermore, the sign and magnitude of the correlation between 
changes in the risk-free rate of interest and firm value can be critical in determining 
credit spreads. Therefore, CCA risky debt valuation models which incorporate interest 
rate risk may offer insights into the seemingly anomalous behavior of low-grade 
corporate bonds relative to high-grade corporate bonds. Based of Longstaff and 
Schwartz's [1995, p. 795-797] closed form expression for a risky discount bond, the 
following figure depicts credit spreads for a risky bond holding all else constant but
Figure 1 
The Credit Spread Effect
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The assumptions are as follows: (1) r = 4% (riskless rate of interest), (2) X = 2 (leverage ratio = V/k, 
where k is the threshold value when distress occurs, see Black and Cox [1976]), (3) w = 0.5 (1-w = 
recovery rate), (4) a  = 0.06 (the sum of short-term riskless interest rate parameter C, and a constant 
representing the market price of interest rate risk), (5) p = 1 (the other short-term riskless interest rate
2 2 parameter (see Vasicek [1977]), (6) Gv = 4% (variance of the firm's assets), (7) CTr = 0.1% (variance
of the short-term riskless rate of interest), (8) C = 8% (rate on the bond), and (9) T = 10 (maturity in
years).
The credit spread is an increasing function of pry . Therefore, in the more complex 
CCA risky debt models, the correlation between changes in the risk-free rate of 
interest and firm value is a potentially important determinant of the sensitivity of risky 
debt values to risk-free bond and equity values. If the more complex CCA model for 
risky debt is applicable, there are the following three basic possibilities with relevance 
to the empirical examinations which follow this chapter: (1) the correlation between 
changes in the risk-free rate of interest and firm value is significantly positive to cause 
the returns of risky debt to be more sensitive to equity returns and/or less sensitive to 
risk-free bond returns particularly during periods when interest rates are changing 
and/or the economy is in recession; (2) the correlation between changes in the risk- 
free rate of interest and firm value is close enough to zero to cause the returns of risky 
debt to behave as in the more simple CCA risky debt valuation models; and (3) the 
correlation between changes in the risk-free rate of interest and firm value is 
significantly negative enough to cause the returns of risky debt to be significantly less 
sensitive to equity returns and/or more sensitive to risk-free bond returns particularly
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during periods when interest rates are changing and/or the economy is in recession. It 
is this final case that is of interest to this thesis.
Assuming the correlation between changes in the risk-free rate of interest and firms 
value is significantly negative, State of the World 2 (i.e., where solvency and the risk- 
free rate of interest decline) is no longer as ambiguous as before. As before, as the 
firm becomes less solvent and as the risk-free rate of interest declines, thus increasing 
the value of the risk-free bond, the value of the put option increases (i.e., V declines 
and B increases). Unlike before, as the risk-free rate of interest declines the value of 
the firm tends to increase, thus tending to decrease the value of the put option. This 
final effect will tend to make more risky debt behave less like equity and more like the 
risk-free bond than debt which is less risky. Essentially, in the more complex CCA 
risky debt models which incorporate prV, the value of the embedded put can be 
significantly affected through changes in the risk-free rate of interest, not just through 
B but also through V. Thus, in the particular case where prV is significantly negative 
enough to affect changes in firm value through changes in the risk-free rate of interest, 
more risky debt can be expected to be more bond-like and less equity-like than less 
risky debt as the risk-free rate of interest declines (i.e., more risky means that the 
embedded put is closer to being or deeper in-the-money than the less risky bond).
Regarding convertible bonds, the more complex CCA risky debt models may also 
provide some significant insights with respect to convertible bond behavior relative to 
risky bonds which do not possess the equity call option (i.e., straight risky bonds). In 
the case of straight risky debt the focus was on the put option, while in the case of 
convertible bonds the focus will be directed at the equity call option. In the case of 
straight risky bonds, ceteris paribus, as the risk-free rate of interest decreases the 
value of the stockholders' put option is reduced if the value of the firm increases as a 
result (i.e., the case where pr V is significantly negative). Thus, during periods of 
declining interest rates risky bonds can act less equity-like and more bond-like. In 
contrast, in the case of the convertible bonds, ceteris paribus, as interest rates decline 
the value of the firm increases and the exercise price of the equity conversion option 
approaches the strike price of the option (i.e., V approaches V*). Therefore, like the 
interest rate call option, as the value of the underlying security approaches the strike 
price the option becomes less sensitive to movements in the underlying security.
Thus, in the case of the equity call option of a convertible bond, if the value of the 
firm is significantly affected by movements in the risk-free rate of interest (i.e., the 
case where pr V is significantly negative), as interest rates decline, it would be
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expected that the value of a convertible bond may become less sensitive to equity 
market movements and possibly more sensitive to movements in the risk-free bond 
market. Specifically, if one compares convertible bond market movements to 
movements in the straight risky bond market, it is expected that this effect should be 
observable during periods when the equity call option is increasing in value and the 
value of the interest rate call option is increasing in value (i.e., States of the World 6 
and 8). Otherwise, this effect might also be observable during periods when the equity 
call option is increasing in value (i.e., States of the World 5, 6, 7, and 8), but it would 
not be expected to be as strong as in the two cases where there is the combination of 
increasing interest rate and equity call values.
Therefore, assuming that periods of downgrades can be proxied by periods of 
declining credit quality or recession, the following null hypothesis for recessionary 
periods results: H0: during periods when the general credit quality is declining, low- 
grade bonds should become relatively less sensitive to Treasury bond market 
movements and more sensitive to stock market movements.
Therefore, assuming that periods of interest rate calls can be proxied by periods of 
declining interest rates, the following null hypothesis for interest rate call periods 
results: H0: during periods when interest rates are declining, low-grade bonds should 
become relatively less sensitive to Treasury bond market movements and more 
sensitive to stock market movements. This follows from the Cornell and Green [1991] 
expectation that low-grade bonds do not possess as high a level of interest rate call 
protection as high-grade bonds.
In addition, states of the world when both interest rates are declining and the economy 
is weakening may tend to accentuate the strictly lower interest rate call rate for lower 
grade bonds relative to higher grade bonds. For example, as the economy performs 
poorly and perceived credit quality declines, the put option which tends to be more in- 
the-money for lower grade bonds than higher grade bonds tends to act to offset 
increases in the value of the bond as interest rates decline and put pressure on the 
bond to be called away (e.g., ala Kim et al. [1993]). Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
an added put/call hedge effect for low-grade bonds relative to high-grade bonds will 
occur during periods when interest rate call options are moving into-the-money (i.e., 
periods of declining interest rates) and periods of declining credit quality (i.e., as 
proxied by recessionary periods). Therefore, assuming that periods of interest rate 
calls can be proxied by periods of declining interest rates and periods of declining 
credit quality can be proxied by recessionary periods, the following null hypothesis
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for combination interest rate call and recessionary periods results: H0: during 
recessionary periods when interest rates are declining, low-grade bonds should 
become relatively less sensitive to Treasury bond market movements and more 
sensitive to stock market movements.
Finally, the testable hypotheses developed above can be summarized by the following 
table which provides expectations for the straight low-grade versus high-grade bond 
asset classes (i.e., corporate and municipal):
Table 7
Expectations for Straight Low-Grade vs. High-Grade Bonds
Expectations
Period under Study 
Simple CCA:
Interest Rate Call Periods 
Put Periods
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods)
CCA with Interest Rate Risk:
Interest Rate Call Periods 
Put Periods
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods)
Expectation Expectation
for Sensitivity to for Sensitivity to
Treasury Bonds Equities
0 0
- or 0 +
- or 0 +
0 or + 0 or -
0 or + 0 or -
+
These expectations will be tested in Chapters 6 and 7 for straight low-grade and high- 
grade bonds, and an extended set will be tested for convertible and straight low-grade 
corporate bonds in Chapter 8. Given the possible importance of put/call hedge effects 
and the need to address convertible bonds, the next section will address the issue of 
convertible bonds.
3.4 Convertible Corporate Bond Asset Class Implications and the Thesis
Convertible corporate bonds are generally composed of low-grade bonds (see Altman 
[1988]). Therefore, certain significant effects which are expected to occur between 
straight low-grade and high-grade bonds would not be expected to occur between 
convertible corporate bonds and straight low-grade corporate bonds. Although, there 
is an additional option embedded in convertible bonds which might create an 
additional effect relative to straight low-grade bonds.
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Convertible bonds are a type of corporate bond which the owner typically has the 
option to exchange the bond (at par) for common stock (at the exercise price) of the 
issuing entity. A straight corporate bond doesn't have an equity call option. Ignoring 
illiquidity, the following is a simplified contingent claims view of the general 
equations of the five types of securities analyzed in this study:
(1) TBNDi = Bf, where TBND is the value of Treasury bond i, and B is the value of 
risk-free bond i;
(2) HGCf = Bt -  CjR, where HGC is the value of high-grade corporate bond i20, and 
CIR is the value of interest rate call option i;
(3) LGC, = Bj -  CIR -  PjDJlt, where LGC is the value of low-grade corporate bond i, 
and PP®' is the value of default or put option i;
(4) CNVRT f = Bi -  CjR -  P®flt + Cf90', where CNVRT is the value of convertible 
corporate bond i, and Cfqty is the value of equity call option i; and
(5) EQTYj = PtDJlt + CEqty, where EQTY is the value of equity security i. Clearly, from 
an option pricing viewpoint, convertible bonds appear to be the most complex security 
listed. They are composed of all four of the building blocks which form all five 
security types. Treasury bonds are the most simply security type listed, and, by 
definition, are an element of all of the bond security types.
As one works down the above security hierarchy, certain options distinguish one bond 
or asset type from another. As can be seen, what distinguishes a HGC from a TBND is 
CIR , what distinguishes a HGC from a LGC is P DJ1t, and what distinguishes a 
CNVRT from a straight LGC is CEqty. In addition, as the value of the equity call 
option increases (moves deeper into-the-money), the value of a convertible bond 
approaches the following: C N V R T= Bf -  CIR -  P Ej]t + EQTYj, which reduces to 
CNVRTj = Bj -  C]jR + Cfq,y. Therefore, it is not clear that as equity call options 
increase in value and the convertible bond becomes more equity-like, that the 
convertible bond will respond to its embedded put option. Again, this only illustrates 
the complexities involved with evaluating the financial performance of complex risky 
bonds. This thesis evaluates the financial performance of convertible bonds during 
periods when its three embedded options would be expected to increase in value. 
Therefore, it is critical to identify when these embedded options are exercised and/or 
the probability of exercise increases. Regarding direct comparisons of financial 
performance, convertible bonds will be evaluated against low-grade bonds.
20 Note that high-grade corporate bonds have put options, but they are, by definition, so far out of the 
money they are dropped from the equation to simplify the analysis.
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Based on the foregoing analysis convertible bonds are not expected to differ from 
low-grade bonds in their interest rate call propensities or put propensities. Therefore, 
relative to low-grade bonds, convertible bonds would not be expected to be relatively 
more or less sensitive to Treasury bond markets movements or more or less sensitive 
to equity market movements during interest rate call or put periods. Although, given 
that straight low-grade bonds do not possess an equity call option, convertible bonds 
might be expected to at least be more or less sensitive to equity market movements 
during equity call periods. These same expectations apply to combination periods. 
Although, the interaction effect(s) between the various embedded options may 
dominate during combination periods as to render some expectations invalid, but it is 
difficult to know a priori what expectations may not hold.
The following table provides the relevant expectations regarding the comparison of 
convertible versus straight low-grade corporate bond returns.
Table 8
Expectations for Convertible vs. Straight Low-Grade Corporate Bonds
Expectations
Expectation Expectation
for Sensitivity to for Sensitivity to
Period under Study Treasury Bonds Equities
Interest Rate Call Periods 0 0
Put Periods 0 0
Equity Call Periods 0 or + 0 or-
Combination Periods:
Interest Rate Call & Put Periods 0 0
Interest Rate Call & Equity Call Periods 0 or + 0 or-
Put & Equity Call Periods 0 or + 0 or-
Both Calls & Put Periods 0 or + 0 or-
Clearly, possible significant differences are expected to occur during equity call 
periods only.
4 The Research Method and Statistical Model
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Critical to this thesis is the identification of periods when bond calls and puts would 
be expected to be exercised and/or their probability of exercise significantly increases 
relative to all other periods. For interest rate call periods, this thesis uses periods of 
declining interest rates. Bonds would be expected to be called, and/or their probability 
of exercise increases, when interest rates decline. For put/default periods, this thesis 
uses periods of recession. Credit quality generally declines and defaults increase 
during recessionary periods. For equity call periods, this thesis uses periods when 
equities outperform straight risky bonds. The equity call option would be expected to 
be exercised and/or the probability of exercise increases when equity values increase 
more rapidly than bond values.
Most of the tests in Chapters 6 through 8 employ a simple two factor model (also used 
by Cornell and Green [1991]) which controls for Treasury bond and stock market 
movements. This approach is also compatible with the standard CCA (see Bookstaber 
[1991, p. 243-245]) view of risky bonds. This simple asset pricing model approach is 
used to: (1) control for the risks associated with risky bonds, and (2) examine the 
sensitivity of the asset classes under study to Treasury bond and stock market risk 
during the periods of interest. The regression equation used is as follows:
RBAC, = a 0 +pj x TBR, + P2 x SMR, + p3 x TBR, x PDVt + P4 x SMRt x PDVt +P5 x PDVt + e, 
where RBAC = Risky Bond Asset Class return series, TBR = Treasury bond return 
series, SMR = stock market return series, PDV = Period Dummy Variable, and e = the 
error term. This is the general model used to test for significant risky bond asset class 
effects. Specifically, estimated coefficients P3 and P4 are used to measure significant 
shifts in sensitivity during the periods under study. In addition, the estimated intercept 
term is used to measure any abnormal returns associated with the return series under 
study, after controlling for the aforementioned risks.
Finally, given the above statistical model and methodology, the following two tables 
summarize the principal tests for Chapters 6 through 8.
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Table 9
Expectations for Straight Low-Grade vs. High-Grade Corporate and Municipal
Bonds
Expectations
Expectation Expectation
for Sensitivity to for Sensitivity to
Treasury Bonds Equities
Period under Study Estimated p3 Estimated p4
Interest Rate Call Periods 0 or + 0 or-
Put Periods 0 or + 0 or-
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods) + -
Table 10
Expectations for Convertible vs. Straight Low-Grade Corporate Bonds
Expectations
Expectation Expectation
for Sensitivity to for Sensitivity to
Treasury Bonds Equities
Period under Study Estimated P3 Estimated p4
Interest Rate Call Periods 0 0
Put Periods 0 0
Equity Call Periods 0 or + 0 or-
Combination Periods:
Interest Rate Call & Put Periods 0 0
Interest Rate Call & Equity Call Periods 0 or + Oor-
Put & Equity Call Periods 0 or + 0 or-
Both Calls & Put Periods 0 or + 0 or-
5 The Risky Bond Asset Class Studies in the Thesis - A 
Summary
The following are three sets of asset classes studied in this thesis: (1) low-grade and 
high-grade corporate bonds, (2) low-grade and high-grade municipal bonds, and (3) 
convertible and straight low-grade corporate bonds. The choice of asset classes is 
intended to accomplish the following two objectives of this thesis: (1) analyze the 
possibility of significant embedded option effects for each set of asset classes studied, 
and (2) generally extend research on risky bond asset classes. Regarding the second 
objective, for example, to date no academic study has been performed on low-grade 
municipal bonds.
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Chapter 6, The Effect of Embedded Options on the Financial Performance of Low- 
Grade Corporate Bonds, compares low-grade corporate bond returns to high-grade 
corporate bond returns. This is a version of a paper published in the Financial 
Analysts Journal during 1994. The methodology developed in this chapter was 
applied.
Table 11
Results for Straight Low-Grade vs. High-Grade Corporate Bonds*
Expectations
Period under Study
Expectation 
for Sensitivity to 
Treasury Bonds
Estimated P3
Expectation 
for Sensitivity to 
Equities
Estimated p4
Interest Rate Call Periods 0 0
Put Periods + -
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods) + -
* cut-off at the 5% level of significance.
The results generally support arguments made in this chapter. Specifically a relatively 
strong negative correlation between the risk-free rate of interest and firm values can at 
least in part explain the results.
Chapter 7, The Effect of Embedded Options on the Financial Performance of Low- 
Grade Municipal Bond Funds, compares low-grade municipal bond returns to high- 
grade municipal bond returns. This is a version of a paper conditionally accepted by 
Financial Management. Again, the methodology developed in this chapter was 
applied.
Table 12
Results for Straight Low-Grade vs. High-Grade Municipal Bonds*
Expectations
Period under Study
Expectation 
for Sensitivity to 
Treasury Bonds
Estimated p3
Expectation 
for Sensitivity to 
Equities
Estimated p4
Interest Rate Call Periods + -
Put Periods 0 0
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods) + -
* cut-off at the 5% level of significance.
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Again, the results generally support the arguments made in this chapter. Although, 
unlike corporate bonds the recession period effect is not as pronounced. This can be 
explained by the fact the municipal bonds, due to the high concentration of essential 
service industries, are generally less sensitive to equity market movements than 
corporate bonds. In addition, because of the smaller size of the low-grade municipal 
market when compared to the low-grade corporate market, the low-grade municipal 
asset class is less "low-grade" than its comparable corporate counterpart. Therefore, 
embedded low-grade municipal bond put options are effectively only slightly more in- 
the-money relative to high-grade municipal bonds.
Chapter 8, The Effect of Embedded Options on the Financial Performance of 
Convertible Bond Funds, compares convertible corporate bond returns to straight low- 
grade corporate bond returns. This is a version of a paper which was published in the 
Financial Analysts Journal during 1996. Again, the methodology developed in this 
chapter was applied.
Table 13
Results for Convertible vs. Straight Low-Grade Corporate Bonds*
Expectations
Expectation Expectation
for Sensitivity to for Sensitivity to
Treasury Bonds Equities
Period under Study Estimated p3 Estimated P4
Interest Rate Call Periods 0 0
Put Periods 0 0
Equity Call Periods 0 0
Combination Periods:
Interest Rate Call & Put Periods 0 0
Interest Rate Call & Equity Call Periods + -
Put & Equity Call Periods 0 -
Both Calls & Put Periods 0 -
* cut-off at the 5% level of significance.
Again, the results generally support arguments made in this chapter. Given that the 
two asset classes are both low-grade corporate bonds, the only expected differences 
would be during equity call periods.
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CHAPTER 6
THE EFFECT OF EMBEDDED OPTIONS ON THE FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE OF LOW-GRADE CORPORATE BONDS
1 Introduction
The primary objectives of this chapter are the following: (1) generally extend the 
empirical literature on low-grade corporate bond financial performance, and (2) 
provide evidence to support more complex CCA models of risky bond pricing. The 
analytic approach used in this chapter is to examine the performance of low-grade 
corporate bond returns relative to high-grade corporate bond returns within the context 
of the principal options embedded in them. In the case of low-grade corporate bonds, 
analysis will focus on interest rate call and put periods. As outlined in Chapter 5, the 
primary objectives of this chapter are a by-product of the approach and method 
employed.
As the low-grade corporate bond literature review in Chapter 5 showed, over certain 
periods low-grade corporate bonds have had a higher return and a lower standard 
deviation than high-grade corporate bonds. Previous studies have suggested that this 
is due to the higher frequency of calls for low-grade corporate bonds relative to high- 
grade corporate bonds. Calls alone cannot explain the relatively lower volatility 
associated with low-grade corporate bonds. In fact, it has been shown that defaults 
have had a greater impact on the duration of low-grade bonds than calls (see Kihn 
[1994]). The lower volatility of low-grade bonds relative to high-grade bonds is in 
part due to the effect of options on low-grade debt. Therefore, it is the relative absence 
of defaults, not calls, for high-grade corporate bonds which make them more volatile 
relative to low-grade corporate bonds.
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This chapter examines the return experience of low-grade and high-grade corporate 
bond funds over a long period (i.e., 1/60 through 9/94) in order to shed some light on 
the central controversy which has seemed to create great interest in low-grade 
corporate bonds as an asset class. Specifically, the observation that, relative to high- 
grade corporate bonds, low-grade corporate bonds have generated a higher return at a 
lower risk.
Table 1
Mean Monthly Return and Standard Deviation for the Low-Grade and High- 
Grade Corporate Bond Asset Classes (1/60 through 9/94)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
Low-Grade High-Grade 
1960:01 to 1994:09 Corporate Corporate
Observations = 417
Mean 0.6836% 0.5547%
Standard Deviation 2.4199% 1.7943%
Although the original "Drexel hypothesis" no longer seems to hold (i.e., the standard 
deviation for low-grade corporates is higher than that for high-grade corporates), as 
mentioned in Chapter 5, there are several other seemingly anomalous findings which 
are addressed by this chapter. Specifically, the following issues are examined: (1) do 
low-grade corporate bonds as an asset class show evidence of possessing a higher 
proportion of calls and/or weaker call protection than high-grade corporate bonds; and
(2) do low-grade corporate bonds as an asset class demonstrate a return generation 
process which would suggest that changes in risk-free interest rates and/or the 
economy account for a significant amount of the relative return variation in the low- 
grade corporate bond market overall?
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2 presents 
background on the data and provides summary statistics. Section 3 reviews the 
expectations/hypotheses developed in Chapter 5 which are of relevance to low-grade 
corporate bonds. Section 4 presents the low-grade and high-grade corporate bond 
regression results. The conclusions are summarized in the last section.
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2 Data and Summary Statistics
The corporate bond data set is derived from open-end mutual funds tracked by 
Momingstar during the period from January 1960 through September 1994. These 
returns are net of all but front-end and back-end charges. The Treasury bond series is a 
spliced series based on the Cornell and Green [1991] Treasury bond series (01/60 
through 12/88) and Salomon Brothers’ long bond series (01/89 through 09/94).1 The 
stock series is derived from the Standard and Poor's 500 return index ("S&P 500"). 
Therefore, unlike the return series derived from mutual fund returns, the stock and 
Treasury bond series are gross returns.
Like the Cornell and Green [1991] study on low-grade corporate bonds, this thesis 
uses monthly open-end mutual fund data to derive asset class return series. Lipper 
Analytical Services asset class definitions are used for all asset class return series 
reported. Shares of open-end mutual funds are traded on the basis of net asset value 
("NAV"). Monthly returns are based on the following calculation:
Re turnt = [{NA Vt -  NA Vt_x) + IncDist, + CapGainDistt ] / NA Vt_x. In addition, these 
returns take account of 12b-l fees and management fees but not front-end loads, back­
end loads, or redemption charges.
Each mutual fund based asset class return series was constructed following the 
method used by Cornell and Green [1991]. For each asset class, the equally weighted 
average of all mutual funds each month was calculated. The following were the 
number of funds as of month-end September 1994 for each asset class series derived 
from Momingstar data: 101 low-grade corporate bond funds and 149 high-grade 
corporate bond funds. Table 2 provides background on the asset class return series 
used in this chapter.
1 There was overlap between these two series over the period 04/84 through 12/88. Over that period 
the correlation between the two series is approximately 0.969.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Low-Grade 
Corporate Bond Funds, High-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds,
and Equities
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
1960:01 to 1994:09 
Observations = 417 
Moments of the Distribution: 
1st - Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
Low-Grade
Corporate
High-Grade
Corporate
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500
0.6836%
2.4199%
0.1218
1.9892
-7.0880%
10.9500%
0.5547%
1.7943%
0.7443
3.1875
-4.7600%
9.4353%
0.5676%
2.9033%
0.6865
2.8587
-8.4600%
15.2400%
0.6145%
4.2506%
-0.3540
2.9932
-23.9440%
16.3050%
Tests of Normality#:
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 5.7685 6.3130 3.9925 2.9520
Prob>T 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0033
W: Normal 0.9668 0.9509 0.9656 0.9856
Prob<W 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.6152
# The first test o f normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean 
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
First, it should be noted that the low-grade corporate bond series is essentially an 
extension of the Cornell and Green [1991] series. Based on the period of overlap (i.e., 
01/78 through 12/88)2, the correlation between the Cornell and Green [1991] low- 
grade series and the one used in this study was approximately 0.995. As stated in the 
introduction, over the study period (i.e., 01/60 through 09/94), low-grade corporate 
bonds have had higher returns at a higher level of risk, as measured by standard 
deviation, than high-grade corporate bonds. This contrasts with previous research 
based on earlier periods (e.g., see Blume et al. [1991] and Cornell and Green [1991]). 
The relatively recent increase in the volatility of low-grade corporate bonds relative to 
high-grade corporate bonds is due to increased volatility from 1988 through the early 
1990's. Although, low-grade corporate bonds have returned more than Treasury bonds 
at a lower level of risk. All three bond asset class return series are slightly positively 
skewed, while equities (i.e., the S&P 500) are slightly negatively skewed. The 
kurtosis values indicate that of the three bond asset classes, high-grade corporate
2 Kevin Green and Alan Williams kindly provided the data from the original Cornell and Green [1991] 
study, but the data covered the period 01/60 through 12/88, not 01/60 through 12/89 as in the original 
study.
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bonds returns have been distributed the most platykurtically over the period under 
study.
The test for normality suggests that, at standard levels of statistical significance, only 
the equity return series is drawn from a random sample from a normal distribution 
(i.e., the Shapiro-Wilk test). All four asset class return series reject the null hypothesis 
that mean of each respective distribution is equal to zero. At normal levels of 
statistical significance, all four asset class return series have means which are 
significantly positive. Again, three of four return series reject the null hypothesis that 
the values are drawn from a random sample from a normal distribution.
Table 3 provides correlation and autocorrelations for the asset class return series used 
in this chapter.
Table 3
Tests for Autocorrelation and Correlation Coefficients for the Returns of Low- 
Grade Corporate Bond Funds, High-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury
Bonds, and Equities
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
1960:01 to 1994:09
Low-Grade
Corporate
High-Grade
Corporate
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500
Autocorrelation at Lag 1 
Test for White Noise#: 
12 lags
0.253**
46.12*
0.143**
36.52**
0.050
23.44*
0.016
10.28
Correlation with 
High-Grade Corporate 
Treasury Bonds 
S&P 500
0.619**
0.497**
0.698**
0.829**
0.391** 0.320**
# This is an autocorrelation check for white noise. The null hypothesis is that the autocorrelations sum 
to zero. The test statistic is at the 12th lag (i.e., one year). Therefore, the null hypothesis for the 12th
A  A  A  A
^k~'12 2 r \ 2lag is: T x /  w  ^rk =  0, where rk is the product moment correlation between et and et_k (k = 1, 2 ,
 , 12). If the null hypothesis is true, the statistic is distributed as a chi-square with 12 degrees of
freedom. If the statistic is not statistically significant, the null hypothesis can be accepted.
* denotes significance at the 5% level of significance, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level of 
significance.
Both the low-grade and high-grade corporate bond return series show evidence of 
autocorrelation. This autocorrelation has been interpreted as evidence of nontrading 
(see Cornell and Green [1991, p. 37-39]). Therefore, several sets of regression results 
will be presented in order to correct for possible nontrading and/or serial correlation of
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the error term. As will become clear in section 4, the results do not substantially differ 
regardless of the correction method employed.
Regarding correlations, low-grade corporate bonds returns are more positively 
correlated with equity returns than Treasury bond returns. Conversely, high-grade 
corporate bonds returns are more positively correlated with Treasury bond returns 
than equity returns. Clearly, compared to high-grade corporate bonds, low-grade 
corporate bonds have been more exposed to the risks associated with equities than 
Treasury bonds.
3 Risky Corporate Bond Expectations and Tests
Based on the discussion in Chapter 5, there can be very different expectations for the 
changing sensitivities of more risky debt (i.e., low-grade corporate bonds) relative to 
less risky debt (i.e., high-grade corporate bonds) during periods when their principal 
embedded options would be expected to move deeper in-the-money. Specifically, 
risky debt valuation models which do not incorporate interest rate risk find that the 
behavior of low-grade corporate bond returns during recessionary periods seems 
anomalous; whereas risky debt valuation models which incorporate interest rate risk 
may be able to explain the behavior of low-grade corporate bond returns during 
recessionary periods (i.e., assuming pr v is significantly negative).
The following table summarizes the difference in expectations for what is termed 
CCA "assuming no credit spread effect" and CCA "assuming a strong credit spread 
effect". The first set of expectations are traditional CCA expectations which do not 
incorporate interest rate risk, whereas the latter case incorporates interest rate risk and 
assumes that prV is significantly negative. Of course, if prV is zero or close to zero, 
the two may not differ substantially.
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Table 4
Expectations for Periods under Study
Simple CCA Expectations
Period under Study
Expectation 
for Sensitivity to 
Treasury Bonds
Expectation 
for Sensitivity to 
Stocks
Assuming no Credit Spread Effect: 
Interest Rate Call Periods 0 0
Put Periods - or 0 +
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods) - or 0 +
Assuming a Strong Credit Spread Effect: 
Interest Rate Call Periods 0 or + Oor-
Put Periods 0 or + 0 or-
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods) + -
The null hypotheses which follow are based on CCA risky debt models which do not 
incorporate interest rate risk. Therefore, during interest rate call periods (i.e., periods 
of declining interest rates) the relative sensitivity of low-grade corporate bond returns 
to Treasury bond and equity returns would not be expected to change. Hence,
H0: during periods when interest rates are declining, low-grade corporate bonds 
should not become relatively more or less sensitive to Treasury bond market 
movements and equity market movements.
During put periods (i.e., recessionary periods) the relative sensitivity of low-grade 
corporate bond returns to equity returns would be expected to increase. Hence,
H0: during periods when the general credit quality is declining, low-grade corporate 
bonds should become relatively more sensitive to equity market movements.
During combination interest rate call and put periods the relative sensitivity of low- 
grade corporate bond returns to equity returns would be expected to increase. Hence, 
H0: during periods when interest rates are declining and the general credit quality is 
declining, low-grade corporate bonds should become relatively more sensitive to 
equity market movements (i.e., the put periods hypothesis). Essentially, put periods 
are the only periods expected to have a significant impact on the relative sensitivities 
of low-grade corporate bond returns to Treasury bond and equity market returns. In 
addition, given that puts are of primary importance in the valuation of risky corporate 
debt, it is expected that only sensitivities to the equity market may change, not the 
Treasury bond market.
The largest contrast between the two sets of risky debt valuation models occurs during 
combination periods. Particularly clear is the opposite expectation regarding the 
relative sensitivity of low-grade corporate bond returns to equity market returns
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during combination periods. Given that the signs of the two expectations are diametric 
opposites, this will be the strongest test presented. Therefore, the results for this 
particular test should be viewed with added interest.
4 Regressions Testing the Impact of Call and Put Periods
This thesis hypothesizes that periods where the volatility and sensitivity (i.e., to the 
Treasury bond and equity markets) of low-grade corporate bonds relative to high- 
grade corporate bonds is due in part to the observation by Blume et al. [1991, p. 69] 
that: "low-grade bonds are complex securities having some of the characteristics of 
higher grade bonds and some of the characteristics of equities." The question remains 
as to what causes these periods of relatively low volatility and seemingly anomalous 
relative sensitivities? It is a central argument of this thesis that one of the primary 
causes of the seemingly abnormal behavior of low-grade corporate bonds relative to 
high-grade corporate bonds is that relatively less credit worthy corporate bonds are 
significantly more affected by the correlation between changes in the risk-free rate of 
interest and changes in the value of the firm (i.e., pr V is significantly negative) than 
more credit worthy corporate bonds.
The critical method with which to examine the return behavior of high-grade and low- 
grade corporate bonds is to isolate periods when calls and puts would be expected to 
be exercised and/or the probability of exercise significantly increases. This thesis 
assumes that regarding embedded put options (i.e., defaults and outright bankruptcies) 
the appropriate periods to examine are recessionary periods, while for calls the 
appropriate periods to examine are those of declining interest rates. By examining 
low-grade and high-grade corporate bond returns during these periods, the impact that 
puts and calls have on the relative returns of the two corporate bond asset classes can 
be examined.
As a baseline to the regression analysis which follows, the following regression 
models were run to evaluate the sensitivity of low-grade and high-grade corporate 
bonds to Treasury bond and equity market movements:
(1) LGRt = a 0 + Pj x TBRt + p2 x SMRt + et
(2) HGRt = a 0 + Pj x TBRt + p2 x SMRt + et
(3) LGRt -  HGRt = a 0 + pj x TBRt + p2 x SMRt + et
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where LGR = low-grade corporate bond return, HGR = high-grade corporate bond 
return, TBR = Treasury bond return, SMR = stock market return (i.e., the return of the 
S&P 500 index), and e is the error term. This equation was designed to take account 
of Treasury bond and equity market risk via TBR and SMR.
Besides standard OLS regressions, three additional regressions were run to check the 
robustness of the OLS results. In the regressions which follow, a Dimson [1979] 
adjustment was made in order to counteract for the possible presence of nontrading. 
These results are reported alongside the straight OLS results.3 In addition, since the 
Dimson adjustment does not always control for the presence of nonsynchronous 
trading (e.g., see Fowler and Rorke [1983]) and the fact the prices for corporate bonds 
may not change that often (e.g., see Lo and MacKinlay [1990])4, Yule-Walker and 
maximum likelihood regressions were run based on the premise that the error term 
was not independent across time (i.e., autoregressive errors). If autocorrelation is 
present, the OLS parameter estimates will not be efficient and the standard error 
estimates may be biased. Given the data was monthly, for both the Yule-Walker and 
maximum likelihood methods, the autoregressive process was initially checked for up 
to order 12 and the significance level criterion was set at a 5% cutoff value. Given that 
the Yule-Walker estimates are used as starting values for the maximum likelihood 
method, the maximum likelihood method is computationally equivalent to or better 
than the Yule-Walker method. However, the various results will show that there is 
little or no difference between any regression method employed.
3 In fact, Bartholdy and Riding [1994] find that neither the Dimson [1979], Scholes and Williams 
[1977], or Fowler et al. [1980] methods reduce the potential bias more than simple OLS. In addition, 
many studies analyzing nonsynchronous trading tend to suggest that monthly data does not possess 
nearly the same magnitude of the problem as weekly and especially daily data (e.g., see Perry [1985], 
Shanken [1987], and Lo and MacKinlay [1990]). In addition, portfolio betas tend to be "extremely 
stable" relative to individual betas (see Dimson and Marsh [1983]). Therefore, regardless of the 
correction for suspected nontrading, monthly portfolio data can be viewed as a significantly more 
reliable source of estimating betas than individual daily data.
4 That is, it may be that nonsynchronicity is the result of economic forces. Thus, the serial dependence 
in bond returns may be the result of economic forces not mismeasurement. Therefore, what is assumed 
to be evidence of nontrading may not be nontrading at all. Although, regarding asset prices, it is 
usually assumed that serial dependence is the result of institutional features.
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Table 5
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Low- 
Grade and High-Grade Corporate Bond Returns
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in corporate 
bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model 0 ) (2) (3) 0 ) (2) (3)
1960:01 to 1994:09 1/2/3 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign# Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0033** 0.0024** 0.0009 0 .0020* 0 .0020** 0.0000
(4.138) (4.970) (1.127) (2.547) (4.027) (0 .012)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0040 0.0043 -0.0003
(0.146) (0.247) (-0 .010)
TBR +/+/- 0.2537** 0.4845** -0.2308** 0.2572** 0.4778** -0.2206**
(8.956) (27.811) (-8.484) (9.305) (27.460) (-8.165)
TBR (Lead 1) 0.1037** 0.0772** 0.0265
(3.767) (4.455) (0.986)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0354 0.0132 0.0222
(1.885) (1.116) (1.210)
SMR +/+/+ 0.3421** 0.0593** 0.2828** 0.3324** 0.0552** 0.2772**
(17.681) (4.985) (15.220) (17.581) (4.637) (15.005)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0634** -0.0186 0.0820**
(3.374) (-1.570) (4.463)
Adj. R 2 0.569 0.705 0.370 0.607 0.716 0.404
F-Statistic 275.228** 494.058** 123.102** 107.364** 175.144** 47.772**
Dependent Mean 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.001
Root MSE 0.016 0.010 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.015
DW Statistic 1.729 1.994 1.735 1.700 1.988 1.728
Observations 417 417 417 415 415 415
# expected signs are based on risky bond expectations (i.e., for the intercept, TBR coefficient, and 
SMR coefficient) and simple CCA expectations (i.e., for all other coefficient expectations). 
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 6
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Low-Grade 
and High-Grade Corporate Bond Returns
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
1960:01 to 1994:09 1/2/3 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign# Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0035** 0.0025** 0.0009 0.0035** 0.0025** 0.0009
(3.821) (5.594) (0.956) (3.763) (5.612) (0.939)
TBR +/+/- 0.2406** 0.4808** -0.2275** 0.2387** 0.4808** -0.2274**
(8.590) (28.209) (-8.417) (8.539) (28.196) (-8.413)
SMR +1+1+ 0.3291** 0.0559** 0.2645** 0.3272** 0.0558** 0.2629**
(17.282) (4.919) (14.688) (17.155) (4.889) (14.564)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1335** -0.1231* -0.1534** -0.1372**
(-2.738) (-2.532) (-3.137) (-2.825)
Lag 7 0.1178* 0.1194*
(2.454) (2.482)
Lag 10 0.1295* 0.1258**
(2.582) (2.604)
Lag 11 -0.1557** -0.1189* -0.1554** -0.1250*
(-3.244) (-2.444) (-3.223) (-2.555)
Total R2 0.579 0.721 0.395 0.580 0.721 0.395
Regression R 0.557 0.710 0.360 0.556 0.710 0.359
Root MSE 0.016 0.010 0.015 0.016 0.009 0.015
DW Statistic 1.994 1.944 2.009
Observations 417 417 417 417 417 417
# expected signs are based on comparable corporate bond expectations (i.e., for the intercept, TBR 
coefficient, and SMR coefficient) and simple CCA expectations (i.e., for all other coefficient 
expectations).
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
The return spread results are of critical importance, and at a general level there is 
nothing surprising. First, the estimated intercept for the return spread regressions is 
slightly positive, but not significantly so. This suggests that, after controlling for 
Treasury bond and equity market risk, low-grade corporate bonds have not 
significantly outperformed high-grade corporate bonds over the sample period. This 
supports the Cornell and Green [1991] and Blume et al. [1991] overall conclusion. 
Second, low-grade corporate bonds are more equity-like than high-grade corporate 
bonds. Finally, high-grade corporate bonds are more risk-free bond-like (i.e., Treasury 
bond-like) than low-grade corporate bonds. Again, these last two results only confirm
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the view of risky debt as a hybrid of equity and pure debt, and that the more risky the 
debt (i.e., the deeper the embedded put is in-the-money), the more equity-like and less 
risk-free bond-like it is.
4.1 Call Periods
If low-grade corporate bonds have had significantly less interest rate call protection 
and/or a higher call rate than high-grade corporate bonds, there should be a significant 
decline in the sensitivity of low-grade corporate bond returns to risk-free bond returns 
during periods when the interest rate call option should be exercised (i.e., during 
periods of declining interest rates). This assertion can be tested by examining the 
behavior of low-grade corporate bond returns relative to high-grade corporate bond 
returns during periods of declining interest rates. Specifically, if there is a significant 
difference, the sensitivity of low-grade corporate bond returns to risk-free bond 
returns would significantly decline during periods of declining interest rates. The 
following table presents the return and standard deviations (among other descriptive 
statistics) associated with periods where the government 10 year constant maturity 
Treasury bond experienced a decline in yield.
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Table 7
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Low-Grade 
Corporate Bond Funds, High-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, 
and Equities: Only for Months when Interest Rates Declined (Call Months)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% o f assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
A month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero.
Low-Grade High-Grade Treasury S&P 500 LGC - HGC
1960:01 to 1994:09 Corporate Corporate Bonds Spread
Observations =191
Moments of the Distribution:
1st - Mean 1.7903% 1.5653% 2.1932% 1.9489% 0.2250%
2nd - Standard Deviation 2.1921% 1.6886% 2.7153% 3.9086% 1.8568%
3rd - Skewness 0.5869 1.3695 1.3683 0.3503 0.1516
4th - Kurtosis 3.1489 4.5735 4.2406 1.3189 2.5923
Minimum -6.1500% -3.6600% -3.9100% -11.3860% -6.9300%
Maximum 10.9500% 9.4350% 15.2400% 16.3050% 6.3790%
Tests of Normality#: 
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 11.2871 12.8110 11.1631 6.8909 1.6748
Prob>T 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0956
W: Normal 0.9533 0.9011 0.9261 0.9843 0.9595
Prob<W 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.6373 0.0003
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean 
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Although low-grade corporate bonds were more volatile than high-grade corporate 
bonds during periods of declining interest rates, low-grade corporate bonds were not 
significantly more volatile (i.e., at the 10% level of significance). For months when 
interest rates were declining, the ratio of low-grade to high-grade corporate bond 
standard deviation is approximately 1.30 versus 1.35 for all months. It seems it would 
not be correct to state that the greater relative number of calls and/or weaker call 
protection afforded low-grade corporate bonds relative to high-grade corporate bonds 
is the cause of their lower volatility. Over the study period, low-grade corporate bonds 
have been only slightly less sensitive to declining interest rates than high-grade 
corporate bonds.
In order to further test this contention, the following regression models were run to 
test for the significance of call periods on the returns of high-grade and low-grade 
corporate bonds.
(4) LGR, = a 0 + Pj x TBR, + p2 x SMR, + P3 x TBR, x DIR, + P4 x SMR, x DIR, + P5 x DIR, + e,
(5) HGR, = a 0 + P, x TBR, + P2 x SMR, + P3 x TBR, x DIR, + P4 x SMR, x DIR, + p5 x DIR, + e,
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(6) LGR, -  HGR, = a 0 + P, x TBR, + P2 x SMR, + P3 x TBR, x DIR, + P4 x SMR, x DIR, + P5 x DIR, + e, 
where DIR = a dummy variable equal to one if interest rates decline and zero 
otherwise. The call dummy variable is intended to isolate the effect of periods when 
calls are more frequent and more probable.
Table 8
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Low- 
Grade and High-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Call Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in corporate 
bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
These regression results compare the effect of periods of declining interest rates. A month is defined as 
a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the ten year constant 
maturity Treasury bond is less than zero.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
1960:01 to 1994:09 4/5/6 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept m/o 0.0012 0.0009 0.0002 0.0028* 0.0018* 0.0009
(1.055) (1.376) (0.215) (2.369) (2.491) (0.823)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0121 0.0009 0.0112
(0.378) (0.043) (0.360)
TBR +/+/- 0.2343** 0.4624** -0.2281** 0.3028** 0.4839** -0.1812**
(5.081) (16.294) (-5.110) (6.400) (16.279) (-3.928)
TBR (Lead 1) 0.1081** 0.0768** 0.0312
(3.875) (4.385) (1.148)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0346 0.0155 0.0191
(1.812) (1.290) (1.026)
SMR +/+/+ 0.3506** 0.0402** 0.3105** 0.3393** 0.0391* 0.3002**
(14.009) (2.607) (12.812) (13.678) (2.509) (12.409)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0634** -0.0170 0.0805**
(3.341) (-1.427) (4.346)
TBR x DIR m/o -0.0478 -0.0212 -0.0267 -0.0673 -0.0252 -0.0421
(-0.750) (-0.539) (-0.432) (-1.080) (-0.644) (-0.693)
SMR x DIR m/o -0.0426 0.0334 -0.0760* -0.0126 0.0401 -0.0527
(-1.076) (1.371) (-1.983) (-0.324) (1.642) (-1.391)
DIR ?/m 0.0066** 0.0036** 0.0030 -0.0007 0.0003 -0.0010
(3.570) (3.147) (1.687) (-0.351) (0.267) (-0.532)
Adj. R 2 0.579 0.710 0.375 0.605 0.716 0.404
F-Statistic 115.563** 204.885** 50.989** 71.504** 117.031** 32.222**
Dependent Mean 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.001
Root MSE 0.016 0.010 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.015
DW Statistic 1.697 2.014 1.711 1.701 2.001 1.723
Observations 417 417 417 415 415 415
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 9
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Low-Grade 
and High-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Call Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
These regression results compare the effect o f periods of declining interest rates. A month is defined as 
a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the ten year constant 
maturity Treasury bond is less than zero.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
1960:01 to 1994:09 4/5/6 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0012 0.0010 0.0002 0.0012 0.0010 0.0001
( 1.022) (1.648) (0.128) (1.017) (1.649) (0.119)
TBR +/+/- 0.2183** 0.4579** -0.2292** 0.2167** 0.4577** -0.2293**
(4.887) (16.910) (-5.339) (4.869) (16.885) (-5.357)
SMR +/+/+ 0.3402** 0.0387** 0.2952** 0.3390** 0.0387** 0.2939**
(13.718) (2.613) (12.496) (13.637) (2.608) (12.387)
TBR x DIR ?/?/0 -0.0364 -0.0205 -0.0209 -0.0353 -0.0202 -0.0206
(-0.578) (-0.563) (-0.349) (-0.561) (-0.551) (-0.344)
SMR x DIR 7/7/0 -0.0523 0.0287 -0.0849* -0.0532 0.0284 -0.0854*
(-1.367) (1.246) (-2.337) (-1.395) (1.224) (-2.355)
DIR ?/?/? 0.0069** 0.0036** 0.0034 0.0069** 0.0036** 0.0035*
(3.768) (3.259) (1.960) (3.786) (3.264) (1.986)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1489**
(-3.050)
-0.1351**
(-2.777)
-0.1668**
(-3.408)
-0.1491**
(-3.066)
Lag 7 0.1309**
(2.719)
0.1319**
(2.720)
Lag 10 0.1195*
(2.481)
0.1233*
(2.536)
Lag 11 -0.1503**
(-3.121)
-0.1249*
(-2.566)
-0.1497**
(-3.090)
-0.1316**
(-2.684)
Total R2 0.595 0.730 0.407 0.595 0.730 0.408
Regression R2 0.572 0.719 0.373 0.570 0.720 0.372
Root MSE 0.016 0.009 0.015 0.016 0.009 0.015
DW Statistic 1.985 1.962 2.007
Observations 417 417 417 417 417 417
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Again, the estimated intercept can be interpreted as the amount of abnormal return 
attributed to the dependent return series after adjusting for the various movements of 
the independent variables. In this case, the results indicate that after controlling for 
periods of declining interest rates, there is no significant difference in the return 
performance of the two asset classes.
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Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between low-grade 
and high-grade corporate bond returns to Treasury bond market returns during call 
periods, there is reason to reject the hypothesis that low-grade corporate bonds have 
significantly weaker and/or less interest rate call protection than high-grade corporate 
bonds. If high-grade corporate bonds were significantly more sensitive to interest rate 
movements due to better call protection relative to low-grade corporate bonds, then it 
would be expected that the estimated coefficient p3 would be significantly greater 
than the same coefficient for the low-grade corporate bond regression. The fact that 
this is not the case casts doubt on the contention of the significant difference between 
the number of calls and/or the call protection associated with the respective asset 
classes.
Regarding the issue of the risky debt model which explains call period behavior more 
accurately, the overall results of the above regressions tend to support those models 
with a strong credit spread effect. Although, these results do not strongly support the 
strong credit spread effect risky debt models over more traditional risky debt models. 
In the return spread regressions for all but the Dimson regression, the estimated 
coefficient p4 is significant at the 5% level of significance. Clearly, this would not be 
expected under risky debt valuation models which do not incorporate interest rate risk.
4.2 Put Periods
Regarding low-grade corporate bond puts or defaults, if there was a significant affect 
of the exercise and/or increase in the probability of exercise of low-grade corporate 
bond puts relative to high-grade corporate bond puts it will become significant during 
periods when the economy is performing poorly. If low-grade corporate bonds are 
significantly more exposed to business cycle risk during recessions, low-grade 
corporate bond returns should be more sensitive to equity market movements during 
periods when more defaults would be expected to occur. Therefore, traditional risky 
debt valuation models would hypothesize that during recessionary periods low-grade 
corporate bond returns will be significantly more affected by movements in the equity 
market than at other times, whereas risky debt valuation models which incorporate 
interest rate risk may not agree with that hypothesis (i.e., especially if interest rates 
tend to decline during recessions and pr v is assumed negative).
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Table 10
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Low-Grade 
Corporate Bond Funds, High-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, 
and Equities: Recession Months Only (Put Months)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
A recession is defined as the period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of 
the subsequent trough. This definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
definition.
1960:01 to 1994:09
Low-Grade
Corporate
High-Grade
Corporate
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500 LGC - HGC 
Spread
Observations = 67 
Moments o f the Distribution: 
1st - Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
0.7084%
3.8812%
0.4227
-0.1842
-6.5820%
10.9500%
1.0493%
2.8403%
0.8258
0.7361
-3.4100%
9.4350%
1.2955%
4.0544%
0.9409
2.2162
-7.1400%
15.2400%
0.4051%
5.7530%
0.1383
-0.0123
-11.9330%
16.3050%
-0.3410%
2.3322%
0.0286
0.4429
-5.7590%
6.3790%
Tests of Normality#: 
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 1.494 3.0239 2.6154 0.5764 -1.1965
Prob>T 0.1400 0.0036 0.0110 0.5663 0.2358
W: Normal 0.9688 0.9361 0.9492 0.9795 0.9875
Prob<W 0.2321 0.0026 0.0182 0.6243 0.9219
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean 
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Although low-grade corporate bonds were more volatile than high-grade corporate 
bonds during recesssionary periods, low-grade corporate bonds were not significantly 
more volatile. For recession months, the ratio of low-grade to high-grade corporate 
bond standard deviation is approximately 1.37 versus 1.35 for all months. Like 
interest rate calls, defaults alone cannot explain the volatility differential between 
high-grade and low-grade corporate bonds. Over the period analyzed, low-grade 
corporate bonds have been only slightly more sensitive to recessionary periods than 
high-grade corporate bonds.
It is interesting to note how equity-like low-grade corporate bonds seem to be during 
recessions. Conversely, it is interesting to note how Treasury bond-like high-grade 
corporate bonds seem to be during recessions. Low-grade corporate bonds and 
equities are the only asset classes to have negative kurtosis during recessions. At the 
10% level of significance, neither low-grade corporate bonds or equities have a 
positive mean return during recessions, while high-grade corporate bonds and
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Treasury bonds do. The Shapiro-Wilk statistic indicates that the recession return series 
for both low-grade corporate bonds and equities is a random sample drawn from a 
normal distribution, while the recession return series for both high-grade corporate 
bonds and Treasury bonds are not. Clearly, based on descriptive statistics, and relative 
to high-grade corporate bonds, low-grade corporate bonds are more equity-like than 
Treasury bond-like during recessionary periods.
In order to test the recession put hypothesis, the following regression models were run 
to test for the impact of put periods on the returns of high-grade and low-grade 
corporate bonds.
(7 ) LGR, = a 0 + pi x TBR, + P2 x SMR, + p6 x TBR, x Rec, + p7 x SMR, x Rec, + P8 x Rec, + e,
(8) HGR, = a 0 + Pi x TBR, + p2 x SMR, + p6 x TBR, x Rec, + P7 x SMR, x Rec, + P8 x Rec, + e,
(9) LGR, -  HGR, =a0 + P, x TBR, +P2 xSMR, +P6 x TBR, xRec, +P7 xSMR, xRec, +P8 xRec, +e, 
where Rec = a dummy variable equal to one if the economy is in a recession and zero 
otherwise. The put dummy variable is intended to isolate the effect of recessionary 
periods when puts are more frequent and/or more probable for low-grade corporate 
bonds. These regression models are based on the models used by Cornell and Green 
[1991, p. 43-45]5.
5 Note, the time period examined in this study is 1960 through 1988 not 1960 through 1989 as in the 
Cornell and Green study.
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Table 11
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Low- 
Grade and High-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Put Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in corporate 
bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
These regression results compare the effect of recessionary periods. A recession is defined as the 
period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. This 
definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (7) (8) (9) (7) (8) (9)
1960:01 to 1994:09 7/8/9 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept m/o 0.0039** 0.0024** 0.0015 0.0030** 0 .0021** 0.0008
(4.680) (4.676) (1.841) (3.502) (3.994) (0.981)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0062 0.0050 0.0012
(0.232) (0.295) (0.045)
TBR +/+/- 0.1770** 0.4573** -0.2803** 0.1832** 0.4558** -0.2726**
(5.376) (22.555) (-8.713) (5.747) (22.555) (-8.655)
TBR (Lead 1) 0.0982** 0.0653** 0.0329
(3.599) (3.776) (1.219)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0205 0.0084 0.0122
(1.107) (0.712) (0.664)
SMR +/+/+ 0.3183** 0.0325* 0.2858** 0.3187** 0.0327* 0.2860**
(14.470) (2.398) (13.294) (14.926) (2.413) (13.557)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0600** -0.0183 0.0783**
(3.240) (-1.563) (4.282)
TBR x Rec m/o 0.2470** 0.0593 0.1877** 0.2587** 0.0510 0.2076**
(3.993) (1.555) (3.106) (4.267) (1.328) (3.466)
SMR x Rec ?/?/+ 0.0619 0.0955** -0.0336 0.0154 0.0831** -0.0677
(1.442) (3.609) (-0.799) (0.367) (3.119) (-1.630)
Rec ?/?/? -0.0039 0.0009 -0.0048* -0.0052* 0.0005 -0.0057**
(-1.804) (0.642) (-2.250) (-2.456) (0.341) (-2.705)
Adj. R 2 0.592 0.719 0.383 0.626 0.727 0.421
F-Statistic 121.925** 213.654** 52.700** 78.133** 123.255** 34.496**
Dependent Mean 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.001
Root MSE 0.015 0.010 0.015 0.015 0.009 0.015
DW Statistic 1.698 2.027 1.686 1.689 2.020 1.680
Observations 417 417 417 415 415 415
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 12
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Low-Grade 
and High-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Put Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
These regression results compare the effect of recessionary periods. A recession is defined as the 
period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. This 
definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (7) (8) (9) (7) (8) (9)
1960:01 to 1994:09 7/S/9 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0041** 0.0025** 0.0016 0.0041** 0.0025** 0.0016
(4.182) (4.916) (1.470) (4.102) (4.920) (1.414)
TBR +/+/- 0.1591** 0.4563** -0.2876** 0.1569** 0.4564** -0.2887**
(4.944) (23.666) (-9.239) (4.892) (23.625) (-9.308)
SMR +/+/+ 0.3085** 0.0281* 0.2681** 0.3073** 0.0280* 0.2663**
(14.393) (2.172) (13.036) (14.376) (2.137) (12.966)
TBR x Rec 7/7/0 0.2633** 0.0561 0.2292** 0.2652** 0.0559 0.2338**
(4.373) (1.573) (3.982) (4.419) (1.558) (4.077)
SMR x Rec ?/?/+ 0.0511 0.0915** -0.0471 0.0497 0.0915** -0.0491
(1.213) (3.647) (-1.166) (1.181) (3.627) (-1.221)
Rec ?/?/? -0.0037 0.0009 -0.0048* -0.0036 0.0009 -0.0048*
(-1.526) (0.740) (-2.094) (-1.480) (0.738) (-2.036)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1495** -0.1472** -0.1692** -0.1691**
(-3.062) (-3.034) (-3.460) (-3.483)
Lag 7 0.0963* 0.1006*
(2 .002) (2.077)
Lag 10 0.1406** 0.1421**
(2.914) (2.904)
Lag 11 -0.1331** -0.1340** -0.1336** -0.1434**
(-2.766) (-2.762) (-2.759) (-2.926)
Lag 12 -0.0978* -0.1009*
(-2.027) (-2.075)
Total R2 0.607 0.739 0.420 0.608 0.739 0.420
Regression R2 0.585 0.731 0.385 0.584 0.731 0.384
Root MSE 0.015 0.009 0.015 0.015 0.009 0.015
DW Statistic 2.003 1.973 2.010
Observations 417 417 417 417 417 417
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
The estimated intercept for the return spread regressions does not suggest that, after 
adjusting for the various movements of the independent variables, low-grade 
corporate bonds have returned significantly more than high-grade corporate bonds. In
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this case, the results indicate that after controlling for recessionary periods, there is no 
significant difference in the return performance of the two asset classes. Also, note 
that all four regressions generally assign the same sign and level of significance to 
each comparable estimated coefficient.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between low-grade 
and high-grade corporate bond returns to Treasury market returns during put periods, 
there is reason to reject the risky debt valuation models which do not allow for a credit 
spread effect. That is, risky debt valuation models which do not incorporate interest 
rate risk cannot explain why more risky debt would become more sensitive to interest 
rate movements during recessions. In this case, the estimated coefficient P6 is positive 
and significant at the 1% level of significance (i.e., for the return spread regression).
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between low-grade 
and high-grade corporate bond returns to equity market returns during put periods, 
there is reason to reject risky debt valuation models which do not allow for a credit 
spread effect. If low-grade corporate bonds were significantly more sensitive to equity 
market movements during recessions, due to their puts moving deeper into-the-money 
relative to high-grade corporate bonds, then it would be expected that the estimated 
coefficient P7 would be significantly greater than the same coefficient for the high- 
grade corporate bond regression. Although not significantly lower (i.e., the estimated 
P7 coefficients for the model 9 regressions are negative), the fact that this is not the 
case casts doubt on risky debt valuation models which cannot explain this result.
Regarding the issue of the risky debt model which explains put period behavior more 
accurately, the overall results of the above regressions support those models with a 
strong credit spread effect. Overall, the results strongly suggest that during periods 
when low-grade corporate bonds would be expected to show a great deal more 
sensitivity to equity prices relative to high-grade corporate bonds, they do not. This 
implies that high-grade corporate bonds behave more like equities during business 
cycle contractions than during business cycle expansions. In addition, the results 
indicate that low-grade corporate bonds act significantly more like government bonds 
during recessions while high-grade bonds act less like government bonds. During 
recessions, the two asset classes seem to partially reverse their roles. Low-grade 
corporate bonds become less equity-like and more Treasury bond-like, while high- 
grade corporate bonds become more equity-like and less Treasury bond-like.
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4.3 Combination Call and Put Periods
Regarding the increased probability of low-grade corporate bond puts and low-grade 
and high-grade corporate bond interest rate calls, if there was a significant affect of 
the exercise and/or increase in the probability of exercise of the options of low-grade 
corporate bonds relative to high-grade corporate bonds it should show up during 
periods when the economy is performing poorly and interest rates are declining. 
Therefore, at least relative to high-grade corporate bonds, this thesis hypothesizes that 
during combination recession and declining interest rate periods, low-grade corporate 
bond returns will be significantly more sensitive to Treasury bond market movements 
and less sensitive to movements in the equity market than at other times. Essentially, 
this will be the strongest test to evaluate the appropriateness of risky debt valuation 
models which incorporate interest rate risk relative to those which do not.
Table 13
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Low-Grade 
Corporate Bond Funds, High-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, 
and Equities: Only for Months when Interest Rates Declined & Recession (Call
& Put Months)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
A month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero. A recession is defined as the period 
immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. This 
definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
Low-Grade High-Grade Treasury S&P 500 LGC - HGC
1960:01 to 1994:09 Corporate Corporate Bonds Spread
Observations = 35
Moments o f the Distribution:
1st - Mean 2.4290% 2.4959% 3.6568% 2.4843% -0.0670%
2nd - Standard Deviation 3.4140% 2.7212% 3.7289% 4.8937% 2.0065%
3rd - Skewness 0.3837 0.7915 1.4786 0.5480 0.5357
4th - Kurtosis 0.2654 0.5842 2.7307 0.7661 2.6048
Minimum -4.2660% -2.8500% -1.0900% -6.0550% -5.2610%
Maximum 10.9500% 9.4350% 15.2400% 16.3050% 6.3790%
Tests o f Normality#:
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 4.2093 5.4262 5.8017 3.0033 -0.1972
Prob>T 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0050 0.8448
W: Normal 0.9719 0.9329 0.8765 0.9635 0.9536
Prob<W 0.5792 0.0427 0.0007 0.3604 0.1881
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean 
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
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Low-grade corporate bonds were more volatile than high-grade corporate bonds 
during periods of recession and declining interest rates, but not significantly so.
During combination recession and declining interest rate months, the ratio of low- 
grade to high-grade corporate bond standard deviation is approximately 1.25 versus 
1.35 for all months. During months when it is expected that puts and interest rate calls 
on low-grade corporate bonds will be exercised more frequently than those for high- 
grade corporate bonds, there is some decline in volatility for low-grade corporate bond 
returns versus that of high-grade corporate bonds, but that difference is not significant.
In order to test the recession put and declining interest rate call hypothesis, the 
following regression models were run to test for the significance of combination put 
and interest rate call periods on the returns of high-grade and low-grade corporate 
bonds:
( 1 0 )  LGR, = a 0 + P1 x TBR, + P 2 xSMR, + P 9 x TBR, xR ec, x DIR, + P10 xSMR, xR ec, x DIR,+ Pu x Rec, x DIR, +e,
( 1 1 )  HGR, =  a 0 + P, x TBR, + P 2 x SMR, + p 9 x TBR, x Rec, x DIR, + p 10 x SMR, x Rec, x DIR, + p ,, x Rec, x DIR, +e,
( 1 2 )  LGR, -  HGR, = a 0 + P, x TBR, +P2 xSMR, +P9 x TBR, xRec, xDIR, + p 10 xSMR, x Rec, x DIR, + pn xRec, x DIR, +e,
These regressions are intended to capture the relative effect of the combination of puts 
and interest rate calls for low-grade and high-grade corporate bonds. The coefficient 
p9 will isolate the effect that changes in government bond prices have on changes in 
low-grade and high-grade corporate bond prices during periods of recession and 
declining interest rates. The coefficient P10 will isolate the effect changes in equity 
prices have on changes in low-grade and high-grade corporate bond prices during 
periods of recession and declining interest rates.
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Table 14
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Low- 
Grade and High-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Call & Put Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in corporate 
bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
These regression results compare the effects of recessionary and declining interest rate periods. A 
month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero; and a recession is defined as the period 
immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. The 
recession period is definition directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model ( 10) (11) (12) ( 10) ( 11) (12)
1960:01 to 1994:09 10/ 11/12 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0031** 0.0023** 0.0009 0 .0022** 0 .0020** 0.0002
(3.859) (4.646) ( 1.112) (2.709) (4.059) (0.219)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0080 0.0004 0.0076
(0.291) (0.025) (0.281)
TBR +/+/- 0.2025** 0.4648** -0.2623** 0.2289** 0.4630** -0.2341**
(6.361) (24.279) (-8.613) (7.550) (24.853) (-7.862)
TBR (Lead 1) 0.0955** 0.0613** 0.0342
(3.414) (3.565) (1.246)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0312 0.0066 0.0246
(1.665) (0.573) (1.338)
SMR +/+/+ 0.3452** 0.0403** 0.3049** 0.3283** 0.0370** 0.2912**
(17.015) (3.299) (15.705) (16.461) (3.022) (14.872)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0610** -0.0180 0.0790**
(3.262) (-1.569) (4.304)
TBR x DIR x Rec 7/7/0 0.2628** 0.0357 0.2271** 0.2018** 0.0568 0.1450
(3.186) (0.719) (2.877) (2.594) (1.188) (1.898)
SMR x DIR x Rec ?/?/+ -0.0291 0.1694** -0.1985** 0.0333 0.1517** -0.1184*
(-0.473) (4.586) (-3.377) (0.574) (4.249) (-2.074)
DIR x Rec ?/?/? -0.0037 -0.0008 -0.0029 -0.0025 0.0003 -0.0028
(-0.956) (-0.351) (-0.778) (-0.818) (0.172) (-0.941)
Adj. R 2 0.578 0.722 0.388 0.613 0.734 0.408
F-Statistic 114.993** 217.453** 53.708** 73.925** 128.016** 32.749**
Dependent Mean 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.001
Root MSE 0.016 0.009 0.015 0.015 0.009 0.015
DW Statistic 1.692 2.032 1.681 1.658 2.000 1.713
Observations 417 417 417 415 415 415
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 15
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Low-Grade 
and High-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Call & Put Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
These regression results compare the effects of recessionary and declining interest rate periods. A 
month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero; and a recession is defined as the period 
immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. The 
recession period is definition directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (10) (11) (12) ( 10) ( 11) (12)
1960:01 to 1994:09 10/ 11/12 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept 7/7/0 0.0032** 0.0023** 0.0009 0.0032** 0.0023** 0.0009
(3.453) (4.823) (0.874) (3.369) (4.832) (0.834)
TBR +/+/- 0.1827** 0.4600** -0.2704** 0.1794** 0.4599** -0.2719**
(5.844) (25.059) (-9.104) (5.760) (25.048) (-9.183)
SMR +1+1+ 0.3309** 0.0360** 0.2844** 0.3286** 0.0358** 0.2819**
(16.611) (3.095) (15.215) (16.507) (3.058) (15.073)
TBR x DIR x Rec 7/7/0 0.2865** 0.0533 0.2895** 0.2906** 0.0540 0.2968**
(3.509) (1.155) (3.784) (3.562) (1.169) (3.880)
SMR x DIR x Rec ?/?/+ -0.0374 0.1550** -0.2005** -0.0385 0.1550** -0.2008**
(-0.644) (4.444) (-3.675) (-0.670) (4.433) (-3.713)
DIR x Rec ?/?/? -0.0030 -0.0010 -0.0038 -0.0029 -0.0010 -0.0038
(-0.773) (-0.452) (-1.054) (-0.743) (-0.455) (-1.055)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1525**
(-3.124)
-0.1505**
(-3.107)
-0.1786**
(-3.649)
-0.1753**
(-3.609)
Lag 7 0.1164*
(2.419)
0.1206*
(2.479)
Lag 10 0.1188*
(2.467)
0.1229*
(2.532)
Lag 11 -0.1364**
(-2.836)
-0.1379**
(-2.847)
-0.1364**
(-2.813)
-0.1481**
(-3.036)
Lag 12 -0.1118*
(-2.320)
-0.1172*
(-2.409)
Total R2 0.594 0.743 0.425 0.595 0.743 0.426
Regression R2 0.571 0.734 0.390 0.569 0.734 0.390
Root MSE 0.016 0.009 0.015 0.016 0.009 0.015
DW Statistic 2.001 1.998 2.009
Observations 417 417 417 417 417 417
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
The recession effect is accentuated during periods of decreasing interest rates. That is, 
during combination business cycle contraction and declining interest rate periods
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high-grade corporate bonds act even more like equities and less like government 
bonds than during business cycle contraction periods alone (compare the model 9 and 
12 results, particularly for estimated coefficient P10). The sign and significance of the 
estimated coefficients P9 and p10 for the model 12 regressions suggests that periods of 
declining interest rates combined with recession significantly affect the return 
relationship between low-grade and high-grade corporate bonds.
The results indicate a somewhat counterintuitive result. During periods when both 
interest rate calls and puts should be exercised (i.e., the worst of both worlds) their net 
effect is reduced due to the fact that as credit quality declines (i.e., bankruptcies and 
defaults rise) it has the effect of depressing prices sufficiently as to discourage the 
exercise of the interest rate call option (i.e., moving the price down and away from the 
strike price), thus partially offsetting the potential call effect and allowing some price 
appreciation for more credit worthy bonds.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between low-grade 
and high-grade corporate bond returns to Treasury bond market returns during 
combination interest rate call and put periods, there is reason to reject risky debt 
valuation models which do not allow for a credit spread effect. That is, risky debt 
valuation models which do not incorporate interest rate risk cannot explain why more 
risky debt would become more sensitive to interest rate movements during 
combination declining interest rate and recession periods. In this case, the estimated 
coefficient P9 is positive and significant at the 1% level of significance (i.e., for all but 
the Dimson regression).
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between low-grade 
and high-grade corporate bond returns to equity market returns during combination 
interest rate call and put periods, there is additional reason to reject risky debt 
valuation models which do not allow for a credit spread effect. If low-grade corporate 
bonds were significantly more sensitive to equity market movements during 
recessions, due to their puts being more in-the-money relative to high-grade corporate 
bonds, then it would be expected that the estimated coefficient p10 would be 
significantly greater than the same coefficient for the high-grade corporate bond 
regression. The estimated p10 coefficients for the model 12 regressions are 
significantly negative in all four regressions. Thus, risky debt models which do not 
incorporate interest rate risk into the their valuation model would expect the estimated 
p10 coefficients for the model 12 regressions to have a positive sign, the fact that the
193
sign is strongly negative casts doubt on risky debt valuation models which cannot 
explain this result.
Regarding the issue of the risky debt model which explains combination interest rate 
call and put period behavior more accurately, the overall results of the above 
regressions strongly support those models with a strong credit spread effect. Overall, 
the results suggest that during periods when low-grade corporate bonds would be 
expected to show a great deal more sensitivity to equity market movements relative to 
high-grade corporate bonds and little or no change in sensitivity to government bond 
market movements, they do not. During declining interest rate and recessionary 
periods, the two asset classes seem to partially reverse their roles. Low-grade 
corporate bonds become less equity-like and significantly more Treasury bond-like, 
while high-grade corporate bonds become significantly more equity-like and less 
Treasury bond-like.
Finally, to test the extent to which effect dominates (i.e., interest rate call, put, or 
combination interest rate call and put), the following regressions were run:
(13) LGR, = a 0 +P, x TBR, +|32 x SMR, + P3 x TBR, x DIR, + p4 x SMR, x DIR, + P5 x DIR, +
P6 x TBR, x Rec, +  P7 x SMR, x Rec, + P S x Rec, + P, x TBR, x Rec, x DIR, +P ,0 x SMR, x Rec, x DIR, + P n x Rec, x DIR, +e,
(14 ) HGR, = a 0 + p, x TBR, + p2 x SMR, + p3 x TBR, x DIR, + p4 x SMR, x DIR, + P5 x DIR, +
P6 x TBR, xR ec, + P 7 xSMR, xR ec, + p s xR ec, +P9 x TBR, xR ec, xDIR, + P l0xSMR, xR ec, x DIR, +P ,, xR ec, xDIR, +e,
(15) LGR, -  HGR, = a 0 + pj x TBR, + P2 x SMR, + P3 x TBR, x DIR, + P4 x SMR, x DIR, + P5 x DIR, +
P6 x TBR, xR ec, + p 7 xSMR, x Rec, + p g xR ec, + P , x TBR, xR ec, x DIR, +P ,0 xSMR, xR ec, xDIR, + p n xR ec, xDIR, +e,
Risky debt valuation models which include interest rate risk and assume a 
significantly negative pr V would imply that p9 and p10, rather than p3, P4, p6, and P7 
should pick up the bulk of any significant changes in the sensitivities of the risky 
corporate debt return spread.
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Table 16
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Low- 
Grade and High-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Calls, Puts, and Calls & Puts
Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in corporate 
bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (13) (14) (15) (13) (14) (15)
1960:01 to 1994:09 13/14/15 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 ' 0.0012 0.0007 0.0005 0.0034** 0 .0020** 0.0014
(1.075) (0.981) (0.477) (2.882) (2.712) (1.201)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0037 -0.0022 0.0059
(0.117) (-0 .111) (0.189)
TBR +/+/- 0.1828** 0.4425** -0.2598** 0.2391** 0.4662** -0.2271**
(3.761) (14.818) (-5.407) (4.993) (15.568) (-4.803)
TBR (Lead 1) 0.1068** 0.0617** 0.0451
(3.837) (3.543) (1.642)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0184 0.0074 0.0110
(0.967) (0.624) (0.584)
SMR +/+/+ 0.3077** 0.0269 0.2808** 0.3227** 0.0154 0.3073**
(10.922) (1.552) (10.084) (12.175) (0.931) (11.740)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0638** -0.0154 0.0792**
(3.349) (-1.296) (4.212)
TBR x DIR ?/?/ 0 -0.1721* -0.0607 -0.1113 -0.1143 -0.0374 -0.0769
(-2.354) (-1.351) (-1.541) (-1.817) (-0.951) (-1.238)
SMR x DIR ?/?/0 0.0029 -0.0035 0.0064 0.0028 0.0426 -0.0397
(0.065) (-0.127) (0.145) (0.075) (1.789) (-1.058)
DIR ?/?/? 0.0094** 0.0053** 0.0040* 0.0005 0.0003 0.0001
(4.809) (4.452) (2.097) (0.247) (0.284) (0.070)
TBR x Rec ?/?/0 0.2320 0.1047 0.1273 0.3154** 0.0559 0.2594**
(1.929) (1.416) (1.071) (3.655) (1.036) (3.045)
SMR x Rec ?/?/+ 0.1259* 0.0427 0.0832 -0.0052 0.0257 -0.0310
(2.250) (1.243) (1.504) (-0.099) (0.774) (-0.590)
Rec ?/?/? 0.0005 0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0031 0.0002 -0.0033
(0.149) (1.171) (-0.577) (-1.120) (0.130) (-1.217)
TBR x DIR x Rec ?/?/0 0.2226 0.0140 0.2086* 0.0098 0.0289 -0.0192
(1.476) (0.151) (1.399) (0 .102) (0.482) (-0 .202)
SMR x DIR x Rec ?/?/+ -0.1204 0.1436** -0.2640** 0.0417 0.1302** -0.0884
(-1.398) (2.713) (-3.101) (0.584) (2.911) (-1.253)
DIR x Rec ?/?/? -0.0117* -0.0069* -0.0048 -0.0050 -0.0012 -0.0039
(-2.278) (-2.194) (-0.941) (-1.145) (-0.430) (-0.887)
Adj. R 2 0.613 0.734 0.401 0.626 0.734 0.422
F-Statistic 60.947** 105.521** 26.348** 47.246** 77.115** 21.138**
Dependent Mean 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.001
Root MSE 0.015 0.009 0.015 0.015 0.009 0.015
DW Statistic 1.690 2.080 1.661 1.687 2.031 1.694
Observations 417 417 417 415 415 415
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 17
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Low-Grade 
and High-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Calls, Puts, and Calls & Puts
Regressions
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (13) (14) (15) (13) (14) (15)
1960:01 to 1994:09 13/14/15 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0013 0.0008 0.0004 0.0013 0.0008 0.0003
(1.029) (1.149) (0.301) (1.012) (1.150) (0.280)
TBR +/+/- 0.1751** 0.4383** -0.2573** 0.1741** 0.4379** -0.2570**
(3.801) (15.438) (-5.843) (3.792) (15.451) (-5.884)
SMR +1+1+ 0.2980** 0.0281 0.2616** 0.2969** 0.0280 0.2596**
(10.988) (1.683) (10.092) (10.959) (1.672) (10.050)
TBR x DIR ?/?/0 -0.1644* -0.0563 -0.1260 -0.1633* -0.0558 -0.1272
(-2.356) (-1.333) (-1.886) (-2.347) (-1.324) (-1.919)
SMR x DIR ?/?/0 -0.0112 -0.0173 -0.0062 -0.0125 -0.0181 -0.0070
(-0.263) (-0.659) (-0.154) (-0.296) (-0.689) (-0.174)
DIR in n 0.0093** 0.0053** 0.0050** 0.0093** 0.0053** 0.0051**
(4.948) (4.592) (2.783) (4.963) (4.602) (2.851)
TBR x Rec ?/?/o 0.2534* 0.0846 0.1492 0.2554* 0.0837 0.1505
(2.214) (1.195) (1.354) (2.236) (1.183) (1.375)
SMR x Rec ?/?/+ 0.1137* 0.0445 0.0722 0.1124* 0.0448 0.0708
(2.074) (1.340) (1.365) (2.053) (1.348) (1.340)
Rec m n 0.0011 0.0018 -0.0013 0.0012 0.0018 -0.0012
(0.334) (0.928) (-0.408) (0.353) (0.919) (-0.388)
TBR x DIR x Rec 1/1/0 0.2082 0.0361 0.2478 0.2060 0.0375 0.2524
(1.407) (0.410) (1.743) (1.389) (0.427) (1.781)
SMR x DIR x Rec !/!/+ -0.1080 0.1451** -0.2465** -0.1066 0.1456** -0.2448**
(-1.312) (2.849) (-3.096) (-1.301) (2.862) (-3.090)
DIR x Rec 1/1/1 -0.0123** -0.0060* -0.0072 -0.0124** -0.0060* -0.0074
(-2.603) (-2.038) (-1.600) (-2.632) (-2.035) (-1.663)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1480**
(3.022)
-0.1666**
(-3.442)
-0.1667**
(-3.387)
-0.1868**
(-3.865)
Lag 8 0.1056*
(2.184)
0.1171*
(2.402)
Lag 10 0.1492**
(3.057)
0.1574**
(3.171)
Lag 11 -0.1093* -0.1168* -0.1493** -0.1180* -0.1171* -0.1639**
(-2.231) (-2.396) (-3.087) (-2.349) (-2.381) (-3.334)
Lag 12 -0.0987*
(-2.023)
-0.1063*
(-2.154)
Total R 2 0.638 0.755 0.458 0.638 0.755 0.459
Regression R 2 0.614 0.750 0.414 0.613 0.751 0.415
Root MSE 0.015 0.009 0.014 0.015 0.009 0.014
DW Statistic 2.004 2.054 2.012
Observations 417 417 417 417 417 417
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Except for the Dimson regression, the return spread regression results support the 
hypothesis that it is the combination of interest rate call and put periods which 
principally cause more risky corporate bonds to become significantly less sensitive to 
equity market movements than more credit worthy corporate bonds (i.e., regression 
model 15, estimated coefficient p10). Therefore, these final regressions would also 
strongly support risky debt valuation models which incorporate both interest rate risk 
and a significantly negative pr V.
5 Summary and Conclusions
Regarding the overall performance of low-grade corporate bonds, the results presented 
here do not significantly differ from those of Cornell and Green [1991] and Blume et 
al. [1991]. By essentially extending the Cornell and Green sample by 4 and 3/4 years 
there is no significant difference in the overall financial performance of low-grade 
corporate bonds relative to high-grade corporate bonds. After controlling for 
government bond and equity market movements, low-grade corporate bonds do not 
significantly outperform high-grade corporate bonds. Regarding the hypothesis that 
low-grade corporate bonds have significantly weaker interest rate call protection 
and/or relatively more interest rate calls, the tests performed in this chapter do not 
support such an assertion.
During periods of declining interest rates, recession, or combination declining interest 
rate and recession low-grade corporate bonds do not demonstrate significantly 
different volatility compared to high-grade corporate bonds. Although, periods of 
declining interest rates significantly affect the relative sensitivity of low-grade and 
high-grade corporate bonds to movements in the government bond market. Also, 
periods of recession significantly affect the relative sensitivity of low-grade and high- 
grade corporate bonds to movements in the equity market. Finally, periods of 
declining interest rates combined with recession significantly affect the relative 
sensitivity of low-grade and high-grade corporate bonds to movements in the both the 
government bond and equity markets.
The following table provides a summary of the tests conducted.
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Table 18
A Comparison of Expectations and Outcomes for Low-Grade versus High-Grade
Corporate Bonds
Simple CCA & Credit Spread Effect Expectations
Expectation Expectation
for Sensitivity to for Sensitivity to
Treasury Bonds Stocks
Period under Study (est. P 3, P6, P 9) (est. P4, P7, P10)
Interest Rate Call Periods (i.e., declining interest rates) 0/0 or + 0/0 or -
Put Periods (i.e., recession) - or 0/0 or + +/0 or -
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods) - or 0/+ + /-
Realization for Low-Grade vs. High-Grade Bonds
(cut-off at the 5% level of significance) Sensitivity to Sensitivity to
1960:01 through 1994:09 Treasury Bonds Stocks
Interest Rate Call Periods (i.e., declining interest rates) 0 -
Put Periods (i.e., recession) + 0
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods) + -
During periods of declining interest rates, low-grade corporate bonds become less 
equity-like compared to high-grade corporate bonds. During business cycle 
contractions, low-grade corporate bonds become more government bond-like 
compared to high-grade corporate bonds. During combination periods, both effects 
occur. These results support risky debt valuation models which incorporate interest 
rate risk and a significantly negative correlation between changes in interest rates and 
changes in firm value. If interest rate risk and a significantly negative value for pr V 
were not of importance in valuing risky corporate bonds, the overall results should 
have been about the opposite of those found.
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CHAPTER 7
THE EFFECT OF EMBEDDED OPTIONS ON THE FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE OF LOW-GRADE MUNICIPAL BONDS
1 Introduction
The primary objectives of this chapter are the following: (1) begin empirical literature 
on low-grade municipal bond financial performance, and (2) provide evidence to 
support more complex CCA models of risky bond pricing. As in Chapter 6, the 
analytic approach used in this chapter is to examine the performance of low-grade 
bond returns relative to high-grade bond returns within the context of the principal 
options embedded in them. In the case of low-grade municipal bonds, analysis will 
focus on interest rate call and put periods. As shown in Chapter 6, the primary 
objectives of this chapter are a by-product of the approach and method employed. In 
addition, given that low-grade municipal bonds possess the same principal embedded 
options as low-grade corporate bonds, the structure and content of this chapter is 
similar to Chapter 6.
Given the size of the U.S. tax-exempt bond market, there is surprising little research 
in this area of finance. As of 1993, one estimate of the overall size of the municipal 
bond market was $1.2 trillion.1 At a minimum, this chapter is intended to provide a 
basis for future research on the relative performance of low-grade and high-grade 
municipal bonds.2 Figure 1 provides a visual backdrop for the remainder of the 
introduction.
1 Taken from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (tax-exempt liabilities and assets 
outstanding).
2 In addition to the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and 
Guam issue municipal bonds which are often held by national municipal bond funds.
1 9 9
Figure 1
Return and Standard Deviation for Tax-Exempt Asset Classes (01/78 through
09/94)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings. Insured 
municipal bond funds invest at least 65% of assets in insured municipal bond issues. Intermediate 
municipal bond funds invest in municipal bond issues with weighted average maturities of between 5 
and 10 years. Short municipal bond funds invest in municipal bond issues with weighted maturities of 
less than 5 years. The return and standard deviation values are annualized.
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Given standard quadratic utility, and assuming that risk and return are best described 
by historic standard deviation of return and mean return, low-grade municipal bonds 
have appeared to dominate high-grade municipal bonds. From 01/78 through 09/94 
low-grade municipal bonds have had a higher return at a lower level of risk, as 
measured by standard deviation, than high-grade municipal bonds. Also, it is trivial to 
show that linear combinations of short maturity municipal bonds and low-grade 
municipal bonds dominate intermediate and insured municipal bonds. The apparent 
anomalous relationship between low-grade and high-grade municipal bonds is one of 
the issues addressed by this chapter. Although, an equality of means t-test between the 
two asset class return series is not significant, are risk adjusted low-grade municipal 
bond returns greater than high-grade municipal bond returns?
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This chapter examines the return experience of low-grade and high-grade municipal 
bond funds over a long period (i.e., 1/78 through 9/94) in order to begin compiling 
evidence on the financial performance of low-grade municipal bonds, and to generally 
extend low-grade corporate bond analysis to the municipal market. Although not 
statistically significant, low-grade municipal bonds have generated a higher return at a 
lower standard deviation of return over the period examined.
Table 1
Mean Monthly Return and Standard Deviation for the Low-Grade and High- 
Grade Municipal Bond Asset Classes (1/78 through 9/94)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
Low-Grade High-Grade 
1978:01 to 1994:09 Municipal Municipal
Observations = 201
Mean 0.6268% 0.5989%
Standard Deviation__________ 2.2625% 2.4037%
In a weak sense the original "Drexel hypothesis" seems to hold for the two municipal 
bond asset classes. In addition to the possible outperformance of low-grade municipal 
bonds relative to high-grade municipal bonds, as mentioned in Chapter 5, there are 
several other seemingly anomalous low-grade corporate bond findings extended to 
municipal bonds which are addressed by this chapter. Specifically, the following 
issues are addressed: (1) do low-grade municipal bonds as an asset class show 
evidence of possessing a higher proportion of calls and/or weaker call protection than 
high-grade municipal bonds; and (2) do low-grade municipal bonds as an asset class 
demonstrate a return generation process which would suggest that changes in risk-free 
interest rates and/or the economy account for a significant amount of the relative 
return variation in the low-grade municipal market overall?
This chapter makes the following contributions: (1) establishes the existence of the 
low-grade municipal bond asset class; (2) analyzes and extends the low-grade/high- 
grade corporate bond effect (see Kihn [1994]) to municipal bonds; (3) analyzes the 
abnormality of the returns for low-grade municipal bonds; and (4) generally extends 
research on tax-exempt securities. The remainder of this chapter is divided into five 
sections. Section 2 presents background on the data and provides summary statistics. 
Section 3 reviews the expectations/hypotheses developed in Chapter 5 which are of
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relevance to low-grade municipal bonds. Section 4 presents the low-grade and high- 
grade municipal bond regression results. Section 5 examines the possible effects the 
January effect and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 might have had on low-grade 
municipal bond financial performance. The conclusions are summarized in the last 
section.
2 Data and Summary Statistics
This preliminary investigation of relative risk in municipal and corporate bonds 
reveals that in at least two respects they are remarkably similar. First, the 
measured variances of return for portfolios of comparably rated bonds are 
virtually identical. Second, the covariances of comparably rated bond portfolios 
with an index of common stock returns are very close to one another.
Skelton [1983, p. 633]
The municipal bond and corporate bond data set is derived from open-end mutual 
funds tracked by Momingstar during the period from January 1978 through 
September 1994. January 1978 is the first date that low-grade municipal bond funds 
were listed by the Momingstar database. The Treasury bond series is a spliced series 
based on the Cornell and Green [1991] Treasury bond series (01/78 through 12/88) 
and Salomon Brothers' long bond series (01/89 through 09/94). The stock series is 
derived from the Standard and Poor's 500 return index ("S&P 500"). Therefore, unlike 
the return series derived from mutual fund returns, the equity and Treasury bond 
series are gross returns.
Like the Cornell and Green [1991] study on low-grade corporate bonds, this chapter 
uses monthly open-end mutual fund data to derive asset class return series. Lipper 
Analytical Services asset class definitions are used for all asset class return series 
reported. Shares of open-end mutual funds are traded on the basis of NAV. Monthly 
returns are based on the following calculation:
Re turn( = [{NA Vt -  NA Vt_x) + IncDistt + CapGainDist( ] / NA V/_1.3 In addition, these 
returns take account of 12b-l fees and management fees but not front-end loads, back­
end loads, or redemption charges.
3 As a general rule, for municipal bonds, income distributions are tax-exempt while capital gains 
distributions are taxable. Given that, like corporate bonds, low-grade municipal bonds have a higher 
incidence of capital loses (e.g., defaults), after tax high-grade municipal bond returns would be 
expected to be overestimated relative to after tax low-grade municipal bond returns.
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Each mutual fund based asset class return series was constructed following the 
method used by Cornell and Green [1991]. For each asset class, the equally weighted 
average of all mutual funds each month was calculated. The following were the 
number of funds as of month-end September 1994 for each asset class series derived 
from Momingstar data: 101 low-grade corporate bond funds, 149 high-grade 
corporate bond funds, 34 low-grade municipal bond funds, 180 high-grade municipal 
bond funds, 43 insured municipal bond funds, 82 intermediate maturity municipal 
bond funds, and 35 short maturity municipal funds. Table 2 provides background on 
the comparable corporate bond asset class return series used in this chapter; and Table 
3 provides background on the principal asset class return series used in this chapter.
Table 2
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Low-Grade 
Corporate Bond Funds and High-Grade Corporate Bond Funds
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% o f assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 
80% of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
Low-Grade High-Grade
1978:01 to 1994:09 Corporate Corporate
Observations = 201
Moments o f the Distribution:
1st - Mean 0.8399% 0.7262%
2nd - Standard Deviation 2.2726% 1.7076%
3rd - Skewness 0.3475 0.8190
4th - Kurtosis 3.1486 4.0368
Minimum -6.5360% -4.1570%
Maximum 10.9500% 9.4353%
Tests of Normality#:
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 5.2399 6.0297
Prob>T 0.0001 0.0001
W: Normal 0.9560 0.9589
Prob<W 0.0001 0.0001
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean 
is zero. The second test o f normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
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Table 3
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Low-Grade 
Municipal Bond Funds, High-Grade Municipal Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds,
and Equities
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
1978:01 to 1994:09
Low-Grade
Municipal
High-Grade
Municipal
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500
Observations = 201 
Moments o f the Distribution: 
1st - Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
0.6268%
2.2625%
-0.6664
3.6491
-8.6000%
9.1330%
0.5989%
2.4037%
-0.4478
2.3130
-7.9250%
8.2930%
0.8042%
3.6029%
0.5662
1.5742
-8.4600%
15.2400%
0.8891%
4.4117%
-0.7540
4.6516
-23.9440%
13.1770%
Tests of Normality#: 
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 3.9276 3.5325 3.1647 2.8572
Prob>T 0.0001 0.0005 0.0018 0.0047
W: Normal 0.9280 0.9502 0.9753 0.9694
Prob<W 0.0001 0.0001 0.1033 0.0150
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean 
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Over the study period (i.e., 01/78 through 09/94), low-grade corporate bonds have had 
higher returns at a higher level of risk, as measured by standard deviation, than high- 
grade corporate bonds. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the relatively recent increase in the 
volatility of low-grade corporate bonds relative to high-grade corporate bonds is due 
to the volatility from 1988 through the early 1990's. Overall, the two corporate bond 
asset classes display similar profiles over the 01/78 through 09/94 and 01/60 through 
09/94 periods.
Over the study period, low-grade municipal bonds have had higher returns at a 
slightly lower level of risk, as measured by standard deviation, than high-grade 
municipal bonds. Unlike the two comparable corporate bond series, the two municipal 
bond series are slightly negatively skewed. This negative skewness tends to be more 
associated with equity returns than bond returns. Also, unlike the two comparable 
corporate bond series, the two municipal bonds return distributions show the opposite 
"peakedness" for their respective return distributions. That is, the low-grade corporate 
bond distribution of returns is less kurtotic than the high-grade corporate bond 
distribution of returns (i.e., it has a more platykurtic distribution), while the opposite
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is true of the two municipal bond distributions of returns. Overall, the equity return 
series has the highest mean, the highest standard deviation, is the most negatively 
skewed, and the most platykurtic.
The tests for normality suggest that, at standard levels of statistical significance, only 
the Treasury bond return series is drawn from a random sample from a normal 
distribution (i.e., the Shapiro-Wilk test).4 All five other asset class return series reject 
the null hypothesis that the mean of each respective distribution is equal to zero (i.e., 
at the 5% level of significance). At normal levels of statistical significance, all the 
asset class return series presented have means which are significantly positive. Again, 
five of the six return series reject the null hypothesis that the values are drawn from a 
random sample from a normal distribution.
Tables 4 and 5 provide correlations and autocorrelations for the asset class return 
series used in this chapter.
Table 4
Tests for Autocorrelation and Correlation Coefficients for the Returns of Low- 
Grade Corporate Bond Funds, High-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury
Bonds, and Equities
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 
80% of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher.
Low-Grade High-Grade Treasury 
1978:01 to 1994:09 Corporate Corporate Bonds
Autocorrelation at Lag 1 0.314** 0.215** 0.081
Test for White Noise#:
12 lags____________________35.86** 31.62** 15.31
Correlation with
High-Grade Corporate 0.742**
Treasury Bonds 0.634** 0.934**
S&P 500___________________ 0.524** 0.366** 0.377**
# This is an autocorrelation check for white noise. The null hypothesis is that the autocorrelations sum 
to zero. The test statistic is at the 12th lag (i.e., one year). Therefore, the null hypothesis for the 12th
A  A  A  A
_  il2 2 rv 2
lag is: 7 x /  ,t  x rk — 0, where rk is the product moment correlation between et and et_k (k = 1, 2 ,
 , 12). If the null hypothesis is true, the statistic is distributed as a chi-square with 12 degrees of
freedom. If the statistic is not statistically significant, the null hypothesis can be accepted.
* denotes significance at the 5% level of significance, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level of 
significance.
S&P 500 
- 0.010 
14.23
4 Equities may have rejected the normal distribution null hypothesis due to their general run-up during 
most of the 1980s and early 1990s.
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Over the shorter study period, both the low-grade and high-grade corporate bond 
return series show evidence of autocorrelation. This autocorrelation has been 
interpreted as evidence of nontrading (see Cornell and Green [1991, p. 37-39]). 
Regarding correlations between the taxable asset classes, low-grade corporate bond 
returns are slightly less positively correlated with equity returns than Treasury bond 
returns. Whereas high-grade corporate bond returns are significantly more positively 
correlated with Treasury bond returns than equity returns. Clearly, relative to high- 
grade corporate bonds, low-grade corporate bonds have been more exposed to the 
risks associated with equities than Treasury bonds.
Table 5
Tests for Autocorrelation and Correlation Coefficients for the Returns of Low- 
Grade Municipal Bond Funds, High-Grade Municipal Bond Funds, Treasury
Bonds, and Equities
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
1978:01 to 1994:09
Low-Grade
Municipal
High-Grade
Municipal
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500
Autocorrelation at Lag 1 
Test for White Noise#: 
12 lags
0.159*
36.00**
0.116*
34.86**
0.081
15.31
-0.010
14.23
Correlation with 
High-Grade Municipal 
Treasury Bonds 
S&P 500
0.978**
0.737**
0.413**
0.772**
0.420** 0.377**
# This is an autocorrelation check for white noise. The null hypothesis is that the autocorrelations sum 
to zero. The test statistic is at the 12th lag (i.e., one year). Therefore, the null hypothesis for the 12th
A  A  A  AZ 2 2rk =  0 , where rk is the product moment correlation between et and et_k (k = 1, 2 ,
 , 12). If the null hypothesis is true, the statistic is distributed as a chi-square with 12 degrees of
freedom. If the statistic is not statistically significant, the null hypothesis can be accepted.
* denotes significance at the 5% level of significance, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level of 
significance.
At normal levels of statistical significance, both municipal bond asset classes show 
evidence of autocorrelation. Although, the first order autocorrelation associated with 
low-grade and high-grade corporate bonds is significantly higher than that associated 
with low-grade and high-grade municipal bonds. If first order autocorrelation is 
evidence of nontrading, the two municipal bond asset classes show evidence of 
dramatically lower levels of nontrading than their corporate bond counterparts over 
the same sample period. In addition, adjusting for municipal bond nontrading does not
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significantly decrease autocorrelation in the regressions run (see Appendix 1). 
Regarding the correlations between the municipal bond asset classes and Treasury 
bonds and equities, the municipal asset classes seem to be very similar.
As with Chapter 6, several sets of regression results will be presented in order to 
correct for possible nontrading and/or serial correlation of the error term. Again, as 
with the Chapter 6 results, the results do not substantially differ regardless of the 
correction method employed.
3 Risky Municipal Bond Expectations and Tests
We have also carried out tests for other business cycle effects on municipal risk 
structure, but obtained no significant results. This should not be surprising since 
municipal bonds, like utility bonds already discussed, should not be appreciably 
affected by normal business cycle fluctuations.
Jaffee [1975, p. 318]
Based on the discussion in Chapter 5, there can be very different expectations for the 
changing sensitivities of more risky debt (i.e., low-grade municipal bonds) relative to 
less risky debt (i.e., high-grade municipal bonds) during periods when their principal 
embedded options would be expected to move deeper in-the-money. For example, 
risky debt valuation models which do not incorporate interest rate risk find that the 
behavior of low-grade corporate bond returns during recessionary periods seems 
anomalous; whereas risky debt valuation models which incorporate interest rate risk 
may be able to explain the behavior of low-grade corporate bond returns during 
recessionary periods (i.e., assuming pr V is significantly negative). Given that, from 
the perspective of CCA, low-grade municipal bonds can be generally viewed as a tax- 
exempt version of low-grade corporate bonds, the empirical analysis applied to low- 
grade corporate bonds will be extended to low-grade municipal bonds.
Before proceeding, regarding corporate and municipal bond defaults and recoveries, 
some comments should be made. Defaults and exchanges are events indicating that 
the firm's or municipal authority's management have exercised the put option equity 
holders received from bondholders when the bonds were issued. All corporate bonds 
and municipal bonds are exposed to default risk. Although, for municipal bonds, 
revenue bonds have a much higher incidence of defaults than general obligation bonds
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(e.g., see Heide et al. [1994, p. 496]5). Therefore, it is important to note that it seems 
that overall municipal bonds have tended to have lower historic default rates than 
corporate bonds. Historically, revenue bond default reduces prices by more than 50% 
(e.g., see Cirillo and Jessop [1993]) which is comparable to the figure for corporate 
bond default (e.g., see Altman [1992]).
The following table summarizes the difference in expectations for what is termed 
CCA "assuming no credit spread effect" and CCA "assuming a strong credit spread 
effect". These expectations mirror those derived for risky corporate bonds. The first 
set of expectations are traditional CCA expectations which do not incorporate interest 
rate risk, whereas the latter case incorporates interest rate risk and assumes that pr v is 
significantly negative. Of course, if pr v is zero or close to zero, the two should not 
differ substantially.
Table 6
Expectations for Periods under Study
Simple CCA Expectations
Period under Study
Expectation 
for Sensitivity to 
Treasury Bonds
Expectation 
for Sensitivity to 
Stocks
Assuming no Credit Spread Effect:
Interest Rate Call Periods 0 0
Put Periods - or 0 +
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods) - or 0 +
Assuming a Strong Credit Spread Effect:
Interest Rate Call Periods 0 or + Oor-
Put Periods 0 or + 0 or-
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods) + -
The null hypotheses which follow are based on CCA risky debt valuation models 
which do not incorporate interest rate risk. Therefore, during interest rate call periods 
(i.e., periods of declining interest rates) the relative sensitivity of low-grade municipal 
bond returns to Treasury bond and equity returns would not be expected to change. 
Hence,
H0: during periods when interest rates are declining, low-grade municipal bonds 
should not become relatively more or less sensitive to Treasury bond and equity 
market movements.
5 Historically, revenue bonds have been at least ten times more likely to default than general obligation 
bonds (also, see Cirillo and Jessop [1993]).
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During put periods (i.e., recessionary periods) the relative sensitivity of low-grade 
municipal bond returns to equity returns would be expected to increase. Hence,
H0: during periods when general credit quality is declining, low-grade municipal 
bonds should become relatively more sensitive to equity market movements.
During combination interest rate call and put periods the relative sensitivity of low- 
grade municipal bond returns to equity returns would be expected to increase. Hence, 
H0: during periods when interest rates are declining and general credit quality is 
declining, low-grade municipal bonds should become relatively more sensitive to 
equity market movements (i.e., the put periods hypothesis). Essentially, put periods 
are the only periods expected to have a significant impact on the relative sensitivities 
of low-grade municipal bond returns to Treasury bond market and equity market 
returns. In addition, given that puts are of primary importance in the valuation of risky 
municipal debt, it is expected that only sensitivities to the equity market may change, 
not the Treasury bond market.
The largest contrast between the two sets of risky debt valuation models occurs during 
combination periods. Particularly clear is the opposite expectation regarding the 
relative sensitivity of low-grade municipal bond returns to equity market returns 
during combination periods. Given that the signs of the two expectations are diametric 
opposites, this is the strongest test presented. Therefore, as was the case in Chapter 6, 
the results for this particular test should be viewed with added interest.
4 Regressions Testing the Impact of Call and Put Periods
This thesis hypothesizes that periods where the volatility and sensitivity (i.e., to the 
Treasury bond and equity markets) of low-grade municipal bonds relative to high- 
grade corporate bonds is due in part to the fact that low-grade bonds are hybrid 
securities, having both risk-free bond and equity characteristics. It is a central 
argument of this thesis that one of the possible causes of the seemingly abnormal 
behavior of low-grade municipal bonds relative to high-grade municipal bonds is that 
relatively less credit worthy bonds are significantly more affected by the correlation 
between changes in the risk-free rate of interest and changes in the value of the firm 
(i.e., pr V is significantly negative) than more credit worthy bonds.
As with corporate bonds, the critical method with which to examine the return 
behavior of high-grade and low-grade municipal bonds is to isolate periods when calls
2 0 9
and puts would be expected to be exercised and/or the probability of exercise 
significantly increases. This thesis assumes that regarding embedded put options (i.e., 
defaults and outright bankruptcies) the appropriate periods to examine are 
recessionary periods, while for calls the appropriate periods to examine are those of 
declining interest rates. By examining low-grade and high-grade municipal bond 
returns during these periods, the impact that puts and calls have on the relative returns 
of the two municipal bond asset classes can be examined.
As a baseline to the regression analysis which follows, the following regression 
models were run to evaluate the sensitivity of low-grade and high-grade municipal 
bonds to Treasury bond and equity market movements:
(1) LGRt = a 0 + pj x TBRt + P2 x SMRt + et
(2) HGRt = a 0 + pj x TBRt + p2 x SMRt + et
(3) LGRt -  HGRt = a 0 + Pj x TBRt + p2 x SMRt + et
where LGR = low-grade municipal bond return, HGR = high-grade municipal bond 
return, TBR = Treasury bond return, SMR = stock market return (i.e., the return of the 
S&P 500 index), and e is the error term. This equation was designed to take account 
of Treasury bond and equity market risk via TBR and SMR.
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Table 7
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Low- 
Grade and High-Grade Municipal Bond Returns
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
1978:01 to 1994:09 1/2/3 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign# Muni Muni Spread Muni Muni Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0021 0.0014 0.0007* 0.0018 0.0011 0.0007
(1.947) (1.304) (2.065) (1.574) (1.003) (1.776)
TBR (Lag 1) -0.0358 -0.0156 -0 .0202*
(-1.142) (-0.499) (-1.992)
TBR +/+/- 0.4253** 0.4773** -0.0520** 0.4050** 0.4529** -0.0479**
(13.366) (15.033) (-5.222) (12.940) (14.531) (-4.729)
TBR (Lead 1) 0.0886** 0.0913** -0.0027
(2.808) (2.907) (-0.268)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0698** 0.0583* 0.0115
(2.725) (2.286) (1.386)
SMR +1+1+ 0.0808** 0.0819** -0.0011 0.0796** 0.0834** -0.0037
(3.108) (3.157) (-0.135) (3.119) (3.279) (-0.452)
SMR (Lead 1) -0.0711** -0.0844** 0.0133
(-2.761) (-3.290) (1.591)
Adj. R 2 0.560 0.612 0.132 0.596 0.645 0.147
F-Statistic 128.047** 158.447** 16.220** 49.683** 60.868** 6 .686**
Dependent Mean 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.000
Root MSE 0.015 0.015 0.005 0.014 0.014 0.005
DW Statistic 1.820 1.841 2.290 1.832 1.849 2.314
Observations 201 201 201 199 199 199
# expected signs are based on comparable corporate bond expectations (i.e., for the intercept, TBR 
coefficient, and SMR coefficient) and simple CCA expectations (i.e., for all other coefficient 
expectations).
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 8
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Low-Grade 
and High-Grade Municipal Bond Returns
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model 0 ) (2) (3) ( 1) (2) (3)
1978:01 to 1994:09 1/2/3 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign# Muni Muni Spread Muni Muni Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0 .0022* 0.0015 0.0007* 0 .0022* 0.0015 0.0007*
(2.166) (1.674) (2.338) (2.177) (1.682) (2.350)
TBR +/+/- 0.4312** 0.4817** -0.0551* 0.4312** 0.4818** -0.0552**
(15.217) (15.782) (-5.726) (15.200) (15.793) (-5.691)
SMR +1+1+ 0.0688** 0.0684** 0.0024 0.0685** 0.0682** 0.0026
(2.930) (2.713) (0.302) (2.911) (2.702) (0.320)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 0.1453* 0.1522*
(2.061) (2.138)
Lag 2 0.2486** 0.2194** 0.2533** 0.2241**
(3.682) (3.156) (3.765) (3.226)
Lag 7 0.1410* 0.1391*
(2.089) (2.054)
Lag 10 -0.1551* -0.1557*
(-2.242) (-2.240)
Lag 12 -0.2304** -0.2271**
(-3.315) (-3.243)
Total R2 0.622 0.635 0.160 0.622 0.635 0.160
Regression R2 0.626 0.632 0.157 0.626 0.632 0.157
Root MSE 0.014 0.015 0.005 0.014 0.015 0.005
DW Statistic 1.697 1.770 2.001
Observations 201 201 201 201 201 201
# expected signs are based on comparable corporate bond expectations (i.e., for the intercept, TBR 
coefficient, and SMR coefficient) and simple CCA expectations (i.e., for all other coefficient 
expectations).
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
The return spread results are of critical importance, and at a general level there is 
something surprising. Namely, the estimated intercept for the return spread 
regressions is significantly positive (i.e., at the 5% level for all but the Dimson 
regression). This suggests that, after controlling for Treasury bond and equity market 
risk, low-grade municipal bonds have outperformed high-grade municipal bonds over 
the study period. Second, low-grade municipal bonds are not significantly more 
equity-like than high-grade municipal bonds. This is a somewhat surprising result, but
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given that municipal bonds are not in general as equity-like as corporate bonds it is 
not completely unexpected. Clearly, low-grade municipal bonds may be exposed to 
additional risk(s) that go beyond corporate equity risk. But given that municipalities 
do not issue equity, it may be difficult to empirically control for municipal equity risk. 
Finally, high-grade municipal bonds are more risk-free bond-like (i.e., Treasury bond­
like) than low-grade municipal bonds.
4.1 Call Periods
If low-grade municipal bonds have had significantly less interest rate call protection 
and/or a higher call rate than high-grade municipal bonds, there should be a 
significant decline in the sensitivity of low-grade municipal bond returns to risk-free 
bond returns during periods when the interest rate call option should be exercised (i.e., 
during periods of declining interest rates). This assertion can be tested by examining 
the behavior of low-grade municipal bond returns relative to high-grade municipal 
bond returns during periods of declining interest rates. Specifically, if there is a 
significant difference, the sensitivity of low-grade municipal bond returns to Treasury 
bond market movements would significantly decrease during periods of declining 
interest rates. The following table presents the return and standard deviations (among 
other descriptive statistics) associated with periods where the government 10 year 
constant maturity Treasury bond experienced a decline in yield.
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Table 9
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Low-Grade 
Municipal Bond Funds, High-Grade Municipal Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, 
and Equities: Only for Months when Interest Rates Declined (Call Months)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
A month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero.
1978:01 to 1994:09
Low-Grade
Municipal
High-Grade
Municipal
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500 LGM - HGM 
Spread
Observations = 99 
Moments of the Distribution: 
1 st - Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
1.7284%
1.7177%
1.1169
3.4628
-3.1250%
9.1330%
1.8465%
1.8358%
0.8025
2.3656
-3.5000%
8.2930%
2.7394%
3.2342%
1.1259
2.8317
-3.9100%
15.2400%
2.1337%
3.9549%
0.3981
0.1939
-6.0550%
13.1770%
-0.1180%
0.4555%
-0.6125
2.7905
-1.9700%
1.1170%
Tests of Normality#: 
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 10.0118 10.0078 8.4278 5.3681 -2.5801
Prob>T 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0114
W: Normal 0.9361 0.9489 0.9380 0.9728 0.9627
Prob<W 0.0001 0.0022 0.0002 0.2167 0.0389
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean 
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Although low-grade municipal bonds were less volatile than high-grade municipal 
bonds during periods of declining interest rates, low-grade municipal bonds were not 
significantly less volatile. For months when interest rates were declining, the ratio of 
low-grade to high-grade municipal bond standard deviation is approximately 0.94 
versus 0.94 for all months.6 It seems it would not be correct to state that the greater 
relative number of calls and/or weaker call protection afforded low-grade municipal 
bonds relative to high-grade municipal bonds is the cause of their lower volatility. 
Over the study period, low-grade municipal bonds have not been more or less 
sensitive to declining interest rates than high-grade municipal bonds.
6 It should be noted that, due to the tax treatment of discount municipal bonds, there is increased 
volatility associated with discount municipal bonds (e.g., see Mailman [1981], Leibowitz [1981], and 
Arak and Silver [1984]). This should have little or no impact on the results over the full period, but 
may produce extra volatility during periods following a general deline in municipal bond market 
values.
In order to further test this contention, the following regression models were run to 
test for the significance of call periods on the returns of high-grade and low-grade 
municipal bonds.
(4) LGR, = a 0 + (3j x TBRt + P2 x SMR, + p3 x TBR, x DIR, + P4 x SMR, x DIR, + P5 x DIR, + e,
(5) HGR, = a 0 + Pj x TBR, + p2 x SMR, + p3 x TBR, x DIR, + P4 x SMR, x DIR, + p5 x DIR, + e,
(6) LGR, -  HGR, = a 0 + Pj x TBR, + P2 x SMR, + p3 x TBR, x DIR, + P4 x SMR, x DIR, + P5 x DIR, + e, 
where DIR = a dummy variable equal to one if interest rates decline and zero 
otherwise. The call dummy variable is intended to isolate the effect of periods when 
calls are more frequent and more probable.
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Table 10
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Low- 
Grade and High-Grade Municipal Bond Returns - Call Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
These regression results compare the effect of periods of declining interest rates. A month is defined as 
a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the ten year constant 
maturity Treasury bond is less than zero.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
1978:01 to 1994:09 4/5/6 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Muni Muni Spread Muni Muni Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0009 -0.0002 0 .0011* 0.0021 0.0009 0 .0012*
(0.570) (-0 .120) (2.217) (1.314) (0.572) (2.334)
TBR (Lag 1) -0.0236 -0.0044 -0.0192
(-0.762) (-0.141) (-1.950)
TBR +/+/- 0.4544** 0.5197** -0.0653** 0.4678** 0.5258** -0.0580**
(8.905) (10.204) (-4.108) (9.103) (10.275) (-3.544)
TBR (Lead 1) 0.0864* 0.0799* 0.0065
(2.417) (2.245) (0.568)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0571* 0.0486 0.0085
(2.228) (1.903) (1.045)
SMR +1+1+ 0.1325** 0.1107** 0.0218* 0.1295** 0.1117** 0.0178
(4.063) (3.403) (2.144) (3.978) (3.447) (1.712)
SMR (Lead 1) -0.0698** -0.0811** 0.0113
(-2.751) (-3.209) (1.394)
TBR x DIR ?/?/0 -0.0894 -0.1419* 0.0525* -0.1094 -0.1602* 0.0508*
(-1.255) (-1.996) (2.364) (-1.558) (-2.292) (2.272)
SMR x DIR ?/?/0 -0.1338* -0.0763 -0.0575** -0.1136* -0.0601 -0.0535**
(-2.567) (-1.466) (-3.545) (-2.196) (-1.166) (-3.247)
DIR m n 0.0064* 0.0076** -0.0011 0.0028 0.0045 -0.0017
(2.589) (3.050) (-1.460) (1.008) (1.601) (-1.840)
Adj. R2 0.585 0.634 0.190 0.611 0.658 0.206
F-Statistic 57.382** 70.223** 10.356** 35.568** 43.324** 6.691**
Dependent Mean 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.000
Root MSE 0.015 0.015 0.005 0.014 0.014 0.005
DW Statistic 1.796 1.887 2.206 1.828 1.911 2.277
Observations 201 201 201 199 199 199
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 11
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Low-Grade 
and High-Grade Municipal Bond Returns - Call Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
These regression results compare the effect o f periods of declining interest rates. A month is defined as 
a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the ten year constant 
maturity Treasury bond is less than zero.
YW YW OLS ML ML OLS
Model (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
1978:01 to 1994:09 4/5/6 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Muni Muni Spread Muni Muni Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0009 0.0001 0 .0011* 0.0009 0.0001 0 .0011*
(0.638) (0.053) (2.217) (0.648) (0.064) (2.217)
TBR +/+/- 0.4777** 0.5425** -0.0653** 0.4787** 0.5437** -0.0653**
( 10.112) (11.130) (-4.108) (10.086) ( 11.122) (-4.108)
SMR +1+1+ 0.1155** 0.0873** 0.0218* 0.1148** 0.0859** 0.0218*
(3.662) (2.698) (2.144) (3.633) (2.645) (2.144)
TBR x DIR ?/?/0 -0.1114 -0.1736* 0.0525* -0.1129 -0.1754** 0.0525*
(-1.700) (-2.595) (2.364) (-1.705) (-2.619) (2.364)
SMR x DIR 7/7/0 -0.1094* -0.0484 -0.0575** -0.1085* -0.0468 -0.0575**
(-2.236) (-0.962) (-3.545) (-2.217) (-0.926) (-3.545)
DIR 7/7/7 0.0064** 0.0073** -0.0011 0.0064** 0.0073** -0.0011
(2.854) (3.166) (-1.460) (2.856) (3.169) (-1.460)
AR Parameters:
Lag 2 0.2575**
(3.744)
0.2320**
(3.322)
0.2675**
(3.885)
0.2460**
(3.497)
Lag 12 -0.1759*
(-2.558)
-0.1762*
(-2.527)
Total R2 0.634 0.664 0.210 0.635 0.664 0.210
Regression R2 0.639 0.662 0.210 0.640 0.663 0.210
Root MSE 0.014 0.014 0.005 0.014 0.014 0.005
DW Statistic 2.206 1.722 1.876 2.206
Observations 201 201 201 201 201 201
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
The estimated intercept term can be interpreted as the amount of abnormal return 
attributed to the dependent return series after adjusting for the various movements of 
the independent variables. In this case, the results indicate that after controlling for 
periods of declining interest rates, there is a significant difference in the return 
performance of the two asset classes. Therefore, after controlling for Treasury bond 
and equity market risk, low-grade municipal bonds outperformed high-grade 
municipal bonds during periods when interest rates are stable and/or increasing.
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Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between low-grade 
and high-grade municipal bond returns to Treasury bond market returns during call 
periods, there is reason to reject the hypothesis that low-grade municipal bonds have 
significantly weaker and/or less interest rate call protection than high-grade municipal 
bonds. If high-grade municipal bonds were significantly more sensitive to interest rate 
movements due to greater call protection relative to low-grade municipal bonds, then 
it would be expected that the estimated coefficient p3 would be significantly greater 
than the same coefficient for the low-grade municipal bond regression. The fact that 
the reverse of this is true casts doubt on the contention of the significant difference 
between the number of calls and/or the call protection associated with the respective 
asset classes. If there is a difference regarding asset class interest rate call protection, 
it is against high-grade municipal bonds not low-grade municipal bonds. The 
regressions show that high-grade municipal bonds become significantly less 
government bond-like while low-grade municipal bonds become significantly less 
equity-like during interest rate call periods.
Regarding the issue of the risky debt model which explains interest rate call period 
behavior more accurately, the overall results of the above regressions tend to support 
those models with a strong credit spread effect. These results strongly support the 
strong credit spread effect risky debt models over more traditional risky debt models. 
In all the return spread regressions the estimated coefficient p4 is negative and 
significant at the 1% level of significance. In addition, in all the return spread 
regressions the estimated coefficient p3 is positive and significant at the 5% level of 
significance. Clearly, these results would not be expected under risky debt valuation 
models which do not incorporate interest rate risk.
4.2 Put Periods
Regarding low-grade municipal bond puts or defaults, if there was a significant affect 
of the exercise and/or increase in the probability of exercise of low-grade municipal 
bond puts relative to high-grade municipal bond puts it will become significant during 
periods when the economy is performing poorly. If low-grade municipal bonds are 
significantly more exposed to business cycle risk during recessions, low-grade 
municipal bond returns should be more sensitive to equity market movements during 
periods when more defaults would be expected to occur. Therefore, traditional risky 
debt valuation models would hypothesize that during recessionary periods low-grade
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municipal bond returns will be significantly more affected by movements in the 
equity market than at other times, whereas risky debt valuation models which 
incorporate interest rate risk may not agree with that hypothesis (i.e., especially if 
interest rates tend to decline during recessions and pr y is assumed significantly 
negative).
Table 12
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Low-Grade 
Municipal Bond Funds, High-Grade Municipal Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, 
and Equities: Recession Months Only (Put Months)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
A recession is defined as the period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of 
the subsequent trough. This definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
definition.
1978:01 to 1994:09
Low-Grade
Municipal
High-Grade
Municipal
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500 LGM - HGM 
Spread
Observations = 30 
Moments of the Distribution: 
1st - Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
0.8174%
4.1374%
-0.5202
0.3945
-8.6000%
9.1330%
0.9228%
4.2296%
-0.3783
-0.0987
-7.9250%
8.2930%
1.9743%
5.2237%
0.6705
0.7658
-7.1400%
15.2400%
0.7209%
5.4695%
-0.0854
-0.3900
-10.1790%
11.5980%
-0.1050%
0.8236%
-0.6970
0.6618
-2 .2000%
1.2880%
Tests o f Normality#: 
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 1.0821 1.1950 2.0701 0.7219 -0.7014
Prob>T 0.2881 0.2418 0.0475 0.4761 0.4887
W: Normal 0.9463 0.9588 0.9572 0.9744 0.9583
Prob<W 0.1578 0.3304 0.3015 0.7042 0.3199
# The first test o f normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean 
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Although low-grade municipal bonds were less volatile than high-grade municipal 
bonds during recesssionary periods, low-grade municipal bonds were not significantly 
less volatile. For recession months, the ratio of low-grade to high-grade municipal 
bond standard deviation is approximately 0.98 versus 0.94 for all months. Like 
interest rate calls, defaults alone cannot explain the volatility differential between 
high-grade and low-grade municipal bonds. Over the period analyzed, low-grade 
municipal bonds have been only slightly less sensitive to recessionary periods than 
high-grade corporate bonds.
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It is interesting to note how during recessions all four asset classes have similar 
normality test results. At the 5% level of significance, only Treasury bonds have a 
mean return greater than zero. The Shapiro-Wilk statistic indicates that the recession 
return series for all four asset classes is a random sample drawn from a normal 
distribution.
In order to test the recession put hypothesis, the following regression models were run 
to test for the impact of put periods on the returns of high-grade and low-grade 
municipal bonds.
(7) LGR, -  a 0 + Pj x TBR, + p2 x SMR, + p6 x TBR, x Rec, + p7 x SMR, x Rec, + p8 x Rec, + e,
(8) HGR, = a 0 + p, x TBR, + p2 x SMR, + P6 x TBR, x Rec, + P7 x SMR, x Rec, + P8 x Rec, + e,
(9) LGR, -  HGR, = a 0 + P, x TBR, +p2 xSMR, +P6 x TBR, xRec, +P7 xSMR, xRec, +P8 xRec, +e, 
where Rec = a dummy variable equal to one if the economy is in a recession and zero 
otherwise. The put dummy variable is intended to isolate the effect of recessionary 
periods when puts are more frequent and/or more probable for low-grade municipal 
bonds.
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Table 13
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Low- 
Grade and High-Grade Municipal Bond Returns - Put Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
These regression results compare the effect of recessionary periods. A recession is defined as the 
period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. This 
definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (7) (8) (9) (7) (8) (9)
1978:01 to 1994:09 7/8/9 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Muni Muni Spread Muni Muni Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0031** 0.0023* 0.0009* 0.0028* 0.0021 0.0007
(2.762) (1.982) (2.341) (2.407) (1.770) (1.867)
TBR (Lag 1) -0.0255 -0.0060 -0.0195
(-0.827) (-0.194) (-1.874)
TBR +/+/- 0.3477** 0.4048** -0.0571** 0.3383** 0.3922** -0.0539**
(9.547) (11.043) (-4.791) (9.521) (10.995) (-4.494)
TBR (Lead 1) 0.0929** 0.0943** -0.0014
(2.987) (3.022) (-0.136)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0546* 0.0443 0.0104
(2.184) (1.764) (1.227)
SMR +/+/+ 0.0784** 0.0799** -0.0015 0.0823** 0.0842** -0.0019
(2.824) (2.861) (-0.169) (3.021) (3.079) (-0.206)
SMR (Lead 1) -0.0675** -0.0813** 0.0138
(-2.706) (-3.247) (1.639)
TBR x Rec 7/7/0 0.2829** 0.2604** 0.0225 0.2591** 0.2331** 0.0260
(4.025) (3.681) (0.977) (3.765) (3.374) (1.120)
SMR x Rec ?/?/+ -0.0254 -0.0228 -0.0027 -0.0521 -0.0385 -0.0137
(-0.399) (-0.355) (-0.127) (-0.816) (-0.600) (-0.634)
Rec ?/?/? -0.0078* -0.0066* -0.0012 -0.0081** -0.0073* -0.0008
(-2.561) (-2.149) (-1.215) (-2 .688) (-2.402) (-0.818)
Adj. R 2 0.596 0.637 0.128 0.625 0.665 0.141
F-Statistic 59.965** 71.251** 6.848** 37.647** 44.629** 4.597**
Dependent Mean 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.000
Root MSE 0.014 0.014 0.005 0.014 0.014 0.005
DW Statistic 1.751 1.776 2.305 1.783 1.802 2.319
Observations 201 201 201 199 199 199
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 14
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Low-Grade 
and High-Grade Municipal Bond Returns - Put Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
These regression results compare the effect of recessionary periods. A recession is defined as the 
period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. This 
definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (7) (8) (9) (7) (8) (9)
1978:01 to 1994:09 7/8/9 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Muni Muni Spread Muni Muni Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0028* 0.0021 0.0009** 0.0028* 0.0020 0.0009**
(2.535) (1.864) (2.711) (2.530) (1.866) (2.729)
TBR +1+1- 0.3627** 0.4179** -0.0599** 0.3634** 0.4188** -0.0600**
(10.714) (11.908) (-5.170) (10.683) (11.829) (-5.185)
SMR +1+1+ 0.0710** 0.0705* 0.0008 0.0705** 0.0697* 0.0009
(2.712) (2.594) (0.089) (2.695) (2.564) (0.103)
TBR x Rec ?/?/0 0.2618** 0.2382** 0.0210 0.2602** 0.2360** 0.0209
(3.914) (3.436) (0.924) (3.830) (3.342) (0.913)
SMR x Rec ?/?/+ 0.0069 0.0049 0.0026 0.0084 0.0065 0.0029
(0.118) (0.082) (0.129) (0.144) (0.107) (0.141)
Rec ?/?/? -0.0062* -0.0054* -0.0013 -0.0061* -0.0053 -0.0013
(-2.400) (-1.998) (-1.413) (-2.366) (-1.967) (-1.422)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 0.1527*
(2.152)
0.1612*
(2.228)
Lag 2 0.1665*
(2.398)
0.1508*
(2.140)
0.1770*
(2.521)
0.1621*
(2.264)
Lag 12 -0.2294**
(-3.304)
-0.1647*
(-2.336)
-0.2391**
(-3.381)
-0.1711*
(-2.374)
Total R2 0.638 0.664 0.170 0.639 0.664 0.171
Regression R2 0.646 0.668 0.168 0.648 0.669 0.169
Root MSE 0.014 0.014 0.005 0.014 0.014 0.005
DW Statistic 1.698 1.766 2.008
Observations 201 201 201 201 201 201
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Except for the Dimson regression, the estimated intercept for the return spread 
regressions does suggest that, after adjusting for the various movements of the 
independent variables, low-grade municipal bonds have returned significantly more 
than high-grade municipal bonds. In this case, the results indicate that after 
controlling for recessionary periods, there is a significant difference in the return 
performance of the two asset classes. Also, note that all four regressions generally
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assign the same sign and level of significance to each comparable estimated 
coefficient.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between low-grade 
and high-grade municipal bond returns to Treasury bond market returns during put 
periods, there is no strong reason to reject risky debt valuation models which do not 
allow for a credit spread effect. That is, risky debt valuation models which do not 
incorporate interest rate risk cannot explain why more risky debt would become more 
sensitive to interest rate movements during recessions, but the regressions run do not 
provide strong evidence of this. In this case, the estimated coefficient p6 is 
approximately zero. Actually both asset classes became significantly more 
government bond-like, but this effect is approximately the same for each asset class.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between low-grade 
and high-grade municipal bond returns to equity market returns during put periods, 
there is a weak reason to reject risky debt valuation models which do not allow for a 
credit spread effect. Risky debt valuation models which do not incorporate interest 
rate risk would expect that low-grade bonds should become more sensitive to equity 
market movements during recessions. If low-grade municipal bonds were 
significantly more sensitive to equity market movements during recessions, due to 
their puts moving deeper into-the-money relative to high-grade municipal bonds, then 
it would be expected that the estimated coefficient p7 would be significantly greater 
than the same coefficient for the high-grade municipal bond regression. Although not 
significantly different, the fact that this is not the case casts doubt on the usefulness of 
risky debt valuation models which cannot explain this result.
These results are unlike the comparable results for low-grade and high-grade 
corporate bonds, where high-grade corporate bonds behave more like equities during 
business cycle contractions than during business cycle expansions. Besides being 
exposed to different kinds of equity risk, another possible explanation for the lack of a 
recession effect for low-grade and high-grade municipal bonds may be that, unlike 
corporate bonds, there is no large increase in perceived credit risk during recessionary 
periods. As some low-grade municipal bonds default, thus removing them from the 
asset class and lowering duration for the asset class, a relatively equal amount of high- 
grade municipal bonds are downgraded. During economic booms, high-grade 
municipal bonds can be upgraded, but upgrades may be a relatively direct function of 
the length and magnitude of the expansion, and downgrades are a direct function of
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the length and magnitude of the contraction. Either way, the results suggest that 
defaults do not significantly affect the two return series under study.
Regarding the issue of the risky debt model which explains put period behavior more 
accurately, the overall results of the above regressions weakly support those models 
with a credit spread effect. Overall, the results weakly suggest that during periods 
when low-grade municipal bonds would be expected to show a great deal more 
sensitivity to equity market movements relative to high-grade municipal bonds, they 
do not. Although, high-grade municipal bonds do not behave significantly more like 
equities during business cycle contractions than during business cycle expansions. In 
addition, both low-grade and high-grade municipal bonds act significantly more like 
government bonds during recessions. During recessions, the two asset classes seem to 
maintain their relative Treasury bond and equity market sensitivities.
4.3 Combination Call and Put Periods
Regarding the increased probability of low-grade municipal bond puts and low-grade 
and high-grade municipal bond interest rate calls, if there was a significant effect of 
the exercise and/or increase in the probability of exercise of the options of low-grade 
municipal bonds relative to high-grade municipal bonds it should show up during 
periods when the economy is performing poorly and interest rates are declining. 
Therefore, at least relative to high-grade municipal bonds, this thesis hypothesizes 
that during recessionary periods with decreasing interest rates, low-grade municipal 
bond returns will be significantly more affected by interest rate movements and less 
affected by movements in the equity market than at other times. Essentially, this will 
be the strongest test to evaluate the appropriateness of risky debt valuation models 
which incorporate interest rate risk relative to those which do not.
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Table 15
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Low-Grade 
Municipal Bond Funds, High-Grade Municipal Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, 
and Equities: Only for Months when Interest Rates Declined & Recession (Call 
& Put Months)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
A month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero. A recession is defined as the period 
immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. This 
definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
1978:01 to 1994:09
Low-Grade
Municipal
High-Grade
Municipal
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500 LGM - HGM 
Spread
Observations = 17 
Moments of the Distribution: 
1st - Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
2.9464%
2.6565%
0.7794
0.0918
-0.9000%
9.1330%
3.1296%
2.7685%
0.5313
-0.5323
-1.1910%
8.2930%
5.0022%
4.4116%
1.2089
1.1129
-0.0600%
15.2400%
2.8384%
4.7606%
0.0478
-0.0756
-6.0550%
11.5980%
-0.1830%
0.7868%
-0.5242
0.2891
-1.9700%
1.1170%
Tests of Normality#: 
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 4.5731 4.6609 4.6751 2.4583 -0.9605
Prob>T 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0257 0.3511
W: Normal 0.9305 0.9456 0.8813 0.9737 0.9787
Prob<W 0.2246 0.3892 0.0331 0.8545 0.9231
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Low-grade municipal bonds were slightly less volatile than high-grade municipal 
bonds during periods of recession and declining interest rates, but not significantly so. 
During recession and declining interest rate months, the ratio of low-grade to high- 
grade municipal bond standard deviation is approximately 0.96 versus 0.94 for all 
months. During months when it is expected that puts and interest rate calls on low- 
grade municipal bonds will be exercised more frequently than those for high-grade 
municipal bonds, there is some increase in volatility for low-grade municipal bond 
returns versus that of high-grade municipal bonds, but that difference is not 
significant.
In order to test the recession put and declining interest rate call hypothesis, the 
following regression models were run to test for the significance of combination put 
and interest rate call periods on the returns of high-grade and low-grade municipal 
bonds:
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(10) LGR, = a 0 + p, x TBR, + P2 xSMR, + P 9 x TBR, xR ec, x DIR, + $l0xSMR, xR ec, xDIR, + P n xR ec, xDIR, +e,
( 1 1 )  HGR, = a 0 + pi x TBR, + P 2 xSMR, + P9 x TBR, xR ec, xDIR, + P l0xSMR, xR ec, xDIR, + p n x Rec, xDIR, +e,
( 1 2 )  LGR,-HGR, = a 0 + P, x TBR, +P2 xSMR, +P9 x TBR, xRec, x DIR, +P 10xSMR, xR ec, xDIR, +P,, xRec, xDIR, +e,
These regressions are intended to capture the effect of the combination of puts and 
interest rate calls for low-grade and high-grade municipal bonds. The coefficient p9 
will isolate the effect that changes in government bond prices have on changes in low- 
grade and high-grade municipal bond prices during periods of recession and declining 
interest rates. The coefficient p10 will isolate the effect changes in equity prices have 
on changes in low-grade and high-grade municipal bond prices during periods of 
recession and declining interest rates.
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Table 16
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Low- 
Grade and High-Grade Municipal Bond Returns - Call & Put Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% o f assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
These regression results compare the effects of recessionary and declining interest rate periods. A 
month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero; and a recession is defined as the period 
immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. The 
recession period is definition directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (10) ( 11) (12) ( 10) ( 11) ( 12)
1978:01 to 1994:09 10/ 11/12 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Muni Muni Spread Muni Muni Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0017 0.0011 0.0007 0.0015 0.0009 0.0006
(1.570) (0.957) (1.961) (1.343) (0.829) (1.592)
TBR (Lag 1) -0.0304 -0.0128 -0.0176
(-0.970) (-0.407) (-1.755)
TBR +/+/- 0.3995** 0.4607** -0.0612** 0.3898** 0.4477** -0.0579**
(11.091) (12.700) (-5.497) (11.145) (12.722) (-5.182)
TBR (Lead 1) 0.0935** 0.0936** -0.0001
(2.915) (2.902) (-0.014)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0660* 0.0555* 0.0104
(2.587) (2.165) (1.281)
SMR +1+1+ 0.1004** 0.0929** 0.0075 0.1006** 0.0955** 0.0050
(3.706) (3.405) (0.895) (3.769) (3.558) (0.591)
SMR (Lead 1) -0.0696** -0.0845** 0.0149
(-2.712) (-3.273) (1.821)
TBR x DIR x Rec ?/?/0 0.1011 0.0339 0.0672* 0.0892 0.0163 0.0728*
(1.047) (0.349) (2.252) (0.954) (0.174) (2.439)
SMR x DIR x Rec ?/?/+ -0.2018* -0.1160 -0.0858** -0 .2111* -0.1260 -0.0850**
(-2.312) (-1.320) (-3.181) (-2.491) (-1.478) (-3.142)
DIR x Rec m n 0.0056 0.0061 -0.0006 0.0030 0.0039 -0.0009
(0.970) (1.065) (-0.331) (0.527) (0 .688) (-0.519)
Adj. R 2 0.568 0.612 0.169 0.603 0.644 0.185
F-Statistic 53.557** 63.996** 9.109** 34.415** 40.733** 5.999**
Dependent Mean 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.000
Root MSE 0.015 0.015 0.005 0.014 0.014 0.005
DW Statistic 1.808 1.870 2.185 1.832 1.885 2.233
Observations 201 201 201 199 199 199
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 17
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Low-Grade 
and High-Grade Municipal Bond Returns - Call & Put Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
These regression results compare the effects of recessionary and declining interest rate periods. A 
month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero; and a recession is defined as the period 
immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. The 
recession period is definition directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
YW YW OLS ML ML OLS
Model (10) ( 11) (12) ( 10) ( 11) (12)
1978:01 to 1994:09 10/ 11/12 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Muni Muni Spread Muni Muni Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0017 0.0012 0.0007 0.0018 0.0012 0.0007
(1.769) (1.291) (1.961) (1.805) (1.329) (1.961)
TBR +/+/- 0.4194** 0.4792** -0.0612** 0.4207** 0.4811** -0.0612**
(12.602) (13.848) (-5.497) (12.620) (13.877) (-5.497)
SMR +/+/+ 0.0893** 0.0789** 0.0075 0.0885** 0.0773** 0.0075
(3.487) (2.937) (0.895) (3.454) (2.875) (0.895)
TBR x DIR x Rec ?/?/0 0.0284 -0.0456 0.0672* 0.0224 -0.0542 0.0672*
(0.323) (-0.492) (2.252) (0.251) (-0.579) (2.252)
SMR x DIR x Rec ?/?/+ -0.1544* -0.0898 -0.0858** -0.1542* -0.0868 -0.0858**
(-2.029) (-1.125) (-3.181) (-2.024) (-1.093) (-3.181)
DIR x Rec ?/?/? 0.0069 0.0074 -0.0006 0.0070 0.0076 -0.0006
(1.431) (1.436) (-0.331) (1.468) (1.483) (-0.331)
AR Parameters:
Lag 2 0.2437** 0 .2101** 0.2616** 0.2350**
(3.524) (2.993) (3.699) (3.288)
Lag 12 -0.1660* -0.1643*
(-2.400) (-2.319)
Total R2 0.616 0.640 0.189 0.616 0.640 0.189
Regression R2 0.619 0.637 0.189 0.620 0.639 0.189
Root MSE 0.014 0.015 0.005 0.014 0.015 0.005
DW Statistic 2.185 1.743 1.850 2.185
Observations 201 201 201 201 201 201
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
The decreasing interest rate effect is accentuated during periods of recession. That is, 
during combination business cycle contraction and declining interest rate periods low- 
grade municipal bonds act even less like equities than during business cycle 
contraction periods alone (compare the model 9 and 12 results for the estimated 
coefficients P7 and p10, respectively). The sign and significance of the estimated 
coefficients p9 and P10 for the model 12 regressions suggests that periods of declining
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interest rates combined with recession significantly affect the return relationship 
between low-grade and high-grade municipal bonds.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between low-grade 
and high-grade municipal bond returns to Treasury bond market returns during 
combination interest rate call and put periods, there is reason to reject risky debt 
valuation models which do not allow for a credit spread effect. That is, risky debt 
valuation models which do not incorporate interest rate risk cannot explain why more 
risky debt would become more sensitive to interest rate movements during 
combination declining interest rate and recession periods. In this case, the estimated 
coefficient P9 is positive and significant at the 5% level of significance in all 
regressions.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between low-grade 
and high-grade municipal bond returns to equity market returns during combination 
interest rate call and put periods, there is additional reason to reject risky debt 
valuation models which do not allow for a credit spread effect. If low-grade municipal 
bonds were significantly more sensitive to equity market movements during 
recessions, due to their puts moving deeper into-the-money relative to high-grade 
municipal bonds, then it would be expected that the estimated coefficient P10 would 
be significantly greater than the same coefficient for the high-grade municipal bond 
regression. The estimated coefficient P10 for the model 12 regression is negative and 
significant at the 1% level in all four regressions. Thus, risky debt models which do 
not incorporate interest rate risk into the their valuation model would expect the 
estimated p10 coefficients for the model 12 regressions to have a positive sign. 
Therefore, the fact that the sign is strongly negative casts doubt on risky debt 
valuation models which cannot explain this result.
Regarding the issue of the risky debt model which explains combination interest rate 
call and put period behavior more accurately, the overall results of the above 
regressions strongly support those models with a strong credit spread effect. Overall, 
the results suggest that during periods when low-grade municipal bonds would be 
expected to show a great deal more sensitivity to equity market movements relative to 
high-grade municipal bonds and little or no change in sensitivity to government bond 
market movements, they do not. During combination declining interest rate and 
recessionary periods, the two asset classes seem to partially reverse their roles. Low- 
grade municipal bonds become less equity-like and significantly more Treasury bond­
2 2 9
like, while high-grade municipal bonds become significantly more equity-like and 
less Treasury bond-like.
Finally, to test the extent to which effect dominates (i.e., interest rate call, put, or 
combination interest rate call and put), the following regressions were run:
(13) LGR, = 0Cq + Pj x TBR, + P2 x SMR, +Pj x TBR, x DIR, + P4 x SMR, x DIR, + P5 x DIR, +
P6 x TBR, xR ec, +P 7 xSMR, xR ec, + p g xR ec, + P , x TBR, xR ec, xDIR, + p l0xSMR, xR ec, xDIR, + p „  xR ec, xDIR, +e,
(14) HGR, = a 0 +Pj xTBR, +P2 xSMR, +p3 xTBR, xDIR, +p4 xSMR, x DIR, + P5 x DIR, +
P6 x TBR, x Rec, + P 7 x SMR, x Rec, + p g x Rec, +P 9 x TBR, x Rec, x DIR, + P 10 x SMR, x Rec, x DIR, + P n x Rec, x DIR, +e,
(15 ) LGR, -  HGR, = a 0 + p, x TBR, + p2 x SMR, + P3 x TBR, x DIR, + p4 x SMR, x DIR, + p5 x DIR, +
P6 x TBR, x Rec, + P 7 x SMR, x Rec, + p g x Rec, + p 9 x TBR, x Rec, x DIR, + P 10 x SMR, x Rec, x DIR, + P U x Rec, x DIR, +e,
Risky debt valuation models which include interest rate risk and assume a 
significantly negative pr V would imply that P9 and P10, rather than P3, p4, p6, and P7, 
should pick up the bulk of any significant changes in the sensitivities of the risky 
municipal debt return spread.
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Table 18
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Low- 
Grade and High-Grade Municipal Bond Returns - Calls, Puts, and Calls & Puts 
Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (13) (14) (15) (13) (14) (15)
1978:01 to 1994:09 13/14/15 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Muni Muni Spread Muni Muni Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0014** 0.0026 0.0011 0.0015**
(0.817) (-0.117) (2.851) (1.637) (0.713) (2.738)
TBR (Lag 1) -0.0091
(-0.305)
0.0031
(0.104)
-0.0122
(-1.210)
TBR +/+/- 0.3581** 0.4156** -0.0575** 0.3742** 0.4253** -0.0511**
(6.985) (8.108) (-3.423) (7.282) (8.300) (-2.945)
TBR (Lead 1) 0.0962**
(2.772)
0.0893*
(2.581)
0.0069
(0.587)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0392
(1.612)
0.0319
(1.313)
0.0074
(0.895)
SMR +1+1+ 0.0980** 0.0875** 0.0105 0 .1000** 0.0894** 0.0106
(2.948) (2.632) (0.966) (3.039) (2.725) (0.953)
SMR (Lead 1) -0.0692**
(-2.883)
-0.0793**
(-3.315)
0.0101
(1.249)
TBR x DIR ?/?/0 -0.1014 -0.1366 0.0353 -0.1018 -0.1338 0.0319
(-1.276) (-1.720) (1.355) (-1.303) (-1.717) (1.209)
SMR x DIR ?/?/0 -0.0527 -0.0209 -0.0318 -0.0348 -0.0051 -0.0298
(-0.956) (-0.379) (-1.760) (-0.637) (-0.093) (-1.613)
DIR ?/?/? 0.0068** 0.0083** -0.0015 0.0028 0.0047 -0 .0020*
(2.737) (3.355) (-1.884) (0.980) (1.686) (-2.074)
TBR x Rec ?/?/o 0.5761** 0.6740** -0.0979* 0.5778** 0.6628** -0.0850
(4.064) (4.756) (-2.107) (4.124) (4.744) (-1.795)
SMR x Rec ?/?/+ 0.0773 0.0074 0.0699** 0.0580 0.0061 0.0519
(0.893) (0.086) (2.464) (0.657) (0.069) (1.740)
Rec ?/?/? 0.0012 0.0041 -0.0029 0.0011 0.0036 -0.0025
(0.257) (0.861) (-1.842) (0.234) (0.761) (-1.553)
TBR x DIR x Rec ?/?/o -0.3322 -0.4583** 0.1261* -0.3706* -0.4882** 0.1176*
(-1.905) (-2.629) (2.206) (-2.153) (-2.844) (2.023)
SMR x DIR x Rec ?/?/+ -0.2240 -0.0971 -0.1269** -0.2374 -0.1230 -0.1144**
(-1.821) (-0.790) (-3.149) (-1.943) (-1.009) (-2.771)
DIR x Rec ?/?/? -0.0020 -0.0051 0.0031 -0.0016 -0.0041 0.0025
(-0.269) (-0.696) (1.300) (-0.223) (-0.575) (1.038)
Adj. R 2 0.642 0.683 0.225 0.663 0.726 0.226
F-Statistic 33.572** 40.136** 6.284** 26.995** 32.247** 4.860**
Dependent Mean 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.000
Root MSE 0.014 0.014 0.004 0.013 0.013 0.004
DW Statistic 1.876 1.946 2.157 1.904 1.963 2.215
Observations 201 201 201 199 199 199
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 19
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Low-Grade 
and High-Grade Municipal Bond Returns - Calls, Puts, and Calls & Puts 
Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (13) (14) (15) (13) (14) (15)
1978:01 to 1994:09 13/14/15 Low- High- Low- High-
Explanatory Expected Grade Grade Return Grade Grade Return
Variables Sign Muni Muni Spread Muni Muni Spread
Intercept 7/7/0 0.0009 -0.0002 0.0015** 0.0009 -0.0002 0.0015**
(0.689) (-0.175) (3.228) (0 .686) (-0.182) (3.256)
TBR +1+1- 0.3808** 0.4379** -0.0551** 0.3829** 0.4408** -0.0549**
(7.883) (8.716) (-3.368) (7.911) (8.753) (-3.364)
SMR +1+1+ 0.0794* 0.0685* 0.0087 0.0774* 0.0660 0.0086
(2.420) (2.044) (0.816) (2.351) (1.955) (0.804)
TBR x DIR 7/7/0 -0.1074 -0.1444 0.0343 -0.1088 -0.1455 0.0343
(-1.451) (-1.869) (1.379) (-1.476) (-1.890) (1.381)
SMR x DIR 7/7/0 -0.0322 0.0014 -0.0315 -0.0299 0.0044 -0.0315
(-0.610) (0.027) (-1.762) (-0.565) (0.081) (-1.761)
DIR ?/?/? 0.0068** 0.0081** -0.0017* 0.0068** 0.0080** -0.0017*
(3.006) (3.381) (-2.139) (3.019) (3.379) (-2.156)
TBR x Rec 7/7/0 0.4982** 0.6330** -0.0972* 0.4909** 0.6275** -0.0971*
(3.799) (4.602) (-2.165) (3.754) (4.582) (-2.168)
SMR x Rec ?/?/+ 0.1105 0.0317 0.0735** 0.1142 0.0347 0.0738**
(1.374) (0.379) (2.626) (1.421) (0.415) (2.634)
Rec ?/?/? 0.0001 0.0049 -0.0031* -0.0000 0.0050 -0.0031*
(0.016) (1.094) (-2.048) (-0.004) (1.124) (-2.063)
TBR x DIR x Rec 7/7/0 -0.2831 -0.4564** 0.1288* -0.2779 -0.4561** 0.1290*
(-1.804) (-2.712) (2.358) (-1.788) (-2.721) (2.370)
SMR x DIR x Rec ?/?/+ -0.2347* -0.1210 -0.1274** -0.2372* -0.1239 -0.1275**
(-2 .102) (-1.040) (-3.207) (-2.116) (-1.068) (-3.212)
DIR x Rec ?/?/? 0.0013 -0.0043 0.0031 0.0016 -0.0042 0.0031
(0.205) (-0.625) (1.337) (0.245) (-0.620) (1.333)
AR Parameters:
Lag 2 0.2228**
(3.177)
0.1799*
(2.507)
0.2455**
(3.462)
0.2040**
(2.786)
Lag 7 0.1714*
(2.385)
0.1863*
(2.557)
Lag 12 -0.1922**
(-2.742)
-0.2080**
(-2.902)
Total R 2 0.693 0.711 0.292 0.694 0.711 0.292
Regression R2 0.697 0.707 0.282 0.700 0.708 0.284
Root MSE 0.013 0.013 0.004 0.013 0.013 0.004
DW Statistic 1.856 1.968 2.157
Observations 201 201 201 201 201 201
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Except for the Dimson regression, the return spread regression results support the 
hypothesis that it is the combination of interest rate call and put periods which 
principally cause more risky municipal bonds to become significantly less sensitive to 
equity market movements than more credit worthy municipal bonds (i.e., regression 
model 15, estimated coefficient p10). Therefore, these final regressions would also 
strongly favor risky debt valuation models which incorporate both interest rate risk 
and a significantly negative pr K.
5 Municipal Bonds, the January Effect, and the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986
Although not the focus of this thesis, part of the motivation behind the examination of 
low-grade and high-grade municipal bond returns is the established controversy 
surrounding the comparison of low-grade and high-grade corporate bond returns.
Some studies have supported the proposition that over long periods of time, low-grade 
corporate bonds have returned more than high-grade corporate bonds (e.g., Hickman 
[1958], and Fitzpatrick and Severiens [1978]). Other studies have suggested that there 
is no significant difference between the two corporate bond asset classes (e.g., Fraine 
and Mills [1961], Blume and Keim [1987], Weinstein [1987], Cornell and Green 
[1991], and Blume et al. [1991]). Given that this thesis finds that low-grade municipal 
bonds outperform high-grade municipal bonds, some further analysis is in order. 
Specifically, the January effect and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 will be evaluated as 
possible sources of this seeming anomaly.
In order to simplify the analysis which follows, all regression results reported in this 
section will be simple OLS. The following table provides a comparison of the two 
sets of risky bond asset classes.
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Table 20
A Comparison of Two Factor Regressions of Low-Grade and High-Grade 
Corporate Bond Returns versus Low-Grade and High-Grade Municipal Bond 
Returns
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 
80% of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at 
least 50% of assets in lower rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). 
High-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four 
credit ratings.
Models 1, 2, & 3
a 0 Pi P2
Adj.
R2 DW SEE
1978:01 to 1994:09
Corporate Bonds:
(1) Coefficient 0.004** 0.321** 0.171** 0.492 1.553 0.016
t-statistic (3.64) (9.34) (6 .11)
(2) Coefficient 0.004** 0.440** 0.006 0.872 1.807 0.006
t-statistic (8.25) (34.00) (0.56)
(3) Coefficient 0.001 I O CS * * 0.165** 0.199 1.451 0.014
t-statistic (0.63) (-4.14) (7.01)
Municipal Bonds:
(1) Coefficient 0.002 0.425** 0.081** 0.560 1.820 0.015
t-statistic (1.95) (13.37) (3.11)
(2) Coefficient 0.001 0.477** 0.082** 0.612 1.841 0.015
t-statistic (1.30) (15.03) (3.16)
(3) Coefficient 0 .001* -0.052** -0.001 0.132 2.290 0.005
t-statistic (2.06) (-5.22) (-0.14)
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Over the sample period, and after controlling for government bond and equity market 
movements, low-grade corporate bonds have returned slightly more than high-grade 
corporate bonds but not significantly more, while low-grade municipal bonds have 
returned significantly more than high-grade municipal bonds. As has been found in 
other studies (e.g., Cornell and Green [1991]), low-grade corporate bonds are 
significantly less sensitive to government bond market movements than high-grade 
corporate bonds, while low-grade corporate bonds are significantly more sensitive to 
equity market movements than high-grade corporate bonds. As noted previously, the 
same cannot be said of low-grade and high-grade municipal bonds. Although low- 
grade municipal bonds are significantly less sensitive to government bond market 
movements than high-grade municipal bonds, low-grade municipal bonds are 
approximately as sensitive to equity market movements as high-grade municipal 
bonds. Again, the whole issue of seemingly positive abnormal returns accruing to 
low-grade municipal bondholders over the study period may be the result of the
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inability to specify municipality equity risk appropriately. Other explanations may 
revolve around the nature of the municipal market itself.
In addition to the significant difference in the sensitivity of low-grade and high-grade 
corporate bonds to Treasury bond and equity market risk, it has also been found (see 
Blume et al. [1991] and Cooper and Shulman [1994]) that low-grade corporate bonds 
have a significant January effect that high-grade corporate bonds do not possess. Does 
this result extend to municipal bonds? Specifically, after controlling for Treasury 
bond and equity market movements, do any of the five different municipal bond asset 
classes show a January effect?
The following regression model was run for the two corporate bond asset classes and 
the five municipal bond asset classes:
(16) AClsRt = a 0 + pj x TBRt + P2 x SMRt + p12 x JanDV( + et , where AClsR = asset 
class return, and JanDV = a dummy variable equal to one if the month is January and 
zero otherwise.
Table 21
January Effect Regressions of Bond Asset Class Returns
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB. High-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 
80% of assets in corporate bond issues rated A or higher. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at 
least 50% of assets in lower rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). 
High-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four 
credit ratings. Insured municipal bond funds invest at least 65% of assets in insured municipal bond 
issues. Intermediate municipal bond funds invest in municipal bond issues with weighted average 
maturities of between 5 and 10 years. Short municipal bond funds invest in municipal bond issues with 
weighted maturities of less than 5 years.
Asset Class Adj.
a 0 Pi P2 Pl2 R2 DW SEE
1978:01 to 1994:09
Corporate Bonds:
(16) Low-Grade - Coefficient 0.004** 0.326** 0.166** 0.009* 0.500 1.528 0.016
t-statistic (2.93) (9.55) (5.96) (2 .10)
(16) High-Grade - Coefficient 0.004** 0.440** 0.006 0.000 0.873 1.804 0.006
t-statistic (7.84) (33.84) (0.54) (0 .20)
Municipal Bonds:
(16) Low-Grade - Coefficient 0.001 0.432** 0.074** 0 .012** 0.578 1.828 0.015
t-statistic (1.04) (13.84) (2.89) (3.09)
(16) High-Grade - Coefficient 0.000 0.485** 0.074** 0.013** 0.633 1.859 0.015
t-statistic (0.29) (15.68) (2.93) (3.53)
(16) Insured - Coefficient 0.001 0.393** 0.068** 0.013** 0.523 1.876 0.015
t-statistic (0.75) (12.30) (2.62) (3.32)
(16) Intermediate - Coefficient 0.001 0.326** 0.041* 0.013** 0.589 1.777 0.011
t-statistic (0.89) (14.29) (2 .21) (4.58)
(16) Short Maturity - Coefficient 0.004** 0.092** 0.014* 0.005** 0.532 1.975 0.004
t-statistic (13.68) (12.18) (2.30) (5.47)
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
As noted by Blume et al. [1991], low-grade corporate bonds have a January effect 
while high-grade corporate bonds do not. The results for municipal bonds are striking. 
There is a strong January effect for all five municipal bond asset classes. Also, the 
estimated intercept for the low-grade municipal regression is no longer significant 
when the January dummy is introduced. This suggests that the positive abnormal 
returns associated with low-grade municipal bonds are principally determined during 
the month of January. What is surprising to this researcher is that even intermediate 
and short maturity municipal bonds show very strong January effects. Although 
beyond the scope of this thesis, a more detailed analysis of municipal bonds and the 
January effect would be a worthwhile analysis.
In addition to a municipal bond January effect, are there any other effects which might 
have a significant influence on the returns of municipal bonds? Much of the more
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recent municipal bond literature discusses the Tax Reform Act of 19867 (e.g., see 
Poterba [1989], Fortune [1991], and Lovely and Wasylenko [1992]). The Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 reduced the demand for municipal bonds by dramatically reducing bank 
demand, and reduced supply by dramatically reducing the ability of issuing 
authorities to earn arbitrage profits on their borrowings. Did the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 significantly influence the returns of low-grade and high-grade municipal 
bonds? The following table provides regression results which examine low-grade and 
high-grade municipal bond returns before and after 1986.
Table 22
Tax Reform Act of 1986 Regressions of Low-Grade and High-Grade Municipal
Bond Returns
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
Models 1, 2, & 3 Adj.
<*o P, P2 R 2 DW SEE
1978:01 to 1985:12
(1) Coefficient 0.001 0.516** 0.094 0.609 1.766 0.018
t-statistic (0.32) (10.24) (1.92)
(2) Coefficient -0.000 0.546** 0.094* 0.651 1.787 0.018
t-statistic (-0.06) (11.26) (1.98)
(3) Coefficient 0.001 -0.029 0.001 0.018 2.327 0.006
t-statistic (1.16) (-1.79) (0.04)
1986:01 to 1994:09
(1) Coefficient 0.004** 0.272** 0.079** 0.535 1.690 0.010
t-statistic (4.06) (8.43) (3.66)
(2) Coefficient 0.003** 0.362** 0.080** 0.564 1.801 0.011
t-statistic (2.73) (9.45) (3.10)
(3) Coefficient 0 .001** -0.090** -0.000 0.487 1.992 0.003
t-statistic (2.76) (-9.38) (-0.06)
* denotes significance at the 1% level, and ** denotes significance at the 5% level.
There is clearly a significant difference between the results before 1986 and after 
1985. Before 1986, there is no significant estimated intercept term for any of the three 
regressions, after 1985 all three regressions have significant estimated intercept terms. 
This suggests that, after controlling for Treasury bond and equity market risk, positive 
abnormal returns accrued to both asset classes and more so to low-grade municipal 
bonds than high-grade municipal bonds (i.e., post 1985). In addition, after 1985 both 
asset classes became less sensitive to Treasury bond market movements, but low-
7 It became effective October 22, 1986.
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grade municipal bonds became even less sensitive to Treasury bond market 
movements than high-grade municipal bonds. In short, after 1985 municipal bonds in 
general acted less like Treasury bonds. Do the abnormal returns still hold after 1985 if 
the January effect is controlled for? The following table provides regression results 
with the January dummy variable included.
Table 23
Tax Reform Act of 1986 and January Effect Regressions of Low-Grade and 
High-Grade Municipal Bond Returns
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Low-grade municipal bond funds invest at least 50% of assets in lower 
rated municipal bond issues (i.e., issues below the top four credit ratings). High-grade municipal bond 
funds invest at least 65% of assets in municipal bond issues in the top four credit ratings.
Models 1, 2, & 3 Adj.
<x0 Pi , Pg____ P12 R2 DW SEE
1978:01 to 1985:12
(16) Low-Grade Muni - Coefficient -0.001 0.531** 0.089 0.019** 0.637 1.834 0.018
t-statistic -0.52 (10.87) (1.87) (2.85)
(16) High-Grade Muni - Coefficient -0.002 0.562** 0.088 0 .020** 0.683 1.878 0.017
t-statistic - 1.01 (12.10) (1.95) (3.24)
(16) LGM-HGM - Coefficient 0.001 -0.030 0.001 -0.001 0.013 2.333 0.006
t-statistic 1.30 (-1.84) (0.06) (-0.67)
1986:01 to 1994:09
(16) Low-Grade Muni - Coefficient 0.003** 0.273** 0.074** 0.007* 0.549 1.760 0.009
t-statistic (3.42) (8.61) (3.44) (2.06)
(16) High-Grade Muni - Coefficient 0 .002* 0.364** 0.074** 0.008* 0.578 1.860 0.011
t-statistic (2 .12) (9.65) (2 .88) (2.05)
(16) LGM-HGM - Coefficient 0 .001** -0.090** 0.001 -0.001 0.490 1.987 0.003
t-statistic (2.99) (-9.43) (0.09) (-1.23)
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Post 1985, the positive abnormal returns still persist after controlling for the January 
effect. In addition, the January effect persists before 1986 and after 1985. Clearly, 
there seems to be some structural shift which takes place in the markets for low-grade 
and high-grade municipal bonds at or around 1986. It is possible that prior to the 
effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 there were fewer structural differences between 
the corporate and municipal bond markets. For example, especially with respect to 
Treasury bond market movements, low-grade municipal bonds became significantly 
less sensitive to Treasury bond market movements after 1985. After 1985, their 
sensitivity to Treasury bond market movements was almost halved (i.e., estimated 
coefficient p,). It is possible that municipal bonds have become more their own 
market as supply has been constrained and effective tax rates have increased for 
particular institutional buyers. Especially for institutional investors (e.g., banks), as
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effective tax rates increase, corporate and Treasury bonds (i.e., taxable bonds) become 
more imperfect substitutes for tax-exempt bonds.
Overall, much of the low-grade municipal bond positive abnormal returns are 
principally due to the January effect and/or the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
Further refinement and analysis of these issues are beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
represent possible future research in the area.
6 Summary and Conclusions
Regarding the overall performance of low-grade municipal bonds, the results 
presented here suggest there is a significant difference in the financial performance of 
low-grade municipal bonds relative to high-grade municipal bonds. After controlling 
for government bond and equity market movements, low-grade municipal bonds do 
outperform high-grade municipal bonds. Regarding the hypothesis that low-grade 
municipal bonds have significantly weaker interest rate call protection and/or 
relatively more interest rate calls, the tests performed in the chapter do not support 
such an assertion.
All five municipal bond asset classes under study show a significant January effect. 
Furthermore, the abnormal returns associated with low-grade municipal bonds seem 
to be largely due to the January effect. Although, the apparent outperformance of low- 
grade municipal bonds relative to high-grade municipal bonds is more likely the result 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Sorting the effect of these two influences on low- 
grade municipal bond financial performance is a possible subject for future research.
During periods of declining interest rates, recession, or combination declining interest 
rate and recession low-grade municipal bonds do not demonstrate significantly 
different volatility compared to that of high-grade municipal bonds. Although, periods 
of declining interest rates significantly affect the relative sensitivity of low-grade and 
high-grade municipal bonds to movements in the government bond and equity 
markets. Also, periods of recession do not significantly affect the relative sensitivity 
of low-grade and high-grade municipal bonds to movements in the government bond 
and equity markets. Finally, periods of declining interest rates combined with 
recession significantly affect the relative sensitivity of low-grade and high-grade 
municipal bonds to movements in both the government bond and equity markets.
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The following table provides a summary of the tests conducted.
Table 24
A Comparison of Expectations and Outcomes for Low-Grade versus High-
Grade Municipal Bonds
Simple CCA & Credit Spread Effect Expectations
Expectation Expectation
for Sensitivity to for Sensitivity to
Treasury Bonds Stocks
Period under Study (est p3, P6, P9) (est P4, p7, p]0)
Interest Rate Call Periods (i.e., declining interest rates) 0/0 or + 0/0 or -
Put Periods (i.e., recession) - or 0/0 or + +/0 or -
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods) - or 0/+ +/-
Realization for Low-Grade vs. High-Grade Bonds 
(cut-off at the 5% level of significance)
1978:01 through 1994:09
Sensitivity to 
Treasury Bonds
Sensitivity to 
Stocks
Interest Rate Call Periods (i.e., declining interest rates) + -
Put Periods (i.e., recession) 0 0
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods) + -
During periods of declining interest rates, low-grade municipal bonds become more 
government bond-like and less equity-like compared to high-grade municipal bonds. 
During business cycle contractions, low-grade municipal bonds do not become more 
government bond-like or equity-like compared to high-grade municipal bonds. During 
combination periods, low-grade municipal bonds become more government bond-like 
and less equity-like compared to high-grade municipal bonds. These results support 
risky debt valuation models which incorporate interest rate risk and a significantly 
negative correlation between changes in interest rates and changes in the value of the 
firm. If interest rate risk and a significantly negative value for pr V were not of 
importance in valuing risky municipal bonds, the overall results should have been 
about the opposite of those found. Clearly, low-grade municipal bonds are complex 
securities and a relatively accurate valuation model must take account of this fact.
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CHAPTER 8
THE EFFECT OF EMBEDDED OPTIONS ON THE FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE OF CONVERTIBLE BONDS
1 Introduction
The primary objectives of this chapter are the following: (1) generally extend the 
empirical literature on convertible corporate bond (convertible bond) financial 
performance, and (2) provide evidence to support more complex CCA models of risky 
bond pricing. The analytic approach used in this chapter is to examine the 
performance of convertible bond returns relative to straight low-grade corporate bond 
(low-grade bond) returns within the context of the principal options embedded in 
them. In the case of convertible bonds, analysis will focus on interest rate call, put, 
and equity call periods. As outlined in Chapter 5, the primary objectives of this 
chapter are a by-product of the approach and method employed.
One of the first and most interesting applications of option pricing theory has been the 
analysis of convertible bonds (e.g., Ingersoll [1977a] and Brennan and Schwartz 
[1977,1980]). Although there have been numerous theoretical studies modelling the 
valuation of convertible bonds, there has been relatively little empirical research based 
on CCA. Of the empirical work that has been performed on convertible bonds, most 
has been directed at analyzing and rationalizing the seemingly abnormal call behavior 
of firms which call the convertible bonds they have issued (e.g., Ingersoll [1977b], 
Dann and Mikkelson [1984], Harris and Raviv [1985], Acharya and Handa [1988], 
Jaffee and Shleifer [1990], Singh et al. [1991], Asquith and Mullins [1991], Campbell 
et al. [1991], Stein [1992], and Mehta and Khan [1995]). This chapter is the first to
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use CCA as the framework with which to analyze the long run financial performance 
and relative financial performance of convertible bonds as an asset class.1
Given that the principal difference between a convertible bond and straight low-grade 
bond is an embedded equity call option, unlike Chapters 6 and 7, many of the option 
periods (i.e., at least 3 of 7) are expected to generate insignificantly different test 
statistics. Actually, as specified in Chapter 5, only equity call periods and combination 
periods with equity calls are expected to generate any significant differences between 
the two asset classes examined (i.e., if periods where no options are exercised or move 
deeper into-the-money are included, a possible 4 periods of 8). Therefore, three sets of 
test results of the total seven sets of results represent control tests which test whether 
the two asset classes behave similarly during periods when theory would expect 
similar behavior.
This chapter examines the return experience of convertible bonds and straight low- 
grade bond funds over a long period (i.e., 1/62 through 9/94) in order to begin 
compiling evidence on the financial performance of convertible bonds. Although not 
statistically significant, convertible bonds have generated a higher return at a higher 
standard deviation of return over the period examined.
i Although, Altman [1988] analyzed the size (1980 through 1987), total return (1983 through 1987), 
and default (1980 through 1987) experience of convertible bonds. Soldofsky [1971, p. 79] analyzed the 
"yield-risk" performance of convertible securities over the period 1957 through 1969, and found that 
they "generally have experienced a combination of low yields and poor performance" over the study 
period. Atkinson [1967] found that convertible bonds defaulted more prior to WWII than after the war 
(1900-1944), but the quality of convertible bonds declined after the war (1945-1965). Alexander and 
Stover [1977] analyzed 142 convertible IPOs over the period 1967 through 1970, and found new issues 
and "low prestige" underwriter issues generated positive excess returns up to 3 1/2 months after 
issuance. Also, Sparaggis [1995, p. 68] examined an index of convertible bonds over the period 1982 
through 1993, and found that "the convertible market has offered excess return over a well-allocated 
bond/equity portfolio."
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Table 1
Mean Monthly Return and Standard Deviation for the Convertible Bond and 
Low-Grade Corporate Bond Asset Classes (1/62 through 9/94)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
Convertible Low-Grade 
1962:01 to 1994:09 Bonds Corporate
Observations = 393
Mean 0.9401% 0.6815%
Standard Deviation 3.3747% 2.4589%
One of the primary questions addressed in this chapter is the extent to which 
convertible bonds as an asset class have underperformed or outperformed low-grade 
bonds. That is, over a long period are risk adjusted convertible bond returns greater 
than risk adjusted low-grade bond returns? This chapter makes the following 
contributions: (1) generally extends research on convertible bonds; (2) applies CCA to 
the analysis of the financial performance of convertible bonds, and (3) evaluates the 
relative financial performance of the convertible and low-grade bond asset classes.
In addition to the possible outperformance of convertible bonds relative to straight 
low-grade bonds, as mentioned in Chapter 5, there are several other seemingly 
anomalous low-grade bond findings, applied to convertible bonds, which are 
addressed by this chapter. Specifically, the following issues are addressed: (1) do 
convertible bonds as an asset class show evidence of possessing a higher proportion of 
calls and/or weaker call protection than low-grade bonds; and (2) do convertible 
bonds as an asset class demonstrate a return generation process which would suggest 
that changes in risk-free interest rates and/or the economy account for a significant 
amount of the relative return variation in the convertible bond market overall?
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2 presents 
background on the data and provides summary statistics. Section 3 reviews the 
expectations/hypotheses developed in Chapter 5 which are of relevance to convertible 
bonds. Section 4 presents the convertible bond and low-grade bond regression results. 
Section 5 presents the convertible bond January effect regression results. The 
conclusions are summarized in the last section.
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2 Data and Summary Statistics
The convertible bond and low-grade bond data set is derived from open-end mutual 
funds tracked by Momingstar during the period from January 1962 through 
September 1994. These returns are net of all but front-end and back-end charges. The 
Treasury bond series is a spliced series based on the Cornell and Green [1991] 
Treasury bond series (01/62 through 12/88) and Salomon Brothers' long bond series 
(01/89 through 09/94). The stock series is derived from the Standard and Poor's 500 
return index ("S&P 500"). Therefore, unlike the return series derived from mutual 
fund returns, the stock and Treasury bond series are gross returns.
Like the Cornell and Green [1991] study on low-grade bonds, this thesis uses monthly 
open-end mutual fund data to derive asset class return series. Lipper Analytical 
Services asset class definitions are used for all asset class return series reported.
Shares of open-end mutual funds are traded on the basis of NAV. Monthly returns are 
based on the following calculation:
Re turnt -  [{NA Vt -  NA Vt_x) + IncDistt + CapGainDist, ] / NA Vt_1. In addition, these 
returns take account of 12b-l fees and management fees but not front-end loads, back­
end loads, or redemption charges.
Each mutual fund based asset class return series was constructed following the 
method used by Cornell and Green [1991]. For each asset class, the equally weighted 
average of all mutual funds each month was calculated. The following were the 
number of funds as of month-end September 1994 for each asset class series derived 
from Momingstar data: 34 convertible bond funds and 101 low-grade bond funds. 
Table 2 provides background on the asset class return series used in this chapter.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Convertible Bond 
Funds, Low-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, and Equities
The data are monthly returns. Except for Treasury bonds and the S&P 500 equity series, all mutual 
fund values are derived from Momingstar. Each mutual fund derived return series represents the 
average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were based 
on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that can 
be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of 
assets in corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
1962:01 to 1994:09
Convertible
Bonds
Low-Grade
Corporate
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500 CVT- LGC 
Spread
Observations = 393 
Moments o f the Distribution: 
1st - Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
0.9401%
3.3747%
-0.2632
2.1869
-15.0790%
11.9800%
0.6815%
2.4589%
0.1195
1.9264
-7.0880%
10.9500%
0.5663%
2.9705%
0.6788
2.6706
-8.4600%
15.2400%
0.5866%
4.3007%
-0.3333
3.0062
-23.9440%
16.3050%
0.2686%
2.1760%
0.1260
3.7676
-10.7830%
9.7990%
Tests of Normality#: 
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 5.5222 5.5145 3.7792 2.7038 2.3557
Prob>T 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0072 0.0190
W: Normal 0.9777 0.9666 0.9669 0.9855 0.9650
Prob<W 0.0429 0.0001 0.0001 0.6071 0.0001
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean 
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Over the study period (i.e., 01/62 through 09/94), convertible bonds have had higher 
returns at a higher level of risk, as measured by standard deviation, than low-grade 
bonds or Treasury bonds. In addition, of the three bond asset classes, only convertible 
bonds are slightly negatively skewed (as are equities). Whereas, of the three bond 
asset classes, Treasury bonds have been distributed relatively platykurtically over the 
period under study.
The tests for normality suggest that, at standard levels of statistical significance, only 
the equity return series and possibly the convertible bond return series are drawn from 
a random sample from a normal distribution (i.e., the Shapiro-Wilk test). All four 
asset class return series reject the null hypothesis that mean of each respective 
distribution is equal to zero. At normal levels of statistical significance, all four asset 
class return series have means which are significantly positive. Again, three of four 
return series reject the null hypothesis that the values are drawn from a random 
sample from a normal distribution.
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Table 3 provides correlation and autocorrelations for the asset class return series used 
in this chapter.
Table 3
Tests for Autocorrelation and Correlation Coefficients for the Returns of 
Convertible Bond Funds, Low-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds,
and Equities
The data are monthly returns. Except for Treasury bonds and the S&P 500 equity series, all mutual 
fund values are derived from Momingstar. Each mutual fund derived return series represents the 
average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were based 
on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that can 
be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% of 
assets in corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
1962:01 to 1994:09 
Autocorrelation at Lag 1 
Test for White Noise#: 
12 lags
Convertible Low-Grade Treasury
Bonds Corporate Bonds
S&P 500
0.167**
30.16**
0.253**
45.42**
0.054*
22.26*
0.014
11.46
Correlation with 
Low-Grade Corporate 
Treasury Bonds 
S&P 500
0.765**
0.366**
0.862**
0.505**
0.699** 0.332**
# This is an autocorrelation check for white noise. The null hypothesis is that the autocorrelations sum 
to zero. The test statistic is at the 12th lag (i.e., one year). Therefore, the null hypothesis for the 12th
A  A  A  A
Z12 o 2rk =  0 , where rh is the product moment correlation between et and et_k (k = 1, 2 ,
 , 12). If the null hypothesis is true, the statistic is distributed as a chi-square with 12 degrees of
freedom. If the statistic is not statistically significant, the null hypothesis can be accepted.
* denotes significance at the 5% level of significance, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level of 
significance.
Both the convertible bond and low-grade bond return series show evidence of 
autocorrelation. This autocorrelation can be interpreted as evidence of nontrading. 
Therefore, as in Chapters 6 and 7, several sets of regression results will be presented 
in order to correct for possible nontrading and/or serial correlation of the error term. 
As will become clear in sections 4 and 5, the results do not substantially differ 
regardless of the correction method employed.
Regarding correlations, convertible bonds returns are significantly more positively 
correlated with equity returns than Treasury bond returns. Clearly, convertible bonds 
have been more exposed to the risks associated with equities than Treasury bonds. 
Low-grade bonds returns are more positively correlated with equity returns than 
Treasury bond returns, but not as much as convertible bond returns are. Compared to 
low-grade bonds, convertible bonds have been more exposed to the risks associated 
with equities than Treasury bonds.
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3 Risky Convertible Bond and Low-Grade Bond Expectations 
and Tests
Bond options are often referred to as "embedded options" because they are explicit 
and implicit options which cannot be detached from the security. This chapter is 
particularly interested in the effects that the embedded options have on the pricing of 
convertible bonds and low-grade bonds as asset classes. Therefore, periods when the 
effects of puts and calls are expected to significantly increase will be examined. The 
analysis portion of this chapter will be to focus on periods when calls and puts would 
be expected to be exercised and/or the probability of exercise increases significantly 
for convertible bonds and low-grade bonds. This will isolate the impact embedded 
options have on the returns of convertible bonds and low-grade bonds.
Convertible bonds are a type of corporate bond which the owner typically has the 
option to exchange the bond (at par) for common stock (at the exercise price) of the 
issuing entity. The following are the three principal embedded options of a convertible 
bond: (1) interest rate call option, (2) default or put option, and (3) equity call option. 
A straight corporate bond doesn't have an equity call option. CCA views default as the 
case where equity holders put the company to bondholders. That is, bond default is 
equivalent to the exercise of a put option held by equity holders. Like most corporate 
bonds, most convertible bondholders have explicitly written call options and all have 
implicitly written put options. Although, unlike most corporate bonds, convertible 
bondholders hold a call option on some amount of the equity of the issuing firm.2 
Also, like most corporate bonds and municipal bonds, the interest rate call option is
2 The equity call option given to most convertible bondholders is an explicit call option on the equity 
of the firm (see Jennings [1974]). Even though the optimal equity call policy is clear (see Brennan and 
Schwartz [1977] and Ingersoll [1977a & 1977b]), actual firm conversion policies often delay 
conversion and are thus non optimal (see Harris and Raviv [1983 & 1985]). Therefore, it should be 
noted that given significant non optimal conversions, the impact of the equity call option on the 
financial performance of convertible bonds may not follow from CCA.
Harris and Raviv [1983 & 1985] rationalize these apparent sub optimal delayed calls and the fact that 
common stock returns are significantly negative around the announcement of the call of a convertible 
debt issue (also see Mikkelson [1983], Dann and Mikkelson [1984], Jaffee and Shleifer [1988], and 
Constantinides and Grundy [1989]). In addition, Acharya and Handa [1988] wrote a follow-up study 
which focused on explaining sub optimal early calls. Harris and Raviv [1983 & 1985] suggest that 
managers will delay a call of convertibles based on information indicating poor future prospects for the 
firm, while Acharya and Handa [1988] suggest managers will make an early call of convertibles based 
on positive information. Therefore, long delays signal an increase in future performance, while early 
calls signal a decrease in future performance. More recent evidence questions the existence o f sub 
optimal early calls altogether (e.g., Asquith [1995]).
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exercised when interest rates decrease enough from the time of issuance to make it 
profitable for the issuing entity to exercise. Therefore, convertible bonds are 
distinguished from low-grade bonds by their equity call option, and it is this feature 
which will be the focus of much of the analysis which follows.
Also, it has been shown that the lower the quality of the bond (i.e., the riskier the 
bond), the more relevant CCA may be for valuing corporate bonds (see Jones et al. 
[1984]). Therefore, low-grade bond asset classes are more appropriate than high-grade 
corporate bonds to apply CCA. Given that convertible bonds and low-grade bonds are 
mostly composed of lower grade bonds, they make useful asset classes to analyze the 
effects of options on bond pricing.3
Based on the discussion in Chapter 5, there can be different expectations for the 
changing sensitivities of convertible bonds relative to low-grade bonds during periods 
when their principal embedded options would be expected to move deeper into-the- 
money. For example, risky debt valuation models which do not incorporate interest 
rate risk find that the behavior of low-grade bond returns during recessionary periods 
seems anomalous; whereas risky debt valuation models which incorporate interest rate 
risk may be able to explain the behavior of low-grade bond returns during 
recessionary periods (i.e., assuming pr v is significantly negative). Arguing along the 
same lines, the behavior of convertible bond and low-grade bond returns during equity 
call periods may be explained at least in part by risky debt valuation models which 
incorporate interest rate risk.
As in Chapters 6 and 7, the following table summarizes the difference in expectations 
for what is termed CCA "assuming no credit spread effect" and CCA "assuming a 
strong credit spread effect". The first set of expectations are traditional CCA 
expectations which do not incorporate interest rate risk, whereas the latter case 
incorporates interest rate risk and assumes that prV is significantly negative. Of 
course, if prV is zero or close to zero, the two should not differ substantially.
3 As of 1987, a sample of convertible bonds analyzed by Altman [1988, p. 6] showed that 
approximately 62% were defined as low-grade bonds.
Table 4
Expectations for Periods under Study
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Simple CCA Expectations
Period under Study
Assuming no Credit Spread Effect:
Interest Rate Call Periods 
Put Periods 
Equity Call Periods
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods) 
Interest Rate Call & Put Periods 
Interest Rate Call & Equity Call Periods 
Put & Equity Call Periods
Both Calls & Put Periods
Assuming a Strong Credit Spread Effect: 
Interest Rate Call Periods 
Put Periods 
Equity Call Periods
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods) 
Interest Rate Call & Put Periods 
Interest Rate Call & Equity Call Periods 
Put & Equity Call Periods
Both Calls & Put Periods
Expectation Expectation
for Sensitivity to for Sensitivity to
Treasury Bonds Stocks
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 or + 0 or -
0 0
0 or + 0 or -
0 or + 0 or-
0 or + Oor-
The null hypotheses which follow are based on CCA risky debt models which do not 
incorporate interest rate risk. Given that both asset classes are predominantly 
composed of low-grade bonds, the only differences between the two sets of alternative 
expectations occur during equity call periods and equity call periods combined with 
the other two types of periods. Hence,
H0: during periods when interest rates are declining, convertible bonds should not 
become relatively more or less sensitive to Treasury bond market movements and 
equity market movements.
Hq\ during periods when general credit quality is declining, convertible bonds should 
not become relatively more or less sensitive to Treasury bond market movements and 
equity market movements.
H0: during periods when interest rates are declining and general credit quality is 
declining, convertible bonds should not become relatively more or less sensitive to 
Treasury bond market movements and equity market movements.
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H0: during periods when firm values are increasing (i.e., equity call periods), 
convertible bonds should not become relatively more or less sensitive to Treasury 
bond market movements and equity market movements.
H0: during periods when interest rates are declining and firm values are increasing, 
convertible bonds should not become relatively more or less sensitive to Treasury 
bond market movements and equity market movements.
H0: during periods when general credit quality is declining and firm values are 
increasing, convertible bonds should not become relatively more or less sensitive to 
Treasury bond market movements and equity market movements.
H0: during periods when interest rates are declining and general credit quality is 
declining and firm values are increasing, convertible bonds should not become 
relatively more or less sensitive to Treasury bond market movements and equity 
market movements.
Essentially, equity call periods are the only periods expected to have a significant 
impact on the relative sensitivities of convertible bond returns to Treasury bond 
market and equity market returns. Note that the overall credit quality of the two asset 
classes is assumed to be relatively equal, unlike the two chapters examining low-grade 
vs. high-grade bonds. Therefore, there are no alternative hypotheses which are 
diametric opposites as was the case for combination periods in the previous two 
chapters.
Critical to this thesis is the identification of periods when bond calls and puts would 
be expected to be exercised and/or their probability of exercise significantly increases 
relative to all other periods. For interest rate call periods, this thesis uses periods of 
declining interest rates. Bonds would be expected to be called, and/or their probability 
of exercise increases, when interest rates decline. For put/default periods, this thesis 
uses periods of recession. Defaults increase during recessionary periods. For equity 
call periods, this thesis uses periods when equities outperform risky bonds. The equity 
call option would be expected to be exercised and/or the probability of exercise 
increases when equity values increase more rapidly than bond values. Table 4 
summarizes the expectations for the relative sensitivity of convertible bond versus 
low-grade bond returns over interest rate call, put/default, equity call, and 
combination call & put/call periods.
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4 Regressions Testing the Impact of Call and Put Periods
Ignoring Kihn [1996], this chapter represents the first study to examine the relative 
volatility and sensitivity (i.e., to the Treasury bond and equity markets) of convertible 
bonds (i.e., relative to low-grade bonds) during periods when their principal 
embedded options would be expected to move deeper into-the-money. It is a central 
argument of this thesis that one of the primary causes of the seemingly abnormal 
behavior of low-grade bonds relative to high-grade bonds is that relatively less credit 
worthy bonds are significantly more affected by the correlation between changes in 
the risk-free rate of interest and changes in the value of the firm (i.e., pr V is 
significantly negative) than more credit worthy bonds (i.e., for both corporate and 
municipal bonds). Given that the principal difference between a convertible bond and 
a low-grade bond is an equity call option, the comparison of these two risky bond 
asset classes serves as a control for the analysis of the preceding two chapters (i.e., at 
least for interest rate call, put, and combination interest rate call and put periods). As 
in the preceding two chapters, the critical method with which to examine the return 
behavior of convertible bonds and low-grade bonds is to isolate periods when calls 
and puts would be expected to be exercised and/or the probability of exercise 
significantly increases. Specifically, there should be no significant differences 
between convertible bonds and low-grade bonds during the equivalent periods 
examined for low-grade and high-grade bonds.
As a baseline to the regression analysis which follows, the following regression 
models were run to evaluate the sensitivity of convertible bonds and low-grade bonds 
to Treasury bond and equity market movements:
(1) CVT( = a 0 + p! x TBRt + p2 x SMRt + et
(2) LGRt = a 0 + Pj x TBRt + p2 x SMRt + et
(3) CVTt -  LGRt = a 0 + Pj x TBRt + p2 x SMR, + et
where CVT = convertible bond return, LGR = low-grade bond return, TBR =
Treasury bond return, SMR = stock market return (i.e., the return of the S&P 500 
index), and e is the error term. This equation was designed to take account of Treasury 
bond and equity market risk via TBR and SMR.
As in Chapters 6 and 7, in addition to the standard OLS regressions three additional 
regressions were run to check the robustness of the OLS results. Also as in Chapters 6 
and 7, the various results will show that there is little or no difference between the 
regression methods employed.
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Table 5
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of 
Convertible and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model ( 1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
1962:01 to 1994:09 1/2/3 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign# Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0050** 0.0034** 0.0016 0.0041** 0 .0022** 0.0019*
(5.741) (4.062) (1.772) (4.731) (2.617) (2.069)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0609* 0.1029** -0.0420
(2.050) (3.632) (-1.310)
TBR +/+/- 0.1016** 0.2542** -0.1526** 0.1093** 0.2585** -0.1492**
(3.338) (8.746) (-4.775) (3.667) (9.090) (-4.634)
TBR (Lead 1) -0.0314 0.0026 -0.0341
(-1.062) (0.093) (-1.065)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0568** 0.0611** -0.0043
(2.771) (3.123) (-0.194)
SMR +/+/+ 0.6535** 0.3412** 0.3123** 0.6469** 0.3307** 0.3162**
(31.097) (16.998) (14.145) (31.473) (16.862) (14.244)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0270 0.0350 -0.0080
(1.324) (1.797) (-1.310)
Adj. R 2 0.750 0.570 0.336 0.769 0.606 0.347
F-Statistic 588.155** 260.658** 100.050** 217.883** 101.019** 35.556**
Dependent Mean 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.002
Root MSE 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.018
DW Statistic 1.540 1.710 1.732 1.536 1.681 1.740
Observations 393 393 393 391 391 391
# expected signs are based on risky bond expectations (i.e., for the intercept, TBR coefficient, and 
SMR coefficient) and simple CCA expectations (i.e., for all other coefficient expectations). 
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 6
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Convertible 
and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
1962:01 to 1994:09 1/2/3 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign# Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0051** 0.0035** 0.0016 0.0051** 0.0036** 0.0016
(3.417) (3.712) (1.340) (3.317) (3.651) (1.307)
TBR +/+/- 0.1004** 0.2404** -0.1377** 0 .1001** 0.2386** -0.1367**
(3.537) (8.382) (-4.378) (3.522) (8.332) (-4.349)
SMR +1+1+ 0.6427** 0.3275** 0.3176** 0.6418** 0.3257** 0.3181**
(32.790) (16.624) (14.754) (32.412) (16.506) (14.770)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1790** -0.1436** -0.1143* -0.1916** -0.1639** -0.1215*
(-3.634) (-2.862) (-2.284) (-3.889) (-3.259) (-2.428)
Lag 5 -0.1264*
(-2.576)
-0.1310**
(-2.682)
Lag 9 -0.1213*
(-2.423)
-0.1326**
(-2.642)
Lag 12 -0.1524**
(-3.118)
-0.1528**
(-3.113)
Total R2 0.773 0.582 0.360 0.773 0.582 0.360
Regression R 0.767 0.559 0.360 0.768 0.557 0.362
Root MSE 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.017
DW Statistic 1.957 1.993 1.965
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393
# expected signs are based on risky bond expectations (i.e., for the intercept, TBR coefficient, and 
SMR coefficient) and simple CCA expectations (i.e., for all other coefficient expectations).
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
The return spread results are of critical importance, and at a general level there is 
nothing surprising. First, the estimated intercept for the return spread regressions is 
slightly positive, but not significantly so (i.e., except for the Dimson regression). This 
suggests that, after controlling for Treasury bond and equity market risk, convertible 
bonds have not significantly outperformed low-grade bonds over the sample period. 
Second, convertible bonds are more equity-like than low-grade bonds. Finally, 
convertible bonds are less risk-free bond-like (i.e., Treasury bond-like) than low-grade 
bonds. Again, these last two results only confirm the view of risky debt as a hybrid of 
equity and pure debt, and that convertible bonds are more equity-like than low-grade
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bonds. Essentially, these results largely confirm the CCA view of convertible bonds. 
That is, as expected, the presence of the equity call option should tend to increase the 
sensitivity of convertible bonds to equity market movements, especially relative to 
government bond market movements.
4.1 Interest Rate Call Periods
If convertible bonds have had significantly less interest rate call protection and/or a 
higher call rate than low-grade bonds, there should be a significant decline in the 
sensitivity of convertible bond returns to risk-free bond returns during periods when 
interest rate call options should be exercised (i.e., during periods of declining interest 
rates). This assertion can be tested by examining the behavior of convertible bond 
returns relative to low-grade bond returns during periods of declining interest rates. 
Specifically, if there is a significant difference, the sensitivity of convertible bond 
returns to risk-free bond return movements would significantly decline during periods 
of declining interest rates. The following table presents the return and standard 
deviations (among other descriptive statistics) associated with periods where the 
government 10 year constant maturity Treasury bond experienced a decline in yield.
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Table 7
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Convertible Bond 
Funds, Low-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, and Equities: Only 
for Months when Interest Rates Declined (Interest Rate Call Months)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
A month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero.
1962:01 to 1994:09
Convertible
Bonds
Low-Grade
Corporate
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500 CVT- LGC 
Spread
Observations = 180 
Moments of the Distribution: 
1st - Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
2.1119%
3.0047%
0.6343
1.1237
-6.5700%
11.9800%
1.8333%
2.2352%
0.5457
2.9823
-6.1500%
10.9500%
2.2409%
2.7688%
1.3342
4.0054
-3.9100%
15.2400%
1.9714%
3.9878%
0.3454
1.2107
-11.3860%
16.3050%
0.2786%
1.9998%
0.3696
1.4540
-5.8270%
7.1800%
Tests of Normality#: 
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 9.4301 11.0041 10.8580 6.6323 1.8692
Prob>T 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0632
W: Normal 0.9668 0.9552 0.9282 0.9846 0.9785
Prob<W 0.0100 0.0001 0.0001 0.6702 0.2661
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Although convertible bonds were more volatile than low-grade bonds during periods 
of declining interest rates, convertible bonds were not significantly more volatile. For 
months when interest rates were declining, the ratio of convertible bond to low-grade 
bond standard deviation is approximately 1.34 versus 1.37 for all months. It seems it 
would not be correct to state that the greater relative number of calls and/or weaker 
call protection afforded convertible bonds relative to low-grade bonds is the cause of 
their higher volatility. Over the study period, convertible bonds have been only 
slightly less sensitive to declining interest rates than low-grade bonds.
In order to further test this contention, the following regression models were run to 
test for the significance of interest rate call periods on the returns of convertible and 
low-grade bonds.
(4 ) CVT, = a 0 + P, x TBR, + p2 x SMR, + p3 x TBRt x DIR, + P4 x SMR, x DIR, + P5 x DIR, + e,
(5) LGR, = a 0 + P, x TBR, + P2 x SMR, + P3 x TBR, x DIR, + p4 x SMR, x DIR, + P5 x DIR, + e,
(6 ) CVT, -  LGR, = a 0 + P, x TBR, + P2 x SMR, + P3 x TBR, x DIR, + P4 x SMR, x DIR, + P5 x DIR, + e,
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where DIR = a dummy variable equal to one if interest rates decline and zero 
otherwise. The call dummy variable is intended to isolate the effect of periods when 
calls are more frequent and/or more probable.
Table 8
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of 
Convertible and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Interest Rate Call
Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effect of periods of declining interest rates. A month is defined as 
a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the ten year constant 
maturity Treasury bond is less than zero.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
12G2;OUaJ994;09. 4/5/6 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0040** 0.0011 0.0028* 0.0039** 0.0014 0.0026
(3.218) (0.963) (2.201) (3.210) (1.160) (1.958)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0572 0.0847** -0.0275
(1.748) (2.720) (-0.782)
TBR +/+/- 0.0560 0.2385** -0.1825** 0.0841 0.2822** -0.1981**
(1.123) (5.058) (-3.491) (1.701) (5.999) (-3.728)
TBR (Lead 1) -0.0304 0.0049 -0.0353
(-1.023) (0.174) (-1.105)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0537** 0.0621** -0.0084
(2.605) (3.167) (-0.381)
SMR +1+1+ 0.6838** 0.3456** 0.3382** 0.6757** 0.3328** 0.3428**
(24.765) (13.235) (11.685) (24.984) (12.932) (11.789)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0223 0.0336 -0.0112
(1.083) (1.711) (-0.507)
TBR x DIR 7/710 0.0653 -0.0616 0.1268 0.0539 -0.0914 0.1453*
(0.944) (-0.941) (1.748) (0.804) (-1.431) (2.014)
SMR x DIR 7/7/0 -0.0864* -0.0323 -0.0540 -0.0732 -0.0084 -0.0649
(-1.996) (-0.790) (-1.191) (-1.731) (-0.208) (-1.425)
DIR 7/7/7 0.0027 0.0071** -0.0044* 0.0007 0.0039** -0.0032
(1.295) (3.640) (-2.048) (0.323) (1.871) (-1.355)
Adj. R 2 0.752 0.581 0.343 0.770 0.608 0.353
F-Statistic 238.093** 109.902** 41.952** 145.700** 68.303** 24.672**
Dependent Mean 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.002
Root MSE 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.017
DW Statistic 1.526 1.673 1.726 1.526 1.670 1.748
Observations 393 393 393 391 391 391
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 9
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Convertible 
and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Interest Rate Call Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effect of periods of declining interest rates. A month is defined as 
a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the ten year constant 
maturity Treasury bond is less than zero.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
1962:01 to 1994:09 4/5/6 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0039* 0.0011 0.0029* 0.0039* 0.0011 0.0029*
(2.276) (0.877) (1.993) (2.217) (0 .868) (1.962)
TBR +1+1- 0.0505 0.2205** -0.1564** 0.0503 0.2188** -0.1545**
(1.100) (4.850) (-3.088) (1.097) (4.833) (-3.051)
SMR +/+/+ 0.6720** 0.3337** 0.3428** 0.6713** 0.3324** 0.3433**
(25.524) (12.927) (11.990) (25.464) (12.841) (12.007)
TBR x DIR 7/7/0 0.0759 -0.0484 0.0998 0.0763 -0.0472 0.0977
(1.167) (-0.752) (1.383) (1.175) (-0.734) (1.352)
SMR x DIR ?/?/0 -0.0816* -0.0412 -0.0496 -0.0813* -0.0419 -0.0493
(-2.040) (-1.046) (-1.129) (-2.035) (-1.067) (-1.126)
DIR ?/?/? 0.0028 0.0074** -0.0043* 0.0028 0.0074** -0.0043*
(1.468) (3.910) (-2.048) (1.466) (3.935) (-2.037)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1826** -0.1614** -0.1193* -0.1927** -0.1796** -0.1273*
(-3.695) (-3.213) (-2.371) (-3.893) (-3.566) (-2.531)
Lag 5 -0.1195*
(-2.429)
-0.1259*
(-2.567)
Lag 9 -0.1063*
(-2.114)
-0.1190*
(-2.348)
Lag 12 -0.1588**
(-3.236)
-0.1623**
(-3.293)
Total R2 0.777 0.599 0.370 0.777 0.599 0.370
Regression R2 0.772 0.575 0.369 0.772 0.574 0.371
Root MSE 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017
DW Statistic 1.957 1.983 1.960
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Again, the estimated intercept can be interpreted as the amount of abnormal return 
attributed to the dependent return series after adjusting for the various movements of 
the independent variables. In this case, the results indicate that after controlling for 
periods of declining interest rates, at the 5% level there is a significant difference in 
the return performance of the two asset classes (i.e., except for the Dimson
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regression). It is interesting to note that the estimated coefficient for the dummy for 
periods of declining interest rates was negative and statistically significant in the asset 
classes comparison regression (model 6, except for the Dimson regression). Therefore, 
periods of declining interest rates tend to more negatively impact convertible bond 
financial performance relative to low-grade bond financial performance. Therefore, 
this implies that convertible bonds tend to outperform low-grade bonds during periods 
of increasing interest rates.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between 
convertible bond and low-grade bond returns to Treasury bond market returns during 
interest rate call periods, there is reason to reject the hypothesis that convertible bonds 
have significantly weaker and/or less interest rate call protection than low-grade 
bonds. If low-grade bonds were significantly more sensitive to interest rate 
movements due to greater call protection relative to low-grade bonds, then it would be 
expected that the estimated coefficient p3 would be significantly greater than the same 
coefficient for the convertible bond regression. The fact that this is not the case casts 
doubt on the contention of a significant difference between the number of calls and/or 
the call protection associated with the two asset classes.
Overall, interest rate call periods do not seem to have much of an impact on the 
relative performance of convertible bonds versus low-grade bonds. Given that the 
primary difference between convertible bonds and low-grade bonds is the equity call 
feature, this is a sensible result.
4.2 Put Periods
Regarding convertible bond puts or defaults, if there was a significant effect of the 
exercise and/or increase in the probability of exercise of convertible bond puts relative 
to low-grade bond puts it will become significant during periods when the economy is 
performing poorly. If convertible bonds are significantly more exposed to business 
cycle risk, convertible bond returns should be more sensitive to equity market 
movements during periods when more defaults would be expected to occur.
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Table 10
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Convertible Bond 
Funds, Low-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, and Equities: 
Recession Months Only (Put Months)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
A recession is defined as the period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of 
the subsequent trough. This definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
definition.
1962:01 to 1994:09
Convertible
Bonds
Low-Grade
Corporate
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500 CVT - LGC 
Spread
Observations = 57 
Moments o f the Distribution: 
1st - Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
0.6762%
4.7197%
-0.0215
0.1753
-11.3230%
11.9800%
0.6346%
4.1170%
0.4636
-0.3734
-6.8520%
10.9500%
1.3510%
4.3508%
0.8660
1.6177
-7.1400%
15.2400%
0.1374%
6.0246%
0.2656
-0.0717
-11.9330%
16.3050%
0.0416%
2.6392%
0.0433
3.0556
-8.6090%
8.2480%
Tests of Normality#: 
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 1.0816 1.1637 2.3444 0.1722 0.1190
Prob>T 0.2841 0.2495 0.0226 0.8639 0.9057
W: Normal 0.9866 0.9598 0.9539 0.9800 0.9529
Prob<W 0.9153 0.1151 0.0598 0.6924 0.0529
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Although convertible bonds were more volatile than low-grade bonds during 
recessionary periods, convertible bonds were not significantly more volatile. For 
recession months, the ratio of convertible bond to low-grade bond standard deviation 
is approximately 1.15 versus 1.37 for all months. Over the period analyzed, 
convertible bonds have been only slightly more sensitive to recessionary periods than 
low-grade bonds.
In order to test the recession put hypothesis, the following regression models were run 
to test for the impact of put periods on the returns of convertible and low-grade bonds.
(7) CVT, = a 0 + p, x TBR, + P2 x SMRt + p6 x TBRt x Rec, + P7 x SMR( x Rec, + p8 x Rec, + e,
(8) LGR, = a 0 + pj x TBR, + p2 x SMR, + p6 x TBR, x Rec, + P7 x SMR, x Rec, + P8 x Rec, +e,
(9) CVT, -  LGR, = a 0 + P, x TBR, + P2 x SMR, + P6 x TBR, x Rec, + P7 x SMR, x Rec, + P8 x Rec, + e, 
where Rec = a dummy variable equal to one if the economy is in a recession and zero 
otherwise. The put dummy variable is intended to isolate the effect of recessionary
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periods when puts are more frequent and/or more probable for convertible and low- 
grade bonds.
Table 11
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of 
Convertible and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Put Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effect of recessionary periods. A recession is defined as the 
period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. This 
definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (7) (8) (9) (7) (8) (9)
1962:01 to 1994:09 7/8/9 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept m/o 0.0053** 0.0040** 0.0013 0.0043** 0.0029** 0.0014
(5.663) (4.600) (1.294) (4.615) (3.270) (1.421)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0620* 0.0945** -0.0325
(2.064) (3.348) (-0.998)
TBR +/+/- 0.0478 0.1777** -0.1299** 0.0570 0.1879** -0.1309**
(1.330) (5.287) (-3.430) (1.644) (5.762) (-3.476)
TBR (Lead 1) -0.0357 0.0040 -0.0397
(-1.204) (0.144) (-1.234)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0595** 0.0622** -0.0026
(2.908) (3.231) (-0.119)
SMR +/+/+ 0.6563** 0.3179** 0.3384** 0.6599** 0.3183** 0.3416**
(27.113) (14.050) (13.271) (28.259) (14.502) (13.484)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0206 0.0228 -0.0022
(1.007) (1.186) (-0.099)
TBR x Rec 7/7/0 0.1936** 0.2492** -0.0556 0.2023** 0.2484** -0.0460
(2.811) (3.871) (-0.767) (3.028) (3.954) (-0.635)
SMR x Rec m/o -0.0334 0.0585 -0.0919 -0.0746 0.0177 -0.0923
(-0.684) (1.281) (-1.785) (-1.566) (0.396) (-1.786)
Rec 7/7/7 -0.0026 -0.0040 0.0013 -0.0020 -0.0040 0.0020
(-1.047) (-1.674) (0.492) (-0.792) (-1.725) (0.764)
Adj. R 2 0.753 0.594 0.341 0.773 0.624 0.352
F-Statistic 240.113** 115.521** 41.559** 148.657** 72.892** 24.527**
Dependent Mean 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.002
Root MSE 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.017
DW Statistic 1.535 1.672 1.712 1.535 1.658 1.727
Observations 393 393 393 391 391 391
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 12
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Convertible 
and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Put Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effect of recessionary periods. A recession is defined as the 
period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. This 
definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (7) (8) (9) (7) (8) (9)
1962:01 to 1994:09 7/8/9 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept 7/7/0 0.0055** 0.0041** 0.0013 0.0055** 0.0041** 0.0013
(3.595) (4.052) (1.045) (3.477) (3.967) (1.024)
TBR +/+/- 0.0557 0.1587** -0.1092** 0.0556 0.1565** -0.1076**
(1.666) (4.850) (-2.942) (1.666) (4.799) (-2.903)
SMR +/+/+ 0.6461** 0.3071** 0.3445** 0.6455** 0.3058** 0.3451**
(28.493) (13.991) (13.928) (28.519) (13.974) (13.975)
TBR x Rec 7/710 0.1685** 0.2681** -0.0688 0.1680* 0.2701** -0.0695
(2.608) (4.298) (-0.974) (2.583) (4.347) (-0.986)
SMR x Rec 7/7/0 -0.0335 0.0473 -0.0980* -0.0341 0.0459 -0.0986*
(-0.742) (1.064) (-1.976) (-0.755) (1.035) (-1.987)
Rec 717/7 -0.0030 -0.0037 0.0007 -0.0031 -0.0036 0.0007
(-1.048) (-1.387) (0.251) (-1.037) (-1.340) (0.224)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1842** -0.1631** -0.1218* -0.1962** -0.1837** -0.1299*
(-3.722) (-3.248) (-2.425) (-3.940) (-3.652) (-2.581)
Lag 5 -0.1201*
(-2.434)
-0.1267*
(-2.561)
Lag 9 -0.1244*
(-2.477)
-0.1387**
(-2.743)
Lag 12 -0.1435**
(-2.920)
-0.1452**
(-2.938)
Total R 2 0.777 0.611 0.372 0.777 0.611 0.372
Regression R 2 0.771 0.588 0.373 0.771 0.586 0.375
Root MSE 0.016 0.015 0.003 0.016 0.015 0.017
DW Statistic 1.962 2.002 1.967
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
The estimated intercept for the return spread regressions does not suggest that, after 
controlling for the various movements of the independent variables, convertible bonds 
have returned significantly more than low-grade bonds. In this case, the results 
indicate that after controlling for recessionary periods, there is no significant 
difference in the return performance of the two asset classes. Also, note that all four
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regressions generally assign the same sign and level of significance to each 
comparable estimated coefficient.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between 
convertible bond and low-grade bond returns to Treasury bond market returns during 
put periods, there is no reason to reject the hypothesis that convertible and low-grade 
bonds behave similarly during put periods. If convertible bonds were significantly 
more (less) sensitive to Treasury bond market movements during recessions, then it 
would be expected that the estimated coefficient p6 would be significantly greater 
(smaller) than the same coefficient for the low-grade bond regression.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between 
convertible bond and low-grade bond returns to equity market returns during put 
periods, there is no reason to reject the hypothesis that convertible and low-grade 
bonds behave similarly during put periods. If convertible bonds were significantly 
more (less) sensitive to equity market movements during recessions, then it would be 
expected that the estimated coefficient P7 would be significantly greater (smaller) than 
the same coefficient for the low-grade bond regression.
Over the period, convertible bonds and low-grade bonds did not lose a significant 
amount of their sensitivity to equity market movements during business cycle 
contractions (i.e., estimated coefficient p7). One possible explanation for the lack of a 
recession effect for convertible and low-grade bonds may be that there is no large 
increase in perceived credit risk during recessionary periods. As some low-grade 
bonds and convertible bonds default, thus removing them from their respective asset 
classes and lowering the duration of each asset class, a relatively equal amount of 
straight high-grade bonds and high-grade convertible bonds are downgraded. During 
economic booms, high-grade bonds can be upgraded, but upgrades may be a relatively 
direct function of the length and magnitude of the expansion, and downgrades are a 
direct function of the length and magnitude of the contraction. Either way, the results 
suggest that defaults do not significantly affect the two return series examined.
The embedded puts in convertible bonds have the effect of insignificantly decreasing 
the sensitivity of convertible bonds with respect to equity price movements (i.e., 
estimated coefficient p7 is negative and insignificantly so) and significantly 
lengthening their duration with respect to government bond price movements (i.e., 
estimated coefficient p6 is positive and significant at the 1% level of significance, and 
at the 5% level of significance for the maximum likelihood regression). This suggests
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that the duration of convertible bonds actually increases during recessions. This may 
in part be explained by downgradings of high-grade convertible bonds into the 
convertible bond asset class which overwhelms the effect puts have on the asset class. 
Even though puts occur during recessions with higher frequency, high-grade 
downgradings may more than offset this effect.
In addition, the results indicate that convertible bonds do not act significantly less like 
government bonds during recessions than low-grade bonds. That is, the covariability 
of convertible bond returns with government bond returns does not significantly 
decrease during recessions relative to low-grade bond returns (i.e., model 9, estimated 
coefficient p6). This could also be in part explained by downgradings of high-grade 
bonds during recessions, some of which remain in each asset class while others are 
still called away during the recession.
Overall, the results suggest that during periods when convertible and low-grade bonds 
would be expected to show relatively equal sensitivity to equity market movements, 
they do. During recessions, the two asset classes appear to mirror each other. 
Convertible bonds become insignificantly less equity-like and significantly more 
bond-like, and low-grade bonds become insignificantly more equity-like and 
significantly more bond-like. Given that the essential difference between convertible 
bonds and low-grades bonds is the equity call feature, the recession regression results 
support the CCA implication that recessionary periods would not be expected to have 
a significant impact on the relative performance of the two asset classes, because the 
primary effect of an economic downturn would be on the embedded put option not on 
the equity call option which only convertible bonds possess.
4.3 Combination Interest Rate Call and Put Periods
Regarding the increased probability of convertible and low-grade bond interest rate 
calls and puts, if there was a significant affect of the exercise and/or increase in the 
probability of exercise of the options of convertible bonds relative to low-grade bonds 
it should show up during periods when the economy is performing poorly and interest 
rates are declining. Although, at least relative to low-grade bonds, this thesis 
hypothesizes that during recessionary periods with decreasing interest rates, 
convertible bond returns will be insignificantly affected by movements in the 
Treasury bond and equity markets.
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Table 13
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Convertible Bond 
Funds, Low-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, and Equities: Only 
for Months when Interest Rates Declined & Recession (Interest Rate Call & Put
Months)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
A month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero. A recession is defined as the period 
immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. This 
definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
Convertible Low-Grade Treasury S&P 500 CVT- LGC
1962:01 to 1994:09 Bonds Corporate Bonds Spread
Observations = 30
Moments o f the Distribution:
1st - Mean 2.7995% 2.5916% 3.9486% 2.5343% 0.2079%
2nd - Standard Deviation 3.8756% 3.6372% 3.9140% 5.2010% 2.4569%
3rd - Skewness 0.4818 0.2542 1.3317 0.5358 0.1878
4th - Kurtosis -0.0422 -0.0933 2.0877 0.4424 1.8121
Minimum -3.7000% -4.2660% -1.0900% -6.0550% -5.8270%
Maximum 11.9800% 10.9500% 15.2400% 16.3050% 7.1800%
Tests of Normality#:
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 3.9564 3.9027 5.5256 2.6689 0.4634
Prob>T 0.0005 0.0005 0.0001 0.0123 0.6465
W: Normal 0.9675 0.9729 0.8897 0.9651 0.9698
Prob<W 0.5193 0.6888 0.0046 0.4625 0.5793
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean 
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Convertible bonds were more volatile than low-grade bonds during periods of 
recession and declining interest rates, but not significantly so. During combination 
recession and declining interest rate months, the ratio of convertible bond to low- 
grade bond standard deviation is approximately 1.07 versus 1.37 for all months. 
During months when it is expected that puts and interest rate calls on convertible 
bonds will be exercised as frequently as those for low-grade bonds, there is some 
decline in the volatility of convertible bonds relative to low-grade bonds, but that 
difference is not significant.
In order to test the combination recession put and declining interest rate call 
hypothesis, the following regression models were run to test for the significance of 
combination put and interest rate call periods on the returns of convertible and low- 
grade bonds:
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( 1 0 )  CVT, = a 0 +Pj x TBR, + P2 xSMR, +P9 x TBR, xRec, x DIR, +fil0*SMR, xRec, xDIR, + pu x Rec, xDIR, +e,
( 1 1 )  LGR, = a 0 + P, x TBR, +P2 x SMR, +P9 x TBR, x Rec, x DIR,+ p,0 x SMR, x Rec, x DIR, +pu x Rec, x DIR, +e,
( 1 2 )  CVT, -  LGR, = a 0 + P, x TBR, +p2 xSMR, +P9 x TBR, x Rec, x DIR, +p10 xSMR, x Rec, x DIR, +Pn x Rec, x DIR, +e,
These regressions are intended to capture the effect of the combination of puts and 
interest rate calls on the returns of convertible and low-grade bonds. The coefficient 
p9 will isolate the effect that changes in Treasury bond prices have on changes in 
convertible and low-grade bond prices during periods of recession and declining 
interest rates. The coefficient p10 will isolate the effect changes in equity prices have 
on changes in convertible and low-grade bond prices during periods of recession and 
declining interest rates.
2 6 5
Table 14
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of 
Convertible and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Interest Rate Call & Put
Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effects of recessionary and declining interest rate periods. A 
month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if  during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero, and a recession is defined as the period 
immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. The 
recession period is definition directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (10) (11) (12) ( 10) ( 11) (12)
1962:01 to 1994:09 10/ 11/12 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0048** 0.0032** 0.0016 0.0041** 0 .0022** 0.0019*
(5.420) (3.773) (1.756) (4.624) (2.638) (1.969)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0606* 0.0985** -0.0379
(1.996) (3.432) (-1.155)
TBR +/+/- 0.0731* 0.2071** -0.1340** 0.0826* 0.2184** -0.1358**
(2.123) (6.346) (-3.699) (2.475) (6.918) (-3.759)
TBR (Lead 1) -0.0326 -0.0013 -0.0313
(-1.097) (-0.047) (-0.974)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0580** 0.0674** -0.0094
(2.808) (3.450) (-0.420)
SMR +1+1+ 0.6615** 0.3411** 0.3205** 0.6541** 0.3296** 0.3245**
(29.749) (16.189) (13.708) (30.141) (16.065) (13.822)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0249 0.0344 -0.0095
(1.216) (1.778) (-0.430)
TBR x DIR x Rec 7/7/0 0.1457 0.2331** -0.0874 0.1691 0.2569** -0.0878
(1.589) (2.684) (-0.907) (1.915) (3.077) (-0.920)
SMR x DIR x Rec 7/7/0 -0.0768 -0.0017 -0.0751 -0.0689 0.0071 -0.0761
(-1.134) (-0.027) (-1.055) (-1.051) (0.115) (-1.072)
DIR x Rec ?/?/? -0.0003 -0.0033 0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0074 0.0046
(-0.067) (-0.759) (0.620) (-0.652) (-1.782) (0.955)
Adj. R2 0.750 0.578 0.336 0.770 0.614 0.347
F-Statistic 236.420** 108.210** 40.658** 146.099** 69.995** 24.029**
Dependent Mean 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.002
Root MSE 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.018
DW Statistic 1.522 1.677 1.716 1.524 1.667 1.728
Observations 393 393 393 391 391 391
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and * * denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 15
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Convertible 
and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Interest Rate Call & Put Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effects of recessionary and declining interest rate periods. A 
month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero; and a recession is defined as the period 
immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. The 
recession period is definition directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (10) 0 1 ) ( 12) ( 10) ( 11) ( 12)
1962:01 to 1994:09 10/ 11/12 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0050** 0.0033** 0.0017 0.0050** 0.0033** 0.0017
(3.297) (3.309) (1.420) (3.190) (3.211) (1.384)
TBR +/+/- 0.0710* 0.1871** -0.1136** 0.0705* 0.1837** -0.1119**
(2.204) (5.851) (-3.185) (2.192) (5.768) (-3.141)
SMR +/+/+ 0.6518** 0.3255** 0.3277** 0.6509** 0.3229** 0.3284**
(31.075) (15.765) (14.348) (31.036) (15.648) (14.379)
TBR x DIR x Rec 7/7/0 0.1638 0.2506** -0.0978 0.1653 0.2541** -0.0986
(1.899) (2.920) (-1.020) (1.895) (2.966) (-1.024)
SMR x DIR x Rec 7/7/0 -0.0855 -0.0074 -0.0833 -0.0862 -0.0081 -0.0840
(-1.419) (-0 .122) (-1.241) (-1.432) (-0.136) (-1.252)
DIR x Rec ?/7/7 -0.0014 -0.0018 0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0016 0.0015
(-0.320) (-0.420) (0.342) (-0.329) (-0.358) (0.312)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1898** -0.1603** -0.1203* -0.2034** -0.1891** -0.1309*
(-3.847) (-3.191) (-2.396) (-4.073) (-3.751) (-2.585)
Lag 5 -0.1183*
(-2.405)
-0.1234*
(-2.514)
Lag 9 -0.1242*
(-2.474)
-0.1382**
(-2.742)
Lag 12 -0.1537**
(-3.137)
-0.1546**
(-3.135)
Total R2 0.776 0.595 0.367 0.776 0.596 0.368
Regression R2 0.770 0.572 0.368 0.771 0.570 0.370
Root MSE 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017
DW Statistic 1.954 2.002 1.974
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
As expected, during combination recessionary and declining interest rate periods 
convertible bonds do not act significantly more or less like equities or more or less 
like Treasury bonds. The sign and significance of the estimated coefficients P9 and
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p]0 for the model 12 regressions suggests that periods of declining interest rates 
combined with recession insignificantly affect the return relationship between 
convertible and low-grade bonds.
The estimated intercept for the return spread regressions does not suggest that, after 
adjusting for the various movements of the independent variables, convertible bonds 
have returned significantly more than low-grade bonds. In this case, the results 
indicate that after controlling for recessionary and declining interest rate periods, there 
is no significant difference in the return performance of the two asset classes (i.e., 
except for the Dimson regression). Also, note that all four regressions generally assign 
the same sign and level of significance to each comparable estimated coefficient.
As with interest rate call and put periods, during combination recession and declining 
interest rate periods convertible and low-grade bonds display similar return generation 
processes. The sign and significance of the estimated coefficients P9 and p10 for the 
model 12 regressions suggests that periods of declining interest rates combined with 
recession do not significantly affect the return relationship between convertible bonds 
and low-grade bonds. This is in contrast to the comparisons of low-grade and high- 
grade bonds made in Chapters 6 and 7 where the reverse was true.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between 
convertible and low-grade bond returns to Treasury bond market returns during 
combination interest rate call and put periods, there is no reason to reject the 
hypothesis that the two asset classes have similar return generation processes during 
combination interest rate call and put periods. If convertible bonds were significantly 
more (less) sensitive to government bond market movements during declining interest 
rate and recessionary periods, then it would be expected that the estimated coefficient 
p9 would be significantly greater (smaller) than the same coefficient for the low-grade 
bond regression.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between 
convertible and low-grade bond returns to equity market returns during combination 
interest rate call and put periods, there is no reason to reject the hypothesis that the 
two asset classes have similar return generation processes during interest rate call and 
put periods. If convertible bonds were significantly more (less) sensitive to equity 
market movements during declining interest rate and recessionary periods, then it 
would be expected that the estimated coefficient p10 would be significantly greater 
(smaller) than the same coefficient for the low-grade bond regression.
2 6 8
4.4 Equity Call Periods
Convertible bonds and low-grade bonds were not expected to significantly differ in 
their sensitivity to Treasury bond and equity market movements during the previous 
three periods analyzed, and they did not differ significantly in these sensitivities. The 
next four periods analyzed involve equity call periods. Therefore, for convertible 
bonds there is the possibility that there may be some degree of interaction between the 
risk-free rate of interest, the value of the firm, and the equity call option which may 
cause the return generation process for convertible bonds to differ significantly from 
low-grade bonds.
Regarding convertible bond equity calls, if there was a significant affect of the 
exercise and/or increase in the probability of exercise of equity calls on convertible 
bonds relative to low-grade bonds it will become significant during periods when 
equities outperform straight corporate bonds. If convertible bonds are significantly 
more exposed to equity risk during periods when equities outperform corporate bonds, 
convertible bond returns should be more sensitive to equity market movements during 
periods when the relative positive performance of equities increases. Conversely, if 
there is a significant interaction between the risk-free rate, the value of the firm, and 
the equity call option, this relationship may not hold. Under more complex CCA risky 
debt valuation models the opposite result could occur, where convertible bond returns 
become less sensitive to equity market movements and more sensitive to government 
bond market movements.
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Table 16
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Convertible Bond 
Funds, Low-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, and Equities: Only 
for Months when Equities Outperform Bonds (Equity Call Months)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
A month is defined as a period of equity call if during the month the return on the S&P 500 total return 
index is greater than the return on low-grade corporate bonds.
1962:01 to 1994:09
Convertible
Bonds
Low-Grade
Corporate
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500 CVT - LGC 
Spread
Observations = 200 
Moments of the Distribution: 
1st - Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
2.3363%
2.8511%
0.3217
1.7360
-8.6200%
11.9800%
1.0540%
2.3357%
0.1600
1.7150
-7.0880%
9.0670%
0.7713%
2.9405%
0.3337
1.0295
-7.4200%
11.4500%
3.1935%
3.2716%
0.7399
1.6852
-5.5580%
16.3050%
1.2823%
1.8609%
1.2773
3.3341
-3.1570%
9.7990%
Tests of Normality#: 
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 11.5885 6.3816 3.7097 13.8043 9.7450
Prob>T 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
W: Normal 0.9787 0.9738 0.9799 0.9635 0.9298
Prob<W 0.2470 0.0681 0.3182 0.0014 0.0001
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Convertible bonds were slightly more volatile than low-grade bonds during equity call 
periods. For equity call months the ratio of convertible bond to low-grade bond 
standard deviation is approximately 1.22 versus 1.37 for all months. Therefore, during 
months when equity calls are more probable, there is little change in the relative 
volatility of convertible bond returns versus those of low-grade bonds.
In order to test the equity call hypothesis, the following regression models were run to 
test for the impact of equity call periods on the returns of convertible and low-grade 
bonds.
(13) CVT\ = a 0 + P, x TBRt + p2 x SMRt + p12 x TBRt x EC, + P13 x SMR, x EC, + P14 x EC, + e,
(14) LGR, = a 0 + pL x TBR, + p2 x SMR, + P12 x TBR, x EC, + P13 x SMR, x EC, + P]4 x EC, + e,
(15) CVT, -  LGR, = a 0 + P, x TBR, + P2 x SMR, + P12 x TBR, x EC, + P13 x SMR, x EC, + P14 x EC, +e, 
where EC = a dummy variable equal to one if equities outperform low-grade bonds 
and zero otherwise. The equity call dummy variable is intended to isolate the effect of 
periods when equity calls are more frequent and/or more probable for convertible 
bonds. The regression results are presented in the following two tables.
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Table 17
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of 
Convertible and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Equity Call Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effect of equity call periods. A month is defined as a period of 
equity call if during the month the return on the S&P 500 total return index is greater than the return on 
low-grade corporate bonds.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (13) (14) (15) (13) (14) (15)
1962:01 to 1994:09 13/14/15 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0105** 0.0123** -0.0018 0.0091** 0.0104** -0.0014
(7.443) (9.928) (-1.153) (6.229) (8.135) (-0.867)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0399 0.0640* -0.0240
(1.369) (2.483) (-0.749)
TBR +/+/- 0.1386** 0.2689** -0.1304** 0.1442** 0.2733** -0.1291**
(3.380) (7.497) (-2.950) (3.579) (7.683) (-2.915)
TBR (Lead 1) -0.0339 -0.0070 -0.0268
(-1.175) (-0.276) (-0.847)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0459* 0.0495** -0.0035
(2.269) (2.769) (-0.159)
SMR +/+/+ 0.7605** 0.4861** 0.2744** 0.7366** 0.4544** 0.2822**
(21 .688) (15.844) (7.260) (21.056) (14.711) (7.337)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0214 0.0264 -0.0050
(1.079) (1.507) (-0.229)
TBR x EC 7/7/0 -0.1306* -0.1338* 0.0032 -0.1217* -0.1257* 0.0040
(-2.185) (2.557) (0.049) (-2.091) (2.446) (0.062)
SMR x EC 7/7/0 -0.0350 0.0217 -0.0567 -0.0179 0.0425 -0.0604
(-0.667) (0.471) (-1.001) (-0.347) (0.932) (-1.065)
EC ?/?/? -0.0104** -0.0190** 0.0086** -0.0091** -0.0174** 0.0083**
(-4.834) (-10.102) (3.715) (-4.284) (-9.244) (3.527)
Adj. R 2 0.769 0.667 0.354 0.783 0.683 0.363
F-Statistic 261.746** 157.819** 43.963** 157.407** 94.218** 25.735**
Dependent Mean 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.002
Root MSE 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.017
DW Statistic 1.622 1.882 1.711 1.618 1.826 1.714
Observations 393 393 393 391 391 391
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 18
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Convertible 
and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Equity Call Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effect of equity call periods. A month is defined as a period of 
equity call if  during the month the return on the S&P 500 total return index is greater than the return on 
low-grade corporate bonds.
YW OLS YW ML OLS ML
Mode] (13) (14) (15) (13) (14) (15)
1962:01 to 1994:09 13/14/15 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0 .0100** 0.0123** -0.0020 0.0099** 0.0123** -0.0020
(6.359) (9.928) (-1.175) (6.164) (9.928) (-1.175)
TBR +/+/- 0.1239** 0.2689** -0.1205** 0.1219** 0.2689** -0.1198**
(3.128) (7.497) (-2.817) (3.093) (7.497) (-2.808)
SMR +1+1+ 0.7462** 0.4861** 0.2774** 0.7444** 0.4861** 0.2773**
(21.469) (15.844) (7.405) (21.425) (15.844) (7.389)
TBR x EC ?/?/0 -0.0858 -0.1338* 0.0083 -0.0803 -0.1338* 0.0085
(-1.479) (2.557) (0.132) (-1.386) (-2.557) (0.135)
SMR x EC ?/?/0 -0.0505 0.0217 -0.0555 -0.0521 0.0217 -0.0547
(-0.999) (0.471) (-1.011) (-1.037) (0.471) (-0.997)
EC ?/?/? -0.0088** -0.0190** 0.0090** -0.0086** -0.0190** 0.0090**
(-4.182) (-10.102) (3.945) (-4.089) (-10.102) (3.955)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1594**
(-3.182)
-0.1240*
(-2.474)
-0.1801**
(-3.582)
-0.1298*
(-2.583)
Lag 9 -0.1301*
(-2.595)
-0.1443**
(-2.860)
Lag 12 -0.1047*
(-2.091)
-0.1187*
(-2.354)
Total R2 0.782 0.671 0.385 0.782 0.671 0.386
Regression R2 0.778 0.671 0.387 0.779 0.671 0.389
Root MSE 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.017
DW Statistic 1.882 1.962 1.882 1.965
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
The results indicate that during equity call periods there is no significant difference in 
the relative return performance of the two asset classes. That is, the estimated 
intercept in all four regressions is not significantly different from zero. Over the study 
period, convertible and low-grade bonds did not become significantly more sensitive 
to equity market movements during equity call periods (i.e., estimated coefficient P13). 
The estimated equity call period dummy coefficient is significantly positive (i.e.,
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model 15, estimated coefficient p14) and seems to absorb most of the benefit of 
holding equity calls during equity call periods.
The embedded equity calls in convertible bonds do not have the effect of significantly 
increasing convertible bonds' sensitivity with respect to equity price movements (i.e., 
estimated coefficient p13 is negative and insignificantly so), but they do significantly 
decrease their duration with respect to Treasury bond price movements in the OLS 
regressions (i.e., estimated coefficient P12 is negative and significant at the 5% level 
of significance). This suggests that the duration of convertible bonds actually 
decreases during equity call periods. Apparently, convertible bonds may not become 
more equity-like during equity call periods, but they do become less Treasury bond­
like. Given that low-grade bonds have similar equity call period effects, the equity call 
feature embedded in convertible bonds has not produced a significant performance 
advantage for convertible bonds relative to low-grade bonds.
Overall, the results do not support the contention that during periods when convertible 
and low-grade bonds would be expected to show significantly different sensitivity to 
equity prices, they do not. During equity call periods the two asset classes appear to 
mirror each other. Convertible bonds become insignificantly less equity-like and less 
government bond-like, and low-grade bonds become insignificantly more equity-like 
and significantly less Treasury bond-like. Given that the essential difference between 
convertible bonds and low-grade bonds is the equity call feature, the equity call 
regression results do not strongly support the notion that equity call periods would be 
expected to have a significant impact on the relative performance of the two asset 
classes (i.e., especially with regard to the relative sensitivity of convertible bond 
values with respect to equity market movements).
4.5 Combination Interest Rate Call and Equity Call Periods
The following three sections analyze equity call periods combined with interest rate 
call and/or put periods. This section analyzes the effect of combination equity call and 
interest rate call periods. It is not clear whether combination periods will provide 
evidence which supports complex interactions between the risk-free rate of interest, 
firm value, and the value of the equity call option. But to the extent that CCA risky 
debt valuation models which incorporate interest rate risk apply, combination periods 
of declining interest rates and equity calls would be expected to generate the most 
significant effect on the relative sensitivity of convertible bonds to movements in the
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government bond and equity markets. Therefore, of the following three sections, the 
results of this section are of particular importance to the issue of the applicability of 
more complex CCA models to convertible bond valuation.
Table 19
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Convertible Bond 
Funds, Low-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, and Equities: Only 
for Months when Interest Rates Declined & Equities Outperformed Bonds 
(Interest Rate Call & Equity Call Months)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
A month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero. A month is defined as a period of equity call 
if during the month the return on the S&P 500 total return index is greater than the return on low-grade 
corporate bonds.
1962:01 to 1994:09
Convertible
Bonds
Low-Grade
Corporate
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500 CVT - LGC 
Spread
Observations = 93 
Moments of the Distribution: 
1st - Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
3.2748%
2.8356%
0.7526
1.2550
-2.9370%
11.9800%
2.1023%
2.1826%
0.1728
1.5594
-4.2660%
8.9440%
2.5997%
2.5754%
0.7647
0.9012
-3.1000%
11.4500%
4.4749%
3.2788%
0.9322
1.6923
-2.5180%
16.3050%
1.1725%
1.7310%
0.7028
1.4003
-3.1570%
7.1800%
Tests of Normality#: 
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 11.1373 9.2890 9.7345 13.1617 6.5324
Prob>T 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
W: Normal 0.9485 0.9672 0.9642 0.9425 0.9693
Prob<W 0.0030 0.1021 0.0619 0.0008 0.1424
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean 
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Convertible bonds were slightly more volatile than low-grade bonds during 
combination periods of declining interest rates and equity/bond outperformance. The 
ratio of convertible bond to low-grade bond standard deviation is approximately 1.30 
versus 1.37 for all months. During months when it is expected that interest rate and 
equity calls on convertible bonds and interest rate calls on low-grade bonds will be 
exercised, there is relatively no change in the volatility of convertible bond returns 
versus that of low-grade bonds. The combination of interest rate and equity calls alone 
cannot explain the volatility differential between convertible bonds and low-grade 
bonds.
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In order to test the combination declining interest rate and equity/bond 
outperformance call hypothesis, the following regression models were run to test for 
the significance of combination equity and interest rate call periods on the returns of 
convertible and low-grade bonds:
( 1 6 )  CVT, = a 0 +p, x TBR, +p2 x SMR, +p„ x TBR, x EC, x DIR, +p,6 x SMR, x EC, x DIR, +P17 x EC, x DIR, +e,
( 1 7 )  LGR, = a 0 +P, x TBR, +P2 xSMR, +P1S x TBR, xEC, x DIR, +$l6xSMR, xEC, x DIR, +P,7 xEC, xDIR, +e,
( 1 8 )  CVT, -  LGR, = a 0 + P, x TBR, +P2 xSMR, +PI5 x TBR, x EC, x DIR,+ p16 xSMR, xEC, xDIR, + P17 x EC, xDIR, +e,
These regressions are intended to capture the effect of the combined events of interest 
rate and equity calls for convertible and low-grade bonds. The coefficient p15 will 
isolate the effect that changes in Treasury bond prices have on changes in convertible 
and low-grade bond prices during periods of declining interest rates and equity/bond 
outperformance. The coefficient P16 will isolate the effect changes in equity prices 
have on changes in convertible and low-grade bond prices during periods of declining 
interest rates and equity/bond outperformance. The regression results are presented in 
the following two tables.
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Table 20
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of 
Convertible and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Interest Rate Call &
Equity Call Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effects of declining interest rate and equity call periods. A month 
is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the ten year 
constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero; and a month is defined as a period of equity call if 
during the month the return on the S&P 500 total return index is greater than the return on low-grade 
corporate bonds.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (16) (17) (18) (16) (17) (18)
1962:01 to 1994:09 16/17/18 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0065** 0.0049** 0.0017 0.0057** 0.0037** 0.0020
(6.679) (5.370) (1.630) (5.897) (4.193) (1.884)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0748* 0.1061** -0.0313
(2.518) (3.869) (-0.980)
TBR +/+/- 0.1358** 0.3457** -0.2099** 0.1396** 0.3479** -0.2083**
(3.901) (10.713) (-5.773) (4.117) (11.118) (-5.716)
TBR (Lead 1) -0.0317 0.0082 -0.0398
(-1.075) (0.301) (-1.258)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0517** 0.0611** -0.0094
(2.524) (3.230) (-0.426)
SMR +/+/+ 0.6912** 0.3606** 0.3306** 0.6824** 0.3499** 0.3325**
(27.253) (15.341) (12.483) (27.628) (15.347) (12.521)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0234 0.0307 -0.0073
(1.150) (1.638) (-0.336)
TBR x DIR x EC 7/7/0 -0.0307 -0.3493** 0.3186** -0.0073 0.3280** 0.3207**
(-0.384) (-4.708) (3.812) (-0.095) (4.606) (3.866)
SMR x DIR x EC 7/7/0 -0.0238 0.1269* -0.1507* -0.0098 0.1424* -0.1521*
(-0.384) (2.207) (-2.327) (-0.162) (2.556) (-2.344)
DIR x EC ?/?/? -0.0064* -0.0056 -0.0008 -0.0078* -0.0072 -0.0006
(-1.957) (-1.843) (-0.239) (-2.476) (-2.484) (-0.170)
Adj. R 2 0.755 0.603 0.357 0.775 0.641 0.369
F-Statistic 242.401** 120.236** 44.557** 150.452** 78.255** 26.378**
Dependent Mean 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.002
Root MSE 0.017 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.017
DW Statistic 1.545 1.781 1.740 1.551 1.755 1.753
Observations 393 393 393 391 391 391
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 21
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Convertible 
and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Interest Rate Call & Equity Call
Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effects of declining interest rate and equity call periods. A month 
is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the ten year 
constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero; and a month is defined as a period of equity call if 
during the month the return on the S&P 500 total return index is greater than the return on low-grade 
corporate bonds.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (16) (17) (18) (16) (17) (18)
1962:01 to 1994:09 16/17/18 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept 7/7/0 0.0064** 0.0049** 0.0016 0.0064** 0.0049** 0.0016
(4.287) (4.965) (1.273) (4.084) (4.875) (1.232)
TBR +/+/- 0 .1201** 0.3298** -0.1919** 0.1192** 0.3268** -0.1904**
(3.693) (10.329) (-5.430) (3.670) (10.253) (-5.385)
SMR +/+/+ 0.6782** 0.3489** 0.3367** 0.6772** 0.3467** 0.3373**
(27.758) (14.810) (12.792) (27.729) (14.625) (12.805)
TBR x DIR x EC 7/7/0 -0.0035 -0.3356** 0.3084** -0.0028 -0.3329** 0.3080**
(-0.047) (-4.565) (3.707) (-0.037) (-4.535) (3.693)
SMR x DIR x EC 7/7/0 -0.0508 0 .1210* -0.1513* -0.0523 0 .1200* -0.1511*
(-0.880) (2 .122) (-2.388) (-0.911) (2.107) (-2.388)
DIR x EC in n -0.0043 -0.0050 -0.0005 -0.0042 -0.0049 -0.0004
(-1.402) (-1.680) (-0.136) (-1.365) (-1.644) (-0.127)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1909** -0.1078* -0.1093* -0.2080** -0.1288* -0.1175*
(-3.861) (-2.130) (-2.172) (-4.206) (-2.517) (-2.327)
Lag 4 -0.1093*
(-2 .222)
-0.1158*
(-2.372)
Lag 9 -0.1176*
(-2.338)
-0.1333**
(-2.630)
Lag 12 -0.1294**
(-2.618)
-0.1362**
(-2.739)
Total R 2 0.777 0.614 0.384 0.777 0.614 0.385
Regression R 2 0.773 0.596 0.384 0.774 0.594 0.386
Root MSE 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.017
DW Statistic 1.974 1.993 1.963
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
The estimated intercept for the return spread regressions does not suggest that, after 
adjusting for the various movements of the independent variables, convertible bonds 
have returned significantly more than low-grade bonds. In this case, the results
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indicate that after controlling for combination declining interest rate and equity/bond 
outperformance periods, there is no significant difference in the return performance of 
the two asset classes. Also, note that all four regressions generally assign the same 
sign and level of significance to each comparable estimated coefficient.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between 
convertible and low-grade bond returns to Treasury bond market returns during 
combination equity and interest rate call periods, there is reason to reject the 
hypothesis that convertible bonds behave similarly to low-grade bonds during 
combination equity and interest rate call periods. If convertible bonds were 
significantly more (less) sensitive to government bond market movements during 
combination equity and interest rate call periods, then it would be expected that the 
estimated coefficient p15 would be significantly greater (smaller) than the same 
coefficient for the low-grade bond regression. The model 18 regressions show that the 
estimated coefficient p15 for the convertible bond regression is significantly larger 
than the estimated coefficient P15 for the low-grade bond regression (i.e., at the 1% 
level of significance). Therefore, this alone is strong evidence of the relative 
appropriateness of applying CCA risky debt valuation models which incorporate 
interest rate risk to convertible bond valuation. This result is in some sense the 
convertible bond equivalent of the same results for the low-grade/high-grade bond 
combination interest rate call and put period results in Chapters 6 and 7.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between 
convertible and low-grade bond returns to equity market returns during combination 
equity and interest rate call periods, there is additional reason to reject the hypothesis 
that convertible bonds behave similarly to low-grade bonds during combination equity 
and interest rate call periods. If convertible bonds were significantly more (less) 
sensitive to equity market movements during combination equity and interest rate call 
periods, then it would be expected that the estimated coefficient P16 would be 
significantly greater (smaller) than the same coefficient for the low-grade bond 
regression. The model 18 regressions show that the estimated coefficient p16 for the 
convertible bond regression is significantly smaller than the estimated coefficient P16 
for the low-grade bond regression (i.e., at the 5% level of significance). Therefore, 
this alone is evidence of the relative appropriateness of applying CCA risky debt 
valuation models which incorporate interest rate risk to convertible bond valuation. 
Again, this result is in some sense the convertible bond equivalent of the same results 
for the low-grade/high-grade bond combination interest rate call and put period results 
in Chapters 6 and 7.
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Overall, the results suggest that during periods when convertible bonds and low-grade 
bonds would be expected to show relatively equal sensitivity to government bond and 
equity prices, they do not (i.e., based on more simple CCA risky debt valuation 
models). Convertible bonds become insignificantly less Treasury bond-like and 
insignificantly more equity-like, and low-grade bonds become significantly less 
Treasury bond-like and significantly more equity-like. Given that the essential 
difference between convertible and low-grade bonds is the equity call feature, these 
regression results support more complex CCA risky debt valuation models which 
incorporate interest rate risk.
During combination declining interest rate and equity/bond outperformance periods 
convertible bonds do not significantly differ in their sensitivity to equity or 
government bond price movements. On the other hand, during combination declining 
interest rate and equity/bond outperformance periods low-grade bonds become more 
equity-like (at the 5% level of significance) and less bond-like (at the 1% level of 
significance). Relative to low-grade bonds during combination declining interest rate 
and equity/bond outperformance periods, convertible bonds act less equity-like and 
more bond-like (i.e., model 18 estimated coefficients pi6 and p15, respectively). 
Therefore, the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients p15 and p16 for the 
model 18 regressions suggests that periods of declining interest rates combined with 
equity/bond outperformance significantly affect the return relationship between 
convertible and low-grade bonds. This effect did not occur during interest rate call 
periods or during equity/bond outperformance periods. Therefore, standard CCA risky 
debt valuation models which do not account for the interaction between the risk-free 
rate of interest, firm value, and the equity call option would not be capable of 
explaining this result.
4.6 Combination Put and Equity Call Periods
This section analyzes the effect of combination equity call and put periods. The last 
section was the first section to provide evidence which supports complex interactions 
between the risk-free rate of interest, firm value, and the value of the equity call 
option. Given that this section does not explicitly analyze changes in interest rates, the 
same level of evidence in favor of CCA risky debt valuation models which 
incorporate interest rate risk is not expected.
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Table 22
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Convertible Bond 
Funds, Low-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, and Equities: Only 
for Months of Recession & when Equities Outperformed Bonds (Put & Equity
Call Months)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
A recession is defined as the period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of 
the subsequent trough. This definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
definition. A month is defined as a period o f equity call if during the month the return on the S&P 500 
total return index is greater than the return on low-grade corporate bonds.
1962:01 to 1994:09 
Observations = 26 
Moments of the Distribution: 
1st-Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
Convertible
Bonds
Low-Grade
Corporate
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500 CVT - LGC 
Spread
3.0163%
3.9954%
0.3457
-0.0391
-4.2250%
11.9800%
1.3412%
3.8083%
0.1114
-0.5967
-5.0500%
9.0670%
1.6630%
4.0133%
-0.2549
-0.2746
-7.1400%
8.3200%
4.0951%
4.9043%
0.5986
0.3497
-3.9050%
16.3050%
1.6751%
2.2369%
1.4411
2.8648
-1.6540%
8.2480%
Tests of Normality#:
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 3.8495 1.7958 2.1129 4.2577 3.8184
Prob>T 0.0007 0.0846 0.0448 0.0003 0.0008
W: Normal 0.9714 0.9612 0.9767 0.9597 0.8778
Prob<W 0.6717 0.4344 0.7999 0.4047 0.0047
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean 
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Convertible bonds were slightly more volatile than low-grade bonds during periods of 
equity/bond outperformance and recession. The ratio of convertible bond to low-grade 
bond standard deviation is approximately 1.05 versus 1.37 for all months. During 
months when it is expected that equity calls and puts on convertible bonds and puts on 
low-grade bonds will be exercised, there is relatively little change in the volatility of 
convertible bond returns versus that of low-grade bonds. The combination of equity 
calls and puts alone cannot explain the volatility differential between convertible and 
low-grade bonds.
In order to test the combination equity/bond outperformance call and recession put 
hypothesis, the following regression models were run to test for the significance of 
combination equity call and put periods on the returns of convertible and low-grade 
bonds:
2 8 0
( 1 9 )  CVTt = a 0 + P, x TBR, + P 2 xSMR, + P 18 x TBR, xEC, xR ec, +P „ xSMR, x EC, xR ec, + P 20 x EC, xR ec, +e,
( 2 0 )  LGR, = a 0 +p, x TBR, +p2 x SMR, + P lg x TBR, x EC, x Rec, + P 19 x SMR, x EC, x Rec, +P 20 x EC, x Rec, +e,
( 2 1 )  CVT, -  LGR, = a 0 +P, x TBR, +p2 xSMR, + p,g x TBR, x EC, xRec, + P 19 xSMR, x EC, x Rec, + Pjo x EC, xRec, +e,
These regressions are intended to capture the effect of the combination of equity calls 
and puts for convertible bonds and puts for low-grade bonds. The coefficient P18 will 
isolate the effect that changes in Treasury bond prices have on changes in convertible 
and low-grade bond prices during periods of equity/bond outperformance and 
recession. The coefficient p19 will isolate the effect changes in equity prices have on 
changes in convertible and low-grade bond prices during periods of equity/bond 
outperformance and recession. The regression results are presented in the following 
two tables.
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Table 23
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of 
Convertible and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Put & Equity Call
Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effects of recessionary and equity call periods. A recession is 
defined as the period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent 
trough; and a month is defined as a period of equity call if during the month the return on the S&P 500 
total return index is greater than the return on low-grade corporate bonds. The recession period is 
definition directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (19) (20) (21) (19) (20) (21)
1962:01 to 1994:09 19/20/21 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0052** 0.0040** 0.0012 0.0044** 0.0029** 0.0015
(5.823) (4.798) (1.290) (4.933) (3.527) (1.559)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0670* 0.1164** -0.0494
(2.223) (4.172) (-1.532)
TBR +/+/- 0.1023** 0.2460** -0.1437** 0.1041** 0.2453** -0.1412**
(3.182) (8.191) (-4.291) (3.332) (8.484) (-4.224)
TBR (Lead 1) -0.0331 -0.0030 -0.0301
(-1.105) (-0.109) (-0.938)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0565** 0.0616** -0.0052
(2.730) (3.219) (-0.233)
SMR +/+/+ 0.6543** 0.3344** 0.3198** 0.6477** 0.3242** 0.3235**
(29.380) (16.082) (13.794) (29.827) (16.127) (13.917)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0266 0.0342 -0.0075
(1.305) (1.807) (-0.343)
TBR x Rec x EC ?/?/0 -0.0210 -0.0048 -0.0162 0.0410 0.0563 -0.0152
(-0.195) (-0.047) (-0.145) (0.392) (0.580) (-0.136)
SMR x Rec x EC ?/?/0 0.0526 0.2340** -0.1814* 0.0392 0.2184** -0.1792*
(0.607) (2.890) (-2.009) (0.471) (2.832) (-2.010)
Rec x EC ?/?/? -0.0054 -0.0179** 0.0125** -0.0064 -0.0199** 0.0013**
(-1.202) (-4.301) (2.703) (-1.494) (-5.000) (2.929)
Adj. R 2 0.749 0.587 0.345 0.769 0.629 0.358
F-Statistic 234.653** 112.575** 42.279** 145.316** 74.364** 25.144**
Dependent Mean 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.002
Root MSE 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.017
DW Statistic 1.551 1.712 1.701 1.549 1.681 1.706
Observations 393 393 393 391 391 391
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 24
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Convertible 
and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Put & Equity Call Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effects of recessionary and equity call periods. A recession is 
defined as the period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month o f the subsequent 
trough; and a month is defined as a period of equity call if during the month the return on the S&P 500 
total return index is greater than the return on low-grade corporate bonds. The recession period is 
definition directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (19) (20) (21) (19) (20) (21)
1962:01 to 1994:09 19/20/21 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0053** 0.0042** 0.0011 0.0053** 0.0042** 0.0011
(3.520) (3.978) (0.927) (3.403) (3.845) (0.894)
TBR +/+/- 0.1013** 0.2335** -0.1301** 0.1008** 0.2313** -0.1291**
(3.399) (7.907) (-4.001) (3.386) (7.855) (-3.977)
SMR +1+1+ 0.6458** 0.3175** 0.3277** 0.6449** 0.3150** 0.3286**
(30.423) (15.599) (14.419) (30.385) (15.387) (14.444)
TBR x Rec x EC ?/?/0 -0.0229 0.0275 0.0214 -0.0215 0.0313 0.0259
(-0.227) (0.283) (0.197) (-0.212) (0.321) (0.238)
SMR x Rec x EC ?/?/0 0.0245 0.2265** -0.2155* 0.0223 0.2250** -0.2187*
(0.306) (2.891) (-2.504) (0.279) (2.880) (-2.554)
Rec x EC ?/?/? -0.0037 -0.0186** 0.0138** -0.0036 -0.0187** 0.0139**
(-0.873) (-4.501) (3.022) (-0.845) (-4.493) (3.052)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1728** -0.1351** -0.1295* -0.1875** -0.1591** -0.1389**
(-3.492) (-2.685) (-2.585) (-3.772) (-3.122) (-2.757)
Lag 5 -0.1315**
(-2.667)
-0.1346**
(-2.735)
Lag 9 -0.1283
(-2.561)
-0.1450**
(-2.872)
Lag 11 -0.1045*
(-2.076)
-0.1133*
(-2.230)
Lag 12 -0.1488**
(-3.027)
-0.1510**
(-3.047)
Total R2 0.773 0.607 0.378 0.773 0.607 0.378
Regression R2 0.767 0.582 0.379 0.768 0.580 0.382
Root MSE 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017
DW Statistic 1.959 2.000 1.963
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
The estimated intercept for the return spread regressions does not suggest that, after 
controlling for the various movements of the independent variables, convertible bonds
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have returned significantly more than low-grade bonds. In this case, the results 
indicate that after controlling for combination recession and equity/bond 
outperformance periods, there is no significant difference in the return performance of 
the two asset classes. Also, note that all four regressions generally assign the same 
sign and level of significance to each comparable estimated coefficient.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between 
convertible and low-grade bond returns to Treasury bond market returns during 
combination put and equity call periods, there is no reason to reject the hypothesis that 
convertible bonds behave similarly to low-grade bonds during combination put and 
equity call periods. If convertible bonds were significantly more (less) sensitive to 
government bond market movements during combination put and equity call periods, 
then it would be expected that the estimated coefficient p18 would be significantly 
greater (smaller) than the same coefficient for the low-grade bond regression. The 
model 21 regressions show that the estimated coefficient p18 for the convertible bond 
regression is insignificantly smaller than the estimated coefficient p18 for the low- 
grade bond regression.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between 
convertible bond and low-grade bond returns to equity market returns during 
combination put and equity call periods, there is evidence to reject the hypothesis that 
convertible bonds behave similarly to low-grade bonds during combination put and 
equity call periods. If convertible bonds were significantly more (less) sensitive to 
equity market movements during combination put and equity call periods, then it 
would be expected that the estimated coefficient p19 would be significantly greater 
(smaller) than the same coefficient for the low-grade bond regression. The model 21 
regressions show that the estimated coefficient p19 for the convertible bond regression 
is significantly smaller than the estimated coefficient p19 for the low-grade bond 
regression (i.e., at the 5% level of significance).
Overall, the results suggest that during periods when convertible and low-grade bonds 
would be expected to show relatively equal sensitivity to Treasury bond and equity 
markets, they do not. During combination equity call and put periods convertible 
bonds become insignificantly less government bond-like and insignificantly more 
equity-like, while low-grade bonds become insignificantly more government bond­
like and significantly more equity-like. Given that the essential difference between 
convertible and low-grade bonds is the equity call feature, the combination recession 
and equity/bond outperformance regression results support more complex CCA risky
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debt valuations models which incorporate interactions between the various embedded 
options.
During combination recession and equity/bond outperformance periods convertible 
bonds do not significantly differ in their sensitivity to equity or Treasury bond market 
movements. On the other hand, during combination recession and equity/bond 
outperformance periods low-grade bonds become more equity-like (at the 1% level of 
significance) and insignificantly more bond-like. Relative to low-grade bonds during 
combination recession and equity/bond outperformance periods, convertible bonds act 
less equity-like (i.e., model 21 estimated coefficient p19). Therefore, the sign and 
significance of the estimated coefficient P19 for the model 21 regressions suggests that 
periods of recession combined with equity/bond outperformance significantly affect 
the return relationship between convertible and low-grade bonds. This effect did not 
occur during recession periods or during equity/bond outperformance periods. 
Therefore, standard CCA risky debt valuation models which do not incorporate 
interaction effects among the embedded options would not be capable of explaining 
this result.
4.7 Combination Interest Rate Call, Put, and Equity Call Periods
This section analyzes the effect of combination equity call, put, and interest rate call 
periods. The last two sections were the first sections to provide evidence which 
supports complex interactions between the risk-free rate of interest, firm value, and 
the value of the equity call option. Given that this section does explicitly analyze 
changes in interest rates, evidence in favor of CCA risky debt valuation models which 
incorporate interest rate risk is expected.
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Table 25
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Convertible Bond 
Funds, Low-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, and Equities: Only 
for Months when Interest Rates Declined & Recession & when Equities 
Outperformed Bonds (Interest Rate Call & Put & Equity Call Months)
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
A month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 
ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero. A recession is defined as the period 
immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. This 
definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition. A month is defined as 
a period of equity call if during the month the return on the S&P 500 total return index is greater than 
the return on low-grade corporate bonds.
1962:01 to 1994:09
Convertible
Bonds
Low-Grade
Corporate
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500 CVT- LGC 
Spread
Observations =16  
Moments of the Distribution: 
1st - Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
3.6766%
4.0931%
0.5239
0.0075
-2.9370%
11.9800%
2.0884%
3.4906%
-0.3067
-0.5329
-4.2660%
7.9920%
3.6793%
2.9227%
0.2446
-1.1702
-6.8000%
8.3200%
4.9104%
4.9872%
0.6946
0.4444
-2.0150%
16.3050%
1.5883%
1.9850%
1.3268
3.5942
-1.6540%
7.1800%
Tests of Normality#: 
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 3.5930 2.3931 5.0355 3.9385 3.2005
Prob>T 0.0027 0.0302 0.0001 0.0013 0.0060
W: Normal 0.9412 0.9387 0.9460 0.9459 0.8953
Prob<W 0.3593 0.3304 0.4202 0.4193 0.0686
# The first test of normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean 
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Convertible bonds were more volatile than low-grade bonds during periods of 
declining interest rates, equity/bond outperformance, and recession. The ratio of 
convertible bond to low-grade bond standard deviation is approximately 1.17 versus 
1.37 for all months. During months when it is expected that equity calls, puts, and 
interest rate calls on convertible bonds and puts and interest rate calls on low-grade 
bonds will be exercised, there is relatively little change in the volatility of convertible 
bond returns versus that of low-grade bonds. The combination of equity calls, puts, 
and interest rate calls alone cannot explain the volatility differential between 
convertible bonds and low-grade bonds.
In order to test the combination equity/bond outperformance call, recession put, and 
declining interest rate call hypothesis, the following regression models were run to
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test for the significance of combination equity call, put, and interest rate call periods 
on the returns of convertible and low-grade bonds:
(22) CVT, = a 0+P, x TBR, +p2 x5M ^+P21 xTBR, xEC, xRec, xDIR, +P22 xSMR, y-EC, xRec, x DIR,+ P23 x EC, xRec, x DIR, + e,
(23) LGR, = a 0 +P, x TBR, +P2 xSMR, +P21 x TBR, *EC, xRec, x DIR, + p22 x.SMR,x.EC, xRec, x£)/^+p23x £ q  xRec, xDIR, +e,
(24) CVT, -  LGR, = a 0+P, x TBR, +P2 x SMR, +P21 x TBR, x EC, x Rec, x DIR, 4-p^ x SMR, x EC, x Rec, x DIR, +P23 x EC, x Rec, x DIR, +e,
These regressions are intended to capture the relative effect of the combined events of 
equity calls, puts, and interest rate calls for convertible bonds and puts and interest 
rate calls for low-grade bonds. The coefficient P21 will isolate the effect that changes 
in Treasury bond prices have on changes in convertible and low-grade bond prices 
during periods of equity/bond outperformance, recession, and declining interest rates. 
The coefficient p22 will isolate the effect changes in equity prices have on changes in 
convertible and low-grade bond prices during periods of equity/bond outperformance, 
recession, and declining interest rates. The regression results are presented in the 
following two tables.
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Table 26
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of 
Convertible and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Interest Rate Call & Put
& Equity Call Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effects of declining interest rate, recessionary, and equity call 
periods. A month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in 
yield on the ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero; a recession is defined as the 
period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough; and a 
month is defined as a period of equity call if during the month the return on the S&P 500 total return 
index is greater than the return on low-grade corporate bonds. The recession period is definition 
directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (22) (23) (24) (22) (23) (24)
1962:01 to 1994:09 22/23/24 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept ?/?/0 0.0052** 0.0037** 0.0014 0.0043** 0.0025** 0.0018
(5.840) (4.453) (1.564) (4.887) (3.061) (1.866)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0679* 0.1112** -0.0434
(2.256) (3.935) (-1.341)
TBR +/+/- 0.1024** 0.2644** -0.1619** 0.1075** 0.2666** -0.1591**
(3.266) (8.927) (-4.938) (3.532) (9.316) (-4.855)
TBR (Lead 1) -0.0346 0.0045 -0.0371
(-1.156) (0.088) (-1.151)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0583** 0.0613** -0.0030
(2.818) (3.150) (-0.133)
SMR +1+1+ 0.6557** 0.3377** 0.3181** 0.6476** 0.3270** 0.3206**
(30.092) (16.410) (13.961) (30.445) (16.351) (14.002)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0262 0.0376 -0.0114
(1.280) (1.955) (-0.518)
TBR x DIRxRecxEC ?/?/0 0.1249 -0.0944 0.2193 0.2413 0.0108 0.2305
(0.674) (-0.540) (1.132) (1.334) (0.063) (1.184)
SMR x DIRxRecxEC ?/?/0 -0.0079 0.2254* -0.2333* -0.0194 0.2147* -0.2342*
(-0.073) (2.186) (-2.044) (-0.185) (2.170) (-2.067)
DIR x Rec x EC ?/?/? -0.0086 -0.0167* 0.0082 -0.0125 -0.0217** 0.0092
(-1.201) (-2.485) (1.096) (-1.816) (-3.346) (1.235)
Adj. R2 0.749 0.578 0.340 0.770 0.618 0.353
F-Statistic 234.755** 108.449** 41.335** 145.872** 71.147** 24.595**
Dependent Mean 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.002
Root MSE 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.017
DW Statistic 1.547 1.746 1.723 1.546 1.726 1.732
Observations 393 393 393 391 391 391
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 27
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Convertible 
and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - Interest Rate Call & Put & Equity
Call Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
These regression results compare the effects o f declining interest rate, recessionary, and equity call 
periods. A month is defined as a period of declining interest rates if during the month the change in 
yield on the ten year constant maturity Treasury bond is less than zero; a recession is defined as the 
period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough; and a 
month is defined as a period of equity call if during the month the return on the S&P 500 total return 
index is greater than the return on low-grade corporate bonds. The recession period is definition 
directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (22) (23) (24) (22) (23) (24)
1962:01 to 1994:09 22/23/24 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept 7/7/0 0.0053** 0.0038** 0.0014 0.0053** 0.0038** 0.0014
(3.481) (4.074) (1.165) (3.366) (3.994) (1.127)
TBR +/+/- 0.0910** 0.2511** -0.1469** 0.0976** 0.2487** -0.1457**
(3.371) (8.607) (-4.607) (3.358) (8.553) (-4.576)
SMR +/+/+ 0.6468** 0.3251** 0.3256** 0.6459** 0.3229** 0.3264**
(31.129) (15.930) (14.587) (31.080) (15.774) (14.611)
TBR x DIRxRecxEC 7/7/0 0.1658 -0.1143 0.2817 0.1669 -0.1177 0.2884
(0.979) (-0.672) (1.499) (0.988) (-0.694) (1.533)
SMR x DIRxRecxEC 7/7/0 -0.0468 0.2189* -0.2725* -0.0495 0.2178* -0.2761*
(-0.463) (2.143) (-2.433) (-0.488) (2.128) (-2.471)
DIR x DIR x EC ?/?/? -0.0076 -0.0146* 0.0076 -0.0075 -0.0142* 0.0076
(-1.148) (-2.196) (1.056) (-1.130) (-2.140) (1.050)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1750** -0.1254* -0.1185* -0.1902** -0.1485** -0.1284*
(-3.541) (-2.484) (-2.362) (-3.829) (-2.904) (-2.545)
Lag 5 -0.1320**
(-2.679)
-0.1356**
(-2.763)
Lag 9 -0.1308**
(-2.606)
-0.1456**
(-2.880)
Lag 12 -0.1526**
(-3.109)
-0.1536**
(-3.108)
Total R2 0.774 0.591 0.371 0.774 0.591 0.372
Regression R2 0.768 0.571 0.373 0.769 0.568 0.375
Root MSE 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017
DW Statistic 1.953 1.992 1.961
Observations 393 393 393 391 391 391
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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The estimated intercept for the return spread regressions does not suggest that, after 
adjusting for the various movements of the independent variables, convertible bonds 
have returned significantly more than low-grade bonds. In this case, the results 
indicate that after controlling for combination declining interest rates, recession, and 
equity/bond outperformance periods, there is no significant difference in the return 
performance of the two asset classes. Also, note that all four regressions generally 
assign the same sign and level of significance to each comparable estimated 
coefficient.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between 
convertible and low-grade bond returns to Treasury bond market returns during 
combination interest rate call, put, and equity call periods, there is no reason to reject 
the hypothesis that convertible bonds behave similarly to low-grade bonds during 
combination interest rate call, put, and equity call periods. If convertible bonds were 
significantly more (less) sensitive to government bond market movements during 
combination interest rate call, put, and equity call periods, then it would be expected 
that the estimated coefficient p 21 would be significantly greater (smaller) than the 
same coefficient for the low-grade bond regression. The model 24 regressions show 
that the estimated coefficient p 21 for the convertible bond regression is insignificantly 
larger than the estimated coefficient p 21 for the low-grade bond regression.
Based on the estimated coefficient for the sensitivity of the spread between 
convertible bond and low-grade bond returns to equity market returns during 
combination interest rate call, put, and equity call periods, there is evidence to reject 
the hypothesis that convertible bonds behave similarly to low-grade bonds during 
combination interest rate call, put, and equity call periods. If convertible bonds were 
significantly more (less) sensitive to equity market movements during combination 
interest rate call, put, and equity call periods, then it would be expected that the 
estimated coefficient p22 would be significantly greater (smaller) than the same 
coefficient for the low-grade bond regression. The model 24 regressions show that the 
estimated coefficient p22 for the convertible bond regression is significantly smaller 
than the estimated coefficient P22 for the low-grade bond regression (i.e., at the 5% 
level of significance).
Overall, the results suggest that during periods when convertible and low-grade bonds 
would be expected to show relatively equal sensitivity to Treasury bond and equity 
market movements, they do not. Convertible bonds become insignificantly more 
Treasury bond-like and insignificantly less equity-like, while low-grade bonds
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become insignificantly less Treasury bond-like and significantly more equity-like. 
Given that the essential difference between convertible and low-grade bonds is the 
equity call feature, the combination declining interest rates, recession, and 
equity/bond outperformance periods regression results support more complex CCA 
risky debt valuations models which incorporate interest rate risk and/or interactions 
between the various embedded options.
During combination declining interest rates, recession, and equity/bond 
outperformance periods convertible bonds do not significantly differ in their 
sensitivity to equity or government bond market movements. On the other hand, 
during combination declining interest rates, recession, and equity/bond 
outperformance periods low-grade bonds become more equity-like (at the 5% level of 
significance) and insignificantly less bond-like. Relative to low-grade bonds during 
combination declining interest rates, recession, and equity/bond outperformance 
periods, convertible bonds act significantly less equity-like (i.e., model 24 estimated 
coefficient p22). Therefore, the sign and significance of the estimated coefficient p22 
for the model 24 regressions suggests that periods of declining interest rates and 
recession combined with equity/bond outperformance significantly affect the return 
relationship between convertible and low-grade bonds. This effect did not occur 
during declining interest rate periods or during recession periods or during 
equity/bond outperformance periods. Therefore, standard CCA risky debt valuation 
models which do not incorporate interest rate risk and/or interaction effects among the 
embedded options would not be capable of explaining this result.
5 Convertibles and the January Effect
A slight digression is in order to evaluate whether convertible bonds display a January 
returns generation process which significantly differs from low-grade bonds. The 
following table provides summary statistics for the asset classes examined in this 
chapter for the month of January.
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Table 28
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Returns of Convertible Bond 
Funds, Low-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, and Equities:
January Only
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds generally invest at least 80% 
of assets in corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
1962:01 to 1994:09
Convertible
Bonds
Low-Grade
Corporate
Treasury
Bonds
S&P 500 CVT- LGC 
Spread
Observations = 33 
Moments o f the Distribution: 
1st - Mean
2nd - Standard Deviation 
3rd - Skewness 
4th - Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum
2.5152%
3.8185%
0.5842
-0.2531
-3.6190%
11.6100%
2.0361%
2.8743%
0.5580
0.8442
-3.8720%
9.0670%
0.1869%
2.8686%
-0.2949
0.7167
-7.4200%
6.6700%
1.6989%
5.4205%
0.2979
-0.3516
-7.6470%
13.1770%
0.4791%
2.6291%
1.6852
3.8348
-3.0820%
9.7990%
Tests o f Normality#: 
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 3.7839 4.0694 0.3744 1.8005 1.0469
Prob>T 0.0006 0.0003 0.7106 0.0812 0.3030
W: Normal 0.9559 0.9598 0.9854 0.9675 0.8668
Prob<W 0.2423 0.3095 0.9409 0.4812 0.0006
# The first test o f normality is Student's t value for testing the null hypothesis that the population mean
is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the 
values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
Convertible bonds were slightly more volatile than low-grade bonds during the month 
of January, but not significantly so. During January, the ratio of convertible bond to 
low-grade bond standard deviation is approximately 1.33 versus 1.37 for all months. 
Equities were clearly the most volatile during the month of January. In addition, of the 
four asset classes, only Treasury bonds are slightly negatively skewed. Whereas, of 
the three bond asset classes, low-grade bonds have been distributed relatively 
platykurtically over the period under study.
The tests for normality suggest that, at standard levels of statistical significance, all 
four asset class return are drawn from a random sample from a normal distribution 
(i.e., the Shapiro-Wilk test). Only the two corporate bond asset class return series 
reject the null hypothesis that mean of each respective distribution is equal to zero. At 
normal levels of statistical significance, only the two corporate bond asset class return 
series have means which are significantly positive. Across all values presented, the 
two corporate bond asset classes appear to mirror each other during the month of 
January.
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Given that low-grade bonds display a January effect (e.g., see Blume et al. [1991]), 
does this result extend to convertible bonds? Specifically, after controlling for 
Treasury bond and equity market movements, do convertible bonds display a January 
effect? The following regression models were run for the convertible and low-grade 
bond asset classes:
(24) CVTt = a 0 + pj x TBRt + p2 x SMRt + P24 x JanDVt + et
(25) LGRt = a 0 + Pj x TBR, + P2 x SMRt + P24 x JanDVt + et
(26) CVTt -  LGR, = a 0 + pj x TBRt + p2 x SMRt + P24 x JanDVt + en
where JanDV = a dummy variable equal to one if the month is January and zero 
otherwise. The following two tables provide the results for the January effect 
regressions.
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Table 29
Coefficients from Two Factor Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of 
Convertible and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - January Effect
Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
Dimson Dimson Dimson
Model (25) (26) (27) (25) (26) (27)
1962:01 to 1994:09 25/26/27 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign# Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept 7/7/0 0.0042** 0.0024** 0.0018 0.0041** 0.0027** 0.0014*
(4.651) (2.802) (1.876) (4.555) (3.219) (1.409)
TBR (Lag 1) 0.0608* 0.1061** -0.0453
(2.043) (3.769) (-1.418)
TBR +/+/- 0.1082** 0.2622** -0.1540** 0.1093** 0.2577** -0.1484**
(3.590) (9.181) (-4.803) (3.663) (9.132) (-4.638)
TBR (Lead 1) -0.0313 -0.0018 -0.0295
(-1.055) (-0.064) (-0.928)
SMR (Lag 1) 0.0568** 0.0621** -0.0053
(2.766) (3.197) (-0.241)
SMR +/+/+ 0.6471** 0.3334** 0.3136** 0.6468** 0.3332** 0.3136**
(31.007) (16.860) (14.129) (31.391) (17.099) (14.193)
SMR (Lead 1) 0.0269 0.0402 -0.0133
(1.310) (2.069) (-0.603)
January Dummy ?/+/? 0.0098** 0.0118** -0.0020 0.0002 -0.0075 0.0076
(3.207) (4.090) (-0.628) (0.050) (-2.621) (2.358)
Adj. R 2 0.756 0.590 0.335 0.769 0.612 0.355
F-Statistic 404.870** 186.354** 66.728** 186.272** 88.893** 31.633**
Dependent Mean 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.002
Root MSE 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.017
DW Statistic 1.554 1.693 1.727 1.536 2.301 1.722
Observations 393 393 393 391 391 391
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 30
Coefficients from Two Factor Regressions using the Yule-Walker and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods of Estimating the Autoregressive Parameters of Convertible 
and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns - January Effect Regressions
The data are monthly returns. All values are derived from Momingstar. Each return series represents 
the average net returns on all open-end bond funds for that asset class. Asset class definitions were 
based on Lipper definitions. Convertible bond funds invest primarily in bonds and preferred stocks that 
can be converted into common stocks. Low-grade corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in 
corporate bond issues rated below BBB.
YW YW YW ML ML ML
Model (25) (26) (27) (25) (26) (27)
1962:01 to 1994:09 25/26/27 Low- Low-
Explanatory Expected Convert. Grade Return Convert. Grade Return
Variables Sign# Corp. Corp. Spread Corp. Corp. Spread
Intercept m/o 0.0044** 0.0026** 0.0017 0.0044** 0.0026** 0.0017
(2.946) (2.634) (1.442) (2.888) (2.597) (1.407)
TBR +/+/- 0.1047** 0.2470** -0.1390** 0.1043** 0.2448** -0.1380**
(3.707) (8.785) (-4.406) (3.690) (8.730) (-4.377)
SMR +/+/+ 0.6376** 0.3194** 0.3187** 0.6366** 0.3175** 0.3191**
(32.358) (16.515) (14.735) (32.240) (16.379) (14.749)
January Dummy ?/+/? 0.0091** 0.0118** -0.0019 0.0090** 0.0118** -0.0019
(2.849) (4.222) (-0.617) (2.851) (4.227) (-0.609)
AR Parameters:
Lag 1 -0.1789** -0.1523** -0.1161* -0.1910** -0.1745** -0.1234*
(-3.623) (-3.036) (-2.316) (-3.863) (-3.456) (-2.451)
Lag 5 -0.1311** -0.1350**
(-2.662) (-2.752)
Lag 9 -0.1190* -0.1306**
(-2.374) (-2.597)
Lag 12 -0.1359** -0.1336**
(-2.771) (-2.710)
Total R2 0.777 0.601 0.360 0.778 0.601 0.361
Regression R 2 0.771 0.578 0.360 0.771 0.576 0.362
Root MSE 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.018
DW Statistic 1.967 1.989 1.963
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393
T-statistics are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Convertible bonds do display a strong January effect. As is the case in the return 
spread regression which does not include the January dummy variable (i.e., model 3), 
the estimated intercept for the return spread regression is positive but not significant. 
The estimated January dummy coefficients for convertible bonds have roughly the 
same level of January effect as those for low-grade bonds. Therefore, regarding the 
January effect, convertible bonds and low-grade bonds are roughly equivalent. 
Although beyond the scope of this paper, a more detailed analysis of the convertible 
bond January effect would be a worthwhile analysis.
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6 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter is the first to analyze the pricing of convertible bonds by examining the 
financial performance of open-end convertible bond funds over the period 01/62 
through 09/94. The following are several findings of this chapter: (1) in general, after 
adjusting for government bond and equity market movements, convertible bonds have 
not outperformed low-grade bonds over the study period, (2) convertible bonds are 
significantly more equity-like and significantly less bond-like than low-grade bonds, 
and (3) convertible bonds display a strong January effect. Furthermore, the results 
suggest that the equity call option embedded in convertible bonds has been 
appropriately price over the period 01/62 through 09/94.
During periods of declining interest rates, recession, or combination periods of 
declining interest rate and recession, convertible bonds do not demonstrate 
significantly different volatility compared to that of low-grade bonds (i.e., during the 
three periods which correspond to those examined in Chapters 6 and 7). In addition, 
during the following combination periods convertible bonds do not demonstrate 
significantly different volatility compared to that of low-grade bonds: (1) equity/bond 
outperformance, (2) declining interest rates and equity/bond outperformance, (3) 
recession and equity/bond outperformance, and (4) declining interest rates, recession, 
and equity/bond outperformance. This would imply that much of the volatility 
differential between convertible and low-grade bonds is generated over many different 
periods, not just one.
Regarding the hypothesis that convertible bonds have significantly weaker interest 
rate call protection and/or relatively more interest rate calls than low-grade bonds, the 
tests performed in this chapter do not support such an assertion. Regarding the 
hypothesis that convertible bonds have significantly weaker put protection and/or 
relatively more puts than low-grade bonds, the tests performed in this chapter do not 
support such an assertion. Regarding the hypothesis that convertible bonds have 
significantly weaker interest rate call and put protection and/or relatively more interest 
rate calls and puts than low-grade bonds, the tests performed in this chapter do not 
support such an assertion. Therefore, convertible bonds display similar return 
generation processes during the three periods which correspond to those examined in 
Chapters 6 and 7 (i.e., interest rate call periods, put periods, and combination interest 
rate call and put periods).
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Regarding the relative sensitivity of convertible and low-grade bonds to movements in 
the government bond and equity markets, the overall results of the tests conducted 
support more complex CCA risky debt valuation models which incorporate interest 
rate risk and the interaction of the principal embedded options. The following table 
provides a summary of the tests conducted.
Table 31
A Comparison of Expectations and Outcomes for Convertible versus Low-Grade
Bonds
Simple CCA & Credit Spread Effect Expectations
Expectation Expectation
for Sensitivity to for Sensitivity to
Treasury Bonds Stocks
(est. P3, p6, (est. p4, P7,
P9’ Pl2> P i59 Pl0> P l3’ Pl69
Period under Study P189 P21) Pl99 P22)
Interest Rate Call Periods (i.e., declining interest rates) 0/0 0/0
Put Periods (i.e., recessions) 0/0 0/0
Equity Call Periods (i.e., equities outperform bonds) 0/0 or + 0/0 or -
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods):
Interest Rate Call & Put Periods 0/0 0/0
Interest Rate Call & Equity Call Periods 0/0 or + 0/0 or -
Put & Equity Call Periods 0/0 or + 0/0 or-
Both Calls & Put Periods 0/0 or + 0/0 or -
Realization for Convertible vs. Low-Grade Bonds 
(cut-off at the 5% level of significance)
1962:01 through 1994:09
Sensitivity to 
Treasury Bonds
Sensitivity to 
Stocks
Interest Rate Call Periods (i.e., declining interest rates) 0 0
Put Periods (i.e., recessions) 0 0
Equity Call Periods (i.e., equities outperform bonds) 0 0
Combination Periods (Call & Put Periods):
Interest Rate Call & Put Periods 0 0
Interest Rate Call & Equity Call Periods + -
Put & Equity Call Periods 0 -
Both Calls & Put Periods 0 -
Of the four periods where some possible differences in expectations exist, the 
following three provide evidence which would support more complex CCA risky debt 
valuation models: (1) combination interest rate call and equity call periods, (2)
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combination put and equity call periods, and (3) combination interest rate call, put, 
and equity call periods. Of these three, the strongest supportive evidence comes from 
the combination of declining interest rates (i.e., interest rate call periods) and 
equity/bond outperformance (i.e., equity call periods). Clearly, convertible bonds are 
complex securities whose value is affected by interest rate changes not just through its 
effect on the underlying pure bond component of the security. Also, it is clearly 
important to capture interactions between the various embedded options in a 
convertible bond (i.e., particularly the equity call option versus all other embedded 
options).
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CHAPTER 9
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
This thesis had the following nine primary objectives: (1) review important laws and 
regulations affecting distressed firms, (2) review the empirical literature on the costs 
of bankruptcy to provide the background to the empirical chapter on the losses 
incurred during successful bankruptcy, (3) further address the question of the size and 
magnitude of the costs of distress and examine several factors which might affect the 
total costs of successful bankruptcies, (4) review the relevant literature on risky debt 
pricing and empirical studies on risky debt returns, (5) establish the theoretical 
expectations regarding the three related risky bond empirical chapters, (6) generally 
extend the empirical literature on low-grade corporate bond financial performance, (7) 
begin empirical literature on low-grade municipal bond financial performance, (8) 
generally extend the empirical literature on convertible bond financial performance, 
and (9) provide evidence to support more complex CCA models of risky bond pricing.
1 Summary o f Preceding Chapters
This section provides a summary of the main results derived from Chapters 2 through 
8. The objective of Chapter 2 was to satisfy objective #1. There was no 
comprehensive source of information on U.S. laws and regulations in regards to 
distressed firms and their securities. This thesis gathered together a unique set of 
publications in order to provide a reasonably comprehensive overview of important 
laws and regulations. Also, some statistics were presented to provide background on 
specific issues of importance to this thesis (e.g., the rate of Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 
since the inception of the Code). The following is a list of some principal areas 
addressed in Chapter 2: (1) the Code, (2) Chapter 7 and 11, (3) the Doctrine of
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Absolute Priority, (4) the Doctrine of Fraudulent Conveyance, (5) DIP financing, (6) 
prepackaged Chapter 11s versus restructurings, (7) low-grade bond covenants, (8)
U.S. tax consequences of restructuring debt, (9) OID, (10) NOL limitations, (11)
COD, (12) accounting for debt restructurings, and (13) low-grade firm financial 
statements. In reviewing these and other areas, it was clear that a substantial amount 
of future research can be made regarding the laws and regulations affecting distressed 
firms.
The objective of Chapter 3 was to satisfy objective #2. Chapter 3 began with a general 
discussion of the motivation behind empirical work on the costs of bankruptcy. The 
bankruptcy cost issue is often motivated by models which trade-off the tax shield 
generated by issuing debt against the costs of bankruptcy. A review of the various 
costs of bankruptcy (i.e., both direct costs and indirect costs) was made. Finally, a 
review of the empirical studies on the costs of bankruptcy were reviewed and results 
regarding a scale effect for the direct costs of bankruptcy were reviewed. The 
following limitations of the studies reviewed were noted: (1) regarding the 
administrative costs of bankruptcy, a reliance on generally small samples which 
tended to be industry and/or geographic specific; (2) little or no evidence on the total 
costs of, or losses associated with, bankruptcy; and (3) very little evidence on the 
scale effect of the administrative costs of bankruptcy and none regarding whether 
there is a scale effect for the total costs of bankruptcy.
The objective of Chapter 4 was to satisfy objective #3. A measure incorporating many 
indirect costs of Chapter 11s which emerged from bankruptcy court protection was 
proposed (i.e., a measure of the total losses incurred during Chapter 11). The losses of 
"successful" Chapter 11 were found to be large, representing about 24% of asset 
value. Except for the very largest firms, losses were found to be an increasing function 
of firm size. This may be principally due to the fact that the indirect costs of 
bankruptcy are larger than the direct costs of bankruptcy. Regression analyses were 
performed which suggested that the total losses incurred during successful bankruptcy 
were at least in part a function of firm size, time spent under court protection, and the 
relative level of debt. In addition, it was found that time spent under Bankruptcy 
Court protection varied significantly between some court districts and for the very 
smallest firms examined. This suggests that at least regarding one indirect measure of 
the efficiency of the Chapter 11 process (i.e., time to plan of reorganization 
confirmation), venue and size can matter.
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The objective of Chapter 5 was to satisfy objectives #4 and #5. Chapter 5 began by 
reviewing several motivations for research on the low-grade corporate bond asset 
class. Several seemingly anomalous observations and/or statements were noted. For 
example, the observation by Cornell and Green [1991] that low-grade corporate bonds 
were more sensitive to interest rates during recessions. In order to place some of the 
unresolved issues mentioned in context, a review of previous research on low-grade 
corporate bond returns was made. In order to reconcile some past empirical 
observations with more recent theory in the field of risky bonds, a review of some 
relevant CCA literature on risky bond valuation was made. The importance of 
embedded options in explaining the observed return generation process for risky 
bonds was made in order to generate the theoretical expectations regarding the three 
related empirical chapters (i.e., Chapters 6 through 8). After establishing the CCA 
based expectations, the hypotheses and the research method were detailed. Finally, a 
summary of the three risky bond asset class studies was made.
The objective of Chapter 6 was to satisfy objectives #6 and #9. Chapter 6 is an 
empirical study on the performance of low-grade corporate bond funds. The following 
are the principal low-grade corporate bond contributions: (1) extends risky bond 
pricing literature by examining the effects embedded options have on the financial 
performance of low-grade corporate bonds relative to high-grade corporate bonds; (2) 
provides some evidence to support more complex CCA models of risky bond pricing 
which incorporate both a stochastic firm value and risk-free interest rate; (3) provides 
some evidence which does not support the contention that low-grade corporate bonds 
are called more early and/or have significantly weaker call protection than high-grade 
corporate bonds over the period 1/60 through 9/94; and (4) generally extends the 
empirical literature on low-grade corporate bond financial performance.
The objective of Chapter 7 was to satisfy objectives #7 and #9. Chapter 7 is an 
empirical study on the performance of low-grade municipal bond funds. The 
following are the principal low-grade municipal bond contributions: (1) first to 
analyze the risk and return of low-grade municipal bonds by examining the financial 
performance of low-grade open-end municipal bond funds over the period 1/78 
through 9/94; (2) generally extends the low-grade/high-grade corporate result to the 
municipal market; and (3) finds some evidence to support the contention that, after 
controlling for risk with a particular two factor model, low-grade municipal bonds 
have outperformed high-grade municipal bonds over the study period.
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The objective of Chapter 8 was to satisfy objectives #8 and #9. Chapter 8 is an 
empirical study on the performance of convertible bond funds. The following are the 
convertible bond contributions: (1) in general convertible bonds have not 
outperformed straight low-grade corporate bonds over the study period 1/62 through 
9/94; (2) convertible bonds are significantly more equity-like and significantly less 
bond-like than straight low-grade corporate bonds; (3) convertible bonds display a 
strong January effect; and (4) the results suggest that the equity call option embedded 
in convertible bonds has been appropriately priced over the study period.
2 Limitations of the Studies
Chapters 1 through 3 and 5 were intended as background chapters, and this chapter 
contains the summary and conclusions. Therefore, comments regarding limitations of 
the studies apply primarily to Chapters 4 and 6 through 8. Given that the studies were 
primarily empirical studies, many of the limitations discussed are related to sample 
limitations.
The principal limitation of the study performed in Chapter 4 was that the sample was 
composed exclusively of successful Chapter 11s. Although, this restriction was made 
in order to make the analysis more applicable to this form of bankruptcy. It may be 
that the absolute size of the cost of bankruptcy and relationships between the losses 
incurred during bankruptcy and the variables studied do not hold for Chapter 7s or 
unsuccessful Chapter 11s.1 Also, another limitation was that the measure of the losses 
incurred during bankruptcy was designed to measure the losses incurred during 
Chapter 11. Therefore, the measure used may not be universally applicable to all 
bankrupt firms.
Chapters 6 through 8 all suffered from data series length limitations. The principal 
limitation of the study performed in Chapter 6 is the length of the time series under 
study (i.e., 34 3/4 years of monthly data). Although, this restriction was made based 
on data availability and it was the longest data set available (i.e., more than twice that 
of one study highlighted). The principal limitation of the study performed in Chapter 
7 is the length of the time series under study (i.e., 16 3/4 years of monthly data).
1 Actually, this was the argument made to support the contention that this measure of the cost of 
bankruptcy was a lower bound measure for the total cost of bankruptcy. Of course, this assumes that 
the relative cost of Chapter 7 is greater than that of Chapter 11.
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Although, this restriction was made based on data availability and it was the longest 
data set available. The principal limitation of the study performed in Chapter 8 is the 
length of the time series under study (i.e., 32 3/4 years of monthly data). Although, 
this restriction was made based on data availability and it was the longest data set 
available.
Chapters 6 through 8 all suffer from the problem of possible nontrading. Of course, 
this is a problem endemic to all risky assets and it is not clear if it is only partially 
caused by nontrading, or even caused by nontrading at all. As mentioned by Lo and 
MacKinlay [1990], it is difficult to know whether nonsynchronicity of asset prices is 
caused by economic forces or mismeasurement or some combination thereof. Of 
course, this is a limitation but it might also be a useful future research topic to attempt 
to sort through the possible institutional and more economic based causes of 
nonsynchronous risky asset prices.
3 Suggestions for Future Research
This thesis was motivated by the premise that those areas of finance related to distress 
and low-grade securities have been under researched. Therefore, it should not be 
surprising that this thesis generates many suggestions for future research. The 
following suggestions are in no way intended to be a complete list of possible research 
related to that in the thesis. In addition, it should be noted that the literature in the area 
has expended greatly since I began writing the thesis.
Even though Chapter 2 was intended as a background chapter, the following is a list 
of possible future research suggestions motivated by the chapter: (1) a study on the 
relationship between legal low-grade bond seniority and recovery rates (i.e., measure 
and analyze the extent to which legal seniority does not guarantee recovery seniority), 
(2) a study on the economic value of DIP financing (e.g., Does DIP financing indicate 
economic viability or does it primarily indicate and/or induce agency problems?), (3) 
a study on the impact of large bankruptcy case rulings on the pricing of low-grade 
debt (i.e., the impact of specific legal events on the perceived probabilities of 
negotiated settlements and security valuation), (4) a study on the extent to which 
limitations on dividends covenants limit or enhance stockholder-bondholder conflict 
(of course other critical convents could be studied), and (5) a study on the extent to 
which tax laws affect restructuring negotiation outcomes (e.g., Do OIDs and COD
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discourage or encourage out-of-court settlements and prepacks?). Obviously, more 
than one dissertation could be written focusing on the above issues alone.
There are two central suggestions for future research derived from Chapter 4. The first 
is concerned with other possible factors influencing the total cost of bankruptcy. For 
example, creditors, customers, suppliers, managers, employees, product, and other 
court specific factors (i.e., other than court district) could be analyzed. Although, it 
might be very challenging to operationalize many of these factors for empirical 
analysis. Evidence of their significance might lend additional support to the theory 
that indirect costs, not the administrative costs, drive the total costs of bankruptcy.
The same analysis could also be applied to Chapter 7 firms. The second area for future 
research derived from Chapter 4 was regarding district 10. Given that most empirical 
studies have used data gathered from this district, yet it is a largely unrepresentative 
district (i.e., at least regarding successful Chapter 1 Is) it would seem useful to break 
out what it is about the Southern District of New York which makes it unique. For 
example, is it the judges, trustees, or types of firms filing which create the systematic 
cost differentials and success rates in that district?
A few comments should be made regarding the field of distress research. First, there 
are significant data problems. For example, often it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
find anything other than book values or court derived values for bankrupt firms. 
Therefore, there is a natural tendency to focus on large publicly traded firms which 
file for bankruptcy and have publicly traded equity. Although, the vast majority of 
firms which file for bankruptcy are small start-up firms. Clearly, this may be one 
effect impacting the results found in Chapter 4. Relatively new small firms probably 
have a high level of asset specificity and, therefore, they may be required to propose 
high levels of proposed payments in order to have their reorganization plans 
confirmed. Second, the nature of much of the research in the area tends to lend itself 
to small sample studies. For example, there aren't many large Chapter 11 cases and 
even fewer large Chapter 7 cases, and there are many idiosyncratic factors affecting 
distressed firms. Clearly, one bankruptcy court judge may be significantly more 
positively inclined to rule in favor of creditors over managers, while another judge 
may be of the polar opposite inclination. In short, in studying distress it is often 
difficult to make generalisations. Research result generalisations may be much more 
common in more liquid financial markets with more easily obtainable data than more 
illiquid financial markets with hard to obtain data.
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There are two rather general suggestions for future research derived from Chapter 6 
through 8. The first is regarding asset class duration. For example, what effect do the 
upgradings of low-grade debt and downgradings of high-grade debt have on their 
respective asset classes (i.e., corporate and municipal)? Of course, there are many 
other duration effects on various asset classes which could be studied. The second 
suggestion is regarding the call rate on low-grade versus high-grade debt. That is, 
historically, what exactly has the respective call rate for the respective asset classes 
been (i.e., corporate and municipal)?
Regarding low-grade debt at a macroeconomic level, a more general area of future 
research could be pursued by examining the following causation puzzle: do credit 
spread changes cause recessions or do recessions (i.e., the possibility of recession) 
cause credit spreads to change? In Chapters 6 through 8 much analysis was performed 
by isolating the impact of recessionary periods on the return generation process of 
low-grade bonds, but there remains the question as to whether credit spreads respond 
to the changes in the business cycle or whether the business cycle responds to changes 
in credit spreads (i.e., or some combination). Credit spreads have been used in macro 
economic forecasting models (e.g., Chen [1991]) and equity and debt market return 
forecasting models (e.g., Chen et al. [1986]), but they all implicitly presuppose that 
causation runs from credit spread to the economy not vice versa. This type of analysis 
would extend the work done by Jaffee [1975] on the cyclical variations in the risk 
structure of interest rates (i.e., default premiums and the macro economy). One 
problem with this area of research is that, unlike the work on term structure, there isn't 
a directly observable measure (i.e., term to maturity).
Ignoring this thesis, given that there has been no academic research on low-grade 
municipal bonds to date, there are a large number of possible research projects 
available in the area of low-grade municipal bonds. Specifically, as mentioned in 
Chapter 7, further research could be done in the area of sorting through the impact of 
the January effect and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the return generation process 
for low-grade municipal bonds (or any other municipal asset class for that matter). In 
addition, no academic default study has been performed on municipal bonds (i.e., the 
Altman [1989] and Asquith et al. [1989] studies on low-grade corporate bond 
mortality could be used as potential guides).2 Finally, there is the issue of a CCA
2 There has been some work on predicting defaulted GOs, but the data the analysis is based on goes 
back to the 1930s (see Hempel [1973]). In short, a thorough study on default rates for revenue bonds is 
lacking.
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risky municipal debt valuation model which might incorporate specific municipal 
market risks (see Yawitz [1978] on municipal default risk) and/or modify the 
corporate risky debt risks to more closely suit the municipal market (e.g., municipality 
default risk which may differ significantly from corporate default risk).
Clearly, the potential for research in areas directly and indirectly related to those areas 
studied in this thesis are immense. That is one of the principal reasons for my research 
in the area in the first place. The key will be to first select those future research topics 
which will have the greatest impact on the field per unit of cost, and that is a task in 
and of itself.
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APPENDIX 1
ADJUSTING FOR NONTRADING
This appendix is intended as background to the assertion that adjusting for the 
potential effects of nontrading doesn't significantly affect the autocorrelation of the 
municipal bond regressions run. Cornell and Green [1991] included a lead and a lag 
term for each of the market return factors in the regressions for low-grade and high- 
grade corporate bond returns in order to "take account of the potential impact of 
nontrading." This Dimson [1979] adjustment was intended to reduce the impact of 
lagged movements in bond prices. That is, the stale trading adjustment was intended 
to reduce the effect of autocorrelation in the market model equation.3 Firstly, did this 
adjustment reduce autocorrelation in the regressions for low-grade and high-grade 
bond returns? More specifically, did the adjusted equation show significantly fewer 
time series problems with its error term than a more simple model? Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is: H0: the adjustment for nontrading significantly reduced time series 
problems associated with the error term of a model using the adjustment relative to a 
model without the adjustment.
Taken directly from Cornell and Green [1991], the following equation measures the 
sensitivity of low-grade bond returns to changes in the long-term risk-free rate of 
interest, changes in high-cap equity prices, and includes the Dimson adjustment for 
nontrading (i.e., a lead and a lag of the RHS variables):
(1) LGR, = a0 + P, x TBRl+i + P2 x TBRt + P3 x TBR,r_, + P4 x SP500R,+l + p5 x SP500R, + P6 x SP500RIr_, + e, 
where LGR = low-grade bond return, TBR = Treasury bond return, SP500R = 
Standard & Poor's 500 return, and e is the error term. The following equation 
measures the sensitivity of low-grade bond returns to changes in the long-term risk­
free rate of interest and changes in high-cap equity prices:
3 Although, Fowler and Rorke [1983, p. 279] concluded "that the Dimson procedure is incorrect and 
cannot generally be expected to yield consistent beta estimates."
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(2) LGRt = a 0 + P2 x TBRt + P5 x SP500Rt +er
These same models were applied to low-grade and high-grade municipal bond returns. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide the regression results for low-grade and high-grade municipal 
bonds, respectively.
Table 1
Regressions of Low-Grade Municipal Bond Returns with and without the
Adjustment for Nontrading
Models 1 & 2 Adj.
<*o Pi P2 P 3 P4 P5 P 6 R2 DW SEE
78:01 to 94:09
(1) Coefficient 0.002 -0.036 0.405 0.089 0.070 0.080 -0.071 0.596 1.832 0.014
t-statistic 1.57 -1.14 12.94** 2.81** 2.73** 3.12** -2.76**
(2) Coefficient 0.002 0.425 0.081 0.560 1.820 0.015
t-statistic 1.95 13.37** 3.11**
** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Table 2
Regressions of High-Grade Municipal Bond Returns with and without the
Adjustment for Nontrading
Models 1 & 2 Adj.
« o  Pi P2 Ps P4 Ps P 6 R2 DW SEE
78:01 to 94:09
(1) Coefficient 0.001 -0.016 0.453 0.091 0.058 0.083 -0.084 0.645 1.849 0.014
t-statistic 1.00 -0.50 14.53** 2.91** 2.29* 3.28** -3.29*
(2) Coefficient 0.001 0.477 0.082 0.612 1.841 0.015
t-statistic 1.30 15.03** 3.16**
* denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** denotes significance at the 1% level.
If the adjustment for stale trading was justified, a regression run without the 
adjustment should show a statistically significant greater amount of autocorrelation 
than a regression run with the adjustment. Based on models 1 and 2, several tests were 
run to check for the effect of the stale trading adjustment on the error term. These tests 
checked for the presence of autoregressive (AR) and moving average (MA) processes 
of the error term of the regressions run. The principal test used was the Breusch- 
Godfrey test.
The first four rows of Table 3 present the results of eight tests run to check for the 
presence of an AR(p) or MA(q) process of the error term for the regressions run to 
evaluate the return performance of low-grade and high-grade bonds. The AR and MA 
processes were both tested at one and twelve lags (i.e., p=l and q=l, and p=12 and 
q=12, respectively). The AR(p) process evaluated was
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et = p x x et_x + p 2 x e,_2 + + p l2 x e,_12 + v, and the MA(q) process evaluated was
et = v, + flj x v,_j + a2 x v,_2 + +au x v,_12, where et is the random disturbance term
at time t.
To test for the presence of autocorrelation, the Breusch-Godfrey test uses the OLS 
residuals to test the joint significance of the first p autocorrelations of the estimated 
coefficients. Given that the data used in this study was monthly, 12 lags were used to 
run the test. Given that the test applies to both the AR and MA hypotheses, the test 
was run for each. Therefore, four tests were run for each regression (i.e., a total of 
sixteen tests were run). An AR(1) and AR(12) test for the two-factor model and 
Dimson adjusted model, and an MA(1) and MA(12) test for the two-factor model and 
Dimson adjusted model were run for each regression.
In order to calculate the Breusch-Godfrey test for the null hypothesis that there was no 
significant amount of autocorrelation up to twelve lags of the error term, the following 
procedures were run: (1st) apply OLS to the equation being estimated, (2nd) regress
A
the estimated residual et on the relevant dependent variables (depending if the model
A  A
is the two-factor model or two-factor model with Dimson adjustment), et~\, et-2 ,.........,
A
e,~n and calculate the R2 , (3rd) calculate TxR2 (where T is the sample size and the 
statistic is distributed chi-square with p degrees of freedom). Explicitly, to test for the 
presence of autocorrelation in the unadjusted two-factor model regressions, the 
following null hypothesis was tested for each regression: H0: the estimated R2 of the 
estimated equation
A  A A A  A  A  A A A  A
et -  a+ P j x et-\ + p 2 x et-\ +........ +p n x et-n + pj x XI, + p2 x X2, + v, is 0, where XI
and X2 are the two independent variables (i.e., RHS variables). The same procedures 
can be run to test for the presence of an MA(12) process. Explicitly, to test for the 
presence of a moving average process in the unadjusted two-factor model regression, 
the following null hypothesis was tested for each regression: H0: the estimated R2 of 
the estimated equation
A  A A A  A  A  A A A  A
et = a + q l x v t-i + q 2xvt- \+  + ^12xv/-i2 + pjXXI, + p2xX 2, +v, is 0.
Additionally, Q-statistics are reported. The Q-statistics reported were run to test 
whether the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions of the residuals of the 
factor models regressions and Dimson adjusted regressions were distributed as white 
noise. That is, that the residuals were distributed randomly. The null hypothesis is that 
the residuals were not correlated. Regarding autocorrelations, all twelve lags of
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autocorrelations will sum to approximately zero if no autocorrelation is present over
a 2
twelve lags. To test for autocorrelation up to lag twelve, the Q-test is Q -  T ^ r  ,
a  2 A  A
where rn is the product moment correlation between et and et-P (p=l,2, 12). If
the null hypothesis is true, Q is distributed as chi-square with twelve degrees of
a 2
freedom. Explicitly, the null hypothesis is H0: ^ r n = 0. Regarding partial
autocorrelations (i.e., moving average), all twelve lags of partial autocorrelations will 
approximately sum to zero if no moving average is present. Explicitly, the null
a 2  a 2  a
hypothesis is / /0: J / i2 = 0, where m  is the product moment correlation between et
and vt-q (q=l,2,.........12). A high Q-statistic implies that the residuals are not random.
The Q-tests provide an additional check on the Breusch-Godfrey results.
Table 3
Breusch-Godfrey and Q-Statistic Test Results
These tests evaluate the extent to which the adjustment for nontrading effects the error term of the full 
period regressions.
Chi-Square Statistic
Breusch-Godfrey Test High-Grade Low-Grade
Model 2 (1 Lag of Residuals) 1.27 1.65
Model 2 (1 Lag of Error Residuals) 0.18 0.22
Dimson Model 1 (1 Lag of Residuals) 1.15 1.39
Dimson Model 1 (1 Lag of Error Residuals) 0.06 0.06
Model 2 (12 Lags of Residuals) 25.53* 33.81**
Model 2(12 Lags of Error Residuals) 15.74 24.94*
Dimson Model 1 (12 Lags of Residuals) 19.40 30.55*
Dimson Model 1(12 Lags of Error Residuals) 12.72 25.25
Q Statistic - Test for White Noise
Model 2 (12 Lags of Residuals) 22.23* 32.41**
Model 2 (12 Lags of Error Residuals) 12.20 22.85*
Dimson Model 1 (12 Lags of Residuals) 17.76 26.79**
Dimson Model 1 (12 Lags of Error Residuals) 10.86 24.15*
* denotes significance at the 5% level, ** denotes significance at the 1% level o f significance.
Except for the model 2 regression using 12 lags of residuals, the high-grade bond 
regressions showed no statistically significant evidence of an AR or MA process. 
Therefore, for the high-grade bond return regressions there is virtually no statistical 
justification for an adjustment for stale trading.
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For low-grade bonds, both the Breusch-Godfrey and white noise tests for an AR(12) 
process showed a statistically significant level of autocorrelation. Therefore, an 
adjustment for stale trading for the low-grade bond return regressions would be called 
for if it significantly reduces the level of autocorrelation. In both cases, the Dimson 
adjustment slightly decreased autocorrelation. Regarding both the Breusch-Godfrey 
and white noise tests for the presence of a MA(12) process, the Dimson adjustment 
slightly increased the effect (e.g., the Breusch-Godfrey test statistic increased from 
24.94 to 25.25). Regarding the Breusch-Godfrey tests for the presence of an AR(1) 
and MA(1) process, the tests only displayed a moderate decrease in statistical 
significance after the adjustment for nontrading.
Given that the purpose of the Dimson adjustment was to eliminate a nontrading bias, 
thus eliminating autocorrelation, the tests run indicate that the adjustment made did 
not unambiguously reduce evidence of nontrading for the monthly return series of the 
low-grade and high-grade municipal bond asset class return series under study. In 
addition, first order effects were not statistically significant in any regression.
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The Effect of Embedded Options 
on the Financial Performance of 
Convertible Bond Funds
John Kihn
This study is the first to analyze the pricing o f convertible bonds by examining the 
financial performance o f open-end convertible bond funds. The findings indicate that 
(I) in general, convertible bonds did not outperform straight low-grade corporate 
bonds during the study period, January 1962 through September 1994; (2) 
convertible bonds are significantly more equitylike and significantly less bondlike 
than low-grade bonds; and (3) convertible bonds display a strong January effect. The 
results suggest that the equity call option embedded in convertible bonds was 
appropriately priced during the study period.
,ne of the first and most interesting applica­
tions of option pricing theory or contingent 
claims analysis (CCA) has been the analysis of 
convertible bonds. 1 Although many theoretical 
studies have modeled the valuation of convertible 
bonds, relatively little empirical research has been 
based on CCA. Of the empirical work that has been 
performed on convertible bonds, most has been 
directed at analyzing and rationalizing the seem­
ingly abnormal call behavior of firms that call the 
convertible bonds thev have issued.“ This studv is 
the first to use CCA as the framework for analyzing 
the long-run financial performance and relative 
financial performance of convertible bonds as an 
asset class.3
One of the primary questions this studv an­
swers is the extent to which convertible corporate 
bonds as an asset class have underperformed or 
outperformed straight low-grade corporate bonds. 
That is, over a long period are risk-adjusted con­
vertible bond returns greater than low-grade bond 
returns? The study makes the following contribu­
tions: (1) It generally extends financial research on 
convertible bond returns, (2) it applies CCA to the 
analysis of the financial performance of convert­
ible bonds, and (3) it evaluates the relative financial 
performance of the convertible bond and low- 
grade bond asset classes.4  Table 1 presents the 
means, standard deviations, and correlations of
John Kihn is at Kihn Consulting in Lorane, Oregon.
the asset class return series.
Convertible bonds have returned more than 
low-grade bonds but at a higher level of risk (if risk 
is measured as standard deviation). Convertible 
bond returns are significantly more positivelv cor­
related with equity returns than with Treasury 
bond returns. Clearly, convertible bonds have 
been more exposed to risks associated with equi­
ties than those associated with Treasury bonds.
BONDS WITH EMBEDDED OPTIONS
Bond options are often referred to as "embedded 
options" because they are explicit and implicit op­
tions that cannot be detached from the security. 
This study is focused on the effects the embedded 
options have on the pricing of convertible and 
low-grade bonds as asset classes. Therefore, we 
particularly examined periods when the effects of 
puts and calls might be expected to increase signifi­
cantly.- The analysis portion of the study is focused 
on periods when calls and puts would be expected 
to be exercised and/or the probability of exercise 
increases significantly for convertible bonds. This 
approach isolates the impact embedded options 
have on the returns of convertible and low-grade 
corporate bonds.
Convertible bonds are a type of corporate 
bond for which the owner typically has the option 
to exchange the bond (at par) for common stock (at 
the exercise price) of the issuing entity. Ignoring 
illiquidity, the three embedded options of a con-
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of the Returns of Convertible Bond Funds,
Low-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, High-Grade Corporate Bond Funds, Treasury Bonds, and 
Equities, January 1962 to September 1994
C o r p o r a t e  B o n d s
C o n v e r t i b l e  L o w - G r a d e  H i g h - G r a d e
S ta t i s t i c  B o n d s  C o r p o r a t e s  C o r p o r a t e s  T r e a s u r y  B o n d s  S & P  3 0 0
O b s e r v a t i o n s  =  3 9 3  
M o m e n t s  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  (% )
1 st: M e a n  0 .9 4 0 1  0 .6 8 1 5  0 .5 5 4 1  0 .5 6 6 3  0 .5 S t» 6
2 n d :  S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  3 .3 7 4 7  2 .4 5 8 9  1 .8 3 2 0  2 .9 7 0 5  4 .3 0 0 7
C o r r e l a t i o n s  
L o w - g r a d e  c o r p o r a t e s  0 .7 6 5 * *
H i g h - g r a d e  c o r p o r a t e s  0 .4 4 5 * *  0 .6 2 4 * *
T r e a s u r y  b o n d s  0 .3 6 6 * *  0 .5 0 5 * ’  0 .8 3 3 * *
S & P  5 0 0  0 .8 6 2 * *  0 .6 9 ° * *  0 .4 0 0 ”  0 .3 3 2 * *
Note: T h e  d a t a  a r e  m o n t h l y  r e t u r n s .  E x c e p t  f o r  T r e a s u r y  b o n d s  a n d  t h e  S & P  5 3 3  e q u i t y  s e r i e s ,  a!! m u t u a l  f u n d  v a l u e s  a r e  d e r i v e d  
f r o m  M o m i n g s t a r .  E a c h  m u t u a l - f u n d - d e r i v e d  r e t u r n  s e r i e s  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  a v e r a g e  n e t  r e t u r n s  o r  a l l  o p e n - e n d  b o n d  f u n d s  f o r  t h a t  
a s s e t  c la s s .  A s s e t  c l a s s  d e f i n i t i o n s  a r e  b a s e d  o n  L i p p e r  M o m i n g s t a r  d e f i n i t i o n s .  C o n v e r t i b l e  b o r n  f u n d s  i n v e s t  p r i m a r i l y  i n  b o n d s  
a n d  p r e f e r r e d  s t o c k s  t h a t  c a n  b e  c o n v e r t e d  i n t o  c o m m o n  s t o c k s .  L o w - g r a d e  - p o r a t e  b o n d  f u n d s  g e n e r a l l y  i n v e s t  a t  l e a s t  SO 
p e r c e n t  o f  a s s e t s  in  c o r p o r a t e  b o n d  i s s u e s  r a t e d  b e l o w  B B B . H i g h - g r a d e  c o r p o r a t e  b o n d  f u n d s  g e n e r a l l y  i n v e s t  a t  l e a s t  SO p e r c e n t  o f  
a s s e t s  in  c o r p o r a t e  b o n d  i s s u e s  r a t e d  A  o r  h i g h e r .
”  d e n o t e s  s ig n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  1 p e r c e n t  l e v e l .
vertible bond are an interest rate call option, a 
default or put option, and an equity call option. A 
straight corporate bond does not have an equity 
call option. CCA views default as the case in which 
equity holders put the company to bondholders. 
That is, bond default is equivalent to the exercise 
of a put option held by equity holders. Like most 
corporate bonds, most convertible bondholders 
have explicitly written call options and ail have 
implicitly written put options. Unlike most corpo­
rate bonds, however, convertible bondholders 
hold a call option on some amount of the equity of 
the issuing firm.6  Also, like most corporate bonds 
and municipal bonds, the interest rate call option 
is exercised when interest rates decline enough 
from the time of issuance to make it profitable for 
the issuing entity to exercise.
Ignoring illiquidity, the following is a simpli­
fied contingent claims view' of the general equa­
tions of the five types of securities analyzed in this 
study:
• TBNDi = Bi, where TBNDi is the value of 
Treasury bond i and Bi is the value of risk-free 
bond i;
• HGCi = Bi -  CJR, where HGCi is the value of
I D
high-grade corporate bond i and C is the 
value of interest rate call option /;
• LGCi = Bi -  CilR -  PiDflt, where LGCi is the 
value of low-grade corporate bond i and 
PiDflt is the value of default or put option i;
• CNVRTi = Bi -  Ci -  Pi0*11 + , where
CNVRTi is the value of convertible corporate 
bond i and CiEqty is the value of equity call op­
tion i; and
• EQTYi = PiDflt + CiEqty, where EQTYi is the 
value of equity security i.
Clear’v, from a CCA viewpoint, convertible bonds 
appear to be the most complex security listed. They 
are composed of all four of the building blocks that 
form all five security tvpes. Treasury' bonds are the 
simplest security type listed and, by definition, are 
an element of all of the bond security types.
As one works down the security hierarchy, 
certain options distinguish one bond or asset type 
from another. What distinguishes an HGC from a 
TBND is CIR, what distinguishes an HGC from an 
LGC is PD^ ', and what distinguishes a CNVRT  
from a straight LGC is C£<?f-V. In addition, as the 
value of the equity call option increases (goes far­
ther into the money), the value of a convertible 
bond approaches CNVRTi = Bt -  CJR -  PiDflt + 
EQTY, which reduces to CNVRTi = B, -  C-IR + 
CiEqtj. Therefore, as equity' call options increase in 
value and the convertible bond becomes more 
equity like, it is not clear that the convertible bond 
will respond to its embedded put option. This 
example illustrates the complexities involved with 
evaluating the financial performance of complex 
risky bonds, which is what this study is designed 
to do. Wre evaluated the financial performance of 
convertible bonds during periods when their three 
embedded options would be expected to increase 
in value. Therefore, the key to empirical CCA is 
identifying when these embedded options are ex­
ercised and/or the probability of exercise in­
creases. For direct comparisons of financial per­
formance, convertible bonds are evaluated against 
low'-grade bonds.
The volatility of bonds with embedded op­
tions is complicated by the various covariance 
terms. Assuming the portfolio weights sum to 1, 
the follow'ing is the relationship for the variance of
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return on a straight low-grade, or risky, bond:
crii = ag-Os -  ;ccr + a 'cr -  2(av:rrGhr *
-  n ’ ruT^-CK ),
where op.r is the covariance between the risk-free 
bond and the put, Gp.c is the covariance between 
the risk-free bond and the interest rate call, and op.c 
is the covariance between the put and the interest 
rate call. Therefore, if the options embedded in 
riskv bonds sufficiently negatively covarv with 
each other and /or the risk-free bond, the variance 
associated with a risky bond may be less than that 
of a risk-free bond.
CCA, for example, does not always specify the 
relationship between certain key option valuation 
factors. An increase (decrease) in the risk-free rate 
of interest will decrease (increase) the value of a 
risk-free bond and tend to increase the value of the 
interest rate call option primarily by increasing the 
value of the underlving bond (although the call 
option will decrease in value as rates drop), but it 
mav or mav not affect the value of the put option. 
In the case of an increase in the risk-free rate of 
interest, the direction of the change in value of the 
put option will depend on whether the decrease in 
put value caused by the increase in the discount rate 
dominates the possibility that the value of the firm 
declines because of an increase in the risk-free rate 
of interest. Based on CCA. changes in the value of 
the firm and changes in the risk-free rate of interest 
are negatively correlated. Thus, if the correlation 
coefficient between changes in the value of the firm 
and changes in the risk-free rate of interest is suffi­
cient to dominate the discount effect, then as the 
risk-free rate of interest increases, the value of the 
firm may increase and the value of the put option 
decrease. The reverse will hold if the correlation 
coefficient between changes in the value of the firm 
and changes in the risk-free rate of interest is posi­
tive or zero (or only slightly negative).
This study particularly addresses the possibil­
ity that the correlation between changes in the 
value of the firm and changes in the risk-free rate 
of interest is significant enough to have an impact 
on the returns of the convertible bond asset class 
over time. Of course, the most interesting case 
would be that the correlation between the value of 
the firm and the risk-free rate of interest is such that 
a decrease in the value of the risk-free bond is at 
least partially offset by a decrease in the value of 
the put option, which seems to be the case with 
straight low-grade bonds.8
The foregoing analysis generally applies to a 
portfolio of risky bonds or a risky-bond asset class. 
Of course, in addition to the interaction between 
the changes in value of a risk-free bond, an embed­
ded put, and an embedded interest rate call for
each riskv bond, an interaction mav also exist be­
tween each component of the individual riskv 
bonds forming the portfolio or the asset class un­
der studv, which can affect the volatility of the 
portfolio or asset class. The duration of a portfolio 
is defined as
N
DPortfolio = ^  Di,
i= 1
where D: is the duration of the risk-free bond or 
embedded option, i 9 Therefore, ceteris paribus and 
assuming all embedded positions are long posi­
tions, the greater the number of embedded options 
whose price changes negatively covary with the 
underlving bond's price changes, the farther out of 
the monev are the embedded options that covarv 
positively with their underlying bond price move­
ments; the farther in the monev are the embedded 
options that covarv negatively with their underly­
ing bond price movements, the lower the expected 
duration of the portfolio or asset class. The intrigu­
ing aspect of empirical finance is that actual data 
over a relatively long period are available to ana­
lyze  some of the effects of portfolios of embedded 
options.
Critical to this studv is the identification of 
periods when bond calls and puts would be ex­
pected to be exercised and/or their probability of 
exercise increases significantly relative to all other 
periods. For interest rate call periods, we used 
periods of declining interest rates. Bonds would be 
expected to be called and/or their probability of 
exercise increases when interest rates decline. For 
put/default periods, we used periods of recession, 
when defaults increase. For equity call periods, we 
used periods when equities outperformed straight 
risky bonds. The equity call option would be ex­
pected to be exercised and/or the probability of 
exercise increases when equity values increase 
more rapidly than bond values. Table 2 summa­
rizes the expectation for the relative sensitivity of 
convertible versus low-grade bond returns over 
interest rate call, put/default, equity call, and com­
bination call and put/call periods.
Based on the foregoing analysis, convertible 
bonds are not expected to differ from low-grade 
bonds in their interest rate call propensities or put 
propensities. Therefore, relative to low-grade 
bonds, convertible bonds would not be expected to 
be relatively more or less sensitive to Treasury 
bond market movements or more or less sensitive 
to stock market movements during interest rate 
call or put periods. Given that straight low-grade 
bonds do not possess an equity call option, how­
ever, convertible bonds would be expected to be 
more sensitive to stock market movements during
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Table 2. Expectations for Periods under Study: Simple CCA Expectations
E x p e c ta t i o n  f o r  S e n s i t i v i t y  E x p e c ta t io n  f o r  S e n s i t i v i t y
P e r io d  u n d e r  S t u d v  t o  T r e a s u r y  B o n d s  to  S to c k s
I n t e r e s t  r a t e  c a l l  p e r i o d s  0  0
P u t  p e r i o d s  0  0
E q u i ty  c a l l  p e r i o d s  0  +
C o m b i n a t i o n  p e r i o d s  
I n t e r e s t  r a t e  c a l l / p u t  p e r i o d s  0  0
I n t e r e s t  r a t e  c a l l / e q u i t v  c a l l  p e r i o d s  0  +
E q u i ty  c a l l  p u t  p e r i o d s  0  +
equity call periods. These same expectations apply 
to combination periods. The interaction between 
the various embedded options mav dominate dur­
ing combination periods so as to render some ex­
pectations invalid, but knowing a priori what ex­
pectations may not hold is difficult.
Because of the complex nature of the embed­
ded options in various types of bonds and their 
portfolio and asset class effects, the expected risk- 
return relationship for each asset class analvzed 
can be nontrivial. For example, defaults have been 
shown to have an asymmetric effect on the finan­
cial performance of the two corporate bond asset 
classes. 10 That is, defaults and the probability of 
default have a greater effect on low-grade bonds 
than on high-grade bonds. Therefore, the relative 
lack of defaults for high-grade bonds tends to 
make them more volatile relative to low-grade 
bonds.
In addition, CCA has shown that, in theory, 
the interaction between the put option and the 
interest rate call option can be significant. 11 Be­
cause the effect and interaction of the various em­
bedded options on convertible bonds as an asset 
class is an issue in this study, we empirically tested 
this theoretical observation. Also, it has been 
shown that the lower the quality of the bond (i.e., 
the riskier the bond), the more relevant CCA may 
be for valuing corporate bonds. 1 2  Therefore, CCA 
is more applicable to low-grade bond asset classes 
than to high-grade bonds. 13 Given that the con­
vertible bond and straight low-grade bond return 
series used in this study are mostly composed of 
lower grade bonds. '1 thev make useful asset 
classes for analyzing h e  effects of options on bond 
pricing.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Critical to this studv is a clear comparison between 
the convertible and low-grade bond asset classes. 
Therefore, to put the analysis in context, the fol­
lowing regressions were run for convertible and 
low-grade bond returns:
CSVRT, = a  -  (3-CSR ) + (T.« SMR:) -  e, (1)
LGR, = oto + %(TBR > -  P?(SA1R,) + e. (2)
CSVRT,  -  LGR, = a. + ( V T B R . )  +  ( T ( S M R .)  +  e; (3)
where CNVRT is the convertible bond return, LCR 
is the low-grade bond return, TBR is the Treasury 
bond return, SMR is the stock market return, and 
e is the error term. The intercept term can be inter­
preted as the level of abnormal returns associated 
with the return series after controlling for bond 
market and stock market risk.
Table 3 provides results for the convertible and 
low-grade bond returns. Ch er the sample period 
and after controlling for bond and stock market 
movements, convertible bonds returned slightly 
more than low-grade bonds, but not significantly 
more. As expected, convertible bonds were signifi-
Table 3. Two-Factor Regressions of Convertible Bond and Low-Grade Corporate 
Bond Returns, January 1962-September 1994
(/-statistics in parentheses)
C o e f f i c i e n t s
D u r b i n - S t a n d a r d
M o d e l <*o Pi P3 A d j.  R2 W a ts o n E r r o r
E q u a t i o n  1 0 .0 0 5 0 .1 0 2 0 .6 5 4 0 .7 5 0 1 .5 4 0 0 .0 1 7
(5 .7 4 )* * (3 .34)** (3 1 .1 0 )* *
E q u a t i o n  2 0 .0 0 3 0 .2 5 4 0 .3 4 1 0 .5 7 0 1 .7 1 0 0 .0 1 6
(4 .0 6 )* * (8 .7 5 )* * (1 6 .0 0 )* *
E q u a t io n  3 0 .0 0 2 - 0 .1 5 3 0 .3 1 2 0 .3 3 6 1 .7 3 2 0 .0 1 8
(1 -7 7 ) ( -4 .7 8 )* * (1 4 .1 5 )* *
** d e n o t e s  s ig n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  1 p e r c e n t  l e v e l .
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cantlv less sensitive to bond market movements 
than low-grade bonds, and convertible bonds were 
significantly more sensitive to stock market move­
ments than low-grade bonds. Essentially, these re­
sults largely confirm the CCA view of convertible 
bonds; that is, as expected, the presence of the 
equity call option tends to increase the sensitivity 
of convertible bonds to stock market movements, 
especially relative to bond market movements.
Given that low-grade bonds display a January 
effect, 1 ? does this result extend to convertible 
bonds? Specifically, after controlling for Treasury 
bond market movements and large capital stock 
market movements, do convertible bonds display 
a January effect i* The following regression model 
was run for the convertible bond and low-grade 
bond asset classes:
A C h R t  = « , 0 ; -  >.\1Rt )
+ ’’.DVt)  — (4)
where AC/sR is the asset class return and JanDV is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the month is Janu­
ary and zero otherwise. Table 4 provides the re­
gression results for the January effect. Convertible 
bonds display a strong January- effect. In addition, 
the estimated intercept for the convertible bond 
regression remains significant when the January- 
dummy is introduced. This result suggests that the 
positive abnormal returns associated with convert­
ible bonds are not principally determined during 
the month of January.1-
To the extent that certain risks in a portfolio or 
asset class offset each other (e.g., owning a put and 
the underlving security ) or increase diversification 
(thereby reducing the overall risk of the portfolio or 
asset class), being exposed to a larger number of 
risks does not necessarily increase overall portfolio 
or asset class risk. For example, given that stocks 
and bonds are not perfectly correlated, the fact that 
loyv-grade bond prices covarv with stock and bond 
prices offers some diversification effect, but stock 
and bond prices are not perfectly correlated over 
time. In addition to the stock/bond diversification 
effect, there may also be an effect with respect to the 
put and call options written on most loyv-grade
bonds. In effect, calls and puts may be valued and 
exercised over all the bonds in the asset class in 
such a wav as to contribute to a lower asset class 
duration for convertible bonds than for loyv-grade 
bonds.
Call Periods
High-grade bonds are significantly more sen­
sitive to interest rate changes than are loyv-grade 
bonds. 1 7  This relative lack of interest rate sensitiv­
ity has been attributed by some to the higher rela­
tive call rate for loyv-grade bonds. If this yvere the 
case, the sensitivity of low-grade bond returns to 
risk-free bond returns should decline significantly 
during periods when the call option should be 
exercised (i.e., during periods of declining interest 
rates). This assertion was tested bv examining the 
behavior of low-grade bond returns relative to 
high-grade bond returns during periods of declin­
ing interest rates. 1 8  The return spread between 
low-grade and high-grade bonds showed no sig­
nificant difference during periods of declining in­
terest rates. Relative to high-grade bonds, the sen­
sitivity of low-grade bond returns to risk-free bond 
return movements did not significantly decline 
during periods of declining interest rates. Does this 
result hold for convertible and straight low-grade 
bonds? That is, does the equity call feature signifi­
cantly affect convertible bonds when interest rates 
decline? Table 5 presents the means and standard 
deviations of the asset class return series associated 
with periods in which the government ten-year 
constant-maturity Treasury bond experienced a 
decline in yield.
Although convrertible bond returns were more 
volatile than low-grade bonds during periods of 
declining interest rates, thev were not significantly 
more volatile. For months when interest rates were 
declining, the ratio of convertible to low-grade 
bond standard deviations was approximately 1.34 
versus 1.37 for all months. Based on this analysis, 
the cause of low-grade bonds' lower volatility* can­
not be the greater relative number of calls and/or 
weaker call protection afforded convertible bonds 
relative to low-grade bonds; that is, the price of a
Table 4. January Effect Regressions of Bond Asset Class Returns, January 
1962-September 1994
(^statistics in parentheses)__________________ ________________
A s s e t  C l a s s
C o e f f i c i e n t s
A d j .  R2
D u  r b  i n -  
W a t s o n
S t a n d a r d
E r r o rP i 03 .0 6
C o n v e r t i b l e 0 .0 0 4 0 .1 0 8 0 .6 4 7 0 .0 1 0 0 .7 5 6 1 .5 5 4 0 .0 1 7
( 4 .6 5 ) ” ( 3 .5 9 )” ( 3 1 .0 1 ) ” ( 3 .2 1 ) ”
L o w  g r a d e 0 .0 0 2 0 .2 6 2 0 .3 3 3 0 .0 1 2 0 .5 8 7 1 .6 9 3 0 .0 1 6
( 1 8 0 ) ” ( 9 .1 8 ) ” (1 6 .8 6 ) ( 4 .0 9 ) ”
”  d e n o t e s  s ig n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  1 p e r c e n t  l e v e l .
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Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations of the Returns of Various Asset Classes: 
Months when Interest Rates Declined (Interest Rate Call Months)
S t a t i s t i c
C o n v e r t i b l e
B o n d s
-—  r .........
L o w - G r a d e H i g h - G r a d e
T r e a s u r y
B o n d s ? & P  5 0 0
O b s e r v a t i o n s  =  1 8 0
M e a n  ("<>) 2 .1 1 1 9 1 .8 3 3 3 1 .3 8 1 0 2 .2 4 0 9 1 .9 7 1 4
S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n 3 .(3 0 4 7 2 .2 3 5 2 1 .7 2 8 9 2 .7 6 8 8 3 .9 8 7 S
Note: A  m o n t h  is  d e f i n e d  a s  a  p e r i o d  o f  d e c l i n i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  if, d u r i n g  t h e  m o n t h ,  t h e  c h a n g e  in  
y i e l d  o n  t h e  t e n - y e a r  c o n s t a n t - m a t u n t v  T r e a s u r y  b o n d  is  l e s s  t h a n  z e r o .
bond that is short an interest rate call is expected 
to be less sensitive to decreasing interest rates than 
a bond without an interest rate call (or more pro­
tected from a call).
The fo llow ing regression m odels were run to 
test for the significance of interest rate c a l l  periods 
on the re tu rn s  of convertible bonds and low -grade 
bonds:
C N V R T ;  = oo -  j i i(TBRr)  -  fiziTBR:  x D! R ; i 
+ P?(5MR/J + p4(SMR,  x DIR-)
+ (3s(D/Rf) + e t (3)
L GR: = ft— $\RTBR{) -  p2(TBR; x D/Ko 
-  p3t5.MR/) + Pr{SMRi  x D1 R;) 
n p 5(D/Ro + Cf (6)
CNVRT t  -  LGR; = oto + pi(TBRj) -  P:(T6R-
x DI Rt )  + p 3( S M R f )  +  p 4(S M R /  
x DIR; )  +  p 5( D / R ; l  *  c : (7)
where DIR is a dummy variable equal to 1 if interest 
rates decline and zero otherwise. This equation was 
designed to take account of bond and stock market 
risk via TBR and SMR. The call dummv variable is 
intended to isolate the effect of periods when calls 
are more frequent and/or more probable. The re­
gression results are presented in Table 6 .
The estimated a  can be interpreted as the 
amount of abnormal return attributed to the de­
pendent return series after adjusting for the vari­
ous movements of the independent variables. In
this case, the results indicate that during periods of 
declining interest rates, the return performances of 
the convertible and low-grade bond classes are 
significantlv different (at the 5 percent level). Dur­
ing declining interest rate periods, convertible 
bonds seem to have positive abnormal returns 
relative to low-grade bonds after controlling for 
Treasure bond and stock market risk.
Convertible bonds are more sensitive to inter­
est rate movements than low-grade bonds during 
periods of declining interest rates (Equation 7, es­
timated coefficient P2 ), although not significant!’, 
so. Convertible bonds do not displav a significant 
difference in Treasury bond market sensitivity 
during periods of declining interest rates when 
compared with low-grade bonds. This evidence 
suggests that at least convertible and low-grade 
bonds exhibit no significant differential regarding 
interest rate call options.
Compared with straight low-grade bonds, 
convertible bonds are not significantly less sensi­
tive to stock market movements than low-grade 
bonds during periods of declining interest rates 
(Equation 7, estimated coefficient P4 ). Although 
convertible bonds become significantly (at the 5 
percent level) less sensitive to stock market move­
ments during periods of declining interest rates, 
they do not become more sensitive to bond market 
movements.
The coefficient for the dummv for periods of 
declining interest rates was negative and statisti-
Table 6. Interest Rate Call Regressions of Convertible and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns, January 
1962-September 1994
((-statistics in parentheses)
C o e f f i c i e n t s
M o d e l « 0 Pi P: Ps Pr P5 A d j .  R2 W a t s o n E r r o r
E q u a t i o n  5 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 5 6 0 .0 6 5 0 .6 8 4 - 0 .0 8 6 0 .0 0 3 0 .7 5 2 1 .5 2 6 0 .0 1 7
(3 .2 2 )* * ( 1 .1 2 ) ( 0 .9 4 ) (2 4 .7 7 )* (-2.00)* ( 1 .3 0 )
E q u a t i o n  6 0.001 0 .2 3 8 - 0 .0 6 2 0 .3 4 6 - 0 .0 3 2 0 .0 0 7 0 .5 8 1 1 .6 7 3 0 .0 1 6
(0 .9 6 ) (5 .0 6 )* * ( - 0 .9 4 ) (1 3 .2 4 )* * ( - 0 .7 9 ) (3.6-4)**
E q u a t i o n  7 0 .0 0 3 - 0 .1 8 2 0 .1 2 7 0 .3 3 8 - 0 .0 5 4 - 0 .0 0 4 0 .3 4 3 1 .7 2 6 0 .0 1 8
(2.20)** ( -3 .4 9 )* * ( 1 .7 5 ) ( 1 1 .6 9 ) * ’ ( - 1 .1 9 ) ( - 2 .0 5 0 ) *
Note: T h e s e  r e g r e s s i o n  r e s u l t s  c o m p a r e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  p e r i o d s  o f  d e c l i n i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .
* d e n o t e s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  5  p e r c e n t  l e v e l .
** d e n o t e s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  1 p e r c e n t  l e v e l .
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callv significant in the asset classes comparison 
regression (Equation 7). Therefore, periods of de­
clining interest rates tend to affect convertible 
bond financial performance more negatively than 
that of low-grade bonds. Given that low-grade 
bonds are more bondlike than convertible bonds, 
this result should not be too surprising.
Overall, interest rate call periods do not seem to 
have much effect on the relative performance of 
convertible bonds versus low-grade bonds. This re­
sult is sensible. Given that the primary difference 
between convertible bonds and low-grade bonds is 
the equity call feature, periods of declining interest 
rates would not be expected to have much of an effect 
on the equity call option embedded in convertible 
bonds. Therefore—excluding the CCA premise that 
the value of the firm is a negative function of the rate 
of interest (which mav explain conv ertible bonds' 
decrease in sensitivity to stock market movements), 
changes in interest rates should not significantly af­
fect the equity call option.
Put Periods
Regarding convertible puts or defaults, if the 
exercise and/or increase in the probability of exer­
cise of puts had a significant effect on convertible 
bonds relative to low-grade bonds, this effect 
should become significant during recessions. If 
convertible bonds are significantly more exposed 
to business cycle risk during recessions, convert­
ible bond returns should be more sensitive to eq­
uity movements during periods when defaults 
would be expected to increase. Therefore, during 
recessionary periods, convertible bond returns 
should be even less affected by interest rates and 
more affected by movements in the stock market 
than at other times. Thus, if the embedded put 
options in convertible bonds are an effective means 
of diversifying risk during default or put periods 
(i.e., recessions), that characteristic will show up in 
the sensitivity of convertible bond returns to bond 
and stock returns during recessionary periods.
Table 7 presents the means and standard de­
viations of each asset return series associated with 
recessionary periods. Convertible bonds were 
slightly more volatile than low-grade bonds dur­
ing periods of recession. For recession months, the 
ratio of convertible bond to low-grade bond stand­
ard deviations is approximately 1.07 versus 1.37 
for all months. Like interest rate calls, puts alone 
cannot explain the volatility differential between 
convertible and low-grade bonds, unless they have 
the effect of increasing convertible bonds' sensitiv­
ity to stock market movements during periods 
when their exercise and/or the probability of their 
exercise should increase.
The following regression models were run to 
test for the impact of put periods on the returns of 
convertible bonds and low-grade bonds:
CNVRTi — oo + pi(TBRf) -  p:(TBR, x Rcct)
+ p3(SMRf) + p4(SMR, x Rea)
+ feiRect)+et (8 )
LGR: =ao + fr(TBRt ) + p:(TBR, x Rcv.-i
-  p3(SMR‘) + p4< SMR:  X Rect) (9)
- PstRccj) + et
CNVRT, -LGR, = ao + pi (TBR/) + p:(TBR,
x Rec,) + Ps(SMRf) -  p4 (SMR, 
x Rec,) •+ P?(Rco) + t’f. (10)
where Rec is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
economy is in a recession and zero otherwise. The 
put dummy variable is intended to isolate the ef­
fect of recessionary7 periods, when puts are more 
frequent and/or more probable for convertible 
and low-grade bonds. 19
The regression results are presented in Table
8 . The results indicate that, during recessions, the 
return performance of the two asset classes do not 
differ significantly. This result would support the 
contention that convertible bonds are a good 
hedge against extreme movements in stock mar­
kets or government bond markets. Thus, convert­
ible bonds are no worse a hedge against business 
cycle risk than low-grade bonds.
During the study period, convertible and low- 
grade bonds did not lose a significant amount of 
their sensitivity to stock market movements dur­
ing business cycle contractions (estimated coeffi­
cient (34)- One possible explanation for the absence 
of a recession effect for convertible and low-grade 
bonds may be the lack of any large increase in
Table 7. Means and Standard Deviations of the Returns of Various Asset Classes: 
Recession Months (Put Months), January 1962-September 1994
C o r p o r a t e  B o n d s   T r e a s u r y
S t a t i s t i c  B o n d s  L o w - G r a d e  H i g h - G r a d e  B o n d s  S & P  5 0 0
O b s e r v a t i o n s  =  5 7
M e a n  r e t u r n  ( % )  0 .6 7 6 2  0 .6 3 4 6  1 .0 8 /6  1 .3 5 1 0  1 .3 7 4 0
S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  4 .7 1 9 7  4 .1 1 7 0  3 .0 4 7 9  4 .3 5 0 8  6 .0 2 4 6
Note: A  r e c e s s i o n  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  p e r i o d  i m m e d i a t e l y  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  b u s i n e s s  c y c le  p e a k  u p  t o  t h e  
m o n t h  o f  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  t r o u g h .  T h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  d i r e c t l y  b a s e d  o n  t h e  U .S . B u r e a u  o f  E c o n o m ic  
A n a l y s i s  d e f i n i t i o n .
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Table 8. Put Regressions of Convertible and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns, January 
1962-September 1994
((-statistics in parentheses)
M o d e l  
E q u a t i o n  8 
E q u a t i o n  9  
E q u a t i o n  1C
Sotc:  T h e s e  
** d e n o t e s  ;
tt 3, 3:
C o e f f i c i e n t s
3'. 34 A d j .  R~
D u r b i n -
V V a ts o n
S t a n d a r d
E r r o r3s
0 .0 0 5 0 .0 4 8 0 .1 9 4 0 .6 5 6 - 0 .0 3 3 - 0 .0 0 3 0 .7 5 3 1 .5 3 5 0 .0 1 7
( ? .66 r ( 1 .3 3 ) ( 2 .S 1 )** (2 7 .1 1 )* * ( -O .08 ) ( - 1 .0 5 )
0 .0 0 4 0 .1 7 8 0 .2 4 9 0 .3 1 8 0 .0 5 8 - 0 .0 0 4 0 .5 9 4 1 .6 7 2 0 .0 1 6
( 4 .o G m (5 .2 9 )* * (3 .8 7 )* * 1 4 .0 5 ) '* ( 1 .2 8 ) ( - 1 .6 7 )
0.001 - 0 .1 3 0 - 0 .0 5 6 0 .3 3 8 - 0 .0 9 2 0.001 0 .3 4 1 1 .7 1 2 0 .0 1 8
( 1 .2 9 ) ( -3 .4 3 )* * ( - 0 . 7 7 ) ( 1 3 .2 7 )* * ( - 1 .7 9 ) ( 0 .4 9 )
r e g r e s s i o n  r e s u l t s  c o m p a r e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  r e c e s s i o n a r y  p e r i o d s ,  
i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  1 p e r c e n t  l e v e l .
perceived credit risk during recessionary periods. 
As some low-grade bonds and convertible bonds 
default, thus removing them from their respective 
asset classes and lowering the duration of each 
asset class, a relativelv equal amount of straight 
high-grade bonds and high-grade convertible 
bonds are downgraded. During economic booms, 
high-grade bonds mav be upgraded, but upgrades 
mav be a relativelv direct function of the length 
and magnitude of the expansion, just as dow n­
grades mav be a direct function of the length and 
magnitude of the contraction. Either way, the re­
sults suggest that defaults do not significantly af­
fect the two return series under study. For convert­
ible bonds, at least relative to low-grade bonds, 
embedded puts have not been a good method of 
diversifying equity market risk during recessions.
The embedded puts in convertible bonds have 
the effect of insignificantly decreasing their sensi­
tivity with respect to stock price movements (esti­
mated coefficient (32 is insignificantly negative) 
and significantly lengthening their duration with  
respect to bond price movements (estimated coef­
ficient (3: is positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level). This result suggests that the bond duration 
of convertible bonds actually increases during re­
cessions. This increase may be partly explained by 
downgradings of high-grade bonds into the con­
vertible bond asset class, which overwhelms the 
effect puts have on the asset class. Even though 
puts occur more frequently during recessions, 
high-grade downgradings more than offset this 
effect.
The results also indicate that convertible 
bonds do not act significantly less like government 
bonds during recessions than do low-grade bonds. 
That is, the covariability of convertible bond re­
turns with government bond returns does not sig­
nificantly decrease during recessions relative to 
low-grade bond returns (Equation 10, estimated 
coefficient (32). This result could also be explained 
in part by downgradings of high-grade bonds dur­
ing recessions, some of which remain in each asset
class, although others are still called awav during 
the recession.
Overall, the results weakly suggest that during 
periods when convertible and low-grade bonds 
would be expected to show relatively equal sensi- 
tivitv to equity prices, thev do. During recessions, 
the two asset classes relatively mirror each other. 
Convertible bonds become insignificantly less 
equitvlike and significantly more bondlike, and 
low-grade bonds become insignificantlv more 
equitvlike and significantly more bondlike. Given 
that the essential difference between convertible 
bonds and low-grade bonds is the equity call fea­
ture, the recession regression results support the 
simple CCA implication that recessionary periods 
would not be expected to have a significant impact 
on the relative performance of the two asset classes 
because the primary effect of a business downturn 
would be on the embedded put option not on the 
equity call option, which only convertible bonds 
possess.
Equity Call Periods
By definition, convertible bonds have embed­
ded equity calls and straight low-grade bonds do 
not. Of the three basic types of periods under 
study, which are intended to correspond to the 
three convertible bond embedded options, equity 
call periods would be expected to produce a direct 
differential effect on convertible bonds versus low- 
grade bonds. If the exercise and/or increase in the 
probability of exercise of equity calls on convert­
ible bonds relative to low-grade bonds has a sig­
nificant effect, it will be significant during periods 
w hen equities outperform straight corporate 
bonds. If convertible bonds are significantly more 
exposed to equity risk during periods when equi­
ties outperform corporate bonds, convertible bond 
returns should be more sensitive to stock move­
ments during periods when the relative positive 
performance of equities increases. Therefore, dur­
ing equity call periods, convertible bond returns 
should be significantly less affected by interest
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rates and more affected by movements in the stock 
market than at other times. That is, if the embedded 
equitv call options in convertible bonds are an 
effective  m eans of making the bonds more 
equitvlike, that effect will show up in the sensitiv­
ity of convertible bond returns to primarily stock 
returns during periods when those options would 
be expected to be more in the money.
Of course, this effect is contingent upon the 
value of the equity call option not being signifi­
cantly affected by companies attempting to force 
conversion by calling the bonds (i.e., based on the 
interest rate call option). In effect, companies can 
cap the value of the equity call option at the value 
of the interest rate call exercise price. Therefore, in 
a more complex world, the equity call option might 
be expected to reduce the sensitivity of convertible 
bond returns to equity returns during periods 
when equitv call options are going farther into the 
money. Furthermore, this effect could explain whv 
convertible bonds might become more sensitive to 
bond market movements and less sensitive to eq­
uity market movements during periods when in­
terest rates are declining and equities are outper­
forming straight low-grade bonds.
Table 9 presents the means and standard de­
viations of each asset return series associated with 
equity call periods. Convertible bonds were 
slightly more volatile than low-grade bonds dur­
ing equity call periods. For equity call months, the 
ratio of convertible to low-grade bond standard 
deviations is approximately 1.22 versus 1.37 for all 
months. Like interest rate calls and defaults, equity 
calls alone cannot explain the volatility differential 
between convertible and low-grade bonds.
The following regression models were run to
test for the impact of equity call periods on the
returns of convertible and low-grade bonds:
CNVRTt = ao + fa(TBR,) + fa(TBR, x  EC,)
+ fa(SMRt) +  p4(SMR, x ECt)
+ P5(EC,) + e, (11)
LGRt = ao + Pi(TBR,) + p2(TBR, x ECt)
+ p3(SM R,) + p4(SMR, x  ECt)
+ p5(£C ,) + e, (12)
CNVRT, -  LGR, = ao + Pi (TBR,) + p2(TBR,
x  EC:) -  P3( SMR,) + p4(SMR, 
x E C :) - p 5(EC,)+Cf, (13)
where EC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
stocks outperform straight low-grade bonds and 
zero otherwise. The equity call dummy variable is 
intended to isolate the effect of periods when eq­
uitv calls are more frequent and/or more probable 
for convertible bonds.
The regression results are presented in Table 
10. After controlling for the five factors, the results 
indicate that convertible bonds do not display ab­
normal returns relative to low-grade bonds. Dur­
ing the study period, convertible and low-grade 
bonds did not become significantly more sensitive 
to stock market movements during equity call pe­
riods (estimated coefficient p4). Especially for con­
vertible bonds, this result seems to be somewhat 
anom alous. The estimated equity call period  
dummy coefficient, however, is significantly posi­
tive (Equation 13, estimated coefficient P?). This 
result suggests that convertible bonds are signifi­
cantly more positively affected than low-grade 
bonds bv equity call periods.
The embedded equity calls in convertible 
bonds do not have the effect of significantly in­
creasing their sensitivity with respect to equity 
price movements (estimated coefficient p4  is nega­
tive and insignificantly so), but they do signifi­
cantly decrease their duration with respect to bond 
price movements (estimated coefficient P2  is nega­
tive and significant at the 5 percent level). This 
finding suggests that the bond duration of convert­
ible bonds actually decreases during equity call 
periods. Apparently, convertible bonds may not 
become more equitylike during equity call periods, 
but they do become less bondlike. Given that 
straight low-grade bonds have similar equity call 
period effects, the equity call feature embedded in 
convertible bonds has not produced a significant 
performance advantage for convertible bonds rela­
tive to low-grade bonds (at least regarding their 
relative duration).
Overall, the results do not support the conten­
tion that during periods when convertible and
Table 9. Means and Standard Deviations of the Returns of Various Asset Classes for
Months when Equities Outperform Straight Risky Bonds (Equity Call Months), 
January 1962- September 1994 ___  __ ____________
_  Corporate Bonds
Convertible ________________________________  Treasury
Statistic Bonds Low-Grade High-Grade S&P 500
Observations = 200
Mean {%) 13363 1.0540 0.6618 0.7714 3.1935
Standard deviation 18511 2.3357 1.9042 2.9405 3.2716
Note: A month is defined as a period of equity call if, during the month, the return on the S&P 500 total return 
index is greater than the return on low-grade corporate bonds.
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Table 10. Equity Call Regressions of Convertible and Low-Grade Corporate Bond Returns
(/-statistics in parentheses)
M o d e !
E q u a t i o n  11 
E q u a t i o n  12  
E q u a t i o n  13
a - ; 3 ;
C o e f f i c i e n t s
f h 04 3 , A d j .
D u r b i n -
a : s o n
S t a n d a r d
E r r o r
0 . 0 1 1 0 .1 3 9 - 0 .1 3 1 0 .7 6 0 - 0 .0 3 5 - 0 .0 1 0 0 .7 8 9 1 x 0 2 0 .0 1 6
( 7 .4 4 ) ’ *
0 .0 1 2
( 3 .3 8 ) ”
0 .2 6 9
( - 2 . 1 9 ) ’
- 0 .1 3 4
( 2 1 .6 9 ) ”
0 .4 8 6
( - 0 . 6 7 )
0 .0 2 2
( - 4 . 8 3 ) ”
- 0 .0 1 9 0.8(57 1 .8 8 2 0 .0 1 4
( 9 .9 3 ) ”
- 0 .0 0 2
( 7 .5 0 ) ”
- 0 .1 3 0
( - 2 . 3 8 ) ”
0 .0 0 3
( 1 5 .8 4 ) ”
0 .2 7 4
( 0 .4 7 )
- 0 .0 5 7
( - 1 0 . 1 0 ) ”
0 .0 0 9 0 .3 5 4 1 .7 1 1 0 .0 1 7
( 1 .1 5 ) 1 1 J
 
'£>
 
Jl
 
% ( 0 .0 3 ) ( 7 .2 6 ) ” ( - 1 . 0 0 ) ( 3 .7 2 ) ”
Note: T h e s e  r e g r e s s i o n  r e s u l t s  c o ir ,  p a  r e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  p e r i o d s  w h e n  e q u i t i e s  o u t p e r f o r m  r i s k v  b o n d s .  A  m o n t h  is  d e f i n e d  a s  a  p e r i o d  
o f  e q u i t v  c a l l  i f  d u r i n g  t h e  m o n t h  t h e  r e t u r n  o n  t h e  S & P  3 0 0  t o t a l  r e t u r n  i n d e x  is  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  r e t u r n  o n  l o w - g r a d e  c o r p o r a t e  
b o n d s .
* d e n o t e s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  5  p e r c e n t  l e v e l .
”  d e n o t e s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  1 p e r c e n t  l e v e l .
low-grade bonds would be expected to show sig­
nificantly different sensitivity to equity prices, they 
do not. During equitv call periods, the two asset 
classes tend to mirror each other. Convertible 
bonds become insignificantly less equitvlike and 
significantly less bondlike, and low-grade bonds 
become insignificantly more equitvlike and signifi­
cantly less bondlike. Although the essential differ­
ence between convertible bonds and low-grade 
bonds is the equity’ call feature, the equity call 
regression results do not strongly support the no­
tion that equity call periods would be expected to 
have a significant impact on the relative perform­
ance of the two asset classes (especially with regard 
to the sensitivity of convertible prices with respect 
to stock prices). Of course, the estimated coefficient 
Ps in Equation 13 does indicate some level of asym­
metric performance for convertible bonds attribut­
able to equity call periods.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
From 1962 through September 1994, convertible 
bonds returned more than low-grade bonds but at 
a higher standard deviation of return. After adjust­
ing for bond and stock market movements, con­
vertible bonds outperformed low-grade bonds, 
but not at commonly accepted statistical levels of 
significance. Conv ertible bonds are more sensitiv e 
to stock market movements and less sensitive to 
bond market movements than low-grade bonds. 
Given the additional equity call option embedded 
in convertible bonds, they should behave more like 
stocks and less like bonds. In addition, like low- 
grade bonds, convertible bonds display a strong 
January effect.
The analysis shows that during interest rate 
call periods, convertible bonds display positive 
abnormal returns relative to low-grade bonds.
Table 11. A Comparison of Expectations and Outcomes for Convertible versus 
LowGrade Bonds during Each Period Tested: Simple CCA Expectations
E x p e c t a t i o n  f o r  S e n s i t i v i t y  t o  E x p e c t a t i o n  f o r  S e n s i t i v i t v
P e r i o d  u n d e r  S t u d v  T r e a s u r y  B o n d s  ( e s t i m a t e d  p-,) t o  S t o c k s  ( e s t i m a t e d
I n t e r e s t  r a t e  c a l l  p e r i o d s  0
P u t  p e r i o d s  0
E q u i t y  c a l l  p e r i o d s  0
C o m b i n a t i o n  p e r i o d s  
I n t e r e s t  r a t e  c a l l / p u t  p e r i o d s  0
I n t e r e s t  r a t e  c a l l / e q u i t y  c a l l  p e r i o d s  0
E q u i t y  c a l l / p u t  p e r i o d s  0
R e a l i z a t i o n  f o r  c o n v  e r t i b l e  v e r s u s  
l o w - g r a d e  b o n d s  ( c u t - o f f  a t  t h e  
5 %  l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e )
I n t e r e s t  r a t e  c a l l  p e r i o d s  0
P u t  p e r i o d s  0
E q u i t y  c a l l  p e r i o d s  0
C o m b i n a t i o n  p e r i o d s  
I n t e r e s t  r a t e  c a l l / p u t  p e r i o d s  0
I n t e r e s t  r a t e  c a l l / e q u i t y '  c a l l  p e r i o d s  +
E q u i t y  c a l l / p u t  p e r i o d s  0
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During business cvcle contractions, equity call pe­
riods, or combination option exercise periods (i.e., 
all other periods analyzed), convertible bonds do 
not display abnormal returns relative to low- 
grade bonds . - 0  As can be seen in Table 11, the 
expected and actual effect of the embedded equity 
call option in convertible bonds is what princi­
pally distinguishes them from straight low-grade 
bonds.
As expected bv sim ple CCA, the only signifi­
cant em bedded option effects occur during equity 
call periods, although the sim ple CCA expecta­
tions regarding the direction of the effect differs 
from expectations. Clearlv, the effect of the equity
call option on the asset class ;> more complex than 
initial expectations.
What do these findings mean for investors? 
First, like straight low -grade bonds, the put op­
tion em bedded in convertible bonds displavs 
som e offsetting effect, especially during com bi­
nation equitv call and put periods. Second, the 
equitv calls em bedded in convertible bonds do 
not necessarilv give the upside in rising equity  
markets relative to straight risky bonds, as might 
be expected. Last, after controlling for stock and 
bond market risk, convertible bonds have been 
at least as good an investm ent as straight low- 
grade bonds . - 1
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t h r o u g h  1 9 S 7 ) ,  t o t a l  r e t u r n  ( 1 9 S 3  t h r o u g h  1 9 8 7 ) ,  a n d  d e f a u l t  
( 1 9 8 0  t h r o u g h  1 9 S 7 )  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  c o n v e r t i b l e  b o n d s .
4 . T h e  c o n v e r t i b l e  b o n d  s e r i e s  d a t a  a r e  d e r i v e d  f r o m  o p e n - e n d  
m u t u a l  f u n d s  t r a c k e d  b v  N 'o r t h f i e l d  I n f o r m a t i o n  S y s t e m s  
f r o m  J a n u a r y  1 9 6 2  t h r o u g h  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 4 ,  w h i c h  a r e  b a s e d  
o n  M o m i n g s t a r  d a t a  o n  o p e n - e n d  m u t u a l  f u n d s .  T h e  o t h e r  
c o r p o r a t e  b o n d  d a t a  s e r i e s  a r e  d e r i v e d  f r o m  o p e n - e n d  m u ­
t u a l  f u n d s  t r a c k e d  b v  M o m i n g s t a r  d u r i n g  t h e  s a m e  p e r i o d .  
T h e s e  r e t u r n s  a r e  n e t  o f  a l l  b u t  f r o n t - e n d  a n d  b a c k - e n d  
c h a r g e s .  T h e  T r e a s u r e -  b o n d  s e r i e s  i s  a  s p l i c e d  s e r i e s  b a s e d  
o n  B r a d f o r d  C o r n e l l  a n d  K e v i n  G r e e n ,  " T h e  I n v e s t m e n t  
P e r f o r m a n c e  o f  L o w - g r a d e  B o n d  F u n d s , "  The jo u rn a l o f  F i­
nance, v o l .  4 6 ,  n o .  1 ( M a r c h  1 9 9 1 ) :2 9 —1 8; T r e a s u r y  b o n d  s e r i e s  
( J a n u a r y  1 , 1 9 6 2 ,  t h r o u g h  D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 8 ) ;  a n d  S a l o m o n  
B r o t h e r s '  l o n g  b o n d  s e r i e s  ( J a n u a r v  1 ,1 9 8 9 ,  t h r o u g h  S e p t e m ­
b e r  1 9 9 4 ) .  T h e  s t o c k  s e r i e s  i s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  S t a n d a r d  &  P o o r ' s  
5 0 0  I n d e x .  T h e r e f o r e ,  u n l i k e  t h e  r e t u r n  s e r i e s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  
m u t u a l  f u n d  r e t u r n s ,  t h e  s t o c k  a n d  T r e a s u r y  b o n d  s e r i e s  a r e  
g r o s s  r e t u r n s .
L i k e  t h e  C o r n e l l  a n d  G r e e n  s t u d y  o n  c o r p o r a t e  l o w -  
g r a d e  b o n d s ,  t h i s  s t u d y  u s e s  m o n t h l y  o p e n - e n d  m u t u a l  f u n d  
d a t a  t o  d e r i v e  a s s e t  c l a s s  r e t u r n  s e r i e s .  L i p p e r  A n a l y t i c a l  
S e r v i c e s  a s s e t  c l a s s  d e f i n i t i o n s  a r e  u s e d  f o r  a l l  a s s e t  c l a s s  
r e t u r n  s e r i e s  r e p o r t e d .  S h a r e s  o f  o p e n - e n d  m u t u a l  f u n d s  a r e  
t r a d e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  n e t  a s s e t  v a l u e  ( N A  VJ- M o n t h l y  r e t u r n s  
a r e  b a s e d  o n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c a l c u l a t i o n :  R e tu n n  =  ( ( .Y A W  -
Y A  . :- i  | -  IncDL't; -  C a y C a in T . < • ] .  Y A ; I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e s e  r e t u r n s  t a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  2 2 b - 1 f e e s  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  
f e e s  b u t  n o :  r r o n t - e n d  l o a d s ,  b a c s - e n d  l o a d s ,  o r  r e d e m p t i o n  
c h a r g e s .
E a c h  r r u t u a l - f u r d - b a s e d  a s s e t  c l a s s  r e t u r n  s e r i e s  w a s  
c o n s t r u c t e d  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  m e : . - a d  u s e d  b v  C o r n e l l  a n d  
G r e e n .  F o r  e a c h  a s s e t  c i a s s ,  t h e  e u u a l l y  w e i g h t e d  a v e r a g e  o f  
a l l  m u t u a l  r a n d s  e a c h  m o n t h  w a s  c a l c u l a t e d .  A s  o f  m o n t h -  
e n d  S e p t e m b e r  1 ° 9 4 ,  t h e  M o r n i r c s t a r  d a t a  c o v e r e d  10 1  l o w -  
g r a d e  b o n e  f u n d s ,  1 4 °  h i g h - g r a u - ;  b o n d  f u n d s ,  a n d  3 4  c o n -o o o
v e r t i b l e - b o r . d  f u n d s .  T a b l e  1 p r o ',  i d e s  b a c k g r o u n d  o n  t h e  
a s s e t  c l a s s  r e r u m  s e r i e s  u s e d  in  th u s  s t u d y .
3 . O n e  p r o b l e m ,  w i t h  t h i s  m e t h o d  A  m a t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  i l l i q u i d  i tv  
m a v  a l s o  h a v e  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  d u r i n g  p e r i o d s  w h e n  o n l y  
c a l l s  a n d  p u r s  a r e  e x p e c t e d  t o  h e  s i g n i f i c a n t .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  h e r e  i s  t h a t  p e r i o d s  w h e n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  c a l l s ,  
p u t s ,  a n d  e c u i t v  c a l l s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  t h e  p r i c i n g  o f  r i s k y  
b o n d s  c a n  b e  i d e n t i f i e d .
6 . T h e  e q u i t v  c a l l  o p t i o n  g i v e n  t o  m o s t  c o n v e r t i b l e  b o n d h o l d e r s  
is  a n  e x p l i c i t  c a l l  o p t i o n  o n  t h e  e c  - t r y  o f  t h e  f i r m ;  s e e  E d w a r d
H .  J e n n i n g s .  A n  E s t i m a t e  o f  C o n v e r t i b l e  B o n d  P r e m i u m s , "  
Journal o f  F inancial a n d  Q u a n tu a iro e  A n a lys is , v o l .  9 ,  n o .  1 
( J a n u a r v  l ° ~ 4 ) : 3 3 - 5 6 .  E v e n  t h o u g h  t h e  o p t i m a l  e q u i t v  c a l l  
p o l i c v  is  c l e a r  ( s e e  B r e n n a n  a n d  S c h w a r t z ,  " C o n v e r t i b l e  
B o n d s " ;  I n g e r s o l l ,  " A  C o n t i n g e n t - C l a i m s  V a l u a t i o n " ;  a n d  
I n g e r s o l l ,  " .A n  E x a m i n a t i o n  o f  C o r p o r a t e  C a l l  P o l i c i e s  o n  
C o n v e r t i b l e  S e c u r i t i e s " ) ,  a c t u a l  f i r m  c o n v e r s i o n  p o l i c i e s  o f t e n  
d e l a v  c o n v e r s i o n  a n d  a r e  t h u s  n o n o p t i m a l  ( s e e  H a r r i s  a n d  
R a v i v ,  " A  S e q u e n t i a l  S i g n a l l i n g  M o d e l  o f  C o n v e r t i b l e  D e b t  
C a l l  P o l i c v " ) .  T h e r e f o r e ,  g i v e n  s i g n i f i c a n t  n o n o p t i m a l  c o n v e r ­
s i o n s ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  e q u i t v  c a l i  o p t i o n  o n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  c o n v e r t i b l e  b o n d s  m a y  n o t  f o l l o w  f r o m  C C A .
H a r r i s  a n d  R a v i v ,  i n  " A  S e q u e n t i a l  S i g n a l l i n g  M o d e l  o f  
C o n v e r t i b l e  D e b t  C a l l  P o l i c y , "  r a t i o n a l i z e  t h e s e  a p p a r e n t  
s u b o p t i m a l  d e l a y e d  c a l l s  a n d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  c o m m o n  s t o c k  
r e t u r n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  n e g a t i v e  a r o u n d  t h e  a n n o u n c e m e n t  
o f  t h e  c a l l  o f  a  c o n v e r t i b l e  d e b t  i s s u e .  S e e  a l s o  W a y n e  M i k -  
k e l s o n ,  " C a r i t a l  S t r u c t u r e  C h a r  g e  a n d  D e c r e a s e s  i n  S t o c k ­
h o l d e r ' s  W e a l t h :  A  C r o s s - S e c n o n a l  S t u d v  o f  C o n v e r t i b l e  
S e c u r i t y  C a l l s , "  N a t i o n a l  B u r e a u  o f  E c o n o m i c  R e s e a r c h  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r ,  n o .  1 1 3 7  ( J u n e  1 9 8 3 ) ;  L a r r y  Y . D a r i n  a n d  
W a v n e  M i k k e l s o n ,  " C o n v e r t i b l e  D e b t  I s s u a n c e ,  C a p i t a l  
S t r u c t u r e  C h a n g e  a n d  F i n a n c i n g - r e l a t e d  I n f o r m a t i o n , "  Jour­
nal o f  F inancia l E conom ics, v o l .  1 3 , n o .  2  ( J u n e  1 9 S 4 ) :1 5 7 - S 6 ;  
a n d  D . J a f f e e  a n d  A .  S h l e i f e r ,  " C o s t s  o f  F i n a n c i a l  D i s t r e s s ,  
D e l a v e d  C a l i s  o f  C o n v e r t i b l e  B o n d s ,  a n d  t h e  R o l e  o f  I n v e s t -
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m e n t  B a n k s , "  N a t i o n a l  B u r e a u  o f  E c o n o m i c  R e s e a r c h  \ \  
i n g  P a p e r ,  n o .  2 3 5 8  ■ A p r i l  1 9 8 8 ) .  I n  a u d i t i o n ,  A c h a r v u  a r . d  
H a n d a  in  " E a r l \  C a l l s  o f  C o n v e r t i b l e  D e b t , "  a  f o l l o w - u p  
s t u d v .  U v u s e d  o n  e x p l a i n i n g  s u b o p t i m a i  e a r l y  c a l l s  H a m s  
a n d  R a v i v ,  in  " A  S e q u e n t i a l  S i g n a l l i n g  M o d e l , "  s u g g e s t  t r  a :  
m a n a g e r s  w i l l  d e l a v  a  c a l l  o t  c o n v e r t i b l e s  b a s e d  o n  i n f o r m a ­
t i o n  i n d i c a t i n g  p o o r  f u t u r e  p r o s p e c t s  t o r  t h e  f i r m ,  a l t h o u g h  
A c h a r v a  a n d  H a n d a ,  i n  " E a r l v  C a l l s  o t  C o n v e r t i b l e  D t r b t:  
N e w  E v i d e n c e  a n d  T h e o r y . "  s u g g e s t  m a n a g e r s  w i l l  m u s e  a n  
e a r l v  c a l l  o f  c o n v e r t i b l e s  b a s e d  o n  p o s i t i v e  i n f o r m a t i o n .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  l o n g  d e l a v s  s i g n a l  a n  i m p r o v e m e n t  i n  f u t u r e  
p e r f o r m a n c e ,  a n d  e a r l v  c a l l s  s i g n a l  a  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  in  f u t u r e  
p e r f o r m a n c e .
7 . N o t e  t h a t  h i g h - g r a d e  c o r p o r a t e  b o n d s  h a v e  p u t  o p t i o n s  b u t  
t h e v  a r e .  b v  d e f i n i t i o n ,  s o  f a r  o u t  o f  t h e  m o n e y  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  
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8 . S e e  J o h n  K i h n ,  " U n r a v e l l i n g  t h e  L o w - G r a d e  B o n d  R i s k  R e ­
w a r d  P u z z l e . "  Financial A na lysts Journal, v o l .  3 0 ,  n o .  4  
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1 9 . T h e s e  r e c r .  s s i o n  m o d e l s  a r e  b a s e d  o n  t h e  m o d e l s  d e v  e l o p e d  
t o  e x a m i n e  t h e  h i g h  r e t u r n s  a r . d  l o w  v o l a t i l i t y  a s s o c i a t e d  
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Analysis: An Alternative Perspective
In a recent article in this journal, Dreman and Berry offered a perspective on 
analyst earnings forecasting errors and their implications for security analy­
sis. This article provides a different perspective on the subject, taking issue 
with five points Dreman and Berry raised.
A Seasoning Process In the U.S. Peter Carayannopoulos 
Treasury Bond Market: The Curious 
Case of Newly Issued Ten-Year Notes
Evidence shows that newly issued U.S. Treasury securities are persistently 
overpriced. Although the overpricing for issues with original maturities of 
3, 5, and 30 years persists for approximately 2 to 3 months after issuance, in 
the case of l()-year notes, it persists for approximately 20 months after issu­
ance. This pricing behavior could offer arbitrage opportunities.
Does International Diversification Piet M.A. Eichholtz 
Work Better for Real Estate than 
for Stocks and Bonds?
The past decade has seen a surge in international equity and fixed-income 
investments, but most real estate investors still stick to their own countries. 
An international investment strategy also works for real estate. In fact, inter­
national diversification is more effective in reducing the risk of real estate 
portfolios than of common stock and bond portfolios.
Financial Crooks—or Are They? Martin S. Fridson, Editor
W hite-Collar Crim e Reconsidered; Fidelity's World: The Secret Life and Public 
Power o f  the M u tu a l Fund Giant
Unravelling the Low-Grade Bond 
Risk/Reward Puzzle
John Kihn
Previous studies have suggested that low-grade bonds are more likely to be called than 
high-grade bonds, and that this difference explains the higher returns and lower standard 
deviations of low-grade compared with high-grade corporates. But during periods of declining 
interest rates, when one might expect corporate call activity to be high, the volatility of 
low-grade bonds does not differ significantly from that of high-grade bonds. Calls alone appear 
to have an insignificant impact on the relative volatilities of low-grade and high-grade bond 
returns.
Low-grade bonds also incorporate embedded put options; in effect, these allow corporate 
equity holders to put the corporation to bondholders if the corporation's shares become 
worthless. Exercise of these puts might be expected to be most frequent during business cycle 
contractions, when defaults tend to be at their highest rates. During such periods, low-grade 
bonds do not demonstrate significantly different overall volatility from that of high-grade 
bonds. They do, however, become significantly more sensitive to bond market movements and 
less sensitive to stock market movements compared with high-grade bonds.
During periods of recession combined with declining interest rates, this effect is 
accentuated. In effect, during periods when both calls and puts are likely to be exercised, the 
credit quality of low-grade bonds declines, depressing prices enough to discourage the exercise 
of call options. A t the same time, high-grade bonds tend to be called away because of the 
decline in interest rates, while the credit quality of the whole asset class is deteriorating 
because of the business downturn.
The passage of the savings and loan bailout bill in the summer of 1989 sent low-grade bonds 
into a tailspin that lasted until January 1991.1 That 
act, requiring savings and loans to divest them­
selves of low-grade bond holdings by 1994, was 
followed, in early 1990, by the bankruptcy of the 
largest broker and issuer of junk bonds. During 
this period of upheaval in the low-grade market, 
several academic studies concluded that low-grade 
bonds were not an anomalous asset class, as sug­
gested by certain "junk bond" salesmen.
High-yield bonds have recently experienced a 
resurgence, with new issues and renewed interest 
coming from investors concerned with the rela­
tively low yields of government bonds. This article 
examines the return experience of low-grade and 
high-grade bonds over a long period in order to 
shed some light on the central controversy that has
John Kihn is a P h .D . candidate at the London School o f Economics.
motivated the interest in low-grade bonds as an 
asset class— that is, the fact that low-grade bonds 
appear to have generated a higher return at a 
lower risk than high-grade bonds (see Table 1).
ARE LOW-GRADE BONDS ANOMALOUS?
Several researchers have suggested that low-grade 
bonds are not anomalous:
T h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  o f  l o w - g r a d e  b o n d  r e t u r n s  i s  f r e q u e n t l y  
l e s s  t h a n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  o f  h i g h - g r a d e  b o n d  r e t u r n s .  
B i u m e ,  K e i m  a n d  P a t e l  a t t r i b u t e  t h i s  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  l o w - g r a d e  
b o n d s  t y p i c a l l y  h a v e  a  s h o r t e r  d u r a t i o n .  T h e  e f f e c t i v e  d u r a t i o n  
o f  l o w - g r a d e  b o n d s  i s  l o w e r  t h a n  t h a t  f o r  h i g h - g r a d e  b o n d s  a n d  
T r e a s u r y  b o n d s  b e c a u s e  t h e  c o u p o n s  a r e  h i g h e r  a n d  b e c a u s e  
l o w - g r a d e  b o n d s  a r e  o f t e n  c a l l e d  e a r l i e r .  E a r ly  c a l l s  o c c u r  m o r e  
o f t e n  f o r  l o w - g r a d e  b o n d s  b e c a u s e  t h e y  g e n e r a l l y  h a v e  w e a k e r  
c a l l  p r o t e c t i o n  t h a n  t h e i r  h i g h - g r a d e  c o u n t e r p a r t s  a n d  b e c a u s e  
t h e  c r e d i t  q u a l i t y  o f  l o w - g r a d e  b o n d s  i s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  r i s e . 2
Low-grade bonds do generally have a lower 
duration than high-grade bonds, but we will show
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Table 1. Return and Risk for Several Asset Classes, 1960-88
Treasury Bonds High-Grade Bonds Low-Grade Bonds S<kP 500
Observations = 348
Cumulative Return 449.08% 532.73% 828.70% 1,336.68%
Average Return 6.05% 6.57% 7.99% 9.62%
Standard Deviation 10.16% 9.42% 8.64% 15.02%
Reward/Risk Ratio 0.60 0.70 0.92 0.64
that their susceptibility to early call cannot fully 
explain their shorter duration and subsequent 
lower standard deviation. In fact, defaults have a 
greater impact on the duration of low-grade bonds 
than calls.
This article emphasizes the asymmetric impact 
of defaults on the two corporate bond asset classes: 
Default and the probability of default have a 
greater impact on low-grade bonds than on high- 
grade bonds. It is the relative scarcity of defaults of 
high-grade bonds that makes them more volatile 
relative to low-grade bonds.
PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF CORPORATE 
BOND PRICING AND DURATION
Altman notes that the price of risky bonds is 
principally determined by (1) interest rate risk, (2) 
default risk and (3) illiquidity risk.3 Interest rate 
risk is related to reinvestment risk, which is in turn 
related to the risk that the bond will be called. If a 
bond is called during a period of declining interest 
rates (i.e., rising bond prices), the holder will be 
forced to reinvest the proceeds at a lower rate of 
interest, ceteris paribus. Investors will demand a 
premium for the net difference between the cost of 
reinvestment risk and the call premium.
Default risk essentially reflects the risk that 
shareholders will put the company to bondholders 
if the company's shares become worthless. Bond 
investors will demand a premium for writing this 
implicit put. The premium's value will depend on  
the probability of the company defaulting and the 
distribution of possible recovery values.
Illiquidity risk is the risk that the price of the 
bond will fall because of a lack of buyers. For 
bearing this risk, bond investors will demand a 
premium, the value of which will increase, the 
more illiquid the bond is expected to be.
All the premiums associated with risky bonds 
suggest the bonds will sell at a rather substantial 
discount relative to risk-free bonds. Much of the 
pricing of risky bonds can therefore be represented 
by the following equation:
R B ^ B i - t f i  + Ci + Ld, .
where
RB = risky bond,
B = risk-free bond,
P = put or default option value,
C = call option value and 
L = illiquidity or ease-of-sale option value.
The equation tells us that P, C and L directly affect 
the price of a risky bond. It is the combination of P, 
C and L that explains the unique behavior of risky 
bonds relative to risk-free bonds.
This article focuses on the effects that P and C 
have on the pricing of high-grade and low-grade 
bonds as asset classes. It therefore examines peri­
ods when the effects of P and C could reasonably 
be expected to be significant.4 These include peri­
ods when calls and puts would be expected to be 
exercised and/or the probability of exercise could 
be expected to increase significantly for low-grade 
bonds. This isolates the impact puts have on 
corporate bond returns.
This study is the first to focus on the effects of 
puts and calls on corporate bond returns. Option 
and contingent-claims analyses view default as 
equityholders putting the company to bondhold­
ers. In this construct, bond default is equivalent to 
the exercise of a put option held by equityholders.
There is a well established asymmetry be­
tween low-grade and high-grade bonds. High- 
grade bonds experience downgradings before de­
fault. Thus default may be expected to have a 
direct impact on low-gTade bonds only .5 In effect, 
holders of low-grade bonds have written call and 
put options on the bonds they have purchased.6
To evaluate whether calls are the primary 
cause of low-grade bonds' lower durations relative 
to high-grade bonds, this study focuses on the 
effects of calls and puts on low-grade bonds.
Bond Duration
How do puts and calls affect the returns and 
risks of low-grade bonds relative to those of high- 
grade bonds? Analysis of the durations of the two 
corporate bond asset classes yields an explanation.
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Given that duration is a measure of the sensitivity 
of the price of a bond to a change in interest rates, 
it is an appropriate starting point for analyzing 
possible asymmetries between low-grade and 
high-grade bond volatilities.7
In general, duration can be expressed as:
Db,= -  [{dB/d(l +  r)) x  (1/BJ],
where Bt is the price of risk-free bond i and r is the 
interest rate. Default can lower a bond's duration 
drastically, even with no change in the discount 
rate. Historically, defaults have reduced low-grade 
bond prices by more than 50%.8 In the case of 
default caused by bankruptcy, this price decline 
occurs over a period of several years prior to 
bankruptcy7.9
All low-grade bonds include an implicit put, 
written by the bondholders for the issuing firms' 
shareholders. Most low-grade bonds also include 
explicit call options. In the case of both low-grade 
and high-grade bonds, the issuing company will 
exercise a call when interest rates have declined 
enough to make doing so profitable.
Ignoring security-specific factors such as li­
quidity, the value of a low-grade bond can be 
represented by the following general equation:
LG, = B, — P, — Q,
where LG is the value of low-grade bond i, B is the 
value of risk-free bond i, P is the value of the put 
option i and C is the value of the call option i. In 
this contingent-daims view, the duration of a 
low-grade bond can be expressed as the weighted  
average of the previous three components:10
Dlg, ~  (Bi LG;) x Dg. +  (Pj LG,) x  Dp. + (Q LG,) x  Dq, 
where DB is as specified above and:
DPi =  -  [(dP, d( 1 + r)) x  (1/P,)] and 
DQ = -  [(dC, d(l + t)) x  (1/C,)].
The following equation represents the long 
form of the duration of the put option:
Dp. — -  H((dP,- 3B,) x  (dPi 3(1 + r))) + 
(3P, 3(1 + r))] x  (1 P^ ) =  A x  Dfl. -  p
where A is the elasticity of the option price with 
respect to the underlying bond price and p is the 
elasticity of the option price with respect to interest 
rate changes. If lambda exceeds 1, the option's 
duration is greater than the duration of the under­
lying bond. The further the underlying bond price 
is from the option striking price (i.e., ,the further
the option is "out of the money"), the greater the 
duration of the option and the lower its value and 
subsequent weighting in the total bond duration 
calculation. Because, by definition, the put options 
of high-grade bonds are well out of the money 
compared with the puts of low-grade bonds, w e  
can expect significant asymmetry between the ef­
fects of the put option on the durations of the two  
asset classes.
As most low-grade bonds have explicit or 
implicit put and call options written on them, their 
low volatility should not surprise us. If interest 
rates decline sufficiently, the bonds will be called 
away. If the fortunes of the company decline 
sufficiently, the company will be put to the bond­
holders. We hypothesize that it is principally the 
interaction of these effects that contributes to the 
low volatility of low-grade bonds as an asset class.
A Caveat
Previous studies explained the lower standard 
deviation of low-grade bonds relative to high- 
grade bonds in terms of the duration of low-grade 
bonds relative to that of high-grade bonds.11 Al­
though the duration of low-grade bonds is clearly 
lower than that of high-grade bonds, we show  
below that call rates and the relative weakness of 
call protection for low-grade bonds are not the 
principal or even significant causes of their rela­
tively lower duration.12
Past studies did not focus on asset class dura­
tions. The distinction between the duration of a 
portfolio of assets and the duration of an asset 
class is critical. Particularly in the case of low-grade 
bonds, using closed definitions of duration (taking 
the weighted average of the durations of the assets 
forming a portfolio as the portfolio's duration, for 
example) may cause problems.13
In addition to coupons and calls, other factors 
can influence the relative durations of low-grade 
and high-grade bonds. These include (1) upgrad­
ings of low-grade bonds, (2) downgradings of 
high-grade bonds, (3) maturities of low-grade 
bonds, (4) maturities of high-grade bonds, (5) 
exchanges of low-grade bonds, (6) exchanges of 
high-grade bonds, (7) repurchases of low-grade 
bonds, (8) repurchases of high-grade bonds, (9) 
defaults of low-grade bonds, (10) issuance of new  
low-grade bonds and (11) issuance of new  high- 
grade bonds. Previous studies have ignored the 
effects of these factors on the differences in dura­
tions between high-grade and low-grade bond  
asset classes over time.
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Past Evidence
Given previous assertions concerning the rel­
ative call rates of low-grade and high-grade bonds, 
we will review the empirical evidence on low- 
grade bond calls. We will also review the default 
rate experiences of these asset classes—a factor 
ignored by previous studies. 14 Securities with long 
durations are more volatile than those with shorter 
durations; the frequency of events such as calls 
and default should directly impact duration.
Prior research has never established the extent 
to which each asset class is affected by calls. We 
might start by looking at the relative number of 
high-grade and low-grade bonds that have call 
options written on them. (Not all low-grade bonds 
have a call option written into the indenture.) If 
the option to call is more common for low-grade 
than high-grade bonds (and any effects of this 
difference are not balanced or outweighed by dif­
ferential impacts of strike interest rates and exer­
cise prices), then we might expect call options to 
reduce the duration of low-grade bonds more than 
they reduce the duration of high-grade bonds.
Past evidence indicates that defaults have had 
a greater impact on low-grade bond duration than 
calls.13 Table 2 compares the frequencies of calls 
and defaults for low-grade bonds.16 Over the 10 
annual cohort groups, the default rate as of De­
cember 12, 1988 was 10.66% versus 10.88% for the 
call rate. Over the sample, then, defaults and calls 
occurred with approximately the same frequency 
for original-issue low-grade bonds. Recovery rates 
for low-grade bonds have been below 50%, how­
ever; defaults have thus had a greater impact than 
calls on the duration of original-issue low-grade 
bonds.17
An example illustrates this. Consider two 
portfolios, A and B. Portfolio A comprises 10 
bonds with a call option written on each bond. 
Portfolio B comprises 10 bonds with a put option 
written on each bond. All bonds in both portfolios 
mature in 10 years and all are zero-coupon bonds. 
The risk-free discount rate is 10% per annum and 
the term structure is flat. Original-issue bonds 
with call options written on them are called at a 
rate of 10% per year and original-issue bonds with  
put options written on them default at a rate of 
10% per year. Called bonds receive 100 cents on  
the dollar whereas defaulted bonds recover only 
50% of par value. Bonds that are called or default 
reinvest at the discount rate for the remainder of 
the 10-year period. Historically, call and default 
rates are about 2% to 5% per annum for original- 
issue bonds.18 Furthermore, defaulted bonds re­
cover about 38 cents on the dollar.19
A portfolio comprised of risk-free, zero-cou- 
pon bonds without options written on them has a 
duration of 10 years. Portfolio A (the call portfolio) 
has a duration of approximately 4.7 years. If w e  
assume investors do not expect any defaults, Port­
folio B (the default portfolio) has the same duration 
as Portfolio A. If we assume investors accurately 
adjust their discount rate to reflect the expected 
10% default rate and 50% recovery rate, the dis­
count rate would be approximately 23% and Port­
folio B's duration would be approximately 3.9 
years. Based on conservative estimates, then, the 
duration of a portfolio of bonds that are callable is 
about 17% greater than the duration of a portfolio 
of bonds that default. In short, if w e assume 
investors anticipate default rates and call rates,
Table 2  Cumulative Disposition of Original-issue Low-Grade Bonds by Par Amount Issued (December 31, 
1988)
Issue
Year
Total Issued 
(millions)
Defaults
(%)
Exchanges
(%)
Calls
(%)
Maturities
(%)
Residual 
Out. (%)
1977 S 908 23.92% 0.00 32.60% 9.59% 24.14%
1978 1,442 34.26 9.02 25.87 0.00 30.86
1979 1,263 24.70 1.11 32.78 0.00 41.41
1980 1,223 27.56 4.09 30.09 0.00 38.27
1981 1,240 20.97 19,35 27.82 2.42 29.44
1982 2,490 25.94 0.40 47.15 10.84 15.66
1983 6,003 19.21 7.58 13.16 5.83 54.22
1984 11,552 9.38 3.94 9.17 4.60 72.91
1985 14,463 3.53 3.25 13.99 0.00 79.23
1986 30,949 8.14 1.07 3.03 0.97 86.68
Total $71,533 10.66% 3.01% 10.88% 2.19% 73.27%
Source: P. Asquith, D. Mullins and E. Wolff, "Original Issue High Yield Bonds: Aging Analyses of Defaults, Exchanges, and Calls," 
Journal of Finance, September 1989.
Financial Analysts Journal / July-August 1994 35
defaults shorten the duration of low-grade bond 
portfolios more than calls.20
Generally, for low-grade bonds, security dis­
tress has had a larger impact on duration than 
declining interest rates.21 The opposite may be true 
for high-grade bonds. Furthermore, default rates 
have been dramatically higher for low-grade than 
for high-grade bonds.
THE IMPACT OF CALL AND PUT PERIODS
Biume, Keim and Patel have observed that "low- 
grade bonds are complex securities having some of 
the characteristics of higher grade bonds and some 
of the characteristics of equities." 23 Accordingly, 
low-grade bond prices covary with both stock and 
bond prices. H ow are the put and call options 
written on most low-grade bonds related to stock 
and high-grade bond options?
To examine the return behavior of high-grade 
and low-grade bonds, w e isolate periods in which 
calls and puts are likely to be exercised or in which 
the probability of exercise significantly increases. 
We assume that, in regard to embedded put op­
tions (i.e., defaults and outright bankruptcies), the 
salient periods for examination are recessionary 
periods, whereas the salient periods for examining 
calls are those of declining interest rates. By exam­
ining low-grade and high-grade returns during 
these periods, w e can analyze the impacts that 
puts and calls have on the relative returns of the 
two corporate bond asset classes.
Call Periods
High-grade bonds are significantly more sen­
sitive to interest rate changes than low-grade 
bonds.24 Why this is so remains open to question. 
If low-grade bonds' relative lack of interest rate 
sensitivity could be attributed to their relatively 
higher call rate, we would expect a significant 
decline in the sensitivity of low-grade bond returns 
to risk-free bond returns during periods when call 
options are likely to be exercised (i.e., periods of 
declining interest rates).
We can test this by examining the behavior of
low-grade bond returns relative to high-grade 
bond returns during periods of declining interest 
rates. Specifically, if there is a meaningful differ­
ence, the sensitivity of low-grade bond returns to 
risk-free return movements should decline signif­
icantly. Table 3 presents returns and standard 
deviations for periods w hen the 10-year, constant- 
maturity Treasury bond yield declined.
Although low-grade bonds were less volatile 
than high-grade bonds during periods of declining 
interest rates, low-grade bonds were not signifi­
cantly less volatile (at the 10% level of signifi­
cance). For months when interest rates were de­
clining, the ratio of high-grade to low-grade bond 
standard deviations is approximately 1.18; it is 1.09 
for all months. The greater number of calls of and 
the weaker call protection afforded low-grade 
bonds relative to high-grade bonds cannot fully 
explain their lower volatility.
We ran the following regression models to test 
for the significance of call periods on the returns of 
high-grade and low-grade bonds:
LGR, =  <*0 + 0 i  x TBR, + 02 x  TBR, x  DIR, +  03
x SMR, + 0 4 x SMR, x DIR, + 0 5 x DIR, + e, (1)
HGR, = ao +  0 i  x TBRt + 02 x TBR, x DIR, +  03
x SMR, + 0 4 x  SMR, x  DIR, -f 0 5 x  DIR, + e, (2)
LGR, — HGR, =  oq + 0 j x  TBR, +  02 ^ TBR, x  DIR,
+ 03 x SMR, + 04 x SMR, x  DIR, + 0 5 x  DIR, + e, (3)
Here
LGR = low-grade bond return,
HGR = high-grade bond return,
TBR = Treasury bond return,
DIR = a dummy variable equal to 1 if interest 
rates decline and 0 otherwise,
SMR = stock market return (the return of the S&P 
500) and 
e = an error term.
The regression equations were designed to 
take account of bond and stock market risk via TBR 
and SMR. The call dummy variable is intended to
Table 3. Return and Risk for Several Asset Classes for Months when Interest 
Rates Declined (call months), 1960-88
Treasury Bonds High-Grade Bonds Low-Grade Bonds S&P 500
Observations = 149
Cumulative Return 2,425.50% 2,080.38% 1,522.98% 2,436.41%
Average Return 29.70% 28.17% 25.16% 29.75%
Standard Deviation 9.85% 9.28% 7.86% 14.09%
Reward/Risk Ratio 3.02 3.04 3.20 2.11
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Table 4. Call Regressions of Low-Grade and High-Grade Bond Retumf
Model “o A A ft ft ft
Adj.
R2 DW SEE
(1) Coefficient 0.000 0.264 -0 .030 0.373 -0 .032 0.006 0.668 1.85 0.014
t-Statistic 0.12 5.91* -0 .4 9 15.61* -0 .8 2 3.14*
(2) Coefficient - 0.000 0.785 0.005 0.041 0.037 0.002 0.820 2.25 0.012
t-Statistic - 1.12 21.87* 0.09 2.09** 1.18 1.31
(3) Coefficient 0.000 -0 .521 -0 .035 0.337 -0 .069 0.004 0.587 2.00 0.015
t-Statistic 0.22 -11.51* -0 .5 5 13.78* -1 .7 5 2.06**
* Denotes significance at the 1% level.
** Denotes significance at the 5% level.
+ These regression results compare the effect of periods of declining interest rates. A month is defined as a period o f declining 
interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 10-year constant-maturity Treasury bond is less than zero.
isolate the effect of periods when calls are more 
frequent and/or more probable.
Table 4 gives the results. The estimated alpha 
can be interpreted as the amount of abnormal 
return attributed to the dependent return series 
after adjusting for the various movements of the 
independent variables. In this case, the results 
indicate that, during periods of declining interest 
rates, there is no significant difference between the 
return performances of the two asset classes.
As expected, low-grade bonds are signifi­
cantly less sensitive to interest rate movements (/^ 
and &) and significantly more sensitive to stock 
market movements (£3 and £ 4) than high-grade 
bonds. The fact that they are not significantly more 
or less sensitive to either interest rate or stock price 
movements during periods of declining interest 
rates (&  and /34, respectively) casts doubt on the 
existence of significant asymmetry in the effect of 
call options on low-grade versus high-grade 
bonds. If high-grade bonds were significantly 
more sensitive to interest rate movements because 
of greater call protection relative to low-grade 
bonds, w e would expect the coefficient for ft* to be 
significantly more positive than the same coeffi­
cient for the low-grade bond regression.
Interestingly, the coefficient for the dummy 
for periods of dedining interest rates is statistically 
significant in the third regression. This suggests 
that periods of declining interest rates do have 
some significant impact on the returns of the two 
asset dasses and, further, that the impact is signif­
icantly asymmetric (i.e., low-grade bond returns 
are more positively affected than high-grade bond 
returns). At a minimum, after controlling for gov­
ernment bond and stock market risk, this supports 
the contention that low-grade bonds can offer 
diversification advantages over high-grade bonds 
during periods of declining interest rates.
Put Periods
If the exercise of a put or the probability of its 
exerdse has a greater impact on low-grade bonds 
than on high-grade bonds, the difference is more 
likely to be significant during downturns in the 
business cycle. If low-grade bonds are significantly 
more exposed to business cycle risk during reces­
sions, low-grade bond returns should be more 
sensitive to equity movements during periods 
when more defaults occur. Therefore, we hypoth­
esize that low-grade bond returns will be signifi­
cantly more affected by interest rates and less 
affected by movements in the stock market during 
recessionary periods than at other times. That is, if 
the put options embedded in low-grade bonds are 
an effective means of diversifying risk, this will be 
most apparent in the sensitivity of low-grade bond  
returns to bond and stock returns in recessionary 
periods.
Table 5 shows that low-grade bonds were only 
slightly less volatile than high-grade bonds during 
recessions. For recession months, the ratio of high- 
grade to low-grade bond standard deviations is 
approximately 1.10, versus 1.09 for all months. It 
seems that, as was the case with calls, defaults 
alone do not explain the volatility differential be­
tween high-grade and low-grade bonds.
Perhaps defaults dampen the sensitivity of 
low-grade bond returns to stock market m ove­
ments during recessionary periods. We ran the 
following regressions to test for the impact of 
recessionary periods on the returns of high-grade 
and low-grade bonds:
LGR, =  a 0 + ^ x  TBR, + fi2 x TBR, x R e q  + p 3
x SMR, + p A x  SMR, x  Rec, +  p$ x  Rec, +  e, (4)
HGR, = a 0 + p i x TBR, + p 2 x  TBR, xR ec, + p 3
x SMR, + f t  x  SMR, xRec, + p s xRec, + e, (5)
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Table 5. Return and Risk for Several Asset Classes: Recession Months (put
months), 1960-88
Treasury Bonds High-Grade Bonds Low-Grade Bonds S&P500
Observations =  59
Cumulative Return 110.26% 108.22% 50.35% 36.58%
Average Return 16.32% 16.09% 8.65% 6.55%
Standard Deviation 14.45% 14.34% 13.04% 19.97%
Reward/Risk Ratio 1.13 1.12 0.66 0.33
LGRt — HGRf — (Xq +  f}\ x TBRt + p2 x  TBft x  Reef
+ p3 x SMRt + f t  x SMRt x Rect + p5 x Rec, + e, (6)
Here Rec is a dum my variable equal to 1 if the 
economy is in a recession and 0 otherwise. The put 
dummy variable is intended to isolate the effect of 
recessionary periods when puts are more frequent 
and/or more probable for low-grade bonds.
The results in Table 6 indicate that during 
recessions there is no significant difference be­
tween the return performances of the two asset 
classes. This supports the contention that low- 
grade bonds provide a good hedge against extreme 
movements in stock and government bond mar­
kets. In this particular analysis, low-grade bonds 
seem to have provided a good hedge against 
business cycle risk.
Over the period, low-grade bonds lost some of 
their sensitivity to stock market movements during 
business cycle .contractions, whereas high-grade 
bonds became significantly more sensitive to stock 
market movements (estimated coefficient /34). 
These somewhat counterintuitive results imply 
that high-grade bonds behave more like equities 
during business cycle contractions than during 
business cycle expansions.26
A large increase in perceived credit risk during 
recessionary periods could explain this. Whereas 
some low-grade bonds default, and are thus re­
moved from the asset class, lowering its duration, 
high-grade bonds are more likely either to remain 
in their asset class or to be downgraded. During 
economic booms, high-grade bonds can be up­
graded, but upgrades may be a declining function 
of the length and magnitude of the expansion, 
whereas downgrades are a direct function of the 
length and magnitude of the contraction. Either 
way, the results suggest that defaults may not be 
the death of an asset class. For low-grade bonds, at 
least relative to high-grade bonds, defaults have 
been a good method of diversifying equity market 
risk during recessions.
The embedded puts in low-grade bonds insig­
nificantly increase the bonds' sensitivity to equity 
price movements (i.e., estimated coefficient /34 is 
positive but insignificantly so) and significantly 
lengthen their duration with respect to bond price 
movements (i.e., & is very large and very signifi­
cant). This suggests that the duration of low-grade 
bonds actually increases during recessions. This 
may in part be explained by high-grade bonds 
being downgraded into the low-grade asset class, 
overwhelming the effect puts have on the asset 
class. Even though puts are exercised more fre­
quently during recessions, high-grade downgrad­
ings more than offset this effect.
The results also indicate that low-grade bonds
Table 6. Put Regressions of Low-Grade and High-Grade Bond Returns1'
Adj.
Model ft ft ft ft ft R2 DW SEE
(4) Coefficient 0.003 0.202 0.255 0.365 0.004 -0.004 0.679 1.87 0.014
t-Statistic 2.96* 6.09* 4.30* 16.96* 0.09 -1 .72
(5) Coefficient - 0.001 0.782 0.051 0.032 0.095 0.002 0.825 2.27 0.011
t-Statistic -1 .4 1 29.27* 1.08 1.84** 2.83* 0.31
(6) Coefficient 0.002 -0 .580 0.203 0.333 -0.091 -0.004 0.595 1.98 0.014
t-Statistic 1.79 -17.15* 3.37* 15.20* -2.15** -1 .7 9
* Denotes significance at the 1% level.
”  Denotes significance at the 5% level.
t  These regression results compare the effect of recessionary periods. A recession is defined as the period immediately following 
the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. This definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis definition.
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Table 7. Return and Risk for Several Asset Classes: Combination Recession and
Declining Interest Rate Months (put and call months), 1960-88
Treasury Bonds High-Grade Bonds Low-Grade Bonds S&P500
Observations = 31
Cumulative Return 212.56% 190.02% 117.16% 122.72%
Average Return 55.45% 51.01% 35.01% 36.34%
Standard Deviation 13.30% 13.71% 10.94% 17.32%
Reward/Risk Ratio 4.17 3.72 3.20 2.10
are declining. We hypothesize that, during reces­
sionary periods with decreasing interest rates, 
low-grade bond returns will be significantly more 
affected than high-grade returns by interest rates 
and less affected by movements in the stock mar­
ket than at other times.
Table 7 shows that low-grade bonds were less 
volatile than high-grade bonds during periods of 
recession and declining interest rates. In months of 
recession and declining interest rates, the ratio of 
high-grade to low-grade bond standard deviations 
was approximately 1.25. During months when we 
might expect puts and calls on low-grade bonds to 
be exercised, the volatility of low-grade bonds 
declined somewhat versus that of high-grade 
bonds, but the difference is not significant. De­
faults and calls alone cannot explain the difference 
in volatility between high-grade and low-grade 
bonds.
We ran the following regression models to test 
for the significance of simultaneous put and call 
periods on the returns of high-grade and low- 
grade bonds:
LGR,=  o.q +  P\ x  TBR, + p2 x  TBR, x  Rec, x  DIRt
+ 03 x  SMR, + 04 x  SMR, x Rec, x  DIR, + 0 5
x Rec, x  DIR, + e, (6a)
Table 8. Put and Call Regressions of Low-Grade and High-Grade Bond Returns1,
Model «o ft ft ft ft ft
Adj.
R2 DW SEE
(7) Coefficient 0.002 0.233 0.260 0.383 - 0.100 -0 .003 0.670 1.84 0.014
t-Statistic 2.16** 7.35* 3.33* 19.45* -1 .7 2 -0 .6 7
(8) Coefficient 0.001 0.789 0.032 0.038 0.179 - 0.002 0.828 2.28 0.011
t-Statistic 1.27 31.54* 0.52 2.44* 3.90* -0 .8 1
(9) Coefficient 0.001 -0 .5 5 6 0.228 0.345 -0 .2 7 9 - 0.000 0.608 1.96 0.014
t-Statistic 1.18 -17.68* 2.94* 17.71* -4 .83* -0 .0 4
* Denotes significance at the 1% leveL 
** Denotes significance at the 5% level.
t  These regression results compare the effects o f recessionary and declining interest rate periods. A  month is defined as a period of 
declining interest rates if during the month the change in yield on the 10-year, constant-maturity Treasury bond is less than zero, 
and a recession is defined as the period immediately following the business cycle peak up to the month of the subsequent trough. 
The recession period definition is directly based on the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis definition.
act significantly more like government bonds dur­
ing recessions, whereas high-grade bonds act less 
like government bonds. The covariability of low- 
grade bond returns with government bond returns 
increases significantly during recessions relative to 
that of high-grade bond returns (i.e., estimated 
coefficient /32). This could also be explained in part 
by downgradings of high-grade bonds during re­
cessions; most of these bonds remain in the asset 
class and are not called away during the recession.
Overall, the results strongly suggest that dur­
ing periods when low-grade bonds would be ex­
pected to show a great deal more sensitivity to 
equity prices relative to high-grade bonds, they do 
not. During recessions, the two asset classes seem  
partially to reverse their roles. Low-grade bonds 
become less like equity and more like bonds, 
whereas high-grade bonds become more like eq­
uity and less like bonds. This effect will tend to 
increase the volatility of high-grade bonds relative 
to that of low-grade bonds.
Combining Call and Put Periods
If the exercise or the probability of exercise of 
an option has more or less of an effect on low- 
grade bonds than on high-grade bonds, the differ­
ence should show up during periods when the 
business cycle is on a downturn and interest rates
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HGR, =  a 0 +  P\ x  TBRt + p 2 x  TBR* x  Rec, x  DIR, + p3 
x SMR, +  04  x  SMR, x  Rec, x  DIR, +  p5
x  Rec, x DIR, + e, (7) 
LGR, -  HGR, = a0 + 0  jX  TBR, + p2 x  TBR, x Rec, 
x  DIR, + Pi x  SMR, + 0 4 x  SMR, x  Rec, x DIR,
+ /3S x  Rec, x DIR, + e, (8)
These regressions are intended to capture the 
relative effects of the dual events of puts and calls 
for low-grade bonds and calls for high-grade 
bonds.27 The &  coefficient isolates the effect 
changes in government bond prices have on 
changes in low-grade and high-grade bond prices 
during periods of recession and declining interest 
rates. The /34 coefficient isolates the effect changes 
in equity prices have on changes in low-grade and 
high-grade bond prices during periods of recession 
and declining interest rates.
The recession effect is accentuated during pe­
riods of declining interest rates (see Table 8). That 
is, during business cycle contractions with declin­
ing interest rates, high-grade bonds behave more 
like equities and less like government bonds than 
during business cycle contractions without declin­
ing interest rates (compare Model 5 and 8 results, 
particularly for estimated coefficient /3J. The sign 
and significance of the estimated and /34 coeffi­
cients for the Model 9 regressions suggest that 
periods of declining interest rates combined with 
recession significantly affect the relationship be­
tween low-grade and high-grade bond returns.
Recessionary periods combined with periods 
of declining interest rates do not seem to have had 
a great impact on the pricing of low-grade bonds. 
We hypothesize that this is in large part due to the 
fact that the net effect of writing both put and call 
options on low-grade bonds is to increase their 
diversification properties. In short, periods of de­
clining interest rates and recessions diversify the 
risk inherent in the options written on low-grade 
bonds, especially relative to the risk of bonds with 
only call options (i.e., high-grade bonds).
The results indicate a somewhat counterintu­
itive conclusion. During periods when both calls 
and puts should be exercised (i.e., the worst of 
both worlds), their net effect is reduced because, as 
credit quality declines (i.e., bankruptcies and de­
faults rise) prices are depressed sufficiently to 
discourage the exercise of the call option (i.e., 
moving the price down and away from the strike 
price). This partially offsets the potential call effect
and allows some price appreciation for the more 
creditworthy bonds.
In short, combining the put option with a call 
option, especially during periods when calls and 
defaults are most likely, diversifies default risk. 
Higher-quality bonds will tend not to be called 
during a recession, even when interest rates de­
crease, and new, relatively high-quality down­
grades enter the lower-quality asset class. This 
price appreciation is obviously offset by the exer­
cise of put options. For high-grade bonds, how­
ever, there is relatively little offsetting effect. As 
interest rates decline, high-grade bonds tend to be 
called away; during recessions, credit quality gen­
erally declines for the whole asset class.
CONCLUSIONS
Much of the lower volatility of low-grade bond 
returns relative to other risky asset classes can be 
attributed to their relatively low durations. Past 
studies have found that the higher coupon rates 
and call features associated with low-grade bonds 
explain their relatively low durations. But past 
analyses have largely ignored the fact that high- 
grade bonds also have call features.28 Our analysis 
shows that it is not clear that differences in call 
features can explain the shorter durations of low- 
grade bonds. On the basis of past default rates, call 
rates and default recovery values, defaults have 
had a greater impact than calls on shortening the 
durations of low-grade bonds.
Calls may not have had a significant impact on 
the sensitivity of low-grade bonds relative to high- 
grade bonds, but the combination of calls and 
embedded puts acts to diversify the exposure of 
low-grade bonds to the risks of both recession and 
declines in interest rates. Over the 1960-88 period, 
at least, low-grade bonds have demonstrated sig­
nificantly less sensitivity to both bond and stock 
market risks than high-grade bonds as an asset 
class.
What does it all mean? Very long-term inves­
tors in low-grade bonds should not fear recession­
ary periods. In the long run, recessionary periods 
will reduces the volatility of low-grade bonds rel­
ative to high-grade bonds. Also, in the very long 
run, investors in low-grade bonds do not have 
much to fear from periods of declining interest 
rates. To the extent corporate bonds are a sound 
investment, low-grade bonds are at least in part a 
good investment because of the call and put op­
tions written on them .30
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gress on August 4, 1989.
2. B. Cornell and K. Green, "The Investment Performance of 
Low-Grade Bond Funds," Journal of Finance, March 1991. 
See also M. Blume, D. Keim and S. Patel, "Returns and 
Volatility of Low-Grade Bonds 1977-1989," Journal of Fi­
nance, March 1991.
3. E. Altman, "Setting the Record Straight on Junk Bonds: A 
Review of the Research on Default Rates and Returns," 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance (Continental Bank), Sum­
mer 1990.
4. One problem with this method is that the effects of L may 
also have a significant effect during periods when only C 
and P are expected to be significant. Nevertheless, it is 
assumed that call and put periods significantly affecting the 
pricing of risky bonds can be identified.
5. Strictly speaking this is not true. All corporate bonds have 
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high-grade bonds are relatively far out of the money 
c o m p a r e d  with those written on low-grade bonds. There­
fore, put options would be expected to have a significantly 
larger impact on low-grade bonds than high-grade bonds.
6. J. Fons, "The Default Premium and Corporate Bond Expe­
rience," Journal of Finance, March 1987, found that in his 
sample of 702 "low-rated" issues, 670 had call provisions 
(i.e., 95.44%). By comparison, S. Katz, "The Price Adjust­
ment Process of Bonds to Rating Reclassifications: A Test of 
Bond Market Efficiency," Journal of Finance, May 1974, 
found that in his sample of 115 high-grade electric utility 
bonds, 100% had call provisions. A s Katz stated: "It is 
reasonable to assume that almost all corporate bonds cur­
rently issued have some form of call feature."
7. It is defined as the elasticity of price with respect to the 
interest rate.
8. For example, see E. Altman, "Measuring Corporate Bond 
Mortality and Performance," Journal of Finance, September 
1989.
9. For example, in the case of bankrupt equities, see J. 
Aharony, C. Jones and I. Swary, "An Analysis of Risk and 
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ital Market Data," Journal of Finance, September 1980.
10. See R. Bookstaber, Option Pricing and Investment Strategies, 
third edition (New York: Probus Publishing Company, 
1991).
11. Blume, Keim and Patel, "Returns and Volatility of Low- 
Grade Bonds," op. at. and Cornell and Green, "The Invest­
ment Performance of Low-Grade Bond Funds," op. cit.
12. As an extreme example, assuming a flat term structure and 
instantaneous reinvestment, calls do not change the dura­
tion of a portfolio of bonds based on such a strategy, 
although there is limited economic justification for calling a 
bond if interest rates do not change.
13. Formally, the duration of a portfolio with N  bonds is 
defined as:
s
Dp — X  K,' x Do
i-i
where Xj = the weight of bond i in the portfolio, and Ds =  
the duration of bond i.
14. The return series used were the same as those used in 
Cornell and Green ("The Investment Performance of Low- 
Grade Bond Funds," op. cit.), with the exception of 1989, 
for which data were unavailable. The low-grade returns 
were based on low-grade mutual fund data from Upper 
Analytical Services. The returns are net of transaction costs, 
management fees and operating expenses. To be consid­
ered low-grade, a fund must have had at least two-thirds of 
its portfolio invested in corporate bonds rated Baa or lower 
by M oody's or BBB or lower by Standard & Poor's through­
out the month. This data set avoids the selection bias 
problems inherent in creating indexes based on thinly 
traded securities. Unfortunately, not all the securities held 
b y  the mutual funds were low-grade bonds. The return 
series used was the unweighted average of the returns 
available from each fund for each month. The Treasury 
bond and high-grade corporate bond data are derived from 
Ibbotson and Sinquefield data provided by Dimensional 
F u n d  Advisors. The S&P 500 returns are based on that 
index. The dummy variable values used for rising or falling 
interest rates were derived from the 10-year, constant- 
maturity Treasury bond yields published by the Wall Street 
Journal. The dummy variable values for recession were 
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nomic Analysis ("Business Cycle Expansions and Contrac­
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15. Several studies have provided historical call and default 
rates for low-grade bonds. See, for example, E. Altman, 
"Measuring Corporate Bond Mortality and Performance," 
Journal of Finance, September 1989 and P. Asquith, D. 
Mullins and E. Wolff, "Original Issue High Yield Bonds: 
Aging Analyses of Defaults, Exchanges and Calls," Journal 
of Finance, September 1989. Given that the results in the 
latter include calls and exchanges, and there is no signifi­
cant difference between the default rates produced by the 
two studies (see E. Altman, "Setting the Record Straight on  
Junk Bonds: A Review of the Research on Default Rates and 
Returns," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance (Continental 
Bank), Summer 1990), w e used the Asquith, Mullins and 
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16. These values do not account for sinking fund and partial 
repurchases. Defaults were defined by at least one of the 
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ment of a D rating by Standard & Poor's for a missed 
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ance to call or put is important. If the frequency of calls and 
defaults is relatively equal, but the price change for de­
faulted low-grade bonds is more than from calls, then 
default is a more significant determinant of duration and 
the subsequent low volatility of low-grade bonds.
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22. With the possible exception of the Texaco bankruptcy 
(where there was no exchange of bonds or stoppage of 
interest), no high-grade bond has ever defaulted. Trivially, 
if it can be shown that two or more high-grade bonds have 
been called, calls have had a more significant influence on  
high-grade bond duration than defaults.
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24. See Cornell and Green, 'T he Investment Performance of 
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market during recessions. One point of this study is the 
em phasis on defaults or puts for low-grade bonds during 
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27. Again, downgradings for high-grade bonds may have 
significant impacts during recessions and may be affecting 
the results as well.
28. In an article on the efficiency of ratings changes, Katz ("The 
Price Adjustment Process of Bonds to Rating Reclassifica­
tions," op. cit., p. 552) noted that his sample of 115 bonds 
from 66 high-grade electric utility companies was com­
posed only of bonds with call options. Given Katz's sam­
ple, it is unlikely that low-grade bonds have a higher 
percentage of bonds with call provisions.
29. Obviously, a caveat applies to short-term investors.
30. The author would like to thank Kevin Green and Alan 
Williams for making the data available, Joel Sternberg and 
W. V. Harlow for their helpful comments, and Dave Hart, 
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the applicability o f applying dynamic asset allocation (»DAA») in the 
Finnish financial markets. Several equity signals are examined and evaluated within the context 
of asset allocation and mean-variance optimization. The findings suggest that DAA can be suc­
cessfully applied in the Finnish Financial markets.
1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the study is to examine the feasibility of applying DAA (often 
referred to as integrated or tactical asset allocation), to the Finnish financial mar­
kets. Typically, in DAA a portfolio is formed, of certain asset classes (e.g., stocks, 
bonds, and cash) and the weightings of the asset classes are changed over time in 
response to fundamental changes in the financial markets and/or economy. For over 
a decade asset allocation1 has been applied successfully in the United States (U.S.) 
financial markets.
The fundamental assumption behind DAA is that the financial markets can be 
»timed». Normally, given the volatility of stocks relative to other asset classes, the 
stock market is the critical market to time. For example, mistiming the stock market 
is relatively more costly than mistiming the cash market. Given the importance of 
the stock signal, much of this study will examine the results of four different stock 
signals used within a DAA framework.
The author thanks Teppo Martikainen and Paavo Yli-Olli for referee comments, and the Suomen 
Arvopaperimarkkinoiden Edistamissaatio for funding this project. Also. I would like to thank Lili Kihn 
and Tero Vaarna for pointing me in the right direction, and Jari Puhakka for providing data and backg­
round on the Finnish tinancial markets. Without this help, the project would not have been started or 
completed.
1 Most references to asset allocation are references to static asset allocation. This studx is princi­
pally concerned with DAA not static asset allocation. Often the final DAA model results are compared 
to the axerage or static mix. See Ross et al. 11989) for a practical example of static asset allocation. As 
the name suggests, in sialic asset allocation the asset class weightings do not change from period to 
period.
There are several aspects of this study which are unique. First, to date there 
have been no other published studies reviewing asset allocation literature. Second, 
to date there have been no published studies which develop a specific DAA model 
from start to finish. That is, no other published studies lay out the theoretical and 
practical methods of designing a DAA model. Finally, there have been no pub­
lished DAA or static asset allocation studies based on the Finnish financial 
markets.
In order, this study is composed of the following sections: introduction, review 
of literature, data, method employed in the analysis, results and analysis, and con­
clusion. This is the general layout of this study, but the data section is expanded to 
include a longer than normal overview of the risk/return experience o f the Finnish 
financial markets. Also, of course, the method employed in the study will be an as­
set allocation framework (see Figure 1).
Tactical Asset Allocat ion Process
Return s
A s s e t  Mix
Opt imizer
Re tu rns ,  
Ri sks,  and 
Correlations
Predict ion
Procedure
In ve s to r ' s
R i sk
Tole ranc e
Capital
Market
Condi t ions
I nv es t o r ' s  
A s s e t s ,  
Liabs,  and 
Net Wor th
Figure /. Tactical Asset Allocation Process.
Source: Sharpe. W., »Integrated Asset Allocation.» Financial Analysts Journal, September- 
October 1987. p. 29.
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The literature is roughly composed of the following two general areas: (1) Finn­
ish financial markets literature, and (2) asset allocation literature. The emphasis of 
the Finnish financial markets literature will be on certain unique characteristics of 
the financial markets in Finland, particularly the bond and stock markets. The em­
phasis of the asset allocation literature will be on its significance as it relates to as­
set allocation in general and DAA in particular.
2.7. Finnish Financial Markets Literature (Finland Peculiarities)
One obvious reason for the dearth of foreign portfolio investment in Fin­
land, besides the now-dismantled but long-lived exchange control system, 
can be found in the small size of Finnish financial markets; in terms of market 
capitalization, Finland’s securities markets are among the smallest in Europe. 
Koskinen [1991, p. 7]
Although, they appear to be expanding rapidly. This observation has been ex­
plained as a historic result of bank dominance in the financial markets (e.g.. Kosk­
inen [1991] and Koskinen and Pylkkonen [1992]). Also, especially for the equity 
market, past restrictions on foreign investments have likely had a negative impact 
on financial market size. The history of bank dominance and the size of the equity 
markets limits the time period this study is capable of examining.
2.1.1. Debt Instruments
Historically, tax-exempt bonds and deposits have encouraged banks to domi­
nate the bond market (see Koskinen and Pylkkonen [1992] and Malkamaki [1993]). 
Until recently, budget surpluses may have also contributed to this bank domination 
(i.e., the government hasn’t been required to issue a significant amount of bonds). 
Tax-exempt government bonds were not traded much since they were purchased 
mostly by individuals and held to m aturity.2
Corporate bonds have also been dominated by large banks. Corporate bonds 
have been a problem since no publicly operated credit rating system has been oper­
ating in Finland. That is, the costs of monitoring a bond position is higher w ithout 
a bond rating agency. Therefore, the holder must do all the monitoring. Given that 
it is relatively expensive to monitor a corporate bond position in Finland, a larger 
financial institution with ties to that business has been the logical provider of credit. 
The result has been that large banks in Finland have (dominated the corporate lend­
ing markets. Also, given the relatively small size o f Finnish firms, banks have 
tended to raise foreign money for domestic firms.
2 Koskinen [1991, p. 8] stated that »the segmentation o f  the debt-instrument market by type of 
investor reduces the efficiency o f the secondary market.»
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Given the size of Finnish debt markets, liquidity has been a problem (i.e., it has 
been low ).3 Koskinen and Pylkkonen [1992, p. 9-11] have noted that there has been 
a relatively recent increase in liquidity caused by the following factors: (1) growth 
in the markets (i.e., new issues4), (2) public sector deficits. (3) introduction of the 
withholding tax5, (4) tightening of the banks* capital adequacy requirements, and 
(5) introduction of a trading system for the secondary market. Also, restrictions on 
the entry of foreign investors were lifted on January 1, 1991 (January 1, 1993 for 
the equity market) for the bond markets. Again, the recent increase in new issues 
has been due in large part to the banks inability to provide most corporate financing. 
Banks have been unable to provide capital due to bad debts and the change in cap­
ital adequacy requirements. The introduction of the withholding tax for bond in­
come has decreased the incentive of individual investors to hold bonds until m atu­
rity (i.e.. taxable bonds). Generally, recessionary forces have encouraged private 
and public institutions to find new sources of capital. Finally, a secondary debt mar­
ket trading system should encourage trading in the bonds being traded.6
Recently, the debt markets in Finland have seen great grow'th compared to that 
of equity market. Koskinen and Pylkkonen [1992, p. 8] have attributed this to the 
following: (1) the dramatic increase in the government deficit, and (2) fundamental 
bank problems (i.e., excessive bad debts as a result of the economic downturn). 
Both in relative and absolute terms, the bond markets have grown. Koskinen and 
Pylkkonen [1992] found that in 1980 the bond market had less than 25 million FIM 
of bonds outstanding, which was less than 10% of GDP: and by.year end 1991 over 
125 million FIM of bonds were outstanding, which was over 30% of GDP. In short, 
from 1980 through 1991 the Markka denominated bond markets have experienced 
over a 500% absolute increase and, as measured as a percentage of GDP, over a 
300% relative increase.
2.1.2. Equity Instruments
Due to the relatively high levels of Finnish corporate debt, the market for equity 
securities has been limited. At least until recently, the equity markets in Finland
Also, in addition to liquidity, Koskinen and Pylkkonen [1992. p 8J have noted that only  
recently, due to bankruptcies, have investors demanded risk premiums.
4 It is important to note that many, if  not most, new issues have been convertible bonds. This can 
be attributed to the difficulty o f raising equity capital during a recession. The problem with this is that 
convertible bonds are not pure debt securities. Therefore, the time series for debt may not represent a 
true debt series, and offered yields are not pure debt yields.
5 Also, see Malkamaki [1993, p. 15] on this point.
6 The system is intended to require anyone acting as a primary dealer in the government bench­
mark bond issues to act as market makers for those bonds. Through these market makers, the Bank o f  
Finland intends to make more information on volumes and prices publicly available. Also, another pos­
sible avenue for increasing financial market liquidity, the government may allow unit trusts in the 
future. Although, it is possible that trusts may increase liquidity in the bond markets: Malkamaki 
[ 1993. p. 15j reports that trusts (i.e.. mutual funds) have increased liquidity in the equity markets.
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have not shown to be »vveak form» efficient.7 That is. past prices have had signif­
icant forecasting ability (e.g., Yli-Olli and Virtanen [1987] and Martikainen et al. 
[1991b]8)9 l0. Significant and persistent autocorrelation in the time series for 
equity returns could indicate some degree of »stale trading». That is. a general lack 
of trading can cause equity prices to display a high degree of autocorrelation. Al­
though, Berglund and Liljeblom [1988] found that, on a daily basis, over the period 
1977 through 1982 stale trading was not a significant cause of autocorrelation 
found in markets returns.11 Based on these observations, many studies have suc­
cessfully modelled the time series behavior of Finnish stock returns (e.g.. see Booth 
et al. [1994]).
Stock price indices have had an interesting history in Finland (see Hernesniemi
[1991]). Until the introduction on June 1. 1990 of the Helsinki Stock Exchange's 
(the »HSE») own index (i.e., the »HEX»). the Unitas Ltd. (the »Unitas» index) and 
the Kansallis-Osake-Pankki (the »KOP» index) were the principal stock indices. 
Although highly correlated, the KOP and Unitas indices had given substantially 
different impressions as to price movements. For example. Hernesniemi [1991.
' T h e  » E /P  a n o m a ly »  has  b e e n  fo u n d  in the  F in n ish  e q u i ty  m a rk e ts .  R e g a r d in g  th e  E /P  a n o m a ly  
in F in la n d ,  M a r t ik a in e n  [1992]  fo u n d  tha t  a f te r  e s t im a t in g  s y s te m a t ic  r isk  by  fou r  a c c o u n t in g  in s t r u ­
m e n ta l  v a r ia b le s  ( i .e . ,  a c c o u n t in g  be ta ,  f inanc ia l  lev e ra g e ,  o p e r a t in g  lev e ra g e ,  and  g r o w th )  .the e f fe c t  o f  
th e  E/P" a n o m a ly ’ b e c a m e  in s ig n if ican t .  A l th o u g h ,  th e se  r e su l t s  d o  no t  p ro v e  tha t  the  F in n i sh  e q u i ty  m a r ­
ke ts  a re  .no l o n g e r  » w e a k  fo rm »  inef f ic ien t  as  o r ig in a l ly  d e f in ed  by  F a m a  [1970] .
Also, there have been a number of other anomalies found in the Finnish equity market. These 
include the size effect, the day-of-the-week effect (i.e.. in Finland it seems to occur on Tuesdays not 
Mondays), the turn-of-the-month effect, and the turn-of-the-vear effect. See Berglund [1986], Mar­
tikainen and Puttonen [1993], Martikainen et al. [1993a], and Berglund [1986], respectively for the rel­
evant empirical evidence and analysis.
8 The Martikainen et al. [1991b] article is a review o f empirical research literature on the Finnish 
stock market. Regarding weak-form inefficiencies, Martikainen et al. [1991b, p. 259] conclude by indi­
cating that although weak-form efficiency doesn't seem to exist on the Finnish stock market, they do 
not believe »past return series could be used to earn supernormal returns.»
9 Yli-Olli and Virtanen [1987] studied the predictability o f stock returns on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange from 1975 through 1986. Based on monthly and quarterly returns of the Unitas index, they 
found substantial and significant coefficients for their IMA (1,1) models (i.e., Integrated Moving Aver­
age models). They tested the explanatory power o f the following variables: (1) one period lag o f the 
endogenous variable, (2) changes in factory orders, (3) change in the yield on bonds or bank deposits, 
(4) change in money supply, (5) inflation, and (6) contemporaneous stock returns on the Stockholm  
Stock Exchange. All but the change in the yield on bonds or bank deposits were reported as having sta­
tistically significant coefficients.
Indirectly, Drummen and Zimmermann [1992. p. 22] found that »intemational factors (w'orld, 
Europe) are particularly unimportant for Italian, Spanish and Scandinavian stocks». In short, contrary 
to much o f Europe, the Scandinavian equity markets are quit idiosyncratic. Therefore, when construct­
ing Scandinavian stock market return models it might be useful to focus on country specific and Scan­
dinavia specific factors.
10 Although, the basic empirical form o f the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) based on 
Finnish data seems to correspond well to the results derived in other financial markets (see Ostermark 
[1987]). That is, given its limitations, the traditional CAPM seems to model the return generation proc­
ess on the Helsinki stock exchange reasonably well.
11 Berglund and Liljeblom [1988] attributed some o f the cause to Finnish Stock Exchange 
trading practices during the period studied.
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p. 7] noted that during 1988 the KOP general index showed a 49.2% increase while 
the Unitas general index showed a 31.7% increase during the same year. Hemes- 
niemi [1991, p. 7-8] gave the following reasons for the KOP and Unitas index di­
vergences: (1) prices used, (2) share issue adjustments, (3) dividend smoothing, (4) 
weighting scheme used, and (5) formulas used. In particular, the formulas and 
weights used were determined to be the primary causes of the systematic discrep­
ancies between the two indices (Hernesniemi [1991, p. 8]). In the final analysis, the 
formula itself may be most important.12
One relatively recent development has been the growth in the nonrestricted 
share market (see Koskinen [1991]). The 1939 Restriction Act limits foreign own­
ership of shares of Finnish companies to a 20% maximum (i.e., restricted shares). 
A foreign shareholder, with government consent, could raise this upper bound to 
40%. Overseas trading of unrestricted shares is concentrated in the Stock Ex­
change Automated Quotation System (»SEAQ») in London. As of June 1991 the 
unrestricted shares of ten companies were traded on the SEAQ. Koskinen [1991, p. 
10] found that the average premium paid for the shares of those ten companies on 
the SEAQ was 24%. In addition, Koskinen [1991, p. 11] found that the average 
turnover of the shares of those ten companies on the SEAQ was over 200% that of 
Helsinki. Some reasons given for this were: (1) ability to avoid a 1% stamp duty if 
the counterparty to the trade is a foreigner, and (2) anonymity of the buyer and 
seller.13
In addition, Hietala [1989] found that ownership restrictions caused a signifi­
cant price differential between restricted and unrestricted shares. As of January 1, 
1993 there were no limitations for foreign ownership in the HSE. A. more recent 
study by Booth et al. [1993] found that restricted HSE share prices seemed to drive 
the pricing of unrestricted shares (i.e., the unrestricted shares were being priced 
with a lag, based on restricted prices). Therefore, the price behavior of unrestricted 
shares before 1993 seemed to indicate that fundamental pricing information was 
being used to price restricted shares before unrestricted shares. Also, unrestricted 
shares showed a higher level of volatility than restricted shares over the share re­
striction period.
2.2. Asset Allocation Literature in General
Literature on the concept of asset allocation is a relatively recent phenomenon, 
and that on DAA even more recent. In all likelihood, most literature on asset allo­
cation has been unpublished practitioner work. This study will review a substantial
12 Note that most o f the research on the Finnish slock market has used the W l-index, which was 
academically justified by Berglund et al. (1983],
13 It is most likely this is in large part due to liquidity differentials between the SEAQ and the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange (see Amihud and Mendelson [1986a and 1986b] regarding the price impact o f  
liquidity).
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amount of the published material. The literature in the area falls into the following 
three general areas: (1) asset allocation literature (2) international asset allocation 
(»IAA») literature, and (3) asset allocation through the use of options. Although, 
and fortunately for this study, there is substantially more written on the more gen­
eral area of asset allocation.
2.2.1. Asset Allocation Literature
Much of the general asset allocation literature covers aspects of portfolio opti­
mization (e.g., Sharpe [1987], Speidel et al. [1989], Michaud [1989]. Leibowitz and 
Henriksson [1989], Jorion [1992], Smith-Britto and Crowell [1992]. and Kritzntan
[1992]). Another group of the general asset allocation literature addresses asset al­
location decision itself and special considerations (e.g.. Fielitz and Muller [1983]. 
Arnott and von Germeten [1983]. Arnott [1985], Bostock et al. [1989]. Farrell 
[1989], Wainscott [1990], Booth and Fama [1992], and Riley and Chow [1992]).
The Sharpe [1987] article may be the most significant background article on as­
set allocation written. Within the article the framework for a DAA model is present­
ed (see Figure 1), and various other forms of asset allocation are discussed. The 
method used in this study is directly based on this framework.
.The Speidel et al. [1989] article provides information on what portfolio optimi­
zation in essence is. For example, Speidel et al. [1989. p . -22] state: optim ization 
makes sure that, at each level of reward, the portfolio has the lowest possible risk.» 
Speidel et al. [1989, p. 22-28] review the following topics: (1) diversification; (2) 
the efficient frontier; (3) optimizers and allocators; (4) optimizing relative to a 
benchmark; and (5) investor risk tolerance. The article is a good overview of issues 
of interest to most investors.
The Michaud [1989] article discusses whether »Markowitz optimization» is tru­
ly optimal. The article is critical of Markowitz style optimization. The article prin­
cipally addresses optimization with respect to individual assets or securities, not as­
set classes. Michaud [1989, p. 31] states that »its practical value may be enhanced 
by the sophisticated adjustment of inputs and the imposition of constraints based 
on fundamental investment considerations and the importance of priors.» Michaud 
[1989, p. 32-33] lists the following as the principal benefits of mean-variance op­
timizers (»MVOs»): (1) satisfaction of client objectives; (2) control of portfolio 
risk exposure; (3) implementation of style objectives and market outlook; (4) effi­
cient use of portfolio information; and (5) timely portfolio changes. Michaud 
[1989, p. 33] indicates that standard optimization is not used for the following rea­
sons: (1) politics (i.e., senior management’s decisiqn making authority may be re­
duced); (2) a more quantitative investment process may increase the level of ac­
countability, communication, and risk sharing; and (3) marketability (i.e., it is often 
difficult to market optimized portfolios both internally and externally to those with­
out the required background). Michaud [1989, p. 33-36] claims the following as 
limitations of MVOs: (1) they maximize errors; (2) most MVOs use historic means
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which »is generally not optimal»; (3) there tend to be missing factors (e.g., liquid­
ity); (4) mismatched levels of information for the inputs (e.g., the return on equities 
may be significantly uncertain relative to cash); (5) unstable optimal solutions; (6) 
non-uniqueness of the »optimal portfolios, and (6) some MVOs are not exact. Fi­
nally, Michaud [1989, p. 37-38] suggest the following Bayesian motivated adjust­
ments to standard MVOs: (1) use of a benchmark such as a market index; (2) Bayes- 
Stein shrinkage estimators (i.e., adjust estimated expected returns toward some glo­
bal mean): (3) scale estimates to an economically meaningful scale; (4) explicit use 
of priors when selecting from among several optimal portfolios; (5) linear as op­
posed to quadratic programming; and (6) test for mean-variance efficiency.
The Leibowitz and Henriksson [1989] article develops portfolio optimization 
with »shortfall constraints». Leibowitz and Henriksson [1989, p. 35] define a short­
fall constraint as »a minimum return that will be exceeded with some specified 
probability^. Portfolio optimization is the application of combining assets in order 
to achieve an optimal set of portfolios. This optimal set is known as the »efficient 
frontier». These portfolios should represent the best tradeoffs between risk and re­
turn. The relevant measures of risk and return have traditionally been the variance 
or standard deviation of returns and return itself. Leibowitz and Henriksson [1989, 
p. 36] suggest that »the concept o f  a confidence limit is similar to that of a floor in 
dynamic hedging. The floor -  the minimum allowable return -  is intended to limit 
potential loss.» In essence, this approach requires modifying the standard efficient 
frontier in ^rder to take account of specific investor determined constraints. Lei­
bowitz and Henriksson [1989] discuss this principally within the context of the al­
location portfolio and an index benchmark.
The Jorion [1992] article emphasises one point of the Michaud [1989] article 
concerning measurement error. Jorion calls this additional MVO risk »estimation 
risk». By construction, optimal portfolios tend to weight those assets with high ex­
pected returns more than those with lower returns. The problem is that those assets 
or securities with high positive expected returns tend to possess positive estimation 
error. Jorion [1992, p. 68] states: »a major drawback with the classical implemen­
tation of mean-variance analysis is that it completely ignores the effect of measure­
ment error on optimal portfolio allocations.» Jorion [1992], with simulation results, 
goes on to show the effect of this by comparing the performance of a passive world 
index with that of a U.S. index over the period 1978 through 1988. Jorion [1992, p. 
68] finds that »an ex-post mean-variance analysis systematically overstates the pos­
sible gains from going international.»
The Smith-Britto and Crowell [1992] article discusses the asset class real estate 
within a MVO context. As stated by Smith-Britto and Crowell [1992, p. 40]: many 
standard portfolio optimization models favor real estate because of its low' standard 
deviation and low correlation with other asset classes.» The main point of the arti­
cle seems to be that the transaction costs of exiting real estate are sufficiently higher 
than most other asset classes to warrant an extra transaction cost and/or liquidity 
cost constraint on real estate. Of course, if the cost of trading an asset class in­
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creases, its return decreases, which in turn decreases its weighting in an asset allo­
cation context.14
The Kritzman [1992] article reviews optimization itself. It describes the objec­
tive function, and what is meant by optimization with constraints.15 Also, Kritzman 
[1992, p. 12-13] reviews the Sharpe [1987] algorithm for portfolio optimization. 
Lastly, Kritzman [1992, p. 13] discusses what »cynics refer to as 'error maximiza­
t io n '^  Kritzman [1992] did not indicate that he thought the biases associated with 
estimation errors were intractable.
The Fielitz and Muller [1983] article reviews a static asset allocation model 
called SIMR. This is an early article on asset allocation and was principally inter­
ested in providing simulation results to demonstrate the usefulness of such models 
for the asset allocation decision. As Fielitz and Muller [1983. p. 44] state: »SIMR 
allows the investor a cost-effective way to test different assumptions before taking 
on real portfolios.»
The Arnott and von Germeten [1983, p. 31] article can be well summarized by 
the following quote from the authors:
Asset allocation is a difficult process if only because the most effective 
way to add value to a balanced portfolio may be to focus on the least com­
fortable asset class. But simple calculations of market returns -  the current 
yield for cash equivalents, the yield to maturity for bonds and the dividend 
discount model rate of return for equities -  can provide valuable guidance for 
asset allocation by revealing the relative market outlook for various asset 
classes. The use of a disciplined approach for including other information, 
such as recent inflation and economic experience, can give still more insight 
into the return prospects for each asset class.
One of the simplest yet most powerful methods to forecast bond and cash re­
turns is to use the yields on those asset classes in a MVO framework. That is, the 
expected return for cash is the cash yield, and the expected return for bonds is the 
bond yield. While, one of the simplest and yet most powerful methods to forecast 
equity returns is to use a dividend discount model calculated yield in a MVO frame­
work. It seem that these methods have produced strong indicators of current inves­
tor sentiment and expected future returns, particularly in turbulent financial peri­
ods. The authors are strong proponents of the systematic use of market signals in 
the asset allocation decision.
The Arnott [1985] article is based on a questionnaire sent to large pension plan 
sponsers16. There were 50 respondents representing over S100 billion in invested 
assets. The questionnaire asked a wide range of questions (see Arnott [1985, p. 17- 
18]). The key result was (Arnott [1985, p. 17]) that ^sponsers do not pay the most
14 This would be true o f  any asset or asset class, not just real estate.
15 Kritzman [1992, p. 11-12] uses as an example a Lagrange multiplier problem to show this, 
and then uses an example o f  matrix inversion to solve for the resulting system o f linear equations.
16 These are people or organizations which often serve as intermediary between a corporation 
with a pool o f pension plan assets and the portfolio manager.
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for those aspects they perceive as offering the greatest opportunity for adding 
value.» Long term asset allocation and strategic (i.e., tactical) asset allocation were 
universally considered more important than specialty asset allocation, alternative 
investments, equity management, bond management, or balanced management. 
Both were perceived to add the most value yet were ranked 2nd and 3rd from the 
bottom for payment rank (i.e., 5th and 6th of 7 categories). Strategic asset alloca­
tion was ranked first in perceived ability to add value. Also, both were perceived to 
have the greatest impact over a market cycle. The study explained the huge gap be­
tween payment and value as possibly a function of cost. Arnott [1985, p. 22] stated 
that »a multibillion dollar sponser cannot spend more than a few basis points on the 
long-term asset allocation decision, even if it makes a real effort to spend money 
on that decision.» In short, asset allocation is a relatively costless way of generating 
large gains in value, while active bond and equity management (i.e.. bond and stock 
picking) is expensive by its nature vet adds little incremental value.
The Bostock et al. [1989] article addresses an issue of particular importance for 
pension plan’s worried about the duration of its liabilities. This is more an article 
concerned with the duration of assets and pension fund liabilities than asset alloca­
tion per say. Logically, Bostock et al. [1989, p. 53] suggest that matching the dura­
tion of a pension pan's assets to the duration of its liabilities can minimize funding 
uncertainty associated in unexpected changes in discount rates.»
The Farrell [1989] article discusses the problem of using forecasts within a 
standard MVO framework. Farrell [1989, p. 32] states that »differences in inputs, 
particularly estimated correlation coefficients, can have a significant impact on the 
weighting of asset classes in an asset allocation scheme and on the risk and return 
characteristics of that combination.» Most of the article shows the pattern and rela­
tionship between stocks, bonds, and cash returns in the U.S. from 1929 through 
1986. The author notes how important correct expectations can be in determining 
the best asset allocations over long time periods, but gives little or no guidance in 
how traditional historic based forecast inputs can be improved.
Although not stated, the Wainscott [1990] article is a followup to the Farrell 
[1989] article. It specifically addresses the issue of forecast correlation coefficients 
used in the standard MVO framework. Wainscott [1990, p. 55] states that »of these 
three estimates (i.e., returns, risks, and correlations), correlations have appeared to 
be the most stable and have therefore received the least attention.» The article fo­
cuses on the correlation between stocks and bonds in the U.S. over the period 1926 
through 1986. Wainscott [1990, p. 58] states that »clearly, historical correlations 
have been an unsatisfactory predictor of future correlations.» Wainscott [1990. p. 
59] showed that »the income return difference between bonds and stocks is a sig­
nificant and powerful factor in the future stock-bond correlation.» Therefore, the 
article suggests that it is possible to improve on traditional historical based stock- 
bond correlation forecasts by using the income return differential between stocks 
and bonds.
The Booth and Fama [1992] article provides empirical background on and a re­
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view of the Markowitz portfolio diversification principal regarding combining as­
set classes in the U.S. Booth and Fama [1992, p. 31J state that »diversification re­
turns are assured only for those portfolios that maintain relatively fixed asset 
weights.» In short, Booth and Fama claim that active management strategies are 
less likely to provide traditional diversification gains than static asset allocation. 
Although, Booth and Fama do not directly address DAA, they seem to be skeptical 
of market timing.
The Riley and Chow [1992] article provides evidence of individual risk aver­
sion in the U.S. for over 17.000 households and develops a model of relative risk 
aversion17. Riley and Chow [1992. p. 32] find that »a comparison of risk-aversion 
indexes for various demographic and socioeconomic categories reveals distinct dif­
ferences for three groups -  individuals over 65. those with incomes below the pov­
erty level, and the very wealthy.» Gender, race, and marital status seem to be of lit­
tle importance in relative risk aversion, while education, income, and age seem to 
be important determinants of risk aversion. Generally, more education and income 
seem to contribute to higher risk tolerance, while age. especially for those over 65. 
tends to have the opposite effect. This research is useful in establishing actual 
levels of risk aversion, the expectations of which are inputs into many optimizers.
2.2.2.' International Asset Allocation Literature and Asset Allocation Using Options
IAA is asset allocation with at least one asset taken from at least two different 
countries. Given that the principal concern of this study to examine DAA for Fin­
land, a short summary of a few articles will follow. What little there has been of 
IAA literature supports the following contentions: (1) significant gains from dy­
namic IAA are difficult to achieve (e.g., Arnott and Henriksson [1989] and Black 
and Litterman [1992]; (2) significant diversification gains from static IAA are rel­
atively easy to achieve (e.g., Odier and Solnick [1993]); and (3) the currency hedg­
ing decision should be made independent of the asset allocation decision (e.g., Ar­
nott and Henriksson [1989]). The Arnott and Henriksson [1989] and Black and Lit­
terman [1992] articles do provide some basis to be hopeful that value added dynam­
ic IAA may be possible. Otherwise, static IAA seems to be a relatively easy way to 
add value, but dynamic IAA seems to be difficult to achieve.
An even smaller literature than that concerning IAA has been that on options 
within the context of asset allocation. Given that this study is not concerned with 
the use of options within DAA, a short summary of a few articles in the area will 
follow. Generally, the research on the use of options in an asset allocation frame­
work is based on the following strategy: buy and/or replicate call options on the
17 Riley and Chow [1992, p. 33-34] define relative risk aversion as the following: RRA=(1- 
Risky Assets/W ealth), where risky assets are defined as equity securities; and wealth is the sum o f per­
sonal property, real estate, bonds & checking, and risky assets. This measure is based on the Arrow- 
Pratt measure o f relative risk aversion (i.e., the ratio o f risky assets to wealth). Formally, the Arrow- 
Pratt measure is W [U” (W)AJ’(W )], where W=wealth, and U(W ) is the utility function o f wealth.
risky asset classes by borrowing the riskless asset class (see Tilley and Latainer 
[1985] and Fong and Vasicek [1989]). The Tilley and Latainer [1985] article is 
based on traditional stock, bond, and cash asset allocation, while the Fong and Va­
sicek [1989] article is based on IAA across equity markets. The research is inter­
esting and promising.
3. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Typically asset allocation strategies have used the following three asset classes
(1) stocks, (2) bonds, and (3) cash. The basic inputs into the model are the follow­
ing: (1) stock returns, (2) bond returns, (3) cash returns, (4) a stock signal, (5) a 
bond signal, and (6) a cash signal. As much as possible, this study will follow con­
vention. Generally, the signals are the principal determinants of recommended as­
set mixes, while the returns are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the model!s) 
used to forecast the asset class returns.
This study is based on monthly data. Most of the data is available from the Bank 
of Finland Bulletin. It is important to base DAA models on readily available data. 
If the data a DAA model is based on are not readily available the recommended 
strategy may not be achievable (this is especially true of the stock, bond, and cash 
signals).
The stock return series is a spliced series based on the Unitas overall index and 
the HEX all share index. Given that the emphasis of DAA. is market timing, a 
spliced series which is highly positively correlated with the true asset class return 
series will not significantly change the results of the study. The Unitas based return 
series covers the period 12/86 through 01/90 (i.e., from the month it was first re­
ported in the Bank of Finland Bulletin until the inception of the HEX). The HEX 
based return series covers the period 02/90 through 06/93 (i.e., inception through 
the first half of 1993). The stock signal will be discussed in more detail later.
The bond return series is a derived and spliced series. Given that there were no 
available bond indices with which to generate bond returns, bond returns were 
derived by the following equation: BR, = BRAj + BRUt, w'here BRt = bond return at 
time t, BRAj = anticipated portion of bond return at time t, and BRUt -  unanticipated 
portion of bond return at time t. BRA is based on the yield to maturity of the issue. 
The follow ing was the equation used to calculate anticipated return: BRA, = 
(1/12), where y,_j = the yield to maturity lagged one period. Therefore, it is as­
sumed that the yield one month previously is the anticipated portion of the bond re­
turn this period (i.e., adjusted for monthly values). BRU is based on the change in 
yield and bond duration (i.e., the sensitivity of the bond to changes in interest rates). 
The following was the equation used to calculate unanticipated return: BRU,  = 
~(D ,x  A ,). w'here D, = duration at time t, and Ai = unanticipated change in interest 
rates. Duration was based on the following calculation: D, = | [ ( /x C,)/( 1 + /,)]/
Pr The unanticipated change in interest rates was based on the following equation:
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A/ = (/, -  j )/(1 + it_ j), where C, (cash flow at time t) was set equal to y v T (i.e.. 
maturity) was set equal to 5 years, P, (i.e., price at time t) was set equal to unity, 
and ij (i.e.. the interest rate at time t) was set equal toy,. Therefore, in order to gen­
erate bond returns, it was assumed that the yield curve was flat over the period un­
der study. In reality, a certain portion of the changes in interest rates are anticipated 
by market participants, but certain simplifying assumptions were made in order to 
systematically generate past bond returns. The maturity period of five years was 
used based on the last time series used (i.e., five year bonds) of the two spliced bond 
time series.
The bond return series is a spliced series based on the secondary market taxable 
government bond rate and the secondary market 5 year long-term rate (see the Bank 
of Finland Bulletin Table 3.5 for relevant rates). The taxable government bond rate 
covers the period 12/86 through 12/87 (i.e., from the first month stock returns were 
reported in the Bank of Finland Bulletin until the first reporting of the 5 year bond 
series). The 5 year bond rate covers the period 01/88 through 06/93 (i.e., inception 
through the first half of 1993). The bond signal used was this spliced series. As dis­
cussed in the asset allocation literature review, bond yields have been found to be 
useful predictors of future bond returns. Bond yields seem to be sufficient bond 
market signals in Finland as well. Therefore, one lag of the bond yield was used as 
the expected return for-bonds.
Cash yields were also used to derive cash market returns and used as cash mar­
ket signals. The one month HELIBOR (Helsinki Interbank Offered Rate) was used 
as the cash signal and to derive cash returns. Regarding the derivation of cash re­
turns the calculation used was the same as that for deriving the anticipated portion 
of bond returns (i.e., CR{ = v;_i x (1/12)). Given that the values used are monthly, 
this results in as precise a calculation of return as is possible (i.e., the holding pe­
riod is exactly one month for a theoretical one month HELIBOR security). There­
fore, there are no unanticipated movements for a one month rate measured over one 
month. The first available values for the HELIBOR rates were as of 01/87. There­
fore, the return series began as of February 1987.18
Table 1 provides background on the performance of stocks, bonds, and cash in 
Finland over the period February 1987 through June 1993. Given the three asset 
classes and the period under study, stocks have been the poorest performing asset 
class. In hindsight, cash and/or government bonds were the best places to invest 
over the period. Stocks were particularly poor investments over the period 1989 
through 1991. These values will be used to determine the performance of recom­
mended asset class mixes. The relevant question for Finnish investors is: could 
these performances have been predicted?
Table 2 provides some basic characteristics of the monthly return series used in 
this study. All three asset class return series are slightly positively skewed, bond
18 Obviously, it was this aeries which constrained the period under study. Therefore, the earliest 
starting month for the study was February 1987.
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Table 1. Finnish Financial Markets from Feb. 1987 through June 1993.
Finnish Financial Markets (02/87-06/93)
Year Stocks Bonds Cash
1987 (Feb.-D ec.) 25.11% 17.42% 9.53%
1988 31.18 5.68 10.02
1989 -15.44 7.75 12.61
1990 -34.25 14.20 14.70
1991 -22.23 15.43 14.70
1992 7.37 17.91 14.54
1993 (Jan. -  June) 33.96 16.46 4.80
Cumulative Return1 (1987-1993) 2.07s* 142.02% 114.31%
Average Annual Return 0.32s* 14.77% 12.61%
Annual Standard Deviation 22.99% 5.82% 0.68%
Reward/Risk Ratio 0.01 2.54 18.57
1 Reported cumulative returns are based on the following calculation: CUM  = r F T  0 6 / 9 3  I 1 1: =  0 2 /S "
(1 + /?,)] -  1. Reported average annual returns are the annualized geometric average of the
reported cumulative return.
Table 2. Basic Statistics and Tests of Normality for the Return !Series.
Basic Statistics and Tests of Normality 1for the Return Series
Statistic (Observations -  77) Stocks ..- Bonds Cash
Moments of the Distribution:
1 st - Mean 0.0024 0.0117 0.0100
2nd - Standard Deviation 0.0668 0.0169 0.0020
3rd - Skewness 0.5652 1.1982 0.5016
4th - Kurtosis 1.0030 5.3715 -0.7863
Median 0.0014 0.0101 0.0097
Minimum -0.1150 -0.0367 0.0070
Maximum 0.2427 0.0864 0.0148
Tests of Normality1:
T-Statistic: Mean = 0 0.3183 6.0606 44.2347
Prob>T 0.7511 0.0001 0.0001
W:Normal 0.9662 0.9180 0.9281
Prob<W 0.1327 0.0001 0.0002
1 The first test of normality is Student’s t value for testing the null hypothesis that the po-
pulation mean is zero. The second test of normality is the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for testing
the null hypothesis that the values are a random sample from a normal distribution.
returns being skewed the most over the period under study. The kurtosis values in­
dicate that stocks returns have been distributed relatively platykurtically over the 
period under study. The most striking result of the table is that the stock return se­
ries does not appear to be normally distributed. Both the mean test and the normal 
distribution test indicate that the stock return series is not normally distributed.
31 9
The following table provides a check for first order autocorrelation, tests for 
white noise at the 12th and 24th lag 1^ . and correlation coefficients regarding the 
three asset class return series.
Tabic 3. Tests for Autocorrelation and Correlation Coefficients.
Tests for Autocorrelation and Correlation Coefficients
Stocks Bonds Cash
Autocorrelation at Lag 1 0.45* 0.22* 0.84:::
Test for White Noise (12 lags) 34.02* 12.05 186.25*
Test for White Noise (24 lags) 56.67* 22.96 197.57"
Correlation with
Stocks 0.52* -0.19
Bonds 0.09
* denotes significance at the 191 level of significance.
All three asset class return series have significant first order autocorrelation, but 
bonds have about half that o f stocks. Both autocorrelation tests suggest that the 
stock return series is not generated by a white noise process. The only significant 
correlation coefficient is between the stock and bond.return series. Over the period 
stock returns, have been negatively correlated with cash returns, but not significant­
ly so.
4. METHOD EMPLOYED (DYNAMIC ASSET ALLOCATION)
The method used is DAA. DAA is a method were a portfolio is formed over 
time based on a defined set of asset classes. The portfolio is usually formed of three 
asset classes. Based on the following expectations: (1) the risk of each asset class, 
(2) the return of each asset class, (3) the correlation between asset classes, (4) the 
utility function of the investor (i.e., the risk/return tradeoff for the investor), and (5) 
the investment horizon of the investor a portfolio is formed each period. Typically 
the portfolio is constrained to be 100% invested in the asset classes (i.e., no short 
sales or leveraging). Each period the expectations are updated and the portfolio mix 
(e.g., 10% stocks, 30% bonds, and 60% cash) is recalculated. Therefore, this is a 
dynamic strategy requiring the updating of expectations and portfolio rebalancing.
19 These are autocorrelation checks for white noise. The null hypothesis is that the autocorrela­
tions sum to zero. These test statistics are at the 12th and 24th lags (i.e ., one and two years). Therefore, 
the null hypothesis for the 12th lag is: T x  = 0 ,  where rj is the product moment correlation
between e , and (k = 1 , 2 , ..............  12). If the null hypothesis is true, the statistic is distributed as a
chi-square with 12 degrees o f freedom. If the statistic is not statistically significant, the null hypothesis 
can be accepted.
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In the U.S., the asset classes used in DAA are typically stocks, bonds, and cash. 
Usually, in the U.S. the S&P 500 proxies for the equity asset class, some long-term 
government bond proxies for the bond asset class (e.g., the 20 year »constant ma­
turity» Treasury bond), and a short term government bill (e.g., the three month 
Treasury bill) proxies for the cash instrument. For Finnish Asset Allocation 
(»FAA») an attempt will be made to keep some degree of consistency with past 
practice. That is, a stocks, bonds, and cash dynamic allocation will be examined. 
Although, given the relatively recent nature of secondary market trading for stocks 
and bonds in Finland three way asset allocation will be examined over a relatively 
short period.
Institutions should be interested in DAA. Although academic in design, the pur­
pose of DAA is very practical. Its purpose is to achieve a return series for the asset 
allocation portfolio which is superior to the best performing risky asset class. For 
most countries the best performing asset class has been equities. Therefore, assum­
ing that an investor prefers more return to less, and holding risk constant, DAA at­
tempts to create a portfolio which achieves a higher return than the best performing 
asset class at an equal or lower risk.20 Any investor which values lower risk and 
higher return should be interested in DAA.
4.1. Optimization and Calculating Optimal Portfolio Weights (A DAA Algorithm)
Optimization is a process by which we determine the most favorable 
tradeoff between competing interests, given the constraints we face. Within 
the context of portfolio management, the competing interests are risk reduc­
tion and return enhancement. Asset allocation is one form of optimization. 
Kritzman [1992, p. 10]
As stated by Kritzman [1992], portfolio optimization is a process by which an 
objective is maximized (minimized) subject to one or more constraints. Modern 
portfolio theory has established the objective as quadratic in nature (e.g., see Elton 
and Gruber [1991]). The objective is to maximize return and minimize risk, subject 
to an investor’s wealth, risk preferences, etc. The exact form of the objective func­
tion can vary from investor to investor. The algorithm to follow is based on 
Sharpe’s [1987] objective function and algorithm for portfolio optimization. The 
general form of the objective function to be maximized is:
E(U) = E{RP) -  A x g 2
where
E{U) = the expected utility for the DAA investor;
20 As an example of a practitioner model, on an annualized basis, a model developed for the 
United Kingdom returned more than 29r over the best performing asset class (i.e., which were stocks) 
with less than 3ck  the risk (i.e., as measured by the standard deviation o f the return series). Of course, 
those values were net of transactions costs.
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E(Rp) = the expected return for the portfolio: 
a  = the risk aversion parameter for the DAA investor: and 
= the expected variance of the portfolio.
Again, the above objective function is but one form of the objective function 
possible, but it is both logical and simple. As expected return increases, expected 
utility increases. As expected risk increases, expected utility decreases. The greater 
is risk aversion, the lower is expected utility. Risk aversion and expected risk are 
directly related.
The method by which the objective function is maximized is linear program­
ming. Based on the five sets of inputs mentioned, various weights are substituted 
into the calculation until the maximum is reached (i.e.. the asset class weights are 
the unknowms). The following is the general method used to calculate total utility 
and solve for the asset class weights.
First, the expected return and expected risk of the portfolio must be calculated. 
The expected return of a portfolio is the weighted average of the expected returns 
of the assets in that portfolio. Given the three asset class case, the following is the 
expected return for the portfolio:
( 1) E(Rp) = (Ws  x  E(RS)) + {WB x E(Rb)) + ( W c x  E(Rc )) 
where
E(RS) = the expected return for stocks;
E(Rb) = the expected return for bonds;
E{RC) = the expected return for cash;
Ws  = the percentage allocated to stocks;
W = the percentage allocated to bonds; and
\VC = the percentage allocated to cash.
Traditionally, the risk of a portfolio is measured by its standard deviation or 
variance. Given the three asset class case, the following is the expected variance for 
the portfolio:
(2) = (W5 X <Tj)2 + (1VB x a fi)2 + (Wc x o c)2 + (2 x [(Ws x WB x pse)
+ (WB x Wc  x pBC) + (Ws x Wc  x p5C)]}
where
(J5  = the expected standard deviation of stocks;
a B = the expected standard deviation of bonds;
Gc  -  the expected standard deviation of cash; 
p 5 £ = the expected correlation between stocks and bonds; 
pBC = the expected correlation between bonds and cash; and 
Psc = the expected correlation between stocks and cash.
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From  the above equation , assum ing  some expecta tion  o f  co rre la t ion  be tw een  
asset classes, expected  portfo lio  variance  is a function o f  the expec ted  ind iv idual 
asset s tandard  devia tions  and the expected  co-variab ili ty  o f  asset c lass  r e tu rn s .21
Second, the expected  volatil i ty  and  drift o f  the portfo lio  m ust be ca lcu la ted , 
based  on  the expected  r isk  o f  the portfo lio , the expected  return o f  the  portfo lio , and
7 7the investm ent horizon  o f  the D A A  investor. T he  fo llow ing  is the ca lcu la t ion  for
7 7the natural logarithm  rela tive  expec ted  volatility o f  the  portfo lio  :
(3) VP = LN (1 + E(RP)) -  [LN(l + ( a 2 /E(RP)2))/2).
Next the investm ent ho r izon  ad justed  volatility (i.e., the drift) o f  the po rtfo lio  is 
calculated:
(4 ] D p = J V p / H
where
H = the investm ent horizon  o f  the D A A  investor. T he  longer the inves tm en t ho r i­
zon. the less im portant volatil i ty  is in de term ining expec ted  utility. T ha t is, a long 
term investor tends to increase  his or her holdings o f  the expected  risk ier asset 
c la s se s .-4 As Fielitz and M ulle r  [1983, p. 45] state: »the tim e d im ension  is e x tre m e ­
ly important. As the analysis  horizon  is extended, risk increases, but at a s low er rate 
than expected  retu rn .» T hat is, risk varies  with the square  root o f  tim e, while  return 
is assum ed  independent and log norm ally  d istributed ove r  time.
Third , integrate the utility function  (i.e., calculate  total expected  utility based  
on the curren t asset m ix). U tili ty  is: E{U) = X x  (Vp + D P). Fourth, con tinue  reca l­
cu la ting  expected  utility with d iffe ren t asset weights until utility is m ax im ized  (i.e.. 
g iven the constra in ts). Lastly , ou tpu t utility m axim iz ing  asset weights .
In linear programming terms, the objective function (i.e., total utility) is maxi­
mized subject to the following constraints: ( 1) the asset class weights must sum to 
unity (i.e., IV5 + \VB + Wc = 1); (2 )  the asset class weights are equal to or greater 
than zero (i.e., U 5 > 0, WB > 0, and Wc > 0); (3) the asset class weights are less than 
or equal to unity (i.e., <  1, WB < 1, and Wc  < 1); ( 4 )  the investor’s risk aversion
parameter is positive (i.e., X > 0)25; (5) the investor’s risk aversion parameter is less 
than infinity (i.e., X < 00); (6 ) the investor’s investment horizon is greater than zero
_1 More specifically, expected portfolio risk is measured by the variance or standard deviation 
around the portfolios expected return.
See Levhari and Levy [1977] for a mathematical treatment o f investment horizon, mean- 
variance analysis, and the CAPM.
See Booth and Fama [1992] for the appropriate calculation for the variance o f a portfolio.
■4 Generally, DAA is considered to be a long term strategy. Therefore, investors with short 
investment horizons should not be encouraged to invest in such strategies.
As the slope o f the objective function changes, so does the optimal solution. Obviously, the 
risk aversion parameter has a large impact on total utility.
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( i.e., H > 0); (7) the expected  return o f  the portfo lio  is greater than zero (i.e., E{RP) 
>  0); and  (8) the expected  volatility  (i.e .,  risk) o f  the portfolio is g reater than zero  
(i.e., o~  > 0). C onstra in ts  (1) th rough  (3) are not required, but they are typ ical a s ­
sum ptions  m ade fo r  DAA. M ost insti tu tiona l  investors  interested in an asse t a l lo ­
ca tion  stra tegy  do not intend to engage  in short sales o f  asset classes o r  the lever­
ag ing  o f  their  p o r tfo l io .26 C onstrain t (2) enforces  no short sales o f  the asset classes. 
C onstra in ts  (2) and (3) enforce that the asse t  weights  are constrained to be zero  or 
posit ive  and  be tw een  0%  and 100% for  e ach  asset class. Constra in t (1) ensures  that 
the  portfo lio  is a lw ays 100% invested in the asset classes under study. C onstra in ts  
(4) th rough  (8) are required to m ake the appropria te  com putations (i.e., to enable  
the es tim ation  o f  total utility), but are  a lso logical. Constraint (4) m akes the a s ­
sum ption  that the investor is risk averse  (i.e., ho lding all other variables constan t, 
the investo r  requires more expected  re turn  for each unit increase in expected  risk). 
C ons tra in t  (5) m akes the assum ption  that the investor is not so risk averse  that he 
o r  she will not invest  in risky asse t c lasses  (i.e.. i f  the investor is infin ite ly  risk 
averse  he or she w ould  never receive eno u g h  return to warrant taking on any risk). 
C onstra in t  (6) m akes the assum ption  tha t  a D A A  investor will not w ithdraw  funds 
the instan t  those funds are invested. C ons tra in t  (7) m akes the assum ption  that, g iv ­
en  the optim al mix, there is some level  o f  positive expected return (i.e., D A A  in ­
ves tm en ts  are a lw ays made with the expec ta tion  o f  positive returns). C onstra in t  (8) 
m akes  the assum ption  that, given the op tim al mix, there is always som e level o f  
pos it ive  expec ted  volatil i ty  (i.e., ex p ec ted  returns are not constant for the D A A  
portfo lio).
4.2. Estimation o f  Expected Equity Returns
Probab ly  the m ost critical input in to  a  D A A  m odel is the stock m arke t return  
expecta tion . W ith  the possible excep tion  o f  innovations in m oney supply , m ost 
m ac roeconom ic  variab les  have been fo u n d  to be o f  lim ited use in exp la in ing  F in n ­
ish s tock  m arke t m ovem ents  (see Y li-O lli  and V irtanen [1987] and V iskari [1992]). 
A lso , M art ika inen  et al. [1991a] show  that, based  on  m onthly values, the  re la tion  
be tw een  s tock  re turns  and  several m ac ro eco n o m ic  variables was unstable  ove r  the 
pe riod  1977 th rough  1986. In F inland, a t  least for paper  companies, past d iv idends  
have  been  found  to have  a g reat a m o u n t  o f  explana to ry  power in forecasting fu tu re  
d iv idends  (see Y li-O lli  [1982])27. A lso , aggrega te  Sw edish  stock price m ovem en ts  
a re  h igh ly  co rre la ted  with aggregate  F inn ish  s tock  price m ovem ents (see Y li-O lli 
a n d  V ir tanen  [1987, p. 235-237]) .
N ote that short sales are prohibited on Finnish financial markets (see Puttonen and M artikai­
nen [1991]).
27 Y li-O lli [1982] exam ined the dividend series o f  7 Finnish paper and product firms. H e found  
that one lag o f  past dividends had a great deal o f  predictive pow er regarding the current lev e l o f  d iv i­
dends. A lthough, this has apparently changed dram atically in recent years when the dividends o f  Finn­
ish  firms have been more volatile than before (see  Martikainen et al. [1993b]).
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As stated by Sharpe [1987, p. 29]: »in practice  tactical asset a llocation  sys tem s 
are ’con tra r ian ’ in na tu re .» DA A is based  on the observa tion  that a lthough  m arke ts  
p rice  securities  based prim arily  on fundam enta l  factors , the  m arkets seem  to o v e r ­
reac t  to in fo rm a t io n s  Also, it may be the case that a lthough there is a g rea t deal  o f  
e ff ic iency  w ith in  an asset class, fundam enta l ad justm ents  be tw een  asse t c lasses  are 
ra the r  s low  and inefficient. Therefore, i f  financial m arke ts  overreact in a  sys tem atic  
w ay, m arke t tim ing  m ay be achieved. In D A A , the critical m arket to t im e is the 
m arke t  with the greatest level o f  r isk  (i.e., the equity  m arket). T herefo re , it is im ­
pera tive  that the stock signal be a good forecaster o f  fu ture  stock price m ovem en ts  
re la tive  to the o ther  asset classes.
A gain , p rim arily  based on the Y li-O lli  and V irtanen  [1987] article, the fo llo w ­
ing  fac to rs  were considered  im portant de te rm inan ts  o f  Finnish s tock  m arke t re ­
turns: (1) Sw edish  Stock Exchange returns; (2) changes in m oney supply; (3) in f la ­
tion; (4) past returns; (5) changes in industrial production  (or changes  in factory o r ­
ders); and  (6) d ividends. It was decided to avoid Sw edish  values in o rder  to build  a 
fundam en ta lly  F innish  m odel for fo recasting  Finnish  stock returns. Industria l  p ro ­
duc tion  values were not analyzed because  those reported  by the B ank o f  F in land  
w ere  ne ither  timely or accurate (i.e., they were significantly  adjusted  long after they 
were initially  reported). As stated before, the values used for DA A m ust be readily  
ava ilab le  and not subject to significant revisions.
A logical starting point for estim ating  the price o f  a share o f  stock is what is 
popu lar ly  know n as the »constant grow th»  d ividend discount m odel (»D D M ». see 
E lton  and  G ruber [1991, p. 449 -464 ]  on this and o ther  d iv idend d iscoun t m odels). 
The  fo llow ing  is the appropriate  equation: P=D /(k-g), where P = the price o f  a share  
o f  s tock, D = the d iv idend for the share, k = the d iscount rate for the share, and g = 
the cons tan t  grow th  rate for the share. This  m odel assum es that d iv idends  will grow  
at a cons tan t  rate. The g reater the rate o f  grow'th, the greater the price paid  for the 
share. O the r  D D M  models assum e vary ing  grow th rates  th roughout the  foreseeab le  
life o f  a com pany  (e.g., the »two period» D D M ). This  study will focus on the sim ple  
constan t g row th  DDM .
G iven  that this study is concerned  with the asset class stocks, es tim ating  ind i­
vidual s tock  grow'th rates is not o f  principal im portance  as it is for security  analysts. 
T herefo re ,  to the extent to w'hich all F innish  equity  c la im s capture  the grow th  in the 
F innish  econom y , this m odel can be ex tended  to the Finnish econom y in general.
G iven  that this study is interested in forecasting the return on Finnish  stocks, 
the D D M  equation  requires to be solved for the d iscoun t rate. T herefo re , rea r rang ­
ing the D D M  equation  yields the fo llow ing  equation: k=g+(D /P). M ore  spec if ica l­
ly, the fo llow ing  was the relationship  being  solved fo r  in order  to genera te  e x p e c t­
ed stock  returns: E(RS)t = E(g)t + E(D/P)t + RS,_j, w here  E(RS) =  the expec ted  re ­
turn fo r  s tocks, D/P = the d ividend yield  for stocks, and RS = the actual return o f  
stocks. Particu larly  for longer periods, d iv idend y ield  has been found to be a 
s trong  p red ic to r  o f  s tock market m ovem en ts  (e.g., see Fam a and French [1987]). A 
lagged  returns  com ponen t was added in o rder  to capture  some o f  the nature o f  the
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Finnish stock  m arke t  (i.e.. past stock m arket returns are corre la ted  with cu rren t re­
turns).
The fo llow ing  was the general form  of  the grow th  rela tionship: g = f(M S.I), 
w here  M S = g row th  in the m oney supply  and I = inflation. In short, it was assum ed  
that g row th  for the  stock  m arket is a function o f  the grow th in m oney supp ly  and 
inflation. A s s ta ted  before, both these factors had  been found to be im portan t  c o m ­
ponents  o f  s tock  returns in Finland. M ore precisely, the forecast for g was based  on 
the fo llow ing: E(g){ = (MSt -  /,)/18] x  12, MSt = (Mt -  and /, =
(/V ;_ j)//*/,_| , w here  M = m oney supply , and PI = price index. The forecast was 
based  on an 18 m onth  rolling average  o f  the net grow th  in m oney supply  (annual-
TO
ized). T he  m oney  supply  values are from the Bank o f  F in land 's  series for M2. 
The price index values are also from the Bank o f  Finland. Tw o sets o f  values were 
genera ted  based  on the CPI (consum er price index) and the W PI (w holesa le  price 
index). T he  CPI values  were less volatile than the W PI values and were expected  
to y ield  a m ore  stab le  signal.
The fo llow ing  was the general form  o f  the d iv idend relationship: D/P = f(D /P,i) . 
Future d iv idend  yields were assum ed to be a function o f  the previous d iv idend  yield 
and interest rate. Furtherm ore , it was assum ed  that the d iscount rate given to bus i­
nesses was the re levan t interest rate for predicting the level o f  future d iv idends 
re la tive  to price . A n OLS regression  was run based  on the values over  the period 
02/85 th rough ! 1/86 (i.e., 22 values) in order to  forecast out o f  sample over  the pe : 
r iod 12/86 th rough  06/93. The results  were the fo llow ing  forecast equation  for d iv ­
idend  yield: E(D/P)t = - 0 .0 0 5 6  + 0 .8645 x  (D /P ) r_j + 0 .1346  x  BDRt_ j ,  w here  B D R  
= base d iscoun t  rate. The  d iv idend  y ield  series was based  on values ga thered  from 
K auppaleh ti .  T he  B D R  series was from  the Bank o f  F inland Bulletin.
F inally , a coeff ic ien t  for the au to regressiv ity  o f  s tock returns was selected. The 
coeff ic ien t  se lec ted  was 0.8. G iven  pas t  reports on the au toregressiv ity  o f  F innish  
stock  m arke t re turns  a high positive  coeff ic ien t  seem ed  justif ied . U nfortuna tely , it 
w ould  have  been  m ore sa tisfac tory  to base this m easure  on an out o f  sam ple  series, 
but this w ou ld  have  shortened  an a lready  rela tive ly  short study period.
5. E M P IR IC A L  R E S U L T S  A N D  A N A L Y SIS
The results are based on four different expected stock return series (i.e., all 
other parameters were the same). The first two models were based principally on 
dividend yield. This was done in order to provide a base with which to judge the 
more theoretically acceptable DDM based Finnish'expected equity return model,
28 An 18 month period w as selected , but periods o f  betw een one to tw o years did not sign ifi­
cantly change the results. A  long period was preferred in order to stablilize the equity return signal and 
increase the probability that errors and changes in the estim ated m oney supply would not overw helm  
the stock signal.
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and to show the impact of adding an autoregressive parameter. Again, the only dif­
ference between the two DDM based expected return models is that one uses the 
CPI and the other the WPI to generate the growth parameter.
The following were the MVO parameters used: (1) A,=3; (2) H =10 years; (3) 
minimum portfolio change = 10%; (4) Gs  = 30%; (5) o B = 10%; (6) o c  = 2%; (7) 
Psb = 0-5; (8) Pbc = and (9) P5 c  = 0. A risk aversion parameter of 3 indicates that 
for each unit of expected volatility, the investor requires 3 more units of expected
90return. A long investment horizon is not uncommon for institutional investors. 
Other investment horizons were not tested. The selection of a ten year horizon is 
based in part on the fact that DAA is a long term strategy. Therefore, a short invest­
ment horizon would not be theoretically justified. The minimum portfolio change 
of 10% is useful for investors desiring to keep rebalancing costs to a minimum. 
Smaller increments were not tested. A low minimum portfolio change value tends 
to make trading more common. Therefore, in order to keep the models tested from 
trading excessively, a relatively large minimum portfolio change was selected. The 
expected standard deviations and correlations were selected before any actual Finn­
ish security market return calculations were made. These were based on the authors 
prior beliefs concerning studies of other financial markets. The actual correlation 
between stocks and bonds over the period studied was approximately 0.5. while the 
correlation between stocks and cash and bonds and cash was not statistically sig­
nificant over the period studied. It may be useful to vary these parameters in future 
studies .(e.g., calculate out of sample rolling averages of stock and bond.standard 
deviations and the stock/bond correlation) in order to see if these techniques can 
significantly enhance performance. Given the relatively short period under study, 
and past experience with the sensitivity of MVO results with varying parameters
(4) through (9), it was useful to use constant parameters (i.e., 4 through 9) based 
principally on prior beliefs.
In order to show the potential of DAA, and to provide a basis of comparison for 
other results, a theoretical »perfect» DAA return series was constructed. The fol­
lowing table gives the results of a »perfect» DAA model. These values reflect the 
results of 100% investments in the best performing asset class each month. 
Therefore, these values represent the theoretical maximum return achievable on a 
monthly basis over the period under study.
Regarding transactions costs, it was assumed that the investor incurred institu­
tional levels of transactions costs. Also, transactions costs were assumed to only be 
incurred by the initial investment, not on the exit (i.e., only on the buy side). There­
fore, all transactions costs are »front loaded». That is, transactions costs were based
29 T his is a typical value used in the U .S . Qther risk aversion parameters were not used. M ost o f  
the above parameters were based on typical values used in the U .S. An obvious extension to this study  
is to vary certain parameters to check the sensitiv ity  o f  the results.
30 O f course, the shorter return interv a ls, the better the results. That is. assum ing prices change  
over tim e, perfect w eekly tim ing w ould outperform  perfect monthly tim ing, and perfect daily tim ing  
w ould outperform perfect w eekly tim ing, etc.
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Table 4. »Perfect» DAA from Feb. 1987 through June 1993.
Perfect DAA (02/87-06/93)
Average Mix: 43/25/32 (S/B/C) 
Turnover = 514.29%
Year DAA
DAA with 
transactions 
costs
Average
Mix"
1987 (Feb. -  Dec.) 49.14% 45.90% 18.40%
1988 50.75 44.76 17.77
1989 21.75 18.84 -1.21
1990 23.48 19.64 -9 .1 7
1991 44.61 41.01 -1 .98
1992 90.68 79.65 13.64
1993 (Jan. -  June) 47.44 44.17 19.89
Cumulative Return (1987-1993) 1.274.11% 996.70% 67.09%
Averase Annual Return 50.44% 45.24% 8.33%
Annual Standard Deviation 1 3.22% 12.83% 10.64%
Reward/Risk Ratio 3.82 3.53 0.78
on two times the estimated cost of a one way transaction. Transactions costs were 
as follows: (1) stocks were 200 basis points (he., .100 X 2) per buy trade; .(2) bonds- 
were 20 basis .points per buy trade (i.e., 1 0 X 2 ) ;  and (3) cash was 10 basis points 
per buy trade (i.e., 5 X 2).
This table, and the four that follow, is principally composed of three columns 
of results. The first column of results gives the results of the DAA strategy without 
transactions costs. The second column of results gives the results of the DAA strat­
egy with transactions costs included. The last column of results gives the results of 
a static asset allocation strategy derived from the DAA strategy. That is, the static 
strategy is based on the average mix derived from the dynamic strategy. Therefore, 
in the column entitled »average mix» the returns from a strategy of investing in 
constant asset class weightings is reported. Given that the average mix results are 
only achievable ex-post, the average mix column is intended to provide some basis 
of comparison for the specific strategy under consideration, not necessarily as a 
comparison between strategies.
At a minimum, the results of Table 4 (especially when compared to Table 1) in­
dicate that monthly market timing is important in Finland over the period 02/87 
through 06/93. The first results indicate that this theoretical maximum was achiev­
able over the period with an average allocation mix pf 43% stocks, 25% bonds, and 
32%^cash. Although, the average annual turnover of the DAA portfolio was over 
500%. That is, on average the portfolio was reinvested over 5 times each year. Giv­
en this rate of turnover, a high level of transactions costs were incurred with this 
strategy (i.e., compare column 2 to column 3). On average annual basis, approxi­
mately 500 basis points were spent each year on transactions costs.
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The following is a list of the three models used to calculate the expected stock 
returns:
Model 1: E(RS)t = 4 x (D/P)t_t ;
Model 2: E(RS)t = (4 x (D/P)t_ j) + (0.8 x  and
Model 3: E(RS)t = E{D/P)t  + E(g)t + (0.8 x  R S ^ ) .
Models 1 and 2 are based on the general soundness of using past dividends to 
forecast future stock prices. A scaling factor of four was used in order to move the 
stock expectation to a level where stocks would be selected in favor of the other 
asset classes. Comparing model 1 versus model 2 will provide background as to the 
usefulness of adding an autoregressive factor to equity return prediction in Finland. 
Again, two expected return series will be estimated using model 3. One expected 
return series will base expected growth in the economy on the WPI and the other 
on the CPI.
The following table provides the results of DAA using the expected stock return 
series derived from model 1.
Table 5. DAA based on Expected Stock Returns Model 1.
DAA based on Expected Stock Returns Model 1 (02/87-06/9 3)
Average Mix: 4/23/73 tS/B/C) 
Turnover = 137.14%
Year DAA
DAA with 
transactions 
costs
Average
Mix
1987 (Feb. -  Dec.) 13.67% 13.29% 11.94%
1988 9.02 8.79 9.77
1989 12.67 12.54 10.32
1990 7.40 6.31 12.32
1991 12.80 12.05 13.35
1992 18.15 17.34 15.38
1993 (Jan. -  June) 8.04 8.03 8.48
Cumulative Return (1987-1993) 115.91% 109.43% 116.03%
Average Annual Return 12.74% 12.21% 12.75%
Annual Standard Deviation 2.99% 3.03% 2.00%
Reward/Risk Ratio 4.26 4.03 6.37
The results do not suggest timing ability. Although, this model produced a very 
conservative mix of asset classes over the period. Just slightly more than l/4th of 
the recommended investments were in the risky asset classes (i.e., stocks and 
bonds). The average mix performed better than the DAA strategy. The reward to 
risk ratio was 6.37 for the average mix and 4.03 for the DAA with transactions 
costs. This suggests that movements out of asset classes did not add much value. In 
fact, the model produced a return series with substantially more risk and about the
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same return than an all cash investment (i.e., 12.74% return versus 12.61% for cash, 
and 2.99% risk versus 0.68% for cash). Past dividends alone do not seem to provide 
much promise for forecasting stock returns in Finland.
The following table provides the results of DAA using the expected stock return 
series derived from model 2.
Table 6. DAA based on Expected Stock Returns Model 2
DA A based on Expected Stock Returns Model 2 (02/87—06/93)
Average Mix: 14/19/67 (S/B/C) 
Turnover = 294.55%
Year DAA
DAA with 
transactions 
costs
Average
Mix"
1987 (Feb. -  Dec.) 21.41% 17.80% 13.27%
1988 16.34 14.18 12.11
1989 12.38 12.17 7.42
1990 12.97 1 1.99 6.26
1991 24.18 21.23 9.12
1992 48.40 43.03 14.96
1993 (Jan. -  June) 13.37 12.06 10.84
Cumulative Return (1987-1993) 274.61% 228.32% 101.53%
Average Annual Return 22.85% 20.35% 1 1.54%
Annual Standard Deviation 10.35% 9.38% • 3-89%
Reward/Risk Ratio 2.21 2.17 2.97
1  1
The results strongly suggest timing ability. Over 30% of the recommended in­
vestments were in the risky asset classes. With exception of the reward to risk ratio, 
the average mix performed worse than the DAA strategy. In no year, did the sug­
gested mix result in a negative return. Comparing the results to the best performing 
risky asset class over the period (i.e., bonds), it seems clear that at least on a return 
basis the DAA strategy based on the expected stock return series based on model 2 
was substantially better than a strategy of investing in bonds only. The DAA strat­
egy with transactions costs yielded over 5% more per annum than bonds alone. Al­
31 H enriksson/M erton tim ing tests were run for the four m odels. This m odel was the only model 
to show  a statistically  significant timing coefficient (i.e ., significant at below  the 0.1% level o f  sign ifi­
cance). T im ing tests are generally dependent upon the m odel m oving in and out o f  the stock market at 
critical tim es. Unfortunately, during the period under study it Would have been difficult to time the 
stock  market (i.e ., it w as generally in decline). T herefore, it w as expected that a model having recom ­
m ended a significant amount o f  stock might show  tim ing ability. O f the four m odels exam ined, this 
m odel had the second highest level o f  average slock  (i.e ., 14% versus 15% for the next model revie­
w ed). T herefore, in order to better judge tim ing ability o f  the m odels review ed it would be beneficial to 
extend the period under study to include periods when stocks w ere perform ing better than that experi­
enced in the period under study.
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though, this extra return came at the expense of increased risk (bonds had a standard 
deviation of 5.82% versus 9.38% for the DAA strategy). Adding a factor for lagged 
stock returns significantly improves timing ability.
The following table provides the results of DAA using the expected stock return 
series derived from model 3 with the forecast for g based on the WPI.
Table 7. DAA based on Expected Stock Returns Model 3 using the WPI.
DAA based on Expected Stock Returns Model 3 using the WPI (02/87-06/93)
Average Mix: 15/14/71 (S/B/C) 
Turnover = 243.12%
Year DAA
DAA with 
transactions 
costs
Average
Mix"
1987 (F e b .-D e c .) 35.25% 30.37% 13.09%
1988 18.65 15.08 12.57
1989 13.04 11.55 7.29
1990 13.64 12.70 5.61
1991 15.90 15.09 8.62
1992 17.13 14.42 14.78
1993 (Jan. -  June) 7.39 7.23 10.62
Cumulative Return (1987-1993) 200.55% 166.33%: 98.91%.
Average Annual Return 18:.71%: 16.49% 11.31%.
Annual Standard Deviation 4.01% 3.64% 3.96%:
Reward/Risk Ratio 4.66 4.53 2.86
At a minimum, these results indicate that DAA can successfully be applied in 
Finland. Net of transactions costs, the DAA strategy dominates the best performing 
risky asset class (16.49% annualized return versus 14.77 and 3.64% risk versus 
5.82%). Over the period, the suggested mixes resulted in exceptionally high returns 
at exceptionally low risk. The reward to risk ratio is exceptionally high.
Table 8 provides the results of DAA using the expected stock return series de­
rived from model 3 with the forecast for g based on the CPI. Especially with respect 
to risk, these results are more impressive than the last set. The most striking aspect 
of these results is the low level of risk. Without transactions costs, the DAA strat­
egy clearly dominates the best performing risky asset class (15.40% annualized re­
turn versus 14.77 and 2.01% risk versus 5.82%). Clearly, on a risk basis, this is the 
best model presented. Over the period, the suggested mixes resulted in high returns 
at extraordinarily low risk. The reward to risk ratio is significantly higher than the 
previous results.
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Table 8. D A A  based on Expected Stock Returns Model 3 using the CPI.
DAA based on Expected Stock Returns Model 3 using the CPI (02/87-06/93)
Average Mix: 7/18/75 (S/B/C) 
Turnover = 208.83%
Year DAA
DAA with 
transactions 
costs
Average
Mix
1987 (F eb .- Dec.) 14.79 % 12.79% 13.09%
1988 15.40 13.07 12.57
1989 13.67 12.60 7.29
1990 14.81 14.35 5.61
1991 14.95 14.56 8.62
1992 17.13 14.42 14.78
1993 (Jan. -  June) 7.71 7.52 10.62
Cumulative Return (1987-1993) 150.72% 131.44% 111.19%
Averase Annual Return 15.40% 13.97% 12.36%
Annual Standard Deviation 2.01% 1.50% 2.25%
Reward/Risk Ratio 7.68 9.34 5.49
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As discussed in the method section, DAA can provide investors with increased 
return at lower risk than a strategy of investing in the best performing risky asset 
class. It is a useful tool, particularly for large institutional investors exposed to 
equity market and bond market risk. This is particularly applicable for large finan­
cial institutions which are exposed to large amounts of single asset class risk. Even 
if an institution decides not to implement a DAA model, it can use the output to en­
hance the allocation decision process. For example, if a DAA model suggests 0% 
in bonds and stocks and 100% in cash and the institution is heavily invested in 
bonds, it might be prudent to stop rolling over maturing bonds and place the money 
into shorter term instruments. Generally, it may be better to base financial decisions 
on quantifiable financial market valuation than intuition. More to the point, of the 
1,000s of portfolio managers in the U.S. only a handful have outperformed DAA.
Also, most portfolio value is gained or lost based on the asset class chosen, not 
by »picking» stocks and/or bonds (the only value I’ve read on this issue, based on 
a large sample of mutual funds, was in excess of 90% for asset class and less than 
10% for the securities chosen). Again, the purpose of this study was to research 
whether the Finnish financial markets can be timecL One implication of this study 
is, based on a relatively short period of time, the Finnish financial markets can be 
timed. The question remains, if Finnish financial markets can be »timed», why 
aren’t they?
A few final words of warning may be in order. Although the results are very en­
couraging there are some issues which may make past and future timing ability sus­
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pect. DAA may not be profitable after taking account of all transactions costs. As­
suming that the transactions costs used are relatively representative of the costs of 
trading for the respective asset classes, DAA has been economically profitable in 
Finland. If transactions costs are substantially greater than those used in this study, 
the results would not be as strong. Although, it is likely that transactions costs will 
be reduced in the future as the Finnish financial markets expand and become more 
exposed to international pressures. It may also be that it is not possible to buy the 
equity index in Finland. Regardless of whether the complete index can be bought 
or sold is not at issue. A liquid subset of the index which is highly correlated with 
the stock market would be sufficient to enable an investor to time the stock market. 
The most important caveat to these results may be the common caveat made to all 
time series studies: the past may not repeat itself. That is. past economic and finan­
cial market relationships may significantly change in the future in such a way as to 
stop investors from being able to time the market as they did in the past. Given the 
four models presented, the results are largely dependent on the continuation of au­
tocorrelation in the stock return series going into the future.32 It is possible that the 
large recent structural changes in the markets and Finnish economy may make fore­
casting market movements, particularly stock market returns, virtually impossible. 
Again, this final caveat applies to any empirically based economic relationship, not 
just DAA models.
Overall, the results are encouraging. The results of this study could be improved 
by taking into account some of the suggestions made by previous research in the 
area (e.g., dynamic asset class correlation coefficient forecasts)’ and/or by improv­
ing the models presented. In conclusion, this study strongly suggests that DAA 
could have been successfully applied in the Finnish financial markets. Although, 
the question remains as to whether DAA can be successfully applied in the Finnish 
financial markets in the future?
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To Load or Not to Load?
A Study cf the Marketing and Distribution Charges
of Mutual Funds
John Kihn
A mutual fund firm's ability to charge for marketing funds 
is a function of more than past financial performance. 
Front-end loads and annual fund marketing charges are at 
least in part determined by customer services, whether 
deferred marketing charges can be imposed, and financial 
performance. The results imply that, at least in the short 
run, mutual fund firms should focus relatively more on fund 
marketing and service-related characteristics of their funds 
than on financial performance. Mutual fund investors seem to 
demand high levels of services in exchange for high 
marketing charges.
The 199 0s have witnessed unprecedented growth in mutual fund 
assets under management and the number of mutual funds. Figure 1 
illustrates this growth. Mutual fund growth, at least in part, 
can be attributed to legislation permitting tax-deferred savings 
accounts and the general aging of the U.S. population compared 
with historic demographic patterns. Specifically, legislation 
concerning 401(k) plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) 
has had a dramatic impact on the recent growth in the mutual fund 
industry.1 Against this backdrop of surging amounts of individual 
investor funds flowing into an ever-increasing number of mutual 
funds has been an acceleration of the marketing efforts of mutual 
fund firms.
Given that mutual funds are set up in larg^ part to cater to 
the needs of what are often referred to as "uninformed 
investors," on rhe surface these marketing efforts seem to be a 
rational response to consumer needs. Commonly accepted economic
John Kihn is a professor at the London School of Economics.
2t h e o r y  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  m a r k e t in g ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  a d v e r t i s i n g ,  
e f f o r t s  a r e  i n  l a r g e  p a r t  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  p r o v id e  in f o r m a t i o n  t o  
c o n s u m e r s . O f p a r t i c u l a r  c o n c e r n  t o  e c o n o m is t s  h a s  b e e n  t h e  
n o t i o n  t h a t  m a r k e t in g  e f f o r t s  a r e  an  i n t e n t i o n a l  a t t e m p t  t o  
r e d u c e  c o n s u m e r s '  s e a r c h  c o s t s .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  o n e  t h e o r y  i s  t h a t  
f o r  m any c o n su m e r  p r o d u c t s ,  m a in t a in in g  a  tr a d e m a r k  i s  an  
e c o n o m i c a l l y  e f f i c i e n t  m eans f o r  a  com pany t o  s e l l  a  p r o d u c t .  I n  
t h e  c a s e  o f  m ore c o s t l y  p r o d u c t s ,  h o w e v e r , o r  in v e s t m e n t s ,  
c o n su m e r s  c o u ld  g a i n  fro m  p e r f o r m in g  m ore th o r o u g h  s e a r c h e s .  
W h a te v e r  t h e  c u r r e n t  e c o n o m ic  a r g u m e n t , a t  a  m inim um , t h e  l o g i c a l  
c o n c l u s i o n  i s  t h a t  f i r m s  an d  c o n su m e r s  d o  n o t  p a y  f o r  c o s t l y  
m a r k e t in g  s e r v i c e s  u n l e s s  s u c h  s e r v i c e s  p r o v id e  p r o f i t s . t o  t h e  . 
f i r m s  m a k in g  t h e s e  e f f o r t s  arid a t  l e a s t  a . p e r c e i v e d  b e n e f i t  t o  
t h e  c o n s u m e r s  :b e i n g  t a r g e t e d  i : ■
E ven  th o u g h  m u tu a l fu n d  m a r k e t in g  e f f o r t s  m ake s e n s e  fro m  
t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  p r o f i t - m i n d e d  m u tu a l fu n d  f i r m s ,  i t  i s  n o t  
c l e a r  t h a t  m o s t .m u t u a l  fu n d  c o n su m e r s  b e n e f i t  fro m  t h e s e  e f f o r t s  
o n  t h e i r  b e h a l f .  G e n e r a l l y ,  i n  f i n a n c e ,  a n  e x p e n s e  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  
j u s t i f i e d  i f  t h e  m a r g in a l  b e n e f i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  e q u a l  t o  i t s  c o s t . 2 
F in a n c e  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  o f t e n  r e f e r  t o  " v a lu e -a d d e d "  s e r v i c e s  i n  
t h i s  c o n t e x t .  T h e i s s u e  i s  w h e th e r  t h e  c o s t s  o f  m a r k e t in g  m u tu a l  
fu n d s  a r e  j u s t i f i e d  fr o m  a  v a lu e - a d d e d  p e r s p e c t i v e .  A c t u a l l y ,  i t  
h a s  b e e n  sh ow n  t h a t  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  n e g a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e  e x i s t s  
b e tw e e n  m u tu a l fu n d s  c h a r g in g  l o a d s  ( i . e . ,  f r o n t - e n d  m a r k e t in g  
c h a r g e s )  a n d  t h o s e  n o t  c h a r g in g  l o a d s . 3 N o - lo a d  fu n d s  h a v e  b e e n  
sh ow n  t o  o u t p e r f o r m  l o a d  f u n d s . 4
A l s o ,  i n  f i n a n c e ,  i t  h a s  b eco m e a c c e p t e d  d o c t r i n e  t o  a s su m e  
t h a t  i n v e s t o r s  s h o u l d  b e  c o n c e r n e d  p r i m a r i l y  w i t h  t h e  r e t u r n  a n d  
r i s k  o f  t h e i r  i n v e s t m e n t s .  T he a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  a  m u tu a l fu n d  
i n v e s t o r  i s  c o n c e r n e d  o n l y  w i t h  r e t u r n  an d  r i s k  w h e r e a s  a  
c o n su m e r  d u r a b le s  c o n su m e r  i s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  m ore th a n  tw o  
p e r fo r m a n c e  c r i t e r i a  w o u ld  im p ly  t h a t  m u tu a l fu n d  c o n su m e r s  
s h o u ld  h a v e  a n  e a s i e r  t im e  e v a l u a t i n g  a $ 2 ,0 0 0  m u tu a l fu n d  
p u r c h a s e  t h a n ,  s a y ,  a  $ 2 ,0 0 0  u s e d  c a r  p u r c h a s e .  On t h e  s u r f a c e ,  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  a v e r a g e  u s e d  c a r  b u y e r  se e m s  t o  g e t  a  b e t t e r  
b a r g a in  th a n  t h e  a v e r a g e  m u tu a l fu n d  b u y e r  i s  p e r p l e x i n g .
T h is  s t u d y  a d d r e s s e s  a n  a r e a  o f  f i n a n c e  t h a t  h a s  b e e n  
g e n e r a l l y  b a s e d  o n  b e l i e f s  a n d  a n e c d o t e s .  T h a t i s , ,  i t  p r o v i d e s  an  
e m p i r i c a l  b a c k d r o p  t o  t h e  i s s u e s  s u r r o u n d in g ,  t h e  c h a r g i n g - o f  - 
m u tu a l fu n d  m a r k e t in g :  c o s t s .  T he f o l l o w i n g  i s s u e s  a r e  c o v e r e d : '  . . • 
G iv e n  t h e  p a s t  o b s e r v e d  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  m u tu a l fu n d  
s a l e s  a n d  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  w h a t v a r i a b l e s  w o u ld  b e  e x p e c t e d  t o  
d e t e r m in e  t h e  c h a r g i n g  o f  m a r k e t in g  c o s t s ?
B a s e d  o n  r e l a t i v e l y  r e c e n t  d a t a ,  a r e  m u tu a l fu n d  m a r k e t in g  
c h a r g e s  j u s t i f i e d ?
W hat f a c t o r s  d e t e r m in e  m u tu a l fu n d  m a r k e t in g  c o s t s ?
THE COMPONENTS OF MUTUAL FOND MARKETING COSTS—A* MUTUAL FUND 
MARKETING THEORY
It used to be that when a fund had good performance, the 
money would naturally flow into it, ... Now even funds with
unspectacular numbers are seeing substantial asset 
increases, which is clear testimony to the power of 
marketing. Front [1987]5 [Please provide better reference.]
It has become generally accepted that from an investor's 
perspective, the two most important characteristics of a 
financial investment are the return and risk of that investment. 
Risk-averse investors are believed to increase their utility if 
return is increased while risk is held constant or, conversely, 
if risk is decreased while return is held constant. Clearly, the 
intent of this study is not to suggest that in the mutual fund 
game, return and. risk do not matter, but that the marketing value. . 
of return arid risk may, be relatively insignificant when coinpared 
with other, more.marketirig-related variables.6.
Therefore, to provide a clear outline for the direction of 
the research that follows, a general model of the optimal 
charging of marketing costs is proposed. The following 
observation drives a critical assumption of this section: What 
if, as several researchers have found, the return and risk 
performance of a mutual fund does not appear to significantly 
affect the ability of the seller of a mutual fund to sell the 
product. If so, then one might expect that an increase in 
marketing costs, especially brokerage commissions, may ultimately 
lead to increased money under management and increased management 
fees. In economist jargon, the marginal cost of many types of 
marketing expenses in the 1980s and 1990s may have been
5substantially lower than the marginal returns they seem to have 
generated.7 Even though investors would be expected to pay higher 
relative management fees for higher expected performance, this 
study would suggest that the same dynamic might hold for current 
or short-run marketing charges.
Why do mutual fund investors seem to violate a basic tenant 
of modern finance? Why do they not demand more return for the 
extra costs they incur by purchasing a mutual fund from a mutual 
fund company that directly and/or indirectly charges higher 
marketing costs than other funds but does not return more than 
the added cost(s) the investors are charged? The answer may be 
that smaller, less informed investors value services that provide 
a certain level of comfort with an investment they cannot see on 
a daily basis. . :
At a minimum, particularly with mutual funds, there appears 
to be some need for an extension to the standard relationship 
between costs, risk, and return. As long as most mutual fund 
investors are relatively uninformed, the case may be that 
trademarks and other mass-marketing-related goodwill are 
significantly more important than specific fund performance. 
Holding asset class or portfolio strategy characteristics 
constant, what are the determinants of mutual fund marketing 
charges? More specifically, given that up-front marketing charges 
(i.e., loads) are not well explained by past or future 
performance, what other factors determine the ability to charge 
up-front marketing charges? That is, what factors increase sales
revenue more than their marginal cost? Generally, the level of 
informedness of the investor and the size of investment determine 
the increase in sales revenue. A well-informed investor would be 
expected to stress traditional performance criteria, whereas a 
less informed investor might value nonperformance-related 
investor services and image more highly than other criteria.
Also, as suggested by search theory, the larger the mutual fund 
investment, ceteris paribus, the more resources will be expended 
searching for a mutual fund.
Given the previous arguments and past observations, the 
following general model of mutual fund current marketing charges 
is proposed:
CMC, = f (PC^ CS.rDCt) , 
where "■ ' ’ /
CMC = current marketing charges (up-front load or 12b-1 
charges)
PC = performance characteristics (return, risk, and asset 
class)
CS = customer services (e.g., telephone switching, low 
minimum initial purchase, etc.)
DC = deferred marketing charges (deferred charges or 
penalties for leaving the fund) i
This model is intended to be used as the basis for exploratory 
analysis on the determinants of the cost of marketing mutual 
funds.
The investor's problem is to maximize the following utility
7function:
U = U{PC, CS, DC) ,
subject to PC (,Ppc) + CSfP^) - DC (Ppc) + CS (I**) - DC(^c)
<; I and PC, CS, DC ss 0, 
where P is the price of the specified general set of factors and 
I is the value of the investors investment. The mutual fund 
firm, to maximize profits, must provide the investor with those 
services or attributes from which he or she derives more utility 
than the costs of those services.
STATISTICS AND REGRESSIONS TESTING THE DETERMINANTS OF CURRENT 
MARKETING CHARGES8
In some sense, mutual fund marketing charges are hidden costs.
That is, marketing charges are not included, directly in the costs
of managing a mutual fund and therefore do not directly affect 
the fund's observed financial performance. The three current 
types of marketing charges are loads, 12b-1 fees, and deferred 
charges or penalties. Loads are immediately deducted from the 
investment and are considered to be primarily sales commissions. 
12b-1 fees are legally defined to be for marketing, distribution, 
and advertising expenses. They are annual fees Intended to pay 
for a wide array of marketing services over the year (management 
fees are similarly designated). Deferred charges are referred to 
as "back-end loads" and are normally applied only to the original 
investment. Deferred charges are charged upon the sale of fund
8shares and are typically constructed to encourage staying 
invested in the fund (many decline over time),9
In 1980, the mutual fund industry successfully lobbied for 
SEC approval of 12b-1 fees by arguing that their use would 
increase fund sizes and thereby provide economies of scale.10 All 
evidence to date suggests this result has not occurred.11 In fact, 
12b-1 fees seem to have contributed to increasing management 
expenses.12 In addition, management expenses themselves have been 
shown to have a significant negative relationship with net 
returns (12b-1 fees show some of the same effect) ,13 Finally, the 
actual distributions of front-end loads and 12b-1 fees illustrate 
diverse pricing strategies.
As can be.seen from Figures 2 and 3, about half of minimum 
front-end loadsv[please define minimum loads] and 12b-1 fees are 
zero. Minimum loads show some clustering around 3.3 percent, and 
12b-1 fees around 0.2 percent. A fund charging no load will tend 
to charge a higher-than-normal 12b-1 fee and vice versa. Even 
though legally distinct, to some extent front-end loads and 12b-1 
fees are substitutes.
All the correlation coefficients presented in Table 1 are 
significant at well below the 1 percent level of significance. 
Also, the large positive correlation coefficients for year-end 
minimum loads for 1992 and 1993 suggest that front-end loads for 
this sample changed little from 1992 to 1993. The same result 
applies to 12b-l ffees from 1992 to 1993.14 The negative 
correlation between front-end loads and 12b-1 fees suggests that
12b-1 fees are being used as substitutes for legally defined 
loads (i.e., front-end loads). This finding suggests that the 
trade-off between loads and 12b-1 fees is in large part a 
marketing decision on the part of mutual fund firms. Given this 
apparent trade-off between loads and 12b-1 fees, the regression 
analysis that follows will report regressions using minimum load 
and 12b-1 fee as the two dependent variables.
The regression models that were tested were the following:
CMCt = oi0 + ^l(R2i). + (32(Risk3t) + 0 3(FutR,) + et (1)
CMCt = olq + 0l(R3i) + @2 (Risk3t) + 03 (Fut^) + j84(DDCi)+ 05 (D12Jb,)
+.. PsiDQOOi) + jS7 (DTSf) + ps(DIP500) - + ^(Age,) + ^m (Sizei)
‘ +' fin (Ma&32xp) /+ fttfiDMunii) ■ + \:et , ■ (2).
where ’
CMC = current marketing charge(s) (minimum load or 12b-1 
fees are used)
R3 = the monthly mean return over the previous three
years15
Risk3 = the monthly standard deviation of return over the 
prevj ous three years 
FutR = the fund's one-year-hence, or one-year-future, 
return *
DDC = the deferred charge dummy variable (equal to 1 if a
deferred charge was reported, 0 otherwise)
D12b = the 12b-1 dummy variable (equal to 1 if 12b-1
charges are allowed, 0 otherwise)
10
D800 = the 800 number dummy variable (equal to 1 if an 800
number.is provided, 0 otherwise)
DTS = the telephone switching dummy variable (equal to 1 
if telephone switching is available, 0 otherwise) 
DIP500 = the $500 initial purchase dummy variable (equal to
1 if the initial purchase amount is less than or
equal to $500, 0 otherwise)
Age = the number of years the fund has been in business
Size = the asset size of the fund in millions of dollars
(the common logarithm is taken)16 
ManExp = annual management expenses 
, DMuni = the municipal bond fund dummy variable (equal to.
1 if the fund objective is municipal bonds,- 0 
otherwise) ; ' •
e = error term
Equations 1 and 2 are designed to take account of financial 
performance via R3, Risk3, and FutR. Equation 1 is based on 
strictly financial performance criteria and is therefore intended 
for comparative purposes. The mean three-year return was selected 
because the results using the mean three-year return or mean 
five-year return variables did not differ substantially. The 
three-year standard deviation was selected in favor of beta as 
the risk measure ^.because a large number of the funds are not well 
correlated with t;he stock market (e.g., bond and money market 
funds). Also, the three-year standard deviation of return was 
selected because the results using the three-year standard
11
deviation of return or the five-year standard deviation of return 
did not differ substantially. The future one-year return was 
selected based on the notion that when investors pay marketing 
charges in the short run, they may at least agree to pay them in 
part on anticipated future performance as much as on past 
performance. The expected signs of the financial performance 
variables are as follows:
a positive sign for past return (mutual fund investors will 
be willing to pay higher marketing and other charges for 
funds they expect to generate more return, holding risk 
constant)
• a negative sign for past risk (mutual -fund investors will be 
willing pay. lower marketing and other charges for funds they 
expect to'be riskier; holding Iretu'fri constant) '
a positive sign for future return (based on the same 
reasoning applied to past return and the argument that 
mutual fund companies will be more likely to ask for more 
marketing charges for a fund if they also expect that fund 
to perform well in the future)
DDC and D12b in Equation 2 are intended to isolate the 
effect that other, less immediate marketing charges may have on
the setting of more-current marketing charges. For example, if a
mutual fund company is charging a deferred charge, one would
expect that the current load or 12b-1 charge would be lower
(i.e., a substitutability argument). That is, is the relationship 
between the charging of deferred marketing charges and current
12
marketing charges negative or are they complimentary? Also, if a 
mutual fund is allowed to charge future 12b-1 fees on an annual 
basis, one could argue that front-end load charges could be 
lower. Therefore, is the relationship between the ability to 
charge 12b-1 fees later and front-end loads negative, are they 
complimentary, or neither?
£>800, DTS, and DIP500 are intended to isolate the effect 
that small client services have on a mutual fund firm's ability 
to impose current marketing charges. These three service 
variables are not intended to represent an exhaustive list of 
important service variables, but such variables as perceived 
investment prowess on the part of a mutual fund , firm are beyond 
the scope of this study. Given tha:t all these services can be! 
viewed as beneficial to relatively small mutual fund'investors, 
the expected coefficients should be positive.
Age, Size, ManExp, and DMuni are added to examine orthodox 
financial or economic relationships. The older a mutual fund is 
(as measured by years incorporated), ceteris paribus, the higher 
the marketing charge. The larger the mutual fund (as measured by 
total assets under management), ceteris paribus, the greater the 
economies of scale with respect to marketing charges (i.e., the 
larger the size .the lower the relative marketing charge). 
Management expenses are included to test for the degree to which 
marketing charge? are .dependent upon or independent of management 
expenses and to test the extent to which marketing charges are 
compliments or substitutes for the two marketing charges
13
examined. The inclusion of a dummy variable for municipal bond 
mutual funds was intended to pick up any tax-exempt bond 
clientele effect. Tax-exempt bond mutual funds might be well 
positioned to ask for an extra premium from less informed 
investors desiring to invest in tax-exempt bonds (although 
investor demand for specific asset classes could be viewed as a 
client services or financial performance variable).
The financial model regressions, the results of which are 
given in Table 2, show a dramatic difference between using front- 
end loads (as measured by minimum front-end load) versus 12b-1 
fees as the dependent variable. First, the .R2 for both 
regressions is below 1 percent. This result indicates, that, 
financial performance, both past and future, of a mutual fund 
does not explain much of the variance between' the two CMC . 
measures for the cross-sectional sample of mutual funds under 
study. Second, as., expected, the estimated coefficient for past 
returns {R3) is positive and statistically significant for 
minimum load. Unexpectedly, the sign of the estimated is 
negative and very statistically significant for the 12b-1 
regression, which suggests that mutual fund investors are not 
willing to pay higher annual marketing fees if the past (and 
future) returns are high, ceteris paribus. Second, regarding the 
estimated j82, the results for the 12b-1 regression directly 
conflict with the other regression [the MinLoad regression?] The 
statistically significant positive estimated coefficient for 
Risk3 suggests that mutual fund investors are willing to pay
14
higher 12b-1 fees the riskier the mutual fund. Third, the sign of 
the estimated jS3 for the 12b-1 regression, although not 
statistically significant, indicates that higher future returns, 
ceteris paribus, have a negative effect on past marketing 
charges. Finally, even though both front-end loads and 12b-1 fees 
are considered current marketing charges, financial performance 
variables affect them in very different ways.17
At a minimum, from a traditional financial performance 
perspective, something is odd about 12b-1 fees. Possibly, 1992 
was a very strange year, but excluding the future return 
variable, the same basic results held for 1993 (results not 
reported). As mutual fund consumers have; become more aware and 
possibly concerned with ioads, 12b-1 fees may have become a more 
effective means of paying for marketing expenses, which would 
suggest a substitutability argument with the following twist: 
Although 12b-1 fees may be an effective substitute for front-end 
loads, they have the desirable feature that they can be charged 
to pay for marketing on riskier, low-return funds ex post. If so, 
the ability to charge 12b-1 charges would have substantial option 
value to a mutual fund firm. That is, even though a mutual fund 
firm may not currently need to charge substantial 12b-1 fees, the 
fact that it may.be able to do so annually without the consent of 
mutual fund investors may be of moderate value for poorly 
performing funds, as suggested by the 12b-1 regression, but 
possibly of substantial value in general.
Clearly, as Table 3 shows, the dramatic increase in i?2 for
both regressions suggests that the additional variables add a 
significant amount of explanatory power to the original three- 
variable financial regression model. Particularly encouraging is 
that the explained variance for 12b-l fees is now in excess of 60 
percent. In fact, the financial performance variables (and size) 
add very little to the explanatory power of the models.
Regarding the first three estimated beta coefficients, not 
all of the effects established in the financial-model-based 
regressions hold First, the estimated coefficients for R3 and 
FutR for the MinLoad regressions remain positive and 
statistically significant. The estimated coefficient for R3 for 
the 12b-1 regression changes from negative in. the first . 
regression to positive and-'statistically significant .in the full- 
model' regression-.' The estimated coefficient for FutR .for the '.12b-, 
1 regression doe§, not change from the financial-model-based 
regression but is now slightly statistically significant. 
Apparently, even after controlling for customer service and other 
variables, increased past returns do not significantly affect the 
setting of 12b-1 fees. Second, regarding Risk3, the sign of the 
estimated coefficient for the front-end load regressions 
reverses, but it is not statistically significant. Third, as 
before, overall the full-model regressions indiqate that mutual 
fund returns positively affect the setting of front-end loads, 
not 12b-l fees. Fourth, overall the full-model regressions 
indicate that mutual fund risk negatively affects the setting of 
12b-1 fees but not front-end loads.
For the three variables identified as possible substitutes 
or compliments to front-end loads and 12b-l fees (DDC, D12b, and 
ManExp), the results are statistically very strong. The estimated 
coefficient for DDC (the deferred marketing charge dummy) 
strongly suggests that deferred charges are a compliment to 12b-1 
fees and a substitute for front-end loads. For example, the fact 
that the average 1992 minimum front-end load was 1.73 percent and 
the estimated coefficient for the MinLoad regression is -1.90 
percent suggests that a mutual fund that imposes a deferred 
charge reduces its front-end load by 190 basis points, which is 
17 basis points lowr-.r than the average 1992 minimum front-end 
load. Conversely, a mutual fund that imposes a deferred.charge 
increases its 12b-1 fees by 51 basis points# or more than twice 
the average 1992 12b-1 f de charged (the average 12b-1 fee fdr; 
1992 was 20 basis points). Clearly, deferred charges have 
opposite effects on front-end loads as on 12b-1 fees. The 
estimated coefficient for D12b (the dummy for the legal option to 
charge 12b-1 fees) is positive and statistically significant at 
well below the 0.01 percent level of significance. Therefore, the 
estimated coefficient for 1312b strongly suggests that the legal 
ability to charge 12b-l fees is complimentary to front-end loads. 
Most publicly listed mutual fund firms either charge front-end 
loads or 12b-1 fees.18 A firm that can charge 12b-1 fees but is 
not currently charging a high 12b-l fee is likely to have a high 
front-end load; later, it may be required to increase 12b-1 fees 
to cover marketing costs.
17
The estimated coefficient for management expenses is 
negative and not statistically significant for the MinLoad 
regression, but it is positive and statistically significant for 
the 12b-1 regression. Clearly, a mutual fund firm that imposes 
high annual marketing fees tends to charge high management 
expenses. Therefore, management expenses are a compliment to 12b- 
1 charges.
The service variables strongly support the notion that 
mutual fund investors pay substantial fees to acquire certain 
services. Except for the estimated coefficient for DTS in the 
12b-1 regression, which was not statistically significant, the 
estimated coefficients for the three Customer service variables.. . 
(D800, DTS,. and DIP500) are positive in: both: regressions,. 
although the estimated coefficieiits for the customer service 
variables are not as important in the 12b-1 regression as in the 
MinLoad regression. The results suggest that customer services 
allow a fund to charge more for front-end loads than for annual 
marketing fees. This finding is especially true of the estimated 
coefficient for DXP500, which was slightly more than 16 times 
larger in the MinLoad regression than in the 12b-1 regression.
The estimated coefficient for D800 was positive and statistically 
significant in the 12b-1 regression and in the MinLoad 
regression. In the MinLoad regression, the estimated coefficient 
for D800 and DTS were each greater than 27 basis points (37 and 
27, respectively) and statistically significant. The results of 
the customer service variables suggest the following insights:
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(1) in general, the link between customer services and front-end 
loads and 12b-1 fees is positive; (2) regarding front-end loads 
and 12b-1 fees, telephone services matter; (3) regarding minimum 
initial purchase amounts, mutual funds can charge a premium 
permitting relatively small initial investment amounts; and (4) 
given the size and significance of the estimated coefficients for 
an incomplete set of three customer service variables, it would 
be difficult to argue that financial performance is a more 
important determinant of the marketing charges price-setting 
behavior of mutual funds than customer services.
The estimated coefficient for Age is positive and . 
statistically significant in the MinLoad regression and negative 
and statistically significant in; the 12b-1- regression. This 
resuit suggests that the older a mutual fund is‘the lower the 
12b-1 fees it will charge; the opposite holds true of front-end 
loads. The most plausible explanation would be that older funds 
may have an easier time charging front-end loads while newer 
mutual funds tend to rely on 12b-1 fees to pay for marketing and 
distribution. Why.this is the case is not clear, unless mutual 
fund firms prefer to skew charges toward front-end fees and 
mutual fund age is one determinant of the ability to charge 
front-end loads. Also, funds that were in existence before 12b-l 
fees were allowed may have found it difficult to substitute 
front-end fees for 12b-1 fees and/or newer funds more optimally 
use 12b-1 fees as opposed to front-end loads.
The estimated coefficient for mutual fund size (total assets
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under management) is not statistically significant in either 
regression. Also, the positive coefficient in both regressions 
goes against standard economies of scale logic. In this case, 
ceteris paribus, the larger the mutual fund the higher the 
current marketing charges. The results for the size variable 
proxy would seem to stress the point that economies or 
diseconomies of scale do not appear to apply with respect to 
mutual fund size and current marketing charges.
The estimated coefficient for municipal bond mutual funds 
(DMuni) is positive and statistically significant for the 
MinLoad regression but not statistically significant for the 12b- 
1 regression. This finding.suggests that the ability to charge a 
marketing premium for municipal bond mutual .funds is generally 
applicable to front-end loads, only, .not .annual marketing fees. 
Possibly, municipal bond mutual fund investors are more willing 
to pay a single up-front charge rather than annual charges, 
especially if the average municipal bond mutual fund investor 
tends to be a relatively long-term investor compared with other 
mutual fund investor clienteles. Front-end loads are much more 
popular in municipal bond funds than in overall funds in general.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS >
Given that the data analyzed cover 1992 through 1993 (in 
particular, 1992), the empirical results of this study may be 
specific only to 1992 and 1993. Therefore, an obvious extension 
of this research,;is to examine whether the relative and absolute
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levels of marketing charges by mutual fund firms are subject to 
trends.
What have we learned? First, 12b-1 fees and front-end loads 
are very different marketing charges. Some of the determinants of 
front-end loads seem to be
whether the fund imposes deferred marketing charges 
whether annual marketing charges (i.e., 12b-l fees) can be 
charged
hether the mutual fund caters to a municipal bond clientele 
(i.e., tax clientele)
whether low initial purchases are allowed 
next years' fund return 
• past fund-returns
whether telephone switching is" available 
whether an 800 number is available 
the age of the fund 
Some of the determinants of 12b-1 fees seem to be
whether the fund charges deferred marketing charges 
the level of annual management fees charged 
the age of the mutual fund 
whether an 800 number is available 
whether low initial purchases are allowed \ 
the past risk of the mutual fund 
next years' fund returns 
At a minimum, these rather lengthy lists of statistically 
significant determinants of current marketing charges suggest
that the determination of current marketing charges is a complex 
process dependent upon more than financial performance.
Overall, the financial performance variables add little to 
the explanatory power of models designed to identify the 
determinants of current marketing charges. The overall results 
support the general theory of mutual fund marketing charges. That 
is, financial performance is not the most important determinant 
of current marketing charges. Mutual fund services and other 
marketing-related charges are critical determinants of current 
marketing charges.
Mutual fund firms interested in increasing sales can learn 
several lessons from this study. First, they should pay special, 
attention.to the trade-off between front-end: loads, 12b-i fees, 
and deferred charges. 'In addition,• each asset"class may require a\ 
significantly different optimal trade-off between front-end 
loads, 12b-1 fees, and deferred charges. Second, customer 
services seem to be very important to mutual fund investors. 
Therefore, a firm would be well advised to increase relatively 
low-cost customer services and research the cost-benefit 
feasibility of other services. Third, although the image of a 
competent finance firm may be important to the average mutual 
fund investor, the firm should worry relativelyimore about 
marketing image and less about actual financial performance. 
Therefore, a large mutual fund firm would be well advised to 
focus on the financial performance of one or two "flagship" or 
high-visibility funds and not worry so much about the financial
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performance of other funds (especially if the other funds the 
firm has are a well-diversified group).
Mutual fund investors also can learn several lessons. First, 
mutual fund investors should trade off all marketing costs 
(front-end loads, annual fees, and deferred charges) of the 
mutual funds they are examining. Generally, marketing charges do 
not add any real value to the financial performance of mutual 
funds. Second, be better informed. In finance, the general rule 
is that the risk-averse rational investor faces a trade-off 
between return and risk. This study suggests that the majority of 
mutual fund investors are more concerned with customer services 
than with financial performance.19
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Notes:
1. See J. Poterba, S. Venti, and D. Wise, "401(k) Plans and Tax- 
Deferred Saving,1 National Bureau of Economic Research, Working 
Paper No. 4181, October 1992. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 expanded eligibility for IRAs. 401(k) plans were established 
by the Revenue Act of 1978 but were rarely used until the 
Treasury Department issued clarifying rules in 1981.
2. See A. Yohannes, "The Derivation of Simple Formulas for 
Comparing Investment Alternatives with and without Load and 
Account Fees," The Journal of Consumer Affairs, vol. ?, no. ? 
(Winter 1988) :333-4l for a general present-vailue formula-that 
makes:this-relationship explicit for mutual fund, marketing
:charges. '• ' :-
3. See the following studies for evidence on this point: I. 
Friend, M. Blume, and J. Crockett, Mutual Funds and Other 
Institutional Investors: A New Perspective (New York:McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1970); G. Perritt, "Is the Load too Much to Bear?" 
American Association of Individual Investors Journal, vol. ?, no. 
?(June 1984):18-21; and Consumer Reports, "A Guide to Mutual 
Funds" (July 1985):390-95. i
4. For example, see K. Smyth, "The Coming Investor Revolt," 
Fortune, vol. ?, no. ? (October 13, 1994):66-76.
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5. See A. Marton, "The no-loads fight back," Institutional 
Investor, vol. ?, no. ? (April 1987):253-56.
6. See M. Greene, "A Note on Loading Charges for Variable 
Annuities," The Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. ?, no. ? 
(September 1973):473-78 for a list of reasons for high front-end 
loads. The reasons given, which are also applicable to mutual 
funds, are (1) salesmen's commissions, (2) the cost of allowing 
switching between funds, and (3) management expenses.
7. It has been found that for every $1 spent on fees (both 
management fees and marketing fees), investors receive $0.20 in 
return (see Smyth, The Coming investor Revolt.".) .
8. The data were obtained from Steele Systems, Inc. The sample is 
based on the calendar year-end 1992 and 1993 sample populations 
provided. Records were eliminated because of the absence of (1) 
reported returns for 1992 or 1993, (2) reported 12b-1 charges,
(3) reported management expenses, (4) reported loads, (5) 
reported initial^purchase amount, and (6) reported date of fund 
incorporation. These criteria reduced the 1992 sample from 3,048 
mutual funds to 2,586 and the 1993 sample from 4*, 182 mutual funds 
to 3,308. The sample was further reduced upon merging the two 
files, because not all the funds existing at year-end 1992 were 
still in existence at year-end 1993. The final sample consists of 
2,496 mutual funds.
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9. Redemption charges are also applied upon the sale of shares, 
although they typically apply to the whole investment and are not 
referred to as a_ form of back-end load. Redemption charges are 
not strictly legally defined as marketing charges, but given that 
they are real costs and do not affect the legally defined returns 
of mutual funds (i.e., financial performance), one could argue on 
economic grounds that they should be classified as deferred 
marketing charges.
10. See, for example, S. Ferris and D. Chance, "The Effect of 
12b-1 Plans on Mutual Fund Expense Ratios: A Note,*■ The Journal . 
of Finance, vol.. 42, no. 4. (September 1987) : 1077-82. The possible 
excepti<5n to this .'rule is growth^oriented ecpiity funds.'
11. See, for example, Ferris and Chance, "The Effect of 12b-1 
Plans on Mutual Fund Expense Ratios"; and C. Trzcinka and R. 
Zweig, "An Economic Analysis of The Cost and Benefits of SEC Rule 
12b-1," Monograph Series in Finance and Economics, Leonard N. 
Stern School of Business, New York University, 1990. Also, R. 
McLeod and D. Malhotra, in "A Re-examination of the Effect of 
12b-1 Plans on Mutual Fund Expense Ratios," The\ Journal of 
Financial Research, vol. ?# no. ? (Summer 1994):231-40, confirm 
and extend the Ferris and Chance results.
12. For example, see Ferris and Chance, "The Effect of 12b-l
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Plans on Mutual' Fund Expense Ratios."
13. See Josef Lakonishok, "Performance of Mutual Funds Versus 
Their Expenses," Journal of Bank Research, vol. ?, no. ? (Summer 
1981):110-13.
14. The average minimum load declined slightly from 1.7289 
percent in 1992 to 1.6829 percent in 1993. The average 12b-1 fee 
increased slightly from 0.1999 percent in 1992 to 0.2014 percent 
in 1993. This slight shift from front-end loads to 12b-l fees may 
indicate a general trend for mutual fund firms toward marketing 
charges, that are more palatable;. Investors’may be beginning to 
key in on front-end loads, and mutual fund firms may be 
responding by dynamically shifting marketing charges toward those 
that are less consumer sensitive at this time.
15. In some cases, less than three years of data are available as 
the basis for the historic return measure.
16. Given that the logarithm of assets under management was taken 
and several observations did not list assets under management, a 
zero was substituted for those observations. *
17. Although, given that 12b-1 fees drag annual financial 
performance down without a commensurate increase in returns, the 
seemingly anomalous estimated coefficients are somewhat sensible.
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18. Based on the sample under study, for 1992, 69.6 percent 
(1,738 out of 2,496) reported nonzero minimum front-end loads 
and/or 12b-1 fees and for 1993, 70.9 percent (1,770 out of 2,496) 
reported nonzero minimum front-end loads and/or 12b-l fees.
19. A special thanks to Alan Williams. In addition, the author 
would like to thank Bruno Sere of Steele Systems, Inc. for 
helping educate the author on the data provided and on mutual 
fund expenses in general.
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Table 1. Correlation Coefficients for Current Marketing Charges
Minimum Load 12b-l
Charge 1992 1993 1992 1993
Minimum load 1992 1.0000 0.9598 -0.1453 -0.125
Minimum load 1993 1.0000 -0.1300 -0.1119
12b-1 fee 1992 1.0000 0.9606
12b-l fee 1993 1.0000
Source: Based on data provided by Steele Systems, Inc.
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Table 2. Current Marketing Charge Regressions: Financial Model
Variable
MinLoad 12b-1
Parameter t-Statistic Parameter t-Statistic
Intercept 1.5146 16.46**** 0.2339 14.80****
R3 0.2601 3 .43*** -0.0533 —4.09 ****
Risk3 -0.0669 -3.20*** 0.0075 2 .09*
FutR 0.0134 4 .24**** -0.0009 -1.62
Adjusted R? 0.0077 0.0059
F-statistic 7 .42**** 5.96***
Source: Based on data provided by Steele Systems, Inc.
* statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
** statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
*** statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level.
**** statistically significant at the 0.01 percent level.
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Table 3. Current Marketing Charges Regressions: Full Model
MinLoad 12b-l
Variable Parameter t-statistic Parameter t-statistic
Intercept -0 432 -0.23 -0.1481 — 6 .48****
123 0 .2493 3 _ 70*** 0.0085 1.05
R is k 3 0 .0146 0.66 -0.0156 -5 .93****
F u tR 0.0148 5.34**** -0.0008 -2 .47*
DDC -1.9049 -18.33**** 0.5139 42 .13****
D12b 1.3380 19.68****
D 800 0 .3672 2.63** 0.0935 5 . 64 * * * *
DTS 0 .2735 3 .59*** 0.0122 1.33
DIPS 00 0 .5973 8.30**** 0.0353 4.07 * ***
A g e 0 0083 2.78** -0.0010 -2 . 88**
Log ( S i z e ) 0.0124 0.27 0.0103 1 . 88
Management
fees
-0 .1100 -1.78 0.1777 24 .33****
DMuni 0.7280 8.54**** 0.0093 0.90
Adjusted R? 0.2613 - 0.6350
F-statistic 74 54**** 395.67****
Source: Based on values provided by Steele Systems, Inc.
★ statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
* * statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
★ * ★ statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level.
★ ★ ★ ★ statistically significant at the 0.01 percent level
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Figure 1. Annual Total Net Mutual Fund Assets for Equity, 
Bond,and Income Funds, 1970-93
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Source: Investment Company Institute, Washington, D.C., 1994 
Mutual Fund Fact Book, p. 100
Figure 2. Minimum Load Frequency Distribution, Year-End 1992
0.5
0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3J-
\ 0.25
3 0.2
f  0.15
t  
0.1
0.05
. I I |1 1^  if
0 0.55 1.101.65 2.202.75 3.303.85 4.404.95 5.50 
M inim um  Load as a(%? o f  Initial Investm ent
k.
33
Figure 3. 12b-1 Fee Frequency Distribution, Year-End 1992
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John Kihn
London School of Economics 
London House, Suite 222 
Mecklenburgh Square 
London WC1N 2AB 
England
Dear Mr. Kihn:
Here is the edited version of your upcoming F A J article, "To Load 
or Not to Load? A Study of the Marketing and Distribution Charges 
of Mutual Funds." It is tentatively scheduled for publication in 
the May/June 1996 issue.
Please read through the manuscript, paying particular attention 
to all boldface queries. Be sure to make any changes you want, 
and return it to me no later than April 2. Meanwhile, if you have 
questions, you can reach me at (804) 980-3645 or, by e-mail, at 
csOaimr.com.
Sincerely,
Charlene Semer 
Senior Editor
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